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
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MEMOIRS  
OF  
MARSHAL NEY.

*Ney, Marshal, Duc d'Elche, grand de la Moskova*

PUBLISHED BY HIS FAMILY.

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TWO VOLUMES IN ONE.

VOL. I.

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## PREFACE.

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MARSHAL NEY was perhaps, next to Napoleon, the greatest of the generals produced by the French Revolution. When the French people, goaded to desperation by the minions of a long line of besotted and voluptuous monarchs, the oppression of an overbearing and privileged aristocracy, and the arrogance of a proud and dissolute hierarchy, at length threw off the yoke under which they had groaned during so many centuries, and proclaimed an equality of political rights, all the other powers of Europe united to put down the principles which had led to this event. The revolutionary spirit, thus pressed upon and hemmed in on all sides, acquired tenfold energy, and burst like a torrent through the barriers opposed to it, over-running the whole of continental Europe, throwing down the longest established thrones, and sweeping away, in its impetuous course, the very foundations of the most ancient social edifices. This ill-judged opposition to the rights of between twenty and thirty millions of people, changed the aspect of the whole civilized world, and from it sprang a race of warriors who, seconded by the military spirit inherent in the French nation, subdued every country in Europe, save only Great Britain, protected by her navies and her insular situation. Among the "first and foremost" of these warriors stood MICHAEL NEY, the son of a cooper at Sarrelouis, a small town on the Rhine. He was born in 1769, when the debauchery of Louis XV. had exhausted the finances of his country—when the mistresses of this monarch appointed his ministers, his ambassadors, and his generals, and made the government of a great and high-minded people pander to their profligacy. Ney became a soldier in 1787, a short time before the meeting of the States-General, and the wonders effected by the astounding eloquence of Mirabeau.

From the moment the privileges of the aristocracy were abolished, and military promotion was opened to all classes of the community, Ney's career was as rapid as it was brilliant. He gave proof of surpassing genius throughout the French campaigns in Germany and in Switzerland; he displayed diplomatic talents of a high order, under the gui-



dance and instructions of the celebrated Charles Maurice Talleyrand, then minister for foreign affairs to the French Republic—and certainly the greatest diplomatist of this or perhaps any former age.

Michael Ney was appointed Marshal of the French Empire, in his thirty-fifth year; and from that period he shared, day by day, in all the glories and perils of Napoleon. As he was no party man, but devoted wholly to his country, whatever its form of government, he lent his sword and talents to the chief whom it had chosen. This was his principle through life, and it accounts for his serving Louis XVIII. in 1814, as well as for his joining his former master and friend when he found his efforts to oppose him unavailing—when the whole of his army had gone over to Napoleon, and the positive will of the nation, afterwards put down by the united armies of Europe, recalled the exile of Elba to the imperial throne.

The talents, the dauntless valour, the high-minded generosity, and the considerate kindness of Ney, are proverbial in the French army; and he dwells in the memory of the veterans who served under him, like one of the heroes or demigods of old.

From Ney's activity and daring spirit, combined with consummate skill and prudence, and from his particular talent in providing for the wants of the troops, without oppressing the inhabitants of the countries overrun by the French armies, he was generally employed in the vanguard—a circumstance which has led to the error, in which even many of his own countrymen share, that he was a mere soldier of action, excellent in leading an attack, but devoid of the high acquirements, extensive knowledge, and strategic skill so necessary to wield and manœuvre large masses of soldiers. This mistaken notion has been strengthened by some of his old companions in arms, who now attempt to vituperate his memory, because he would not allow them, when under his command to practise that system of robbery and plunder which disgraced the French armies in the countries through which they passed, whether as friends or foes, and by means of which some of Napoleon's generals acquired immense wealth. These men, since Ney's death, have attempted to undervalue his talents as a commander. Others, with a view of elevating themselves, have sought to found a military reputation at the expense of his; and among the latter, is a certain General Jomini, aide-de-camp to the late Emperor Alexander, a Swiss by birth, and a flippant writer about campaigns and battles. Ney, having met with him in Switzerland in an almost destitute condition, made him enter the French service, brought him rapidly forward, and ultimately placed him at the head of his staff. Jomini now pretends that, while filling this situation, he was Marshal Ney's providence; that he constantly directed all the

brilliant achievements of which his general obtained the credit, and got Ney out of all the scrapes into which his deficiencies as a commander were continually leading him. Now, supposing this contemptible rhodomontade to be true, how happens it that this same General Jomini has never distinguished himself by his military talents since he left Ney to enter the service of Russia? His name is quite unknown, even among the third and fourth-rate generals of the day. Surely he cannot allege the want of opportunity; for in the service of no European state is high military talent made more available than in that of Russia.

The truth is, Ney never asked the advice either of his staff collectively, or of any of its officers in particular, on those grand and extraordinary movements by which he often baffled and defeated an enemy of vastly superior force. They were the rapid inspirations of his own instinctive genius, and to this may perhaps be attributed the almost unvaried success that attended them. With regard to his skill as a theoretical as well as a practical warrior, he was unquestionably superior to every other officer in the French service, even to Masséna, by many considered the best of Napoleon's generals. This may appear, to some, a very hazardous assertion; it is nevertheless true. Marshal Ney was second only to the Emperor, who, on many important occasions, even yielded to his opinions.

Ney's retreat from Russia, in 1813, was a masterpiece of strategy; it is equal to any thing of the kind ever performed by the greatest generals of ancient or modern times, and will hold a prominent place in the military annals of the nineteenth century. That Ney united profound science to the experience of a life of active warfare, is placed beyond a doubt by the manuscripts left in his own hand writing, containing his observations upon the various campaigns in which he served, and also his military studies for the use of his own officers, when he commanded the camp at Montreuil. To this we may add, that he first improved upon the old system of military tactics, and founded the system now followed by the French armies.

In defiance of a solemn capitulation, Marshal Ney was imprisoned as a traitor, and adjudged to die by the members of a faction who had sold their country. These men had fixed his doom before they came to the judgment-seat; it was sealed by their iniquitous sentence, and "the bravest of the brave" was judicially murdered at the back of the Luxembourg, on the 7th of December 1815. He died as he had lived, a man of heroic courage and unshaken firmness. His death will ever remain a foul blot, not only upon the then government of his country, but upon those foreign governments which might and ought to have interfered to prevent such a catastrophe. This view of the case will doubtless be de-

clared erroneous by men of the present day, imbued with the blind vindictiveness of party feeling; but it will surely be the one taken in after-ages, when time shall have effaced every vestige of such feeling. Then will the name of Marshal Ney rise pure and imperishable, and justice be done by the whole world to the memory of one who died a felon's death, only because he loved his country too well, and the person of its king less.

The present memoirs are founded upon the papers and documents which he left behind him, consisting of anecdotic and biographical fragments, accounts of his divers missions and campaigns, and the substance of many extraordinary secrets entrusted to him as a general and a statesman. All these materials throw great light upon the history of the French empire more especially upon that part of it which relates to the invasion of Spain and the disastrous expedition against Russia.

The work has been put together under the direction and management of the Duke of Elchingen, Marshal Ney's second son, who has affixed his signature to every sheet sent to press.



# MEMOIRS

OF

## MARSHAL NEY.

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### BOOK THE FIRST.

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#### CHAPTER I.

MICHAEL NEY was born at Sarrelouis, on the 10th of January, 1769. At an early age he evinced a decided taste for a military life. He received his education at a school kept by the monks of St. Augustin, where, although he applied himself sedulously to his studies, he displayed a remarkable turbulence of disposition. He constituted himself the avenger of wrongs among his school-fellows, and, like the general of an army, trained and disciplined them. His father had been a soldier; and after the seven years' war, had retired to his native village, where he exercised the calling of a cooper. He had unintentionally fired the inflammable imagination of his son, by accounts of battles in which he had participated, particularly that of Rosbach, where he had distinguished himself; a circumstance he always contrived to introduce in his tales of fields lost and won. He used to observe, however, that courage was not alone sufficient to insure the success of a military man; that to obtain command, noble birth was also requisite, and that the son of a poor mechanic had nothing but humiliation to expect in a profession where every thing was obtained by favour and family interest. The recollection, he added, of the perils he had encountered, and the glory of his personal achievements, were the only rewards of him who could not boast of high lineage.

The trade of the elder Ney, though considered respectable on the banks of the Rhine, was not however very lucrative, and he was anxious that his son should embrace some other calling. M. Valette,

a notary, whom the youthful pursuits of Michael had interested, offered to take the latter into his office. This appearing eligible, it was determined that young Ney should study the law.\*

Docile to the wishes of his parents, Ney consented without difficulty to this arrangement. Nevertheless, the duties of a notary's office did not exactly harmonize with a mind yearning for the bustle of a military life; he therefore soon became disgusted with them, and obtained an appointment of clerk to the Procureur de Roi. But this was still worse; for if he must be pinned to the desk, he by far preferred copying deeds and contracts, to conducting criminal proceedings.

Time however sped on, and Ney completed his fifteenth year. He had now a presentiment of his future greatness, and was burning to follow the bent of his inclination. His father, unable to appreciate these workings of a master spirit, or to share in the hopes which they raised, endeavoured to suppress them. Peter Ney, his eldest son, was already a soldier. Michael's deference to his father's wishes was extreme, and the latter succeeded for a time, not in subduing this irresistible feeling, but in giving a momentary impulse to his mind in a different direction. The mines of Apenwerler were then in full produce; and young Ney was sent thither as an overseer. The works, and the bustle attendant upon them, at first captivated him; he loved to watch the change in the ore, and to study the different processes it underwent in its transformation. But this knowledge was soon acquired, and his imagination relapsed into its former dreams of campaigns, and battles, and military fame. The entreaties of his father, and the tears of his mother, though they affected him much, could not alter his determination. His vocation was however again checked for a short period, by his thoughts being directed to another channel. Though young, he was well informed, punctual, active, and zealous. An offer was made him to superintend the iron works at Saleck; which he accepted. Besides the new direction which the novelty of this occupation gave for a time to his ideas, it offered him a prospect of future competency, which he never had before; he therefore applied himself cheerfully to the fulfilment of its duties.

Two years were spent in this manner; but his military propensities strengthening every day, the duties of his office became insupportable to him. The very place in which he lived contributed to develop the passion which consumed his life-springs. Almost every town on the Rhine is fortified, and has a garrison. If the superintendant of the Saleck works went to Treves, to Berghem, or to Deux-Ponts, he was sure to see soldiers performing the platoon exercise, and those military movements in which he longed to participate as a mere private, although he already felt the instinct of command. His resolution to conform to the wishes of his parents was not powerful enough to remain proof against the impulse of his soul.

\* The minutes in Ney's hand-writing are still preserved in this office as valuable relics.

Ney resigned his humble situation, and set out for Metz, where the regiment of hussars, called the Régiment de Colonel-Général, was then quartered. The grief with which this sudden and decided step was likely to afflict his parents, gave him considerable uneasiness, and he long hesitated before he paid them a parting visit; but filial affection triumphed over every other feeling, and quitting the high road, he directed his steps towards Sarrelouis.

The meeting was very painful, and he had to encounter reproaches, tears, entreaties, and even threats. The scene which took place was heart-rending, and he could only put an end to it by abruptly resuming his journey on foot. Though without clothes or money, worn out with fatigue and anxiety, his shoes in holes, his feet lacerated and bleeding—still his courage did not desert him; and by his perseverance at this early stage of his career, he already displayed that energy of purpose which, in after life, would yield to no obstacle.

Many years elapsed ere he returned to Sarrelouis. Fortune had then rewarded his courage with high rank and honours. When he again visited his birth-place, the cannon roared, and the troops were under arms. The inhabitants of Sarrelouis ran in crowds to behold their illustrious townsman. On perceiving the road over which, thirteen years previous, he had travelled on foot to become a soldier, Marshal Ney, with emotion, related to the officers who surrounded him the history of his first departure from his family.

On his arrival at Metz, on the 1st of February, 1787, Ney, then eighteen years of age, enlisted in the Régiment de Colonel-Général, afterwards the 4th hussars. He entered this regiment under the auspices of one of his countrymen, but who, being only a lieutenant, could be of no service to him in the way of promotion. This however was of no consequence at that period. Promotion belonged only to the aristocracy; interest was therefore of no use, and he must wait until better times should widen the field of glory through which he was destined to run. But he commenced his military career not without certain advantages. He had some knowledge of business, of practical natural philosophy, and of the resources of industry. His good conduct, his application, and the rapidity with which he made himself master of his duty, attracted the attention of his officers; whilst his patient submission to discipline and his orderly conduct elicited their good-will; and as he wrote a beautiful hand, he was soon employed in the quarter-master's office. This gave him some leisure time, which he devoted to qualifying himself for his new profession.

He distinguished himself among his comrades by his fine, soldier-like appearance, his great dexterity in the use of his weapons, and by the ease and boldness with which he rode the most dangerous horses, and broke in those hitherto considered unmanageable. On this account, every regimental affair of honour was confided to him. The fencing-master of the Chasseurs de Vintimille, a regiment also quar-



tered at Metz, was, like most regimental fencing-masters of those days, a dangerous duellist, and as such dreaded not only by young recruits but by old and experienced swordsmen. This man had wounded the fencing-master of the Colonel-Général, and insulted the whole regiment. The non-commissioned officers having held a meeting for the punishment of this bully, Ney, just promoted to the rank of brigadier, was selected, as the bravest and cleverest swordsman, to inflict the chastisement deemed necessary. He accepted the mission with joy, but just as the duel was about to commence, he felt some one pull him violently by the tail. On turning his head he perceived the colonel of his regiment, who immediately put him under arrest.

Duelling was at that period punishable with death, and Ney was taken in the very act. The matter could not well be more serious; but the young brigadier was much liked by his officers, and besides, there was no personal quarrel, he having been delegated to fight for the honour of the regiment. The non-commissioned officers waited on the colonel in a body to solicit his pardon, which was soon made an *affaire de corps*. Revolutionary ideas already prevailed in the army to such an extent that a too great severity of discipline was always eluded, lest it should exasperate the men. A long confinement therefore saved Ney from a court martial; but he had scarcely obtained his release ere he judged it necessary to satisfy what he deemed a point of honour. The danger he had incurred could not turn him from his purpose; for he scorned to be protected from the peril of a meeting with his formidable adversary, by any other means than his own skill and courage. The interrupted duel now took place, proper precautions being taken to keep it secret. Ney was the conqueror; he disabled his adversary by a wound on the wrist, which subsequently led to the discharge of the bully fencing-master from the service. The latter was afterwards reduced to great poverty; and Ney, who had become rich, sought him out and settled a pension upon him.

Marshal Ney never forgot his origin. When at the very climax of his fortune, he loved to call to mind the point from which he had started. It grieved him, during his career, to see old errors revived, the principles of equality lost sight of, and the bearers of ancient names and titles loaded with favours, without any personal merit to justify such partiality. He was much displeased at the eagerness shown to court such individuals; and he required numerous proofs of courage and talent ere he could overcome the unfavourable impression which he at first conceived of officers forced upon him by policy, and in opposition to his own glorious recollections. When in their presence, he always made a point of speaking of his early life. If any officers talked before him of their noble birth, of the pecuniary allowances they received from their families, or of their expectations of hereditary wealth, he would say, "I was less fortunate than you, gentlemen; I received nothing from my family, and I thought myself rich at Metz when I had two loaves of bread upon my shelf."



Soon after he was raised to the rank of Marshal of the empire, being at a large party, every one crowded round him to offer congratulations on the event. Interrupting the flattering speeches of the company, he addressed an old officer who kept himself at some distance from the rest of the party, "Do you remember, captain," he asked, "the time when you used to say to me, as I made my report to you, 'Very well, Ney; continue as you are now going on, and you will make your way, my lad?'"—"Perfectly well, Monsieur le Marechal," his old captain replied; "I then had the honour to command one better than myself. Such things are not to be forgotten."

The satisfaction which Ney felt in recalling the events of his youth, arose as well from the noble pride of having owed his rise solely to his own exertions, as from the recollection of family attachments. He loved to talk about the tender affection of his mother, and the paternal advice of his father.\* And when he yielded to the impetuosity of his courage, he carefully concealed from his parents the dangers to which he exposed himself. When he led the van of Collaud's division, a destructive action had just taken place. On his return, worn out with fatigue, he related the events of the day to a friend, who blamed what he termed Ney's imprudence. "True," the latter replied, "I have had a narrow escape again to-day; for I was four times quite alone in the midst of the Austrians."—"You have been more fortunate than your poor brother," his friend observed.—"Good God!" said Ney in alarm, "What has happened? Is my brother dead? Oh! my poor mother!"

Ney's friend then informed him that his brother, Peter Ney, officer in the 55th demi-brigade, had been killed in a sanguinary conflict which had just taken place in Italy. Unable to restrain his tears at this afflicting intelligence, "What would have become of my poor mother and sister," he exclaimed, "if I had fallen to-day! Write to them, but conceal from them the risks I run, lest they should feel the alarm of losing me also."

War and the stagnation of trade had created a general distress throughout France, and the operative classes were more particularly affected by it. At that period a general officer received only eight francs a month, and Ney was only a subaltern. His circumstances were therefore far from flourishing. Nevertheless he submitted to the severest privations, and contrived out of his pittance to send pecuniary

\* Marshal Ney's father died a few years since, having lived almost a century. He loved his son with tenderness and respect. Though a man of great physical strength, taking long walks and violent exercise, it was feared that a knowledge of the events of 1815 might prove fatal to him. He was therefore kept in ignorance of them; but the mourning dress of his daughter with whom he lived, as well as of her children, convinced him that some great family misfortune had happened. He dared not to ask what it was; but from that period he fell into a gloomy melancholy, and but seldom pronounced his son's name. His death occurred in 1826.

aid to his mother, then confined to her bed by a disorder which carried her off after four years of suffering.

Ney had just been made an officer. Poor, disinterested, and generous; the most intense feelings of honour and delicacy had taken such deep root in his soul, that he would have scorned to acquire wealth at the expense of the enemy, by taking advantage of the chances of war. Some blamed him for not profiting by a chance which the following anecdote will explain, and thus punishing a base insult; others admired his inflexible rectitude of principle.

He was with the army of the North. Encounters with the British cavalry were frequent, and sometimes valuable captures were made. Ney had just been promoted to the rank of captain; ardent, daring, and eager to distinguish himself, he one day charged with such impetuosity, that with his small detachment he passed the British lines and camp. A squadron of English cavalry appeared; he attacked and dispersed it, and eagerly pursued an English general officer whom it was escorting. The latter surprised at this determined pursuit, made no attempt to defend himself, but preferred treating: "Here," said he, is a purse full of gold; take it and let me go,"—the French captain smiled at the proposal, and this encouraged the English general to press his offer.—"You are surrounded by our forces," he continued, "and you must be taken prisoner. Do better; remain with us, and your fortune shall be made; your promotion shall be rapid, and you will serve your own princes."

"Really, this is going too far," Ney replied with indignation, placing his sword upon the other's breast; "You offer me money, and propose that I should desert my colours. Now, you shall desert, and that too in the presence of your own army. You must charge with me through your own ranks, and if you attempt to escape, that moment shall be your last. Follow me, my lads," addressing his hussars; "forward!" So saying he gave his horse the spur, overthrew every one who opposed him, and passed once more through the English ranks, thunderstruck at seeing one of their own officers charging side by side with the French captain. Ney brought his prisoner in triumph to the head-quarters of the French army; the latter quite confounded at his silly adventure. "Keep your money," said Ney to him; "I might perhaps be justified in taking it from you, but you will want it more than I shall. Another time, however, be more circumspect when you attempt to parley."

Ney, although submissive to those in command over him, was neither obsequious nor a flatterer. He did his duty with zeal and enthusiasm, because he loved his profession. Never did the idea of pleasing his superiors or purchasing his promotion by meanly cringing, enter his mind. From his very entrance into the service, he had no feeling but that of the most entire devotion to his country. He had made to it the offering of his dearest affections, and even life

itself. He knew how to elude too great severity, as well as to resist what he considered unjust.

The character of Kléber is well known. It will be shown hereafter with what kindness and regard he treated Ney, from whom, however, neither the violence of Kléber's temper, nor his anger, nor even his friendship could obtain any improper concessions.

Kléber was sometimes the slave of passion. Having once taken a dislike to an officer to whom he had formerly been attached, he wanted to get rid of him. Having ordered his aide-de-camp, Ney, to make a minute of an order to this effect, "You are going to send him away," the latter observed, "because ——"

"Because," replied Kléber with violence, "I don't like him."

"Well then," said Ney, "you may get somebody else to write the minute, for I would cut my arm off rather than be the instrument of recording such an order."

Kléber, speechless with astonishment, looked for a considerable time at the presumptuous aide-de-camp without speaking a word; then mildly said, "Well, let him remain! You desire it, and so let it be."

Though this was an open resistance to the will of his imperious commanding officer, yet it was the honest feeling of one brave soldier candidly expressed to another. There was much greater danger in braving the will of the representatives of the people, who, by appalling examples, had cemented their authority by blood, and could stir terror into the bosoms of the bravest men.

The emigrants having crucified some volunteers of the republican army, the latter had used reprisals; and as it always happens, one cruelty led to another, until the victims were allowed to choose the mode of their own death. Strict orders had been given to execute with the utmost rigour, the decrees of the convention against the emigrants. Nevertheless, some of the latter had laid down their arms and called for quarter. Ney, then a general officer, would not injure those whom his soldiers had spared. He treated them with kindness, mingled them with the foreign prisoners, and sent them to the depôts of the latter. The representatives were indignant at this; but as they had not full evidence of the fact, they were afraid to bring the matter forward in the shape of an accusation, and contented themselves with watching the offending General more narrowly. The latter, informed of the suspicion attached to him, became more circumspect. His scouts, however, brought in, one evening, some priests whom they had found wandering through the country. These prisoners were half dead with fright, hunger, and fatigue. Ney determined to save them. In the presence of those who captured them, he affected to speak with great violence, and to threaten them with the full penalty of the law; but after he had dismissed his men, under pretence of examining the prisoners in private, he altered his manner, gave them food and money, and sent them the same night under a



disguise to a town through which he knew the army would not pass.\* Next morning, Ney affected violent anger at their escape, which was publicly announced to him. Although he endeavoured to keep as secret as possible the share he had in this flight, it nevertheless became known to the representatives. But the measures of blood, so rife a short time before, were now beginning to be less frequent, and political hatred was rapidly subsiding. The representatives were therefore afraid to act against the kind-hearted General. One of them, however, loudly exclaimed against so flagrant a violation of the law ; the other, more generous, admired Ney's magnanimity in risking his own life to save those of his prisoners. "Your friend Ney," he observed to Kléber, "knows how to spare the blood of his countrymen."

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## CHAPTER II.

BEFORE we begin our recital of the Marshal's military deeds, let us pause an instant to complete the sketch which we have already commenced of his personal character.

It is well known with what extraordinary energy and power he manœuvred large masses of soldiers and brought them to bear upon the enemy. Bold and impetuous when he led his troops to a charge, still he evinced the most imperturbable coolness and presence of mind. Many persons, dazzled by the splendour of his extraordinary courage, have overlooked his other qualities as a commander ; but they who have served under him, will relate other things of him than those mere bursts of enthusiastic valour by which the common soldiers were captivated, and led on to the most dangerous assaults. Calm amid showers of grape-shot, unmoved by the most terrific discharges of artillery, by the balls which dealt death and destruction around him, Ney appeared unconscious of the danger,—he seemed as if he bore a charmed life. This calm rashness, which twenty years of peril did not overcome, gave to his mind that freedom of thought, that promptitude of decision and execution so necessary amid the complicated manœuvres of war and battle. This surprised the officers under his command, still more than that courage of action in which they all shared. One of the latter, a man of tried valour, asked him one day if he had ever been afraid ; thus summing up in a single word that profound indifference to danger, that forgetfulness of death, that tension of mind, and that mental labour so necessary to a general-in-

\* One of these very priests was, a few years since, curé of the parish of St. Symphorien at Versailles.

chief upon the field of battle. "I have never had time," was the Marshal's reply.

This indifference, however, did not prevent him from noticing in others, those slight shades of weakness from which very few soldiers are wholly exempt. An officer was one day making a report to him; a cannon ball passed so close to them, that the officer bent his head as if by instinct to avoid it: nevertheless, he continued his report without betraying any emotion. "Very well," said the Marshal; "but another time don't make so low a bow."

Ney had a high respect for courage, and loved to bring forward those who displayed it. Whenever a man distinguished himself in the field of battle, and showed capacity and talent, the Marshal became his patron, and never ceased his good offices until his protégé had obtained the promotion to which his valour entitled him, or was placed in a situation to make his talents available.

We will not here name the individuals whose courage and abilities Ney was instrumental in bringing to light. They who owe their rise to him will do him justice;—they will acknowledge that he never failed to discover merit, and raise it from obscurity, even were it concealed in the lowest ranks of the army. Press of business at headquarters, was sometimes the cause of his recommendations being overlooked; but he always renewed them, for he was determined that reward should be bestowed upon such as deserved it. His division well knew the quarrels he had, in 1800, with Lahorie and Moreau, on account of a simple hussar who had not been duly promoted.

General B \* \* \*, known by his courage and honourable services, as well as by the persecutions he endured in 1815, was captain of grenadiers in the 103d demi-brigade. During the campaign of Hohenlinden, Moreau had himself appreciated the bravery and zeal of Captain B \* \* \*. Nevertheless, others were rapidly promoted, whilst the Captain was passed over. Ney attempted to overcome this injustice, which had its origin in secret enmity, and he recommended B \* \* \* to the Commander-in-chief, to whom he stated the Captain's services, and the necessity of giving the demi-brigade an officer who could restore its discipline. The recommendation was unsuccessful;—there was an evident repugnance to promote B \* \* \*. "I will get the better of it," said Ney to the latter; and he kept his word. He united the grenadier companies of the 103d, and gave the command of them to B \* \* \*, who performed so many brilliant feats that the enemies of this officer, so eager, before, to darken his prospects, were now forced to acknowledge his services, and yield to Ney's determination to bring him forward.

Anxious as he was to make known the services of those especially under his command, the Marshal would also seek out and patronise men of superior talent, whose power to render useful services exposed them to envy. The following is an instance of this: To vast information, the author of the "*Traité des grandes opérations militaires*,"



added the art of observing and the power of putting his observations upon paper. His talents having become known to Ney, the latter appointed him to his staff, and thus restored him to a profession from which the act of mediation in Switzerland had cut him off,—he being a Swiss by birth. This officer turned his leisure hours to account; but the difficulties attendant upon the publication of military works are well known. The Marshal however came to his assistance, and not only overcame the obstacles to the publication, but promoted the sale of the work, and obtained a just reward for its author. Jealousy was again excited against the latter; again did Ney support him. In a word, from the day on which General Jomini was admitted into the French army, until he quitted it to fight under another banner, Marshal Ney was his warmest friend, and supported him with all his influence. This was not forgotten by Jomini in the bitter days of Ney's adversity; for when the latter was hunted down by a cruel and highly-excited faction, backed by foreign armies, the then aide-de-camp of the Emperor Alexander took sundry steps in Ney's favour, and had the courage—for in those days it was an act of courage—to publish a pamphlet in favour of his former general.

We regret, however, that General Jomini seemed to think that his noble conduct on this occasion had relieved him from the burthen of gratitude towards his old patron and friend. His last works evince in general a wish to depreciate the character of Ney, which must surprise those who know the place which General Jomini held on the Marshal's staff. Can we suppose that the silence of the tomb has encouraged this writer to raise accusations which he hopes no one will be able to refute? How is it that General Jomini, with his acuteness of intellect and powers of perception, does not feel that there is a want of tact in thus coming forward to denounce errors committed, as he dares to allege, against his opinion, and in opposition to his prudent counsels, and in thus arrogating to himself, with the most singular assurance, the successes obtained by his General? A foolish desire to increase Ney's celebrity, which required not such aid, has doubtless misled him, and he will probably be surprised to hear that he himself, the chief of Ney's staff, was ignorant of Ney's orders, and did not even comprehend military operations upon which he was never consulted. We might here begin to remark upon those narratives in which General Jomini tries to place himself in so advantageous a light; but, not to tire the reader, we prefer keeping such observations for another part of these memoirs. General Jomini is an adversary of too great talents for his assertions to remain unnoticed. It is to be regretted, however, that it should be necessary to refute them in such a work as this.\*

\* "It is to the sagacity with which he (Jomini) drew up in 1805, the orders for the movements of the 6th corps, that the capture of Mack's army is to be attributed."

"At Jena, Marshal Ney, impatient at being in the reserve, threw himself

Far from suffering himself to be thus influenced by his officers, the Marshal, on the contrary, never allowed any one to offer him unasked-for counsels. He did not consider himself in need of them. Such a thing, in his view of the matter, would have impeached that belief in a superiority of talent which inspires an army with confidence in its commander. An officer of his staff presented to him, one day, a paper on the affairs of Switzerland, saying, "This, General, is what you should do." So disrespectful a pretension to superior wisdom was treated as a piece of impertinence, and the giver of advice dared not again evince, in the presence of his General, the faith he had in his own sagacity. The lesson was not lost upon others, and it imposed upon them a line of respectful deference, which none afterwards ventured to pass.

Nevertheless, Ney lived upon terms of great intimacy with his officers. He never made them feel his superiority of rank. He treated Lorcet like a brother—Ruffin like a valued friend; but in the course of time these were replaced by men less discreet. One of the latter was once guilty of improper familiarity; Ney noticed it, and determined not to expose himself to such a thing in future; he therefore became more reserved and silent, limiting his confidential intercourse to those only with whose character and habits he was well acquainted. This resolution was strengthened by the following event:

On his entrance into Switzerland, he had received with great kindness a colonel who had been dismissed from the service. This man

with his van guard, composed of three thousand picked men, into the village of Vierzenheiligen, where he was overpowered by the whole army of Prince Hoherlohe. Colonel Jomini, seeing the danger of his General, left the Emperor and ran into the thickest part of the *mêlée* to defend with his own arm the audacious Marshal, who, after losing half his men, and three of his aides-de-camp, owed his victory to Jomini's opportune assistance." \* \*

"They were near undergoing, in the mud of Pultush, the fate anticipated in the condemned memoir (that of Jomini.) They got out however; but the diverging road pursued by Marshal Ney, led them to the brink of a fresh abyss. Napoleon saw but one remedy, which was to send Colonel Jomini to look for the Marshal. Although extremely unwell, he (Jomini) flew to the place where Ney's division was, and not only was the Marshal's corps got out of danger, but likewise that of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo." \* \*

"At a later period in Spain, although he (Marshal Ney) had an exaggerated idea of the importance of Corunna and Ferrol, the chief of his staff persuaded him to evacuate Galicia." \* \*

(And in reference to the battle of Bautzen,) "As he (Marshal Ney) could not comprehend this eccentric movement, the chief of his staff pointed out to him, that it was sufficient to show the head of a column," &c.

The above quotations from M. Jomini's article in "*La Nouvelle Biographie des Contemporains*," and which may be found in some of his other works, give an idea of the manner in which that officer speaks of his old commander, and of the personal share which he took in that commander's feats of arms. Perhaps M. Jomini had the modesty not to write these praises of himself; but in that case he certainly: "aided with his counsels" the person who did write them; for the same feelings and pretensions pervade the last of his works published by himself.

had formerly distinguished himself as a soldier; he was, moreover, a pleasant companion, a man of talent, and every sentiment he uttered seemed to stamp him a man of honour. General Ney tried to get him restored to the army. The cantons were in violent agitation; Ney sent this officer to inquire into its causes. Colonel C \* \* \* had great knowledge and address. He quieted the obstinate mountaineers, and drew up a very lucid report of their motives for being discontented with their new institutions, pointing out, at the same time, that which they regretted in their old. This able report confirmed Ney in his determination to serve the author, and he transmitted it with the Colonel's name, to the minister, strongly recommending that C \* \* \* should be restored to his rank. But the minister had information with regard to this individual, of which Ney was ignorant, and the recommendation was not attended to.

But Ney always persevered in an act of kindness; and on his appointment to the command of the camp at Montreuil, sent for C \* \* \*, and strongly insisted upon his being reinstated. In doing this, he at the same time energetically censured what he considered a great injustice. Though devotedly attached to the head of the state—though a strenuous supporter of a system which promised to protect the interests of all, and allay political excitements—he did not, however, consider himself bound to forego his personal opinions, and he continued to express them freely. Unsuccessful in his application to the War Minister in favour of C \* \* \*, he applied to the First Consul. Surprised at his request being coldly received, he urged it with some warmth. The First Consul listened to him with surprise, but refused to give him an answer. Such conduct only rendered Ney more pressing. “There, read that paper,” said at length Général Buonaparte, “and you will then know what kind of man you have admitted to your confidence.” The paper was a denunciation by C \* \* \* against Ney. It gave an account of the private conversations of the latter, perverting every sentence he had uttered in confidential intercourse, and accusing him of being an enemy to the First Consul, a dangerous man, and one whose actions ought to be carefully watched. The treacherous C \* \* \* was disgracefully exposed; but the circumstance dwelt long upon Ney's mind, who became more reserved, and altered those habits of confidence which harmonised so well with his noble character and goodness of heart!\*

Ney was severe, but just. Of an irritable temper, he sometimes

\* In 1815, when Marshal Ney was arrested, C \* \* \*, who was likewise a prisoner, requested to see the Procureur du Roi, having, as he stated, an important revelation to make. The object of this request was to offer evidence against his former benefactor, and he actually made a deposition to this effect. Will it be believed that this very individual applied, a few years since, to Ney's family for pecuniary assistance upon the strength of the Marshal's former regard for him? We withhold the name of this wretch for the sake of a member of his family, who has done great and brilliant services to his country.

gave way to anger, but as readily offered reparation to those he had offended. He was inspecting, in 1813, a regiment of heavy cavalry belonging to his division. Surprised at seeing a deficiency in the soldiers' fund called the *masse*, he was informed by the men that they had not received their balances, which, however, had been entered in the pay-books as if issued to them. He sent for the colonel of the regiment, and censured him severely. In vain did the latter attempt to justify himself by explaining that he had only obeyed superior orders; Ney, who saw in this circumstance an injustice to the men, would not listen to him. The Marshal had invited the field-officers of his corps to spend the evening with him; all were present but the colonel whom he had reprimanded that morning. On perceiving that the latter was absent, Ney went to his quarters. "I was wrong this morning," said he, taking the colonel by the hand; "pray think no more of it, and come and join our party."



## CHAPTER III.

PROMPT in the repression of excesses, Marshal Ney always exerted himself to prevent their occurrence. Having himself begun as a private, and being consequently well acquainted with the privations endured by the men, he was the better able to sympathise in their sufferings, which he did his utmost to alleviate. He knew that soldiers, though generally grateful to the officers who showed them kindness and paid attention to their personal wants, were nevertheless difficult to keep in subjection when those wants were not supplied, or when they perceived that their commanding officer did not share in their fatigues and privations. Ney loved those masses of men, composed of such a variety of minds, of elements so diversified, and which each day co-operated spontaneously in the same object, rushing upon danger as with one mind and with an equal contempt of death. The French troops, inured at that period to the toils and perils of war, and accustomed to laugh at danger, were of ruder manners and sterner bearing than those of the present day, who lead a pacific life in their garrisons; and discipline, at times lost sight of for a moment, would afterwards resume its sway with more unbending rigour. Amid dangers constantly overcome and as constantly appearing in a new shape, obedience must be prompt, and command is sometimes unavoidably harsh. Bad weather, dearth, or reverses, affect the tempers of all; and as authority has always its engine of punishment—guard-mounting out of turn, arrest, and solitary confinement—the forgetfulness of a moment is often expiated by a lengthened severity in their application, which the ill-humour of an officer, nay, perhaps an injurious epithet, may have provoked. Ney carefully strived to prevent such abuses of power, and convince the officers under his command, that by raising the soldier in his proper estimation, treating him as a rational being, and combining equitable firmness with kind and considerate attention to his wants, they would more easily obtain from him that blind obedience, and sacrifice of individual will, which form the strongest link of military power. He had always an exact report made to him of the moral state of his corps, and often when the generals and colonels under him least expected it, would question them upon a case of individual punishment which they had long since forgotten.

Anxious to give his men as little useless labour as possible, he never loved, from vain ostentation, to be attended by brilliant escorts, or the mummeries of military pageantry. He always endeavoured to diminish, as much as possible, the soldier's fatiguing duties, and not



weaken the strength of his regiments by sending detachments from them. This solicitude was remarked by the men, as well as the care and perseverance with which their General attended to their means of subsistence; and it secured their enthusiastic gratitude. We shall hereafter show the wonders he effected in providing food for his forces during the Portuguese campaign, in a country ravaged by war, where by almost superhuman exertions he succeeded in meeting not only the consumption of the 6th corps which he commanded, but that of the whole army, during the six months it remained upon the banks of the Tagus. Constantly advancing towards the Mondego, and sending forward columns in every direction, he managed to obtain leather, cloth, and provisions sufficient for every demand. These recollections are indelibly imprinted on the minds of the soldiers who served under him; and when his quarrel with Marshal Masséna made him resign the command of the 6th corps, the grief and murmurs of the men, and the first ferment of a mutiny, which a single word would have caused to burst forth with the utmost fury, proved to him that his services were appreciated, and had gained him the warm attachment of the troops which he commanded.

Although so attentive to the least thing that concerned the comforts and welfare of his men, he nevertheless maintained the severest discipline, and punished every kind of excess among them.

A skirmish had taken place near Darmstadt. The Austrians having been repulsed, had formed again near Zwingenberg, where they were again routed. The action had been warm, and the French troops, excited by the resistance of their opponents, forcibly entered and pillaged some houses. Although circumstances might have excused this, it was considered an act of oppression, and an abuse of victory. By it, the unfortunate peasants had been forced to pay for the acts of the sovereign. Ney was not satisfied with inflicting military punishment upon the delinquents; he had an estimate made of the damage, and an adequate indemnity given to the victims of this spoliation; and in order that the estimate might be a just one, he directed that it should be made by the landgrave himself.

"I am grieved to learn," he wrote to that Prince, "that excesses have been committed at Zwingenberg by some of the troops under my command. The village was carried by main force, a circumstance which no doubt led to the disasters which its inhabitants have experienced. Nevertheless, I neither will, nor ought I to tolerate such excesses. My soldiers have disobeyed the orders which they received; the unfortunate villagers have had their cottages plundered; and it behoves me, not only to punish the perpetrators of this outrage, but to repair the damage they have caused. Let the village magistrate draw up an estimate of the losses incurred, and I will take measures for its amount being paid.

Both soldiers and villagers had reason to remember this act. The former were taught by it what they had to expect from their General's

severity, and the latter, the confidence they might place in his honour. The inhabitants of the banks of the Neckar, who had taken up arms to resist pillage, again resumed their usual avocations, and the approach of the French troops no longer inspired the same dread as before. Other acts of justice strengthened this confidence. Heavy contributions had been imposed, and the local administrations, eager to elude the payment of them, had thrown the burthen almost wholly upon Eberfeld. This town, which had been almost wholly destroyed by fire during the preceding campaign, was unable to meet so heavy a charge, and sent a remonstrance to the States. The latter, however, persisted in imposing upon it a burthen which ought to have been borne in equal shares throughout the country. Ney was more equitable than the States. He remembered the misfortunes of this little town, and felt for the situation of its active and industrious inhabitants; and he notified to the commissaries of his army, who were taxing it without mercy, that, as it had twice been laid waste by war, it had already paid its share of war contributions, and should therefore, in the present instance, be exempt from contribution.

Warring only with armies, and respecting the inhabitants of the countries through which he passed, and whom he considered already unfortunate enough in having the territories they inhabited made the seat of war, the Marshal defended such countries against the wants of his soldiers, and the injustice of their own rulers. Inexorable towards those who took advantage of the disorder of conquest to oppress the natives, he was more than once obliged to exercise the utmost vigilance, and display a necessary severity in repressing such abuses. Not that such things were of frequent occurrence. Honour and delicacy generally accompanied the French armies; and if complaints were sometimes made, it was because they who bear the burthens of war are apt to exaggerate their sufferings, often increased by the avidity and selfishness of their own rulers. Doubtless there are many extortions which cannot be avoided. The soldier is a burthen to the individual upon whom he is billeted; detachments sometimes pilfer rations from the villages in which they are quartered; and vanguards now and then take a few heads of cattle from the owners. But this is merely striking the surface of the water; the rulers of these countries alone draw it off;—war offers them none but lucky chances. They impose contributions, and shamelessly rob those whose interests they are bound to defend. If complaints are made—if there is any deficiency in the supplies, the enemy is there to bear the blame;—the enemy has given orders which must be obeyed. It is still worse when a country passes under a new domination. Some of the former rulers cloak their own robberies under an exaggeration of the burthens they have borne; others magnify these burthens in order to obtain indemnities. And in justice we must add, that if exactions which the French officers had not made, were sometimes imputed to them; they were, on the other hand, often taxed with spoliations of which they were really

guilty. But in such cases, punishment never failed to overtake the offending parties, no matter who they were. A general officer, whose opinions on the rights of conquest were such as to remove more than ordinary scruples, had appropriated to his own use, two horses which had struck his fancy. The peasant to whom they belonged, and whose whole fortune they constituted, complained to Ney. The Marshal, in a severe and peremptory order, commanded that they should forthwith be returned to the owner. The officer at first refused. He next endeavoured to substitute a couple of bad horses for the valuable ones he had taken; then altering his mind, he complained of the harshness of the Marshal's order. "If my order appears strange to you," wrote Ney, "what must I think of your obstinacy in keeping that which does not belong to you? Your mode of acting does not suit me, and I have applied for your recall. You will no doubt be soon removed to another division; but in the mean time, you must restore the horses."

The following will give an idea of the severity with which the Marshal visited these shameful robberies. It is a letter which he addressed to another general officer, who was apt to forget the difference between that which did, and that which did not belong to him, but who in other respects was an able and valuable officer.

"January, 4th, 18\*\*

"I cannot but express to you, my dear General, my surprise at your now stating that it was only at St. John's, on your march upon Salzburg, that your secretary left you to negotiate the Botzen bills; whereas at Greusbranth you pledged your word of honour to me that you would remit seventy-five thousand francs to the paymaster (being the amount of these bills, together with the sums you received in cash,) the moment your aide-de-camp returned, who had left Botzen for Basle.

"You have not answered the letter which I requested General Dutailis to write to you on this subject; and you avoided seeing me when you passed through Clagenfurth. All this justifies my suspecting your good faith, until I am certain that you have fulfilled that which is most sacred to a military man—I mean his word of honour.

"I have hitherto deferred laying the matter before the Emperor, in consideration of the services you have rendered during the present campaign; and in the hope that you would not—to use your own words—destroy, for the sake of money, the good opinion which people ought to entertain of your delicacy. But I now declare to you, General, that I will lay the whole affair before his Majesty, unless, in six days from the present date, you fulfil your promise either by paying in the sum, or by sending to the *caisse* your acknowledgment for the amount.

"I beg also to inform you, that your name is upon the list of gratuities granted by the Emperor; that your gratuity amounts to eight



thousand florins ; and that this sum shall be carried to your account as part of the payment which you are bound to make."

These two generals were thus forced to disgorge their plunder ; and neither forgot or forgave Ney's share in the transaction. The one showed his recollection of it in the field of battle ; and the other during Ney's trial. By these severe measures, the Marshal made himself many enemies ; for he spared no plunderers ; he exposed them to shame, and at the same time forced them to disgorge their ill-gotten wealth. No personal considerations could deter him from the performance of what he considered a sacred duty. With this severity for others, it is needless to state that Marshal Ney never reaped any personal advantages from his commands in foreign countries. His whole conduct was guided by the principles which he had imbibed in his infancy ; and he persevered in the same line of conduct throughout his life, as at the outset of his career.

General Ney having taken Eberfeld, whose manufactures of steel had rendered it opulent, the magistrates, dreading its occupation, offered him a large sum of money if he would maintain the strictest discipline among his soldiers. "Yes," he replied, "I thankfully accept the conditions you offer ; not, however, for myself, for I want not your money—but for my soldiers, who are in want of everything. They are destitute of clothing and shoes. Employ the money you offer me in providing them with these necessities, and I promise you they shall give you no reason to complain." The magistrates, in surprise, readily subscribed to these terms. Under similar circumstances Turenne evinced the same disinterestedness. But Turenne belonged to a rich and noble family, and Ney was very poor ; nevertheless, the action of the former is trumpeted forth by every one,—that of the latter, forgotten. Such is worldly justice—such the even-handed distribution of fame.

Galicia, and Salamanca, provinces particularly hostile to the French, have, nevertheless, preserved the recollection of Ney's integrity whilst governor of them. One only spoil of a conquered country did Ney bequeath to his descendants ; this is a relic of St. James of Compostello, with which the monks of St. Jago presented him, in testimony of his humanity towards them.

Marshal Ney was tall, athletic, well made, and broad-chested. Each attitude and motion denoted health and strength of muscle. A soul of fire seemed contained in a frame of iron. His somewhat pale complexion, his large forehead, his under lip and chin rather prominent, and his strongly marked, though not harsh features, gave a manly and severe character to a countenance strongly depicting the workings of his mind, and the rapid impressions it received. The play of his features expressed strongly the feelings by which he was excited.

The fatigues of his profession during the last years of his life, had

made him almost bald. His hair, of a fiery auburn, had caused the soldiers to give him the nicknames of Peter the Red, and the Red Lion, as they gave the Emperor that of the Little Corporal. And when from afar off they heard the thunder of his cannon, they would exclaim among themselves, "courage! the Red Lion is roaring ;—All will soon be right, for Peter the Red is coming."

Having given these personal details of the Marshal, we shall now proceed to narrate the events of his life.

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#### CHAPTER IV.

EQUALITY of rights had been proclaimed ; privileges and exclusion no longer existed. Each was thenceforth what his own deeds made him ; no man could acquire any other importance than that which resulted from courage and talents, neither of which are confined to gentle lineage. Men of high descent, however, from one end of Europe to the other, refused to acknowledge these pretensions of the plebeian race. Those beyond the Rhine prepared to combat them by war ; and in France, a portion of the aristocracy joined in this unholy crusade against the people, whilst the remainder sought refuge in their feudal residences.

The officers of noble birth having abandoned their colours, the vacancies which they left were filled up by men of ability. Ney was appointed sub-lieutenant, then lieutenant, and soon after placed upon the staff of the veteran General Lamarche, a good and respectable officer, who had spent a great portion of his life in the subaltern grades of the army. The revolution raised him to the rank which his talents merited. He had appreciated Ney, whose activity and courage he admired, and he appointed him his aide-de-camp. Thus Ney, almost at the outset of his military career, found himself in a situation to study the art of war, without being subjected to the painful drudgery of the lower grades. Being placed upon an eminence, whence his eye could embrace the whole field of military tactics, he was thus initiated into the secret of grand movements, which he was in a situation not only to study and comprehend, but at times to direct in person ; and he soon proved that the lessons he received were not thrown away.

War had been declared, and Ney, who accompanied General Lamarche into Belgium, shared with that officer the glory and perils of the brilliant debüt of the French army in that country. But unhappily the reverses of the French troops were as sudden as their suc-



cess had been rapid. They were beaten at Aldenhoven, and at Nerwinde, and defection having co-operated with the disasters of their defeat, they were near being annihilated, ere the acclamation on their victory had well ceased. Mayenne had opened its gates, Valenciennes had surrendered, Condé was beleaguered; and the Departments, in a state of insurrection in consequence of the violent acts of the 31st of May, were on the eve of overthrowing the power that governed them. The situation of the country was critical, but never did it display greater energy. Kings were preparing to stifle the revolution, which, nevertheless, assembled its forces, and went forth to do battle with kings. Men and materials had been placed at the disposal of the revolutionary General, whilst armed masses were inundating the frontier. Nevertheless, this prodigious armament was far from being so formidable as it appeared. These general risings, these levies en masse, had undergone the common fate of things, which become less affective in proportion as they are multiplied, and degenerate with each repetition. Experience proved this in the present instance. Three great levies had taken place, the first of which was incontestably superior to the second; as was the second to the third; and the latter, it cannot be denied, was much more effective than the corps raised by the decrees of the National Assembly, and which that body had ordered to the frontier. Nor could it be otherwise. The first battalions of volunteers had almost all been commanded by officers whom the love of their country, an abhorrence of slavery, and, no doubt, the illusions of military glory also, had collected round the national standard. Disciplined and led on by men of experience, they did not strive in the field of battle without reaping some laurels. But their career was as short as it was brilliant. They were swept from the face of the earth, and recourse was had to new levies; composed, it is true, of young men full of valour;—strong, robust, and devoted, like those who had fallen, but who had not experience for their load-star—no veteran and tried courage to direct and render their ardour available. And what is a body without a point of impulse—what power has a mass, when deprived of simultaneous action? We must not imagine that patriotism alone, whatever be its intensity, can overcome fatigue, and obviate the disgust attendant upon warfare. War is marked with sufferings too acute, with privations too great, for the soldier to support it, where he not fettered by habits of discipline, which were easily given to recruits by incorporating them with old soldiers.

By so doing, the energy of the young soldiers, which the want of good officers had for a moment paralyzed, was again excited; and the thousand battalions of which the army was composed, were reduced to six hundred. This was still a great number; for men able properly to command a battalion, are not so numerous as people suppose. But at all events, the army now formed a flexible and compact mass; and if, as Feuquières alleges, God is always on the

side of great squadrons and numerous battalions, then might the army of the French people have reasonably calculated upon Divine aid.

These changes left thirty thousand officers without employment ; and it must be confessed that many of them were men of great talents. But if the measure was attended with some evils, it nevertheless obviated others much more dangerous. For whatever is done by popular choice, is always carried to extremes ; in such cases a certain exaggeration always accompanies the most prudent measures. Doubts having been raised concerning the opinions and talents of officers belonging to the aristocracy, the people seemed suddenly convinced that to lead the French armies to victory, it required only to be a *sans-culotte*. Neither the science nor the practice of war seemed worthy of a moment's consideration ; and it was asserted in the tribune, that if Duguay-Trouin had not been an ignorant man, he never would have proved victorious. This idea was embellished and adorned like an embroidered garment, and a swarm of patriots had left the desk to buzz forth their pretensions in the army, which they filled with trouble and confusion. The incorporation of the battalions was a favourable opportunity to get rid of them, and it was taken advantage of. This was doing a great deal, doubtless ; but it was now necessary to replace these would-be commanders with real warriors, and the latter had, for the most part, been either dismissed or suspended. Brilliant as were the services of General Barthélemi, that officer had been sent to the Abbaye for his independent principles ; and the brave and devoted Tharrau was expiating his noble moderation in another prison.

The latter had been convicted of an act of humanity. Some disturbances having taken place in the vicinity of Chimey, neither the troops nor the gendarmerie had succeeded in apprehending the authors of them. This was sufficient for Saint Just to raise the cry of connivance and want of energy ; and in his anger he issued the following strange order :—

“Generals Balland and Desjardins are hereby enjoined to kill, within three days, all the brigands in the country of Chimey. They shall answer with their lives for the execution of the present order.”

The wording of this sanguinary order being vague, Tharrau took advantage of that circumstance to elude its execution. He knew that reflection often calms the workings of anger ; and he endeavoured to provoke reflection, by writing to know whether the order included women and children. But this, instead of softening, only increased the fury of the ferocious representative, who sent back Tharrau's letter, with the following words written under it :—“A stupid question requires no answer.” Notwithstanding this harshness, Tharrau, to avoid spilling innocent blood, determined that the question should be repeated ; but this time he made Desjardins write. Saint Just was furious at this resistance to his order ; and being aware that Tharrau

directed every thing, he dismissed him from the service. Some officers were also dismissed for having served under Houchard; others for having been appreciated by Custine; and all were replaced by men who had never seen a shot fired. Fortunately, Pichegru was sent to assume the command of this new and unorganized army. Not that he was himself very able; for he had only been promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel six months before, and possessed no very clear notions on the art of war. But he had tact and discernment, and had, moreover, a decided aversion to those saturnalia which demoralized the army, from which he expelled luxury and effeminacy, and allayed the uneasiness that pervaded its ranks. His intimacy with Saint Just enabled him to overcome all opposition; and he exercised over the representatives the same influence as they had heretofore exercised over the generals of the army. He was thus enabled to remove such individuals as were useless, and appoint those whom public opinion pointed out as most worthy of command. His first choice fell upon Scherer, a veteran officer, well versed in the art of war, who being of plebian extraction, had been obliged to seek in foreign countries the reputation which his humble birth had prevented him from acquiring in his own. He had served in Hungary and in Holland—had bled in the cause of freedom and civilization, and having learned the art of war on the field of battle, had also written upon it. In a clever work he had pointed out and examined the faults and manœuvres which led to the reverses of the Austrians and the successes of the Turks. Entrusted with the defence of the Higher Rhine, he had kept a very considerable force in check with only a few battalions, and had evinced much talent in his instructions to the troops sent against Landau. With such claims, Pichegru was delighted to attach this able officer to the army he commanded.

Men experienced in practical warfare were scarce at this period. Pichegru was sensible of his own deficiencies; he knew that he wanted counsel and support, and he sought out those who were able to afford them. Friant, though still a novice, was a man of mind and of action; having evinced talent at the battle of Kayserslautern, he was appointed to the command of a brigade. Kussel, equally distinguished by talent and courage, was put at the head of another. Thus, if the subordinate generals were not men of great military reputation, they were men likely soon to earn renown. Providence, moreover, supplied the army of the North with what was still wanting, by giving it two officers of surpassing merit. These were Marceau and Kléber; the one short, delicately formed, and in the spring of life; the other tall, strong, and of heroic stature. Both, under this contrast of form and appearance, displayed equal ardour and ability; both had won laurels in the field of battle, and both had already given proofs of those great military talents which they afterwards more fully developed. But if the composition of the army was such as to afford reasonable hope, the state of the military stores,



provisions and artillery, were little calculated to inspire it. There was a lamentable scarcity of powder, muskets were also scarce, and the issuing of rations always uncertain. Measures were never taken to secure provisions for even a fortnight together; and often it was not known at night how the wants of the following day were to be supplied. Such a state of things cramped the energies of the army; no movement could be undertaken, no attack conducted with a prospect of success. The want of bread and of ammunition disconcerted the best combined operations; and if the soldiers yielded to the workings of a rash and thoughtless courage, hunger and famine soon avenged the attempt. It was for want of powder that the French had lost the battle of Arlon during the preceding year; and at the beginning of the campaign the want of provisions had delayed for the space of two whole days, the bold march so ably conducted through the Ardennes, and caused the loss of the battle fought on the third of June, under the walls of Charleroy. It is true that this scarcity had not always been attended with such deplorable results, but want is never felt in an army without producing murmurs and insubordination. Even the most simple measures had often failed for want of provisions.

Nevertheless, battles were fought and victories gained. The enemy was defeated, because valour supplied the place of all that was wanting. Such success seemed the precursor of plenty. But two armies had penetrated into Belgium; the civil administrations which they dragged in their train seemed to vie with each other in adding to the privations which the soldiers were forced to endure. They disputed the territory with each other, laid villages under contribution, and opposed force and violence to each other's exactions. A line was attempted to be drawn to limit their several pretensions; but it was respected by neither. At length the two administrations were united into one, to which the provisioning of both armies was entrusted. But this change proved by no means advantageous. The agents no longer appeared in behalf of such and such an army; but some acted in the name of one *ordonnateur*, others, in the name of another. One would have orders to carry into effect a partial, another a general requisition; and each, exclusively occupied in the execution of his separate instructions, would embarrass the proceedings of the others. Sometimes these men would even stop the delivery of provisions to their colleagues, and forbid the inhabitants to supply the latter with any thing. Such unworthy dissensions ruined the country,\* and

\* TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE, AT BRUSSELS.

*Cologne, 17th of Vendemiaire, (8th of Oct.)*

My Dear Colleagues,

The agents sent to issue requisitions, have proceeded in a manner revolting to every body. On entering a town, they put every thing in requisition—*every thing*, absolutely every thing. From that moment no inhabitant can

kept the army in a state of painful excitement. The cavalry were in want of forage, the infantry of rations. Each corps was obliged to supply its own wants, and do for itself that which the administration did not do. Horses were turned into meadows, and the little which had been left to the inhabitants was taken from them. The soldiers lived by violence, and were worn down with privations. This state of things lasted during the whole campaign. It must, however, be stated, that the blame did not wholly attach to the administration; for many of its agents were incompetent, dissipated, avaricious, or more attentive to their pleasure than to their public duties. Besides this, the resources of the country had been greatly over-rated. It was firmly believed that they would prove sufficient for the support of the two armies which had entered it, over and above the consumption of its inhabitants. But Luxemburg and Campen do not produce much; Guelderland, the Duchy of Cleves, and the county of Meurs, are not very fertile; and the resources of the Duchy of Juliers, as well as those of the electorate of Cologne, had been exhausted by the Austrians. Thus Hainault, Brabant, West Flanders, and that part of the territory of Liege which is situated on the left bank of the Meuse, were the only parts of the country which offered the least appearance

either buy or sell. All trade is suspended; and that for an indefinite lapse of time: some requisitions having been made for more than a month, whilst nothing is wanted, and in the mean time the inhabitants are unable to purchase the very necessities of life. If such measures be not counter-revolutionary—if they be not vexatious and likely to raise the whole country against us, I should be glad to know what they are.

Unfortunately the whole territory is subjected to similar requisitions; they succeed each other rapidly, and blow upon blow is struck.

Let the articles we want be put in requisition—nothing is more proper; and this I direct to be done by the commissaries of the army, when there are no other agents. But let the quantity of each article be specified, and the inhabitants have the faculty of disposing of the remainder. No inhabitant will find fault with such an arrangement, provided the articles are paid for.

But that *all* should be put in requisition, and for months together, without stating what is really wanted, and without even paying for what is taken, is absurd and disgraceful, Citizens Colleagues. The agents caused Belgium to rise in the time of Dumourier, and alienated from us the love of its inhabitants. If we do not take good care, the same thing will again occur, and we shall have to wage war with the Belgians, as well as with the Austrians.

You are on the spot, and the principal agency is under your control. Institute then a rigorous inquiry into these measures, and endeavour to apply a prompt remedy to acts which may otherwise be attended with fatal consequences.

What is necessary must be obtained; at the same time sufficient must be left for the wants of the inhabitants. Every article put in requisition, must be immediately paid for and taken away. With regard to issuing requisitions that are not executed, it is unnecessarily vexatious.

Health and fraternity.

GILLET.



of plenty ; but these places had their centres of consumption, and were unable to provide food for so sudden an increase of population. It was the same with regard to forage. Brabant, Juliers, and Cologne had only artificial meadows ; Limburg, whose crops are more considerable, had been partly drained of its supplies ; whilst the army of Sambre-et-Meuse had seventy thousand horses, and that of the North thirty thousand. Thus both infantry and cavalry were forced to suffer the most trying privations.

Such were the difficulties against which the republican troops had to contend ;—such were the first obstacles they had to overcome.

At the end of July 1794, soon after the battle of Fleurus and the taking of Mons, Kléber, still excited by his victory, was preparing to follow it up. The Austrian army was at some distance from him. Anxious to reconnoitre its position, he set out with an escort picket, and on the road entered into conversation with the officer who commanded it. He was so pleased with the clear and judicious observations of the latter, that he determined to appoint him to his staff. Pajol, aide-de-camp to Kléber, delivered the order of appointment to this officer, who turned out to be Ney. He had just joined the 4th regiment of hussars. Promoted to the rank of captain after the affair of Famars, which proved so fatal to the respectable Lamarche, he had returned to his regiment with the intention of not again leaving it. He therefore declined the General's offer. But Kléber had appreciated his talents, and was anxious to have him. Detachments of Austrian troops overran the country ; the inhabitants were in a state of increasing agitation, and Kléber resolved to organize a band of partisans, who might dislodge the Austrian detachments, keep the population in awe, secure a regular supply of provisions, and open safe communications throughout the territory.

This service required to be conducted by a man of superior talent and tried valour, and Ney was selected. Meantime, the army was debouching on Pellemberg. The Austrian forces were numerous ; and the French vanguard, which followed them close, was by no means strong. An action had begun, and the hostile forces soon became warmly engaged. Ney, on hearing the cannonading, changed his route, and proceeded in haste to the scene of action. The Adjutant-General Bouquet had just given way before a squadron of Austrian cavalry. His ranks were broken, and himself was covered with wounds. Ney came up, but the detachment under his command, worn out with their march, were unable to follow him. He however put himself at the head of a few dragoons, rushed on the imperialists, and succeeded in routing them. Kléber, who was an eye-witness to this daring act, mentioned it in his despatch to the representative, in the following terms :—“ Captain Ney, acting Adjutant-General, performed prodigies of courage. At the head of thirty dragoons, and a few chasseurs acting as orderlies, he charged two hundred

of the Blanckestein hussars, and threw them into the greatest disorder."

Gillet, delighted with this act of heroism, appointed Ney to the rank of which he was provisionally performing the duties; namely, that of Adjutant-General.\*

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## CHAPTER V.

THE vanguard had recrossed the Meuse, and Jourdan was endeavouring to protect his rear, and render his position more secure. Landrecy had surrendered, but Quesnoy seemed determined to hold out. Kléber also had advanced and invested Maestricht; but this place was difficult of approach, and provisions were daily becoming scarcer. Ney resumed his excursions, and extended his detachments towards Peer. He left Diest on the 26th of August 1794, reached Peer on the same day, and captured a convoy of twenty-three wagons, which were immediately directed towards the French army. The following day was not attended with the same good fortune. A French trooper who had deserted, gave the enemy information regarding the strength and position of the detachment which was harassing their rear. Ney, who from some neglect had not been made acquainted with this circumstance, was quietly pursuing his march. He surprised the village of Achel, carried off the stores which the Austrians had collected there, but lost them immediately after. The hussars of Blanckestein and the dragoons of Latour suddenly appeared, recaptured the convoy, and made the escort, who were conveying it to the army, prisoners.

Ney however knew nothing of the imperial cavalry being on the alert; he was totally ignorant of what had passed, and quietly proceeded onward towards Werdt. But he had not yet reached Hamont, ere he perceived the imperialists threatening his flanks and his rear, and preparing to make a charge upon his detachment. His situation, and the desertion of the trooper, of which he had just received notice,

\* GILLET, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE ATTACHED TO THE ARMY OF SAMBRE-ET-MEUSE,

In consequence of the report made to him of the military talents and patriotism of citizen Ney, captain in the 4th regiment of hussars, hereby appoints the said citizen Ney to hold the rank of adjutant-general, and chef de bataillon, the duties of which grade he is already performing under General Kléber, commanding the left wing of the army.

14th Thermidor, Year II. (August 1st, 1794.)

GILLET.

showed him the perils that surrounded him, and he began to retreat towards Eyndhoven; but his scouts soon reported to him that this road was also beset—that the enemy's cavalry flanked it right and left, and it was impossible to pass.

"Impossible!" Ney exclaimed; "sound the charge!" And he attacked the Austrian squadrons sword in hand with such impetuosity, that he broke their ranks; then pursuing his march with rapidity, and avoiding the villages, he gained the woods, and escaped from the detachments of the enemy placed to cut him off.

But the plain was covered with the Austrian forces. At almost every step he was forced to halt, and either receive or head a charge. At one place he was under the necessity of forcing a bridge, at another of making a long circuit, further on of attacking a post; every where he was beset with dangers and difficulties. He at length came in sight of Eyndhoven. His flankers had sent a patrol in advance, which had cleared the approaches.

The prisoners which they brought in, as well as the inhabitants he met, having informed him that the place had but a feeble garrison, he hoped to surprise and carry it by a coup-de-main, and with this expectation he rapidly advanced. Unfortunately a body of cavalry which had come to its assistance, debouched as Ney appeared with his little army. The surprise at this unexpected obstacle was great, but the French soldiers were as determined as their leader. They charged the Austrians without regarding their numbers; threw themselves headlong into the midst of the enemy's ranks, broke and dispersed them, took their commander, the Baron Homspech, prisoner, and returned with him to Diest.

Jourdan was not less pleased with the manner in which this expedition had been conducted, than with the capture of the Austrian commander. He knew the noble baron well, and strongly suspected him of having exercised some influence over the determinations of the old French Generals, and mixed himself up with various untoward negotiations. He therefore advised the committee to have the baron sent to Paris. With regard to Ney, the representative Gillet appointed him *chêf-de-brigade*, in which capacity, "he for his part, purposed to employ him with great advantage."

Towards the end of September, the column which had reduced Condé and Valenciennes, prepared for the pursuit of fresh victories, and began a general movement. Meantime, the enemy beaten at Sprimont on the 18th, and defeated at Clermont on the 20th, were endeavouring to rally behind the Roer. A sad reverse of fortune had now dissipated their illusion. The French army, which at the beginning of the campaign was intrenched, in almost hopeless despair, behind the Scarpe, was now on the eve of reaching the Rhine. The Northern army had penetrated into the heart of Holland; the English had disappeared, and on all sides victory had crowned the French arms.



Clairfayt was, however, not discouraged by these reverses. He retreated, but without ceasing to fight; and he ably availed himself of the advantages which the nature of the ground offered him. Neither the rugged banks of the Ourthe, nor those of the Ayvaille, had been able to shelter him from the attacks of the republicans; but the Roer was in a deeper bed, was more rapid, and had higher and more rugged and precipitous banks than the former rivers. He therefore took advantage of these obstacles, and fell back upon the Roer.

The French army pursued him with all the ardour inspired by victory. Scherer commanded the right, Jourdan the centre, and Kléber the left. Each pressed forward upon the retreating enemy, each emulous to outvie the others. Divers encounters took place, all of which turned out in favour of the French, and the Austrians were in full retreat. Kléber however was not yet satisfied.

Bernadotte led the van. This officer had been recently promoted to the rank of general; he combined with the courage which characterized the army of Sambre-et-Meuse, an experience seldom found at that period in the French ranks. He had been a soldier from the age of fourteen; had seen service in America as well as in Europe; and had evinced on the banks of the Delaware, as he then did on the Sambre, that eagle eye, and velocity of manœuvre, which few of his colleagues then possessed. He added to the ascendancy which the habit of warfare had given him, many qualities not less precious in a soldier. He was enterprising, intrepid, and as ardent in action as in the expression of his opinions. His enthusiasm delighted the men under his command; his fine, soldierlike appearance, and his confidence, warmed their imaginations. There was nothing too difficult for them when led on by him—nothing they would not undertake at his bidding. But every thing has its limits; valour even meets with obstacles which it cannot overcome.

Bernadotte pushed on towards Heinsberg. He was desirous of attacking the enemy's rear-guard without allowing it time to breathe; but the hostile forces were numerous, and being favoured by the nature of the ground, made an obstinate stand.

Kléber had already sent reinforcements; but as the battle seemed to last much too long, he became impatient, and despatched Ney to Bernadotte's assistance. Ney advanced with rapidity towards Stockheim, but had scarcely got half way ere he perceived a number of boats making the most strenuous exertions to reach Maestricht in as short a time as possible. In these boats he could discern wheels and gun-carriages, and he had no doubt that they contained guns and stores for the defence of that place. He therefore wheeled round, and gained the banks of the river, for the purpose of intercepting them. His half-naked chasseurs prepared to swim towards the boats and attack them; but the boatmen not daring to run the risk of such a conflict, sank their boats, and with them the guns, powder, and projectiles which they contained.



This incident was fortunate in itself, but it soon became still more so. Ney had resumed his march; his men were congratulating each other on having destroyed a part of the means intended to be employed against them in the defence of Maestricht, when a flotilla appeared at a distance. Ney ordered them to press forward, and seize a prey which could not escape them. A body of them soon reached the banks of the river, threw themselves into it, and swam to the boats, on board of which they succeeded in getting, in spite of the determined resistance of the crews. Here a desperate conflict ensued. Ney, anxious to take a share in it, pressed hastily forward, and soon reached the banks of the river; but his appearance put an end to the action, and the crews of the boats instantly submitted. Having continued his march, he joined Bernadotte at Tranquemont, which the news of this double encounter had already reached. It was also known that Maestricht, deprived in the morning of part of the supplies intended for its defence, had in the last capture lost a portion of the provisions intended for the subsistence of its garrison; and this raised a hope that, being disappointed in these means of prolonging its defence, it would the more readily surrender on reasonable terms.

Bernadotte had likewise obtained some advantages. His troops were proud of his success, and he determined to push forward. Nuth was not far distant; and as the enemy seemed resolved to defend it, he purposed to meet them there. But the Austrians had already betaken themselves to flight; and as the French came in sight of the place, their last patrols could just be perceived gaining the woods. Bernadotte did not think proper to pursue them in person, but ordered Ney upon this service. "See," said he to the latter, "they are proceeding towards Gangelt, where they probably expect peacefully to pass the night; overtake and harass them; let them fall before you like corn before the reaper's sickle."

Ney did overtake them, but they were numerous and resolute, and he was obliged to send for reinforcements. An officer who has since highly distinguished himself, Maurin, then assistant adjutant-general, came to his assistance at the head of the 2d hussars. The pursuit was hot, skirmishes frequent, and at length Ney, accompanied only by his chasseurs and a few companies of light infantry, reached Heinsberg. The enemy occupied it with a strong force; the town was barricaded, and embrasures appeared on all sides, ready to pour death and destruction upon its assailants. But Ney had communicated his own impatient ardour to the troops who had kept up with him. The infantry scaled the walls, the sappers broke open the gates, and in a moment every point was carried. The Austrians, thus driven from the place, made an attempt to form under shelter of the wood; but with no better success. Ney's troops pursued them closely, and forced them to throw themselves in the greatest disorder into Wassenberg.

The Austrians were thus driven to their last resources. The French army debouched upon the Roer, and were already in front of the formidable obstacles raised to oppose them.

The main body had taken up its position between Heinsberg and Drumen. Bernadotte pushed forward towards Ruten at the head of the vanguard. Ruten is a village situated on the left bank of the Roer; it stands upon an eminence, from which might be fully seen all the difficulties which the army had to encounter. There was in view a long line of redoubts, bristling with chevaux-de-frise, and broad intrenchments defended by deep ditches. In one place, there appeared a batterie rasante; at another were guns of large calibre, and behind these formidable works a numerous infantry was drawn up, motionless, and waiting only for the appearance of the French forces to open a destructive fire. These works, and this attitude of defence, were calculated to inspire caution. But for six months past the Austrians had in vain attempted to regain their lost ground. Beaten in every action, they were constantly compelled to retreat, and as constantly driven from the positions which were to have stopped the progress of the republican armies. The French troops could now perceive them intrenched and fortified in the midst of rocks, and behind ravines and coppices. Such obstacles only increased the audacity of the republican soldiers, who were eager to advance, cross the river, and encounter hand to hand the troops they had so often put to flight, and who now dared to face them only because they were protected by their position and works. Excited, like his men, by a series of victories, Bernadotte participated in their enthusiasm. But the Roer was deep and rapid, and the rain, which fell in torrents, increased every hour the impetuosity of its waters. Unwilling to expose his troops to the torrent and to the enemy's grape-shot, without first ascertaining the precise difficulties they would have to overcome, he sent forward the light infantry to reconnoitre; but scarcely had they appeared in front of the river ere the Austrian batteries began to play. The fire was returned from the other bank, and in a moment the two armies were engaged. It was however impossible to meet, and neither would retire. For a long time death was dealt out on either side with an unflinching hand, and the hostile forces moved not from their positions. At length a fresh battery being unmasked, and the Austrians exposed to a murderous cross fire, they began to give way. The 71st seized the opportunity, and rushing into the river, succeeded in gaining the opposite bank. Bernadotte immediately reported this success to Kléber. "Great praise," he wrote, "is due to the brave Ney. He seconded me with the ability which you know he possesses, and I am bound to add, in strict justice, that he greatly contributed to the success we have obtained."

By the time the French troops had crossed the river, it was dark, and no bridges could be constructed till the morrow, or other necessary preparations made to follow up this success. The enemy with-

drew during the night, and on the following morning nothing remained but the marks of their defeat.

Similar operations, attended with similar results, took place along the rest of the line. On this occasion the following report was addressed by Gillet to the Committee of Public Safety :

“ I have delayed until now giving you an account of the most recent successes of the army of Sambre-et-Meuse, in order to be able at the same time to announce to you a victory, together with the capture of a fortified town, a citadel, sixty pieces of cannon, and a great quantity of stores and ammunition.

“ The Austrian army, beaten in detail at Sprimont and Clermont, on the 2d and 3d sans-culottide, had intrenched themselves upon the banks of the Roer, where they still formed a force of from sixty to eighty thousand men. On the 1st instant, we took Aix-la-Chapelle, and our army encamped on the plains of Aldenhoven, the left close to Worms, and the right towards Scherweiler upon the Dinse.

“ The enemy intending to defend the passage of the Roer, and keep open a communication with Maestricht, a considerable portion of their army was stationed on the right bank of that river, in a position just behind Aldenhoven, and in front of Juliers. This position, naturally strong, was moreover fortified with lines and redoubts which defended it on all sides.

“ Determined to follow up our successes, Jourdan resolved to force the enemy in their last intrenchments. To succeed, it was necessary to attempt one of those bold manœuvres which render the most difficult enterprises possible when executed by able officers and intrepid soldiers ; for the Roer, though fordable in many places, was swollen by the rain which had fallen during the last ten days. The fords, in themselves difficult, were covered with chevaux-de-frise, the bridges were destroyed, and the heights which extend along the right bank of the Roer, from its source to Buremonde, were covered with lines and redoubts, and defended by a formidable artillery.

“ Jourdan divided his army into four corps. Scherer commanded the right wing, General Kléber the left, and General Lefebvre the van. Jourdan retained the command of the centre, forming the corps-de-bataille, having under him the generals of division, Hatry, Morlot, Championnet, and Dubois. Scherer was ordered to force the passage of Dueren ; Kléber to attack on the left at Heinsberg, and the vanguard, at Linnich, whilst the corps-de-bataille was to attack the camp in front of Juliers.

“ Yesterday, at five o'clock in the morning, every column was in motion, and all commenced the attack with equal bravery. In less than two hours, the camp in front of Juliers was forced, and the redoubts carried with unexampled intrepidity. The enemy's cavalry appeared to cover the retreat of their army. Ours charged and routed it, pursuing it even to the glacis of Juliers ; and it owed its safety, as



did the whole Austrian army, solely to the guns of that place, which prevented our troops from continuing the pursuit. The other columns were equally successful, but they met with difficulties of another kind. When the vanguard reached Limmich, they found that the enemy had destroyed the bridge, and set fire to the town. Every point of approach having been rendered impracticable, it became necessary to construct bridges under a dreadful fire of artillery and musketry. This was however executed under the protection of our artillery, which on this occasion, as on every other, showed its great superiority over that of the enemy, who were obliged to withdraw and abandon their redoubts. The bridges, however, *could* not be constructed before night, so that it was impossible to complete the passage of the river. Every thing was ready to execute it this morning, when the clearing up of the fog showed us the enemy in full flight.

“Several redoubts had been raised in front of Juliers, and a battery of mortars erected to bombard the place. This battery had already begun to produce great effect, when a white flag appeared on the citadel, and a deputation of magistrates came to deliver up the keys of the town, which had been evacuated by the enemy during the night, and now surrendered at discretion.

“Yesterday must form a memorable epoch in the arms of the republic. An army of from sixty to eighty thousand men defeated under the shelter of a most formidable position; a place stronger than Landrecy—with a good citadel, fosses full of water, and in the best possible state of defence—with an arsenal full of stores, and containing more than fifty thousand pounds of powder—evacuated, taken without a struggle. Such, my dear colleagues, are the fruits of this brilliant day.

“The enemy’s loss is immense. On the other side of the Roer the ground is covered with slain, even within the Austrian lines. This we were able to verify this morning, and it proves the precipitancy of their retreat. Every thing denotes the most complete rout. Several columns of cavalry, light artillery, and grenadiers, are in pursuit of them; and I have just learnt that General Dubois, at the head of six regiments of cavalry, has overtaken their baggage wagons to the right of Cologne. We have made upwards of six hundred prisoners.

“It would be out of my power to notice every act of heroism by which this day is honoured; for I should have to mention by name every corps, every general, every officer, and every soldier, because all have shown themselves heroes: I shall therefore designate only two. The first relates to the vanguard of the divisions under the command of General Kléber. The brave soldiers who composed it, impatient at the delay which the construction of a bridge would cause, threw themselves into the river, swam across it, attacked the enemy’s works, and carried them at the point of the bayonet. The second relates to two squadrons of chasseurs, commanded by General d’Haut-



poul. These brave men, having met four squadrons of the enemy's hussars, charged them without counting their numbers, and drove them into the river. Almost the whole were either killed, drowned, or taken.

"Health and Fraternity.

"GILLET."

"Head Quarters, Juliers, 12th Vendemiaire,  
Year III. (3d October, 1794.)"

## CHAPTER VI.

THE Austrian army was in a deplorable plight. Both generals and soldiers, struck with consternation at their successive defeats interrupted by the slightest success, were now only desirous of recrossing the Rhine. The courage of Werneck himself was at length shaken. This general, habitually so firm and decided, had now lost all confidence. Having made arrangements for the supplying of Maestricht with provisions, he left upon his table a duplicate of the orders he had issued. Bernadotte having come upon him unawares, found this document, and perceiving in an instant the full importance of the information it afforded him, despatched Ney to take the best advantage of it.

"The General who commands an army in which you are employed," he wrote to the latter, "is a fortunate man. I have that good luck, and I fully appreciate it. Continue to pursue and *hussar* the enemy, and I will second you to the utmost of my means. You shall have by to-morrow the 4th hussars and the 16th chasseurs. I will likewise send you a body of infantry, and will ride over and consult with you on the best means of supporting you with the dragoons.

"I must inform you, my dear friend, that there is something of great importance to be attempted. The honour of the attempt is reserved for you, and to you shall be attributed all the merit of its success. You must, if possible, obtain possession of the flour which Field Marshal Werneck is sending, under an escort, along the heights on the other side of Vegong, whence it is to enter the high road, for the purpose of reaching Neuss and Dusseldorf. The undertaking will be, perhaps, hazardous—but no matter; the convoy is not far off, and we can make the attempt.

"I am going to take a few hours' rest; I advise you to do the same, for I fancy we shall have no time for sleep to-morrow.

BERNADOTTE."

"Guerack, 12th Vendemiaire,  
Year III. (3d of October 1794.)"

Ney set out to intercept the escort, which the report of his approach prevented from leaving Neuss; he therefore resolved to make himself master not only of the provisions, but of the town which contained them. From a thousand to twelve hundred horse defended the approaches to the place. He braved and endeavoured to provoke the latter to an action, but the greater his ardour, the more determined were they to avoid a conflict; thus every effort to bring them to battle was vain. Under these circumstances, he came to the resolution of instantly storming the town.

This bold resolve was singular, inasmuch as he had not with him a single foot soldier, and the ramparts of Neuss were covered with a numerous body of infantry. Nevertheless, the *coup-de-main* succeeded. Scarcely had he fired ten shots, ere the garrison set fire to the storehouses, and escaped in great disorder with the flour wagons, which they still attempted to save. Ney pursued them closely, and seized a number of the wagons, dispersing the remainder, and forcing them towards Dusseldorf. The night was however very dark, and his hussars being overcome with fatigue, he was obliged to halt, and allow the men and horses a few hours' rest.

The silence of the bivouac, which was on the banks of the Rhine, having succeeded the tumult of the pursuit, an indistinct sound was shortly after heard, then a confused noise of human voices and oars.

Ney's men now felt that they were about to effect the object for which they had been striving, and this idea inspired them with fresh vigour. They ran to their arms, and resumed their march; but Dusseldorf sided with the Austrians, and no sooner did the French hussars appear before it than it thundered its projectiles upon them. Ney took no notice of this aggression, but continued his route, overtook the portion of the escort which had escaped from him under cover of the darkness of the preceding night, and after dispersing it, took possession of the wagons. Nor was this all. He knew that the diplomatists of the river were sending away their treasure; this he intercepted, and with the riches he expected some valuable despatches which he certainly did not expect, fell into his hands.

Kléber, greatly irritated at the aggression of Dusseldorf, determined to avenge both the insult offered to his vanguard, and the partiality which the citizens seemed to entertain towards the French emigrants. This was, however, by no means easy. His soldiers were without clothing, his wagons without cattle, and the season was becoming daily more unfavourable. But he was not to be turned from his purpose; and that which he needed, he purposed making the enemy supply him with. This was perhaps the first time that an army wanting the means of taking a fortified town, had attempted to force that town to supply such means against itself. However, Kléber had resolved upon it, and the attack began. The batteries of the French army soon set the town on fire. The general sent for Ney.

"Do you see," he said, "the ravages made by our shells? Well,

take a trumpeter, proceed to Dusseldorf, and tell the magistrates, that if I am not put in possession of the place forthwith, together with a million of francs, I will destroy every thing in it."

Ney went, threatened, intimidated, and performed his mission so well that Dusseldorf opened its gates. It contained an immense quantity of artillery, stores, and provisions.

Having resumed his excursions, Ney pushed on towards Cleves, at the head of four hundred horse; defeated the enemy, carried the place, and immediately advancing upon Nimeguen, carried that also. Meantime Kléber had resumed the siege of Maestricht. The waters of the Sambre being low, he had been unable to receive the artillery and ammunition necessary for his operations, and the garrison, emboldened by the failure of the former attempts, feared not to attack the besiegers in their trenches. Kléber, irritated at this, urgently demanded Ney; whilst Jourdan, who had employed him elsewhere, was in no haste to comply with the demand. But Gillet having approached the place at the head of a reconnoitring party, put Ney's services in requisition. He kept him, as he stated in his despatch\* to the Commander-in-chief, "at the request of General Kléber, who was anxious to bring the besieged to reason, and sicken them of making sorties." And in truth they were soon confined within their walls. The artillery at length came down the Sambre, and the siege began under the direction of General Bollemont, a brave and able officer, who, though advanced in years, had preserved all the fire and energy of youth. He ordered the engineers to erect nothing but incendiary batteries upon the first parallel, reserving the siege batteries for the second. Such a thing had never been heard of before, but General Bollemont having directed that it should be done, the body of engineers determined to do their best to reach the second parallel without the support of artillery. In carrying their works along the right flank of Mont St. Pierre, they discovered the mouth of a deep cavern, which according to the statements of the country people, had branches extending under the fortress. In verifying this fact, a subterraneous city was discovered, which proved the exact counterpart of the city above. The circumstance was a singular one; the dark city became the sole topic of conversation, and inquiries were set on foot to ascertain the cause of its existence, and the use to which it was applied.

All this gave great uneasiness to the besieged, who sprang a mine in order to encumber the principal entrance, and prevent the besiegers from satisfying their curiosity. The explosion, though terrific, did not produce the effect intended. It occasioned only the fall of a great quantity of earth, leaving an opening like a vast funnel, which about sixty of the French soldiers immediately entered. Considering, from what had just taken place, that there existed a passage communicating with the fortress, they resolved to ascertain that fact. They therefore

\* Dated 22d Vendemiaire, Year III. (13th October, 1794.)



penetrated into the cavern, and proceeded onward to a considerable distance without hearing the least sound, or seeing any thing extraordinary. At length a great noise struck their ears, and they thought they had discovered the passage. Under the excitement of this pretended discovery, they made oath never to see the light again except through the opening which led to the town. But what was their surprise on advancing, to find that the enemy, whom they expected to encounter hand to hand—the foes whose voices they fancied they heard, turned out to be a flock of sheep which the inhabitants had concealed in the cavern. The adventure ended in their finding abundance of food, but no communication with the fortress.

As the place could not be carried but by a regular siege, an attempt was made to obtain its surrender by negotiation. The governor was summoned, pressed to this effect, and the reverses of the coalition very forcibly urged to hasten his compliance. Although his courage was shaken by such a train of disasters, he would come to no decision until he had first communicated with the Hague, and received the instructions of his masters. Kléber replied that the governor would soon have no master but him, and pushed on his works with vigour. The allies had shown, at Lille, Thionville, Valenciennes, and Landrecy, what they were capable of doing. They had added the horrors of fire by bomb-shells to the ravages of their artillery; and it was resolved to use reprisals on this occasion. Three mortar batteries were accordingly erected, and a considerable quantity of shells thrown into the place.

Still the governor persisted in his resistance. His fortifications were injured; his parapets and covered ways no longer presented any thing but a mass of ruins; and still he remained firm. The citizens were less determined; and Kléber was anxious to open a communication with the magistrates. Ney suggested a very simple plan: it was to summon the Austrian commander to allow the French to negotiate with the citizens, threatening him with the displeasure of the whole army if he refused. The expedient seemed good; and Ney being despatched to the gates with a flag of truce, displayed such confidence, and managed matters so well, that he intimidated the Austrians into compliance. He was accordingly conducted to the Town Hall where the City council were sitting. The latter, however, pretended that the constitution deprived them of all right of interference in the defence of the place. It therefore became necessary, after all, to batter in breach; and the works of the besiegers were continued with great vigour. Nevertheless, Kléber felt considerable repugnance to destroy this noble fortress, and determined on making a fresh attempt at negotiation. He again directed his adjutant-general to offer new matter for consideration to these haughty magistrates. Ney again appeared before them, and a discussion commenced which became harsh and animated. The



governor exaggerated his resources; the council relied upon the strength of their ramparts; and all were bent upon running the chances of their resistance.

"If this be your ultimatum," said the adjutant-general, "I am bound to accept it. Your city will be destroyed, but the people you govern shall know to whom they are indebted for this cruel treatment. History will say that it was caused by your indifference to their interests, and your blind devotion to Austria. It will also say that a generous enemy wished to save your citizens and their property; but that you, their natural protectors—you, who are bound to defend them, have sacrificed them without remorse to the pride of a government deaf to the voice of humanity, and which only seeks the vain glory of making a good but useless defence."

This speech produced an excellent effect. The governor himself was moved; he protested that so far from desiring to build his military reputation upon the misfortunes of the citizens, he would readily yield the place the instant he had proof that further resistance was useless.

"And have you not that proof?" replied Ney, with vivacity. "Can your armies, defeated at Aldenhoven, at Juliers, and at La Chartreuse, and whom the terror of our arms is now driving upon the higher as upon the lower Rhine, come to your assistance? And will the Dutch or the English effect that which is beyond the power of your own forces? Defeated on the Wahl, overthrown on the Escaut, they have been unable to defend either Grave or Venloo. Bois-le-Duc and Crèvecœur have just opened their gates to us, and neither the Austrians nor the English can henceforward do any thing for you."

Ney spoke with vehemence, and the governor and magistrates forcibly admitting the truth of his account of the campaign, assumed a milder tone; the negotiations were resumed, and that which force had been unable to effect was obtained by address.

This was a noble termination to a campaign already unequalled in the annals of warfare. The French army had assembled on the 3rd of June, 1794. Though deficient in artillery, and almost without stores, it had marched against the hostile forces which covered the frontiers of France and occupied many strong holds; it had beaten and driven them from the French territory; nay more, it had pursued them across the Sambre, and defeated them in seven pitched battles. On the 16th and 26th of June they were beaten at Fleurus; on the 1st of July at Mont Palissel, in front of Mons, and at the camp of Rœulx; on the 6th at Waterloo; on the 7th at Sombref; on the 18th of September at the passage of the Ourthe; and on the 2d of October at Juliers. During these operations the French army had not received a single check, nor lost a single piece of ordnance; so far from this, it had begun the campaign with a park of only sixteen pieces, and had taken with these pieces, Charleroy, Landrecy, Ques-

noy, Valenciennes, Condé, Namur, Juliers, Maestricht, Mons, Ath, Hall, Brussels, Louvain, Tirlemont, Tongres, St. Trond, Liège, Aix-la-Chapelle, Cologne, Bonn, Coblenz, Creveldt, Gueldres, and Stephenwerth. It had captured nine hundred and ninety-five pieces of cannon, one hundred and five howitzers, and one hundred and fifty-eight mortars. It possessed at the end of the campaign four hundred and fifty field-pieces, stores for a whole year, besides twenty millions of cartridges; and its parks contained one thousand three hundred and sixty-eight pieces of ordnance. Such were the fruits of six months of peril and fatigue.

It might have been expected that such labours would have insured quiet winter-quarters: no such thing. The Austrians still kept open their outlets upon the Rhine, and had, consequently, the power of again spreading over the Palatinate, and of perhaps repossessing themselves of the rich plains from which the republican army had driven them; it was therefore deemed expedient to prevent the possibility of such an irruption, by laying siege to Mayence. Kléber, who commanded this expedition, selected the corps and officers he wished to have with him. Ney was not forgotten, but the general-in-chief also claimed his services, and to elude the orders of the latter to this effect, it was deemed necessary again to have recourse to Gillet. Being thus driven to invoke the good offices of the representative, Kléber did not confine his demand to Ney, but requested also to have Marescot, Chasseloup, Duclos, Floyes, and the whole of the *bande joyeuse* who had assisted at the siege of Maestricht. Gillet felt a delicacy in deciding the question between the commander of the left wing and the general-in-chief, and referred it to the committee; but he took advantage of his despatch to the latter to say a word in favour of the brave men whose services the two commanders were so anxious to secure.

“ “I know them all extremely well,” he wrote to his colleagues, “and have seen them in actual service. They belong to a good and energetic school, by whose precepts they have profited. They display great zeal, and I urgently recommend them to your notice. It is but justice to these brave young men. As for Ney, you will determine whether or not he is to remain with Kléber. For my own part, I think he would be very useful in the army before Mayence. He is a distinguished officer; and is necessary to our large body of cavalry. Men of his stamp are not common.”

The question which Gillet dared not decide was already settled. Ney had seen with indignation the enemy sally forth from their ramparts, crown a redoubt erected in haste, and brave the efforts of the French soldiers. The corps-de-siège was composed of troops partly from the army of the Rhine and partly from that of Sambre-et-Meuse. Anxious to show the former how to fight, he assembled a few dragoons, saw that the horses were rough-shod, so that they could not slide upon the ice, and begged a few voltigeurs from the chef de

bataillon Molitor. "I am going," he said, "to show you a trick after the manner of Sambre-et-Meuse."

Having put his voltigeurs in motion, they attacked the redoubt in front, whilst he got on the other side and brought up his dragoons against the pass it defended; but the latter hesitated and dared not follow him, so that he penetrated alone into the redoubt. Surrounded by the enemy, single-handed he cut his way through them, recrossed the ditch, and escaped under a shower of balls; but he received a wound in his arm, the pain of which was increased by the motion of his horse. A species of lock-jaw ensued, and he became restless and desponding; at one moment under the excitement of burning fever, at the next weakened by the sufferings he endured, he refused all surgical aid. His friends, uneasy at the strange turn his disorder had taken, hit upon an expedient to bring him to himself. Having assembled the musicians and young girls of the village, with Kléber and the representative Merlin at their head, they all went in procession to Ney's quarters, and danced the farandolle round his bed. The noise was at first unpleasant to him, but by degrees he joined in the hilarity it occasioned. He then laughed at his gloomy thoughts and gave up his arm to the surgeons; his only uneasiness being now about the length of time his cure would take,—his only anxiety that of knowing how soon he should be able to return and face the enemy. Being informed that he had been appointed general of brigade, this promotion was only a source of uneasiness to him. He did not think he had done enough to merit that rank; and wished to leave it to those who, as he said, had better claims than his. In vain were his scruples laughed at—in vain was he urged to accept the promotion; it was impossible to shake his resistance or overcome his modesty. The chief of the staff came to his assistance on the occasion.

"If you persist," wrote the latter, "in refusing the rank of General of Brigade, to which you have been appointed by the representative Merlin, I think you had better write to the board of organization of the land forces. This would be the more advisable, as the representative Merlin is not yet returned from his journey to Paris.

"Health and Fraternity.

"BOURCIER, General of Division, and  
Chief of the General Staff."

"Head-quarters, Gandowblam, the 13th of Pluviose,  
Year III. (1st February 1795.)"

Ney acted upon this suggestion, wrote to the board, and by dint of entreaty succeeded in getting his excuses accepted. As his wound continued painful, the representative Merlin recommended him to try his native air.

"My brave friend," he wrote, "go and complete your cure at

Sarrelibre,\* your birth-place. I have despatched an order to the surgeon of first class, Bonaventure, to send one of his pupils with you. Return soon, and lend us your powerful aid against the enemies of your country.

“ Health and Fraternity.

MERLIN.”

“ Head-quarters at Oberingelheim, the 18th Nivose,  
Year III. (7th January, 1795.)”

Kléber, also desirous of giving Ney a proof of his regard, and the value in which he held the services of that officer, addressed him the following document :

“ Head-quarters of Observation, Ingelheim, 22nd Nivose,  
Year III. (February 10th, 1795.)

“ THE GENERAL OF DIVISION KLEBER, COMMANDING THE CORPS  
D'ARMÉE BEFORE MAYENCE,

“ Hereby certifies that Citizen Ney, adjutant-general, *chêf-de-brigade*, commanded with distinction various bodies of cavalry during the campaign of the army of Sambre-et-Meuse ; that in every operation entrusted to him, he displayed the most consummate skill and bravery, particularly at the siege of Maestricht, where by his valour he did eminent service to the commonwealth ; that having volunteered his services to the army before Mayence, in co-operating towards the capture of that place, he received, in a sortie, a gun-shot wound which has suspended his activity of service until his perfect cure.

KLEBER.”

\* The name of Sarrelouis was changed by the Jacobins to that of Sarrelibre.



## BOOK THE SECOND.

## CHAPTER I.

THE spring was advancing, active operations were about to be resumed, and Ney's wound was not yet healed. With anxiety, though resigned, he watched the slow progress of his convalescence. His hopes were still buoyant, and he trusted that his youth and the approaching season would speedily restore him to health, and that in the mean time the want of necessities, unforeseen military combinations, or some other incident, might delay for a little while the passage of the Rhine. A note from Kléber, however, put these notions to flight. The General ordered him to join the army the moment his wound would allow of his doing so; and Ney, supposing that the campaign was immediately to commence, set out forthwith for head-quarters, without regard to the state of his wound, and in spite of the remonstrances of his surgeon.

The month of May had already commenced. It had been intended to send detachments to many parts of the Duchy of Berg, invest Mayence, force Ehrenbreitstein, and by occupying the rich valley of Maine, make the war feed itself; the ultimate object being to impose terms of peace upon the enemy. But the troubles in France became daily more serious. The faction, defeated on the 9th of Thermidor, attempted to excite fresh insurrections. Beaten on the 12th of Germinal, it had arisen on the 1st of Prairial more formidable and more violent than ever; and the Government, in open rupture with the Jacobins as well as with the companies of Jesus, and embarrassed besides by domestic troubles, had scarcely leisure to bestow its attention upon dangers threatened from abroad. Weariness and disgust had likewise crept into all ranks; and the people would have no more contests, no more battles, and, above all, no more sacrifices.

The committee would willingly have yielded to the general wish, for nothing could be more pacific than the feelings of the men who composed it; but peace was a blessing which the "kings of the earth" would not suffer the French people to enjoy. The governors of the republic were therefore compelled to push on the war; and Richard, the representative attached to the army of the North, was

directed to collect the means of constructing bridges, in order that the army of Sambre-et-Meuse might cross the Rhine.

Meantime Luxemburg had surrendered; an event which ought to have given fresh activity to these preparations. It only served, however, to delay them. No sooner was the garrison of that city freed from the iron discipline which had ruled it, than the licentiousness of the Austrian soldiery burst forth. Clairfayt's battalion immediately disbanded itself; the men indignantly pulled the metal plates from their caps, trod the imperial insignia under foot, and ran tumultuously through the streets, crying, "Vive la France!"—"Vive la liberté!" This unexpected explosion, attended with such a profession of principles, created no little surprise. It led to the supposition that the Austrians were impatient under the yoke of despotism; and the republican government flattered itself that the Aulic council, too prudent to prolong a crisis which might prove fatal to itself, would at length submit to put an end to a contest whose dangers were not wholly confined to cannon-balls. This supposition was plausible enough, and a whimsical incident occurred to give it some appearance of consistency.

Luxemburg, as we have just stated, had opened its gates. The representatives, persuaded that henceforward it would continue to belong to France, ordered a fête "in honour of the marriage of this place to the French republic." Field Marshal Bender, who had surrendered it, was invited to this fête. He was an old soldier, of a lively and amiable disposition. The ceremony seemed to him a good joke, and he attended it at the head of his staff. Jourdan was also present with his. This was the first time any of the hostile forces had met in amity, and such a meeting seemed to afford pleasure to both parties. The conversation soon became confidential; no one on either side disguised his opinions or antipathies. The Austrians, full of esteem for the French, looked upon the Prussians with an aversion which existing circumstances tended to increase; and they were impatient to put an end to hostilities with a nation who had fought them nobly, in order to call an unworthy ally to account for the reverses caused by his defection.

The representative Talot, struck with the sentiments of his guests, reported them to the committee. A French agent at Vienna also gave an account of some confidential sayings which had escaped certain Austrian generals, as being the sentiments of the council. The committee took fire at these vague communications, and persuaded themselves that the war with the Empire was on the eve of termination. The preparations for the campaign were therefore suspended, the transmission of supplies stopped, and the government, without calculating the distance, now thought only of transferring the armies of the Rhine to the Pyrenees. And as an imprudent measure always requires a pretence to excuse or mask its object, the want of means was alleged, and the deficiency of arms and ammunition.

Thus were the preparations making in the North entirely stopped. In vain did Pichegru complain of want of supplies in all the fortified towns—in vain did Jourdan urge the weakness of his muster-rolls; the former received no supplies, the latter no recruits. The armies destined to cross the Rhine were on the eve of dissolution on the left bank of that river. Nothing was doing, nothing in progress; and to fill the measure of evil, the remainder of the season was about to be employed in useless marches. In vain was a cry raised against such an error in judgment;—the committee had all the sensitiveness attached to power, and would not change their measures. Much time was lost in hesitation, in discussion, and in again mooted a question already disposed of. Gillet, who deplored this cruel uncertainty, succeeded at length in putting an end to it. He had long remained, as we have already shown, with the army of Sambre-et-Meuse, and was well acquainted with its feelings, and opinions, and wants. He also knew what there was to expect and what to fear from the Austrians. He pointed out to the committee the fallacy of the hopes they nurtured, and the danger of the measures they seemed resolved to adopt in consequence. If the army, he observed, wanted means of conveyance or stores, the enemy must be made to supply them. The Rhine must be crossed, horses must be obtained, and the service of the army organized at the expense of the riverain princes. In short, that which had been done during the preceding campaign, must be repeated, and the enemy forced to pay the expenses of the war which they had declared. But to withdraw from the Rhine when all was ready to cross it—when two hundred thousand imperialists were pressing towards its banks, was at once to decline a battle, and expose the French provinces to the chance of an invasion. Besides, what an unfavourable impression would such a resolution make upon the army, whose battalions loudly demanded and fully expected to be led against the Austrians! And, indeed, this expectation alone had prevented the soldiers from deserting, like those of the army in the South. Surely such a consequence was not to be risked; for, if even a defensive warfare were adopted, it would surely lead to the immediate dissolution of the army.

“Our armies,” he continued, “bear no resemblance to mercenary troops. Each individual composing them, fights to obtain peace. This is the reason why, with soldiers like ours, the enemy must often be attacked. The more numerous the battles, the greater is the satisfaction of the men; because, being excited by the hope of peace, they can better ascertain the precise period at which it will reach them, and when they shall be able, in consequence of it, to return to their families. If you keep them unoccupied, each individual soldier will think that you can have no occasion for him if he is to remain idle, and this will induce him to desert.

“Our intestine commotions are greatly exaggerated; but admitting them to exist to the extent alleged, do you think to appease them by



exposing yourselves to reverses on the frontiers? Gain victories over the foreigners who attack you, and you will deprive our factions at home of all hopes of support. Would you acquire respect at home and abroad?—strike terror into your enemies by the splendour of your victories.

“I have, I confess, no particular attachment to the principle that the Rhine should form our limits; but I should consider it an act of high treason to restore the Austrian provinces on this side of that river. There are likewise portions of territory, and electorates, which must at all events be ceded to us. Should this question be debated some day, I will lay before the committee a paper upon the new frontiers which would suit France, and the points on which they should be defended.”

These reasons were unanswerable, and the government yielded to them. The project of sending to the Pyrenees the troops collected on the Rhine was abandoned, whilst that of passing this river and carrying on the sieges of the fortresses beyond it was resumed. Richard had yielded to the same illusions which had seduced the Committee of Public Safety; like them, he had relied too implicitly upon confidential communications made to mislead him. He also had suffered himself to be deceived by false overtures, and now that the construction of bridges was to be resumed, he demanded six weeks to get every thing ready. This was too serious a delay; and as there were numerous boats on the Meuse and the Moselle, it was decided that they should be used for the passage of the Rhine. But this was attended with no little difficulty; for how were the boats to be conveyed from one of those rivers to the Rhine?—and how were they to be lowered into it from the other, and brought to the point where they were to be used? The project was beset with difficulties; nevertheless there was good hope of its success. The work was begun; trucks served for one operation and an inclined moveable bridge for the other;—the rest was left to Providence. Every thing succeeded without accident, and the boats reached the river for which they were destined. But here the danger began.

The fort of Ehrenbreitstein commands the mouth of the Moselle, and batteries had been erected all along the right bank of the Rhine. It was a fine moonlight night, not a breath of air was stirring, and the enemy were anxiously watching for the boats to come within the range of their guns. The danger was certainly great, but there was still greater in hesitation, and the boats, trusting to Providence, dashed on towards Neuwied. The enemy's forts and works along the river thundered their artillery at the little vessels, which received a shower of grape-shot as they passed. But in a moment of peril there is something that elevates the soul. The French mariners braved death with as much coolness as if they were exposed to no danger whatever. Each successive battery, as they appeared before it, took up and continued the fire which those already passed had discontinued, causing



considerable damage to the boats. The brave crews, however, uniting their exertions to the force of the current which carried them along, at length peaceably anchored behind the dikes. Neuwied then opened its fire. That beautiful city, so highly embellished by art, and lately enjoying all the blessings of peace, was now transformed into a fortress, raining its murderous projectiles, without mercy, upon the French boats. This aggression was vigorously answered; but long did the French carefully abstain from injuring the city. They even exposed themselves to great risk with this kindly feeling; but the greater their forbearance, the hotter was the fire from the fortress. Their patience became at length exhausted; they threw shells into the town, and in a few hours reduced it to ashes.

Every thing was now ready, and the boats assembled. The republicans could now land on the opposite bank, reach the enemy, and force them back. But this was not enough for Kléber, whose plan was not merely to beat them, but to dislodge them from the positions they had so long occupied. He proposed turning them with his right, cutting off their retreat with his left, routing them, and depriving them of every other means of escape except across the mountains.

This was a great undertaking; for it was necessary to force a line of redoubts which, connected with each other, and palisaded and protected by covered ways, left but little chance of attacking them with success. Dusseldorf must likewise be again taken, and the Count of Erbach defeated, who was waiting for the republicans at the head of twenty thousand picked men. Kléber however had confidence in his plans; he had already erected batteries on the left bank, and his men were eager to come to blows. His preparations were soon made. Lefebvre led the left, Championnet the centre, and Grenier, who commanded the right, was directed to force Dusseldorf. These commanders were calculated to inspire their corps with courage; officers and men threw themselves into the boats, braved the Austrian grape-shot, and landed on the opposite bank. On the 5th of September, at day-break, the republicans occupied the approaches to the river on both sides.

The Rhine once passed, the two wings of the army began offensive operations. The town of Dusseldorf and the line of redoubts being battered by a formidable artillery, seemed to totter. Legrand advanced upon Dusseldorf, and Lefebvre pushed on to Portz, encroaching a little as he proceeded, upon a neck of land confided to the charge of King William. The Prussians endeavoured to stop the one, the Palatine forces to make head against the other; but Lefebvre was not a man to lose time in discussion. He allowed the officer of Hohenlohe to say what he pleased, and pushed on towards Opladen, which the enemy occupied in great force. Lefebvre charged and drove them in great disorder into Eberfeldt. Ney, pursuing them with ardour, soon appeared before that place. The town was opu-

lent ; its riches had awakened the cupidity of the retreating Austrians, and it had undergone every act of violence that a routed army could attempt. The French forces were however at the heels of their defeated opponents. Naked, hungry, and in the excitement of victory, they were expected to commit much greater excesses ; at least so the Austrians had said. They had stated that a French army of a hundred and fifty thousand men was in pursuit of them ; and that the republicans spared neither women nor children, but ravaged every place they reached with fire and sword. The alarmed inhabitants therefore feared their total destruction was at hand.

Although the French had been represented as insatiable, the magistrates did not despair of averting the tempest which threatened them. They went out to meet the French columns, and endeavour to conciliate their kindness by the most lowly supplications and the most splendid offers. Ney, ignorant of the cause of their terror, was as surprised at their abject bearing as at the means they employed to obtain his good will. "Money!" said he ; "I did not expect such a proposal ; but since you have more than you require, employ it in relieving my men, who are in want of every thing. You cannot make a better use of it. The soldier is never unruly but when his wants are not satisfied."

The dread of the magistrates gave way to astonishment. They had expected to see the town pillaged by a swarm of barbarians, and, instead of the acts of violence announced by the Austrians, they found disinterestedness in the commander, and amenity and moderation in his men. The latter were relieved ; they obtained clothes and shoes. Meantime the imperialists were precipitating their retreat, and Ney resumed his pursuit. Leaving the town, he again followed them into the mountains. The ravines were deep ; whilst rocks and trees thrown across the road continually interrupted his progress. But success doubles a man's power ; and Ney's corps, after crossing torrents and climbing precipices, overtook the enemy, and was on the point of forcing them to lay down their arms. But the French forces had been unable to attack them on the left, in consequence of the line of neutrality ; and the Austrians, less scrupulous than the French, threw themselves into the county of La Marche and escaped.

Ney might have followed them ; but he considered himself bound to respect a solemn convention, although the Austrians had violated it, and he took the road to Sollingen, an immense manufactory of arms, which in time of peace rivalled with those of France. In time of war Sollingen supplied arms to the enemies of the latter country. It was important to obtain possession of this place, and to apply to the use of the republicans that which was intended to effect their defeat. But Ney had scarcely occupied Sollingen ere the Austrians again appeared.

The Prussians having loudly complained of the violation of their territory, the Count of Erbach dared not persevere, and returned to

the point whence he entered it. Ney, informed of his motions, joined him behind Lenap. Each was soon ready for action. The Austrians were six thousand strong; but Ney having only a few hundred men with him, could not with such numerical inferiority risk an engagement. He extended the heads of his columns in one direction, sent patrols in another, and managed his manœuvres so well, that Erbach dared not attack him. But such circumspection nearly proved fatal to him, and only rendered his situation more distressing. The Count being intimidated, had rallied all the forces he could control, and General Rise had brought him considerable reinforcements. General Fink was also about to debouch, and the situation of the French was becoming very critical; for the Austrians might force them, reach Mulheim, and again open the line of communication which the republican troops had intercepted.

From the offensive, Ney was obliged to assume the defensive; his forces were so out of proportion with those of the enemy, that he was obliged to find, in the quickness of his manœuvres and the difficulties of the ground, a substitute for the reinforcements he wanted. He destroyed the bridges, cut up the roads, and, sometimes giving way, sometimes fighting—employing by turns prudence and the most daring courage—succeeded in foiling his numerous foes, and in preventing the defeat of the plan of operations laid down by the commander of the French army. The Count of Erbach, despairing of being able to force Ney's small body, again crossed the neutral territory, and reached Frankfort. Ney was less scrupulous this time, and prepared to follow him; but Jourdan still considered himself bound to respect a neutrality of which the Austrians seemed to take so little account.



## CHAPTER II.

THE right wing and centre had crossed the Rhine; the different corps of the army were united, and orders given to advance: Lefebvre led the van. The Prince of Wirtemberg, Wartensleben, and Erbach, had reached the mountains, where they were occupied in rallying their men and taking up positions. They placed detachments in advance of the republican forces to impede their progress, but did not succeed in their object; the only effect they produced was to make the French columns press forward. The latter moved on towards the Sieg, and debouched upon the points they were to occupy; the enemy dispersing every where at their approach. The heights being still crowned by a body of French emigrants, Ney attacked and drove the latter from their positions; after which, nothing farther opposed the passage of the French army. The Sieg being crossed, the ground was found extremely bad; the troops, however, pushed forward. Whilst they were taking up their positions, the Austrians rallied, and concentrated their forces in front of Hennef. Being attacked on the following day by the whole of the French vanguard, they received the shock without being moved, and, notwithstanding all Lefebvre's exertions, he was more than two hours ere he could break them. Even then, these valiant soldiers gave way only to rally upon the neighbouring heights; where, having formed under the protection of a redoubt, they opposed the most determined and intrepid resistance. Ney arrived in the midst of the action, stormed the work which covered them, and artillery-men, infantry, emigrants, and Austrians, were all trampled under the horses' feet.

As the French army pushed forward, they found that the country became more rugged and impracticable. Here was a dark forest, there a deep glen; a torrent roared in one direction, a mountain crossed in another. The republicans found an obstacle at every step they took: at one place they had to cut a passage through a wood, at another to construct a bridge, at a third to attack and carry a defile. They, however, triumphed over all difficulties, and came within sight of Altenkirchen.

The Austrians having employed in re-forming their columns, the time which their opponents had occupied in overcoming the difficulties of the ground, had taken up a strong position upon the heights. They were drawn up in line of battle, under cover of a formidable artillery; an open attack might therefore have been foiled, and recourse was had to stratagem. Ney took a demi-brigade of light infantry, with three squadrons of hussars, and, ascending the Sieg, advanced upon Ruppichterod. The time was calculated with precision, and Lefebvre



marched up to the enemy ere, according to his judgment, Ney could have reached the heights. The ground was cut up and extremely difficult, and he could use neither his cavalry nor his artillery, which reduced his forces to a few thousand men; he advanced nevertheless, and the action commenced. All along the line, from right to left, the troops were in a moment engaged; but it was impossible to overpower a whole army with a handful of men. These were repulsed, brought up again to the charge, and might, perhaps, have suffered severely, had not Ney fortunately succeeded in his movement; his appearance having thrown the Austrians into disorder, Lefebvre's men were again brought up, and the imperialists completely routed.

Fortune continued to crown the French arms with success. The republican forces were about to reach the Lahn, and perhaps cut off the retreat of the defeated Austrians; the army was in high spirits at this prospect, as well as at the idea of seeing the complete success of those combinations which had been on the point of being frustrated at the very outset. Mayence was about to be invested, and the Austrians could no longer maintain themselves upon the left bank of the Rhine. The French frontiers were settled, and the republican armies on the eve of reaping the fruits of their labours; but the advantages to be derived from the prodigies that had been performed, were not to be enjoyed for a long time to come. The success of armies, which on all other occasions produces abundance, far from relieving the wants of the French soldiers, tended only to increase them; for the committee in their wisdom had imagined that the war was to pay its own expenses, and had confiscated to their own profit the provisions, cloth, iron, and horses, found in the conquered territories.

This measure, which, as they said, was "to *provision* their own forces, and *disprovision* those of the Austrians," only partially produced this effect. It ruined the Duchy of Berg, without benefiting the soldiers of the republic, or filling its warehouses. The feeble cattle, which before had dragged on the provision wagons, were now taken away under pretence of evacuations and transports, and were sacrificed to the cupidity of that swarm of vampires which followed in the train of the French armies. The whole country was given up to plunder, and the rich booty which was to have insured success, served only to counteract it. No escort now brought to the soldier the humble ration which secured him from the horrors of famine; no wagon now appeared to receive the wounded. Almost naked, without food, and barefooted, the French soldiers still held themselves in readiness to follow up their victories. But if courage is inexhaustible, physical want has likewise its limits of endurance. Condemned, in the midst of a country of abundance, to live upon a single ration of bread, the French soldier had borne it without a murmur; but even this feeble subsistence was now taken away. At first the troops were reduced to half a ration, then to a quarter, and during the last ten days they had received none at all. Jourdan, cut to the soul at this

cruel conduct, and deeply affected at the admirable fortitude of his men, dared not, under such circumstances, risk sending them in pursuit of the enemy. Nevertheless, it was necessary to commence a pursuit, in order to conceal the state of destitution to which the French troops were reduced; and the general selected for this service the men and horses least weakened by famine. All the provisions that remained were distributed among them; and one part of this body was directed upon Freysingen, the other upon Hachenburg.

At the same time patrols were sent to the different villages, and flour and bread collected in sufficient quantity for a first consumption. But time had been lost; and in war, time is the most valuable of all things. Nevertheless, the troops advanced, and pushed on towards the Lahn, which they purposed crossing; but the bridges were either broken or barricaded, and the Austrians drawn up in an attitude of defence. To force the passage was a measure of some difficulty; but both soldiers and officers were animated with the most generous courage. Bernadotte carried Nassau, Championnet obtained possession of Limburg, and Poncet throwing himself into the river at the head of a small body of troops, swam across, and took Dietz. On all sides were the Austrians broken, and thrown into the greatest confusion. Night came, and the French army halted. They remained masters of the field of battle, and resolved on the morrow to renew their operations. Grenier occupied Weilburg, Lefebvre had established his quarters at Wetzlar, and Ney, scouring the country according to custom, seized a convoy of provisions, and captured a considerable quantity of stores and clothing; there was consequently abundance to meet the most pressing wants of the army.

The enemy beaten during the day, dared not renew the contest. They raised their camp and disappeared as soon as they saw the republicans take up their position for the night. The latter pursued them, pushed them upon Mayence, and themselves debouched upon Hochheim. Mayence was now on the point of being completely invested; and the French hoped ere long to see the whole of the left bank acknowledge no flag but theirs.

Whilst they were indulging in such hopes, the Austrians were taking means to disappoint them. The latter had extended their line from Frankfort to Aschaffenburg. The river alone separated the two armies; but for want of provisions and ammunition the French were unable to go over to attack them. Better provided than the latter, the Austrians assumed the offensive in their turn, and crossed the river to attack the French, but were very cautious in their attempts. They imitated the very manœuvre that their adversaries had before used at Eltkamp, requested the Prussian safeguards to shut their eyes, and directing towards Friedberg the masses which Pichegru's inaction allowed them to dispose of, threatened to turn the left wing of the republican army. The movement was well conceived, executed with courage, and the French were forced to make a retrograde movement.

The latter had advanced without marking their progress by any pitched battle, and they now retired without any serious battle marking their retreat. They were unable to maintain their conquests, to repossess which seemed the only object of the Austrians; and all this took place almost without fighting. But success engenders boldness; and Clairfayt, who was in sight of the Hunsdruck hills, was anxious to occupy the mountain gorges. The contest accordingly recommenced with violence, and General Marceau carried it on with vigour. His attitude and manœuvres soon showed the Austrians that they had a most formidable adversary in this officer. Admiration is expansive; they conveyed to him the expression of their sense of his talents, and he received the compliment with courtesy. Words of peace were then exchanged; nay more, proposals for an armistice were ventured upon. But we will extract Pichegru's account of the manner in which it was concluded, and under what feelings. The following is a letter which that general wrote to Moreau :

“ Herxheim, January 10th, 1796.

“ You surpassed yourself in writing to me immediately on the 28th of Frimaire and the 4th of Nivose. At present you have a right to accuse me of idleness; but the public papers have amply made up for it with regard to ourselves, and if I do not say enough on the subject, it is because they have said too much, and even propagated some errors. I must in the first place offer a few words concerning our operations, in order that you may understand me.

“ The last actions in which both the army of Sambre-et-Meuse and this were engaged, took place during the last days of Frimaire. They were not very important; but the right wing of Sambre-et-Meuse, which had been defeated on the 21st, took its revenge by a marked success of from four to five hundred prisoners and two pieces of cannon. It then marched once more upon the Nahe, from which it had been forced to withdraw. It was immediately after this action that General Clairfayt proposed to General Jourdan a cessation of hostilities, in order to give the troops some rest. Jourdan replied that he would consent to suspend hostilities provisionally; but that he could make no definitive arrangement on the subject without my concurrence. He then sent me an account of what had passed; and General Wurmser having likewise despatched to me an officer of his staff, we drew up together the document of which I enclose a copy. General Jourdan having done the same, we sent our act for the approval of government. The public papers have informed us that the government is not pleased with it; and without believing that it has called forth all the indignation which some pretend, I can see by the answer we have received that the act has not been approved of, because we had no right to make it. I think, however, I have read—perhaps in one of our preceding constitutions—that the General-in-chief of an army has the power of granting armistices.



“However, whilst the form has been disapproved of, the subject matter has been ratified, and the armistice is maintained till further orders, according to the tenour of the enclosed paper. I am therefore about to enable the troops to take the rest that will be allowed them, by placing part of them in cantonments. I shall leave but a slight cordon upon our line, whose right is at Linguenfeldt beyond Gernersheim, and its left at Homburg. The army of Sambre-et-Meuse will leave twenty thousand men in the Hunsdruck, and the remainder will occupy the cantonments in the territory of Juliers. The cordon in the Hunsdruck will support its left at Bacharach, its centre upon the Nahe at Kirn, and its right at St. Vendel, in ascending the same river.

“I do not count upon being employed in the renewal of hostilities; for I have, six different times, demanded my recall. I desire it more and more, and shall not cease to urge it. The levity and injustice with which I have seen the commander treated who does not always succeed, have excited in me a feeling of disgust which it will be difficult to overcome. Be that however as it may, it shall never alter my friendship for you.

PICHEGRU.”



## CHAPTER III.

PICHEGRU's resignation, so often tendered, was at last accepted, and Moreau, who had already succeeded him in his command in Holland, again succeeded him on the Rhine. But this choice, judicious as it was, proved but an imperfect remedy to the evil; the troops still remained in the same state of destitution, and the different branches of the service in the same disorder. The cavalry and artillery were without horses; and the provisions supplied by Belgium, which had obtained permission to pay its contributions in kind, could not be sent to the Moselle for want of the means of carriage. Ammunition was as scarce as food; in short there was a deficiency of every thing, and the stores were completely exhausted.

The campaign in Italy was just opened, and Bonaparte had beaten the Austrians at Montenotte and Millesimo. His brethren in arms on the Rhine were impatient to share in his glorious undertakings; but it was necessary to reap the first-fruits of his victories, in order to procure the means of doing so. The government had at last become more generous. Provisions, horses, and clothing, formerly obtained with great difficulty, were freely granted at the present juncture. The French forces now endeavoured to gain time, in order to collect these new resources, but Prince Charles, who had just assumed the command of the Austrian army, was not over anxious that his adversaries should increase their strength; he, therefore, on the 21st of May, gave notice of the rupture of the armistice. Though too soon, this notification gave general satisfaction to the French army; the irritation produced by suffering was now added to its natural enthusiasm, and the close of its inaction was hailed with joy.

The Austrians had assembled the greatest part of their forces upon the Nahe. Their right wing, commanded by the Prince of Wirtemberg, was distributed between the Lahn and the Sieg. The French prepared to meet them. Kléber occupied Dusseldorf with the divisions of Lefebvre and Collaud, and had concentrated his forces towards Opladen. On the 31st of May 1796, at day-break, he began his march. The Austrians were themselves preparing to commence operations; but Kléber wished to be beforehand with them. He advanced rapidly upon the Acher, a stream issuing from the Sieg, from which it is separated by a narrow strip of land interspersed with woods, ravines, and all the obstacles generally to be found in mountainous districts. Four battalions, with artillery and a few horse soldiers, defended this neck of land, which was protected on the second line by a deep river, and a numerous army. The Prince of Wirtemberg came and strengthened the latter. Kléber having determined to

force this point, crossed the Acher on the 1st of June, overthrew the troops he met on his way, and reached the Sieg. Here the danger began; and here indeed lay the whole difficulty of the undertaking.

The enemy in strong force occupied Siegburg; the columns which the Prince of Wirtemberg was bringing from Neuwied, were beginning to debouch, and the situation of the French became every instant more critical. Nevertheless, there was no alternative;—the passage must be surprised, and the troops dispersed who were preparing to defend it. Lefebvre was already before Siegburg; and Collaud, whose van was commanded by Ney, had reached Minden. The enemy were attacked with the most irresistible impetuosity. On the right, the bridge, together with the artillery which defended it, was carried in a moment; to the left, the river was forded, its steep banks climbed, and the forces which guarded them separated into two parts, one of which Collaud drove upon the Rhine after dispersing and nearly destroying the other. Meantime the fire was becoming brisk toward Siegburg, where Lefebvre's corps was warmly engaged. Collaud despatched two battalions in pursuit of the body of the enemy which he had cut off, and marched to the assistance of his colleague.

This act of foresight was most fortunate. The Prince of Wirtemberg had pressed his movement; his last columns had reached the field of battle; the action had become warmer every instant, and Lefebvre was in danger of being overpowered. D'Hautpoul, however, had just debouched. This officer had the eye of an eagle, and was endowed with an intrepidity which shrank before no obstacle. Every thing, therefore, might be expected from him: but his cavalry was fatigued, the horses were out of breath, and two successive charges had scarcely been sufficient to stop the progress of the Hulans. The position of Lefebvre was therefore becoming more and more critical, when Collaud appeared. Ney led the hussars, and Ormansey the chasseurs. Their arrival seemed for an instant to surprise the enemy, who however soon recovered. The success which the latter had already obtained, and the laurels they still expected to reap, had wound up their courage to a high pitch of excitement, and they resisted for a considerable time without flinching, the shock of these fresh troops. But violent fatigue always follows such exertions. The Austrians were tired of fighting without conquering, and were astonished at not being able to break the French ranks. The Barco hussars hesitated to make another charge, and there was some confusion in their ranks. Ney took advantage of this, and charging them with impetuosity, put them to rout; then despatching part of his force in pursuit of them, threw himself with the remainder upon that swarm of cavalry which the disaster of one of the wings of the Austrian army had just put into motion. But what Ney had already done, had changed the aspect of affairs. Ormansey rushed with fury upon the squadrons that resisted him; Richepanse broke into the ranks opposed to him; and the *mélée* became furious;—death was dealt on either

side with an unflinching hand, and its victims uttered not a cry. The Austrians, overpowered, sought in vain to evacuate the field of battle; flight was still more murderous than resistance. Driven in one direction, overwhelmed in another—wherever they appeared, and whatever obstacles they opposed to the French, they found nothing but shame and defeat.

Richepanse, following up the victory, spread death in the midst of their terror-struck cavalry. A column of infantry attempting to stop him, he halted, exhausted his fire upon them, then charging, overthrew and dispersed them even to the last man.

The main body of the Austrian army soon encountered a similar fate. Ney, Richepanse, and D'Hautpoul returned, and came upon it at the head of a body of cavalry, eager for fame, and elated by the day's victory. The Austrians dared not meet the attack, but retreated and gained Ukerath, leaving two thousand four hundred prisoners in the hands of the French.

Ukerath was an intrenched position covered with artillery, and could be attacked only in front; neither could it be turned except by a very long circuit. The men were worn out; the fatigue of the march, together with that of the battle, had exhausted their strength, and it was found necessary to halt. They however prepared to assail the Austrians in the rear, no longer daring to attack them in front; but the latter had no greater confidence in their means of resistance than the French had in their means of attack; and as soon as the night set in, they began their retreat. At daybreak the French discovered that they had decamped.

The republican forces forthwith crowned the heights, and advanced beyond Ukerath; but having left their quarters without provisions or stores, they had no supplies; and the convoys of provisions not appearing, they were forced to delay their pursuit. It was important however to ascertain not only the road the enemy had taken, but the position they occupied; and reconnoitring parties were directed upon Dierdorf, and detachments despatched to Altenkirchen. The country having been explored during the preceding campaign, it was presumed that the Austrians had divided their forces, and were occupying both these places in considerable numbers. The conjecture was right; they had spread their light infantry along the banks of the Wittbach, and occupied the heights of Altenkirchen with from twenty to twenty-two thousand men. This position, naturally strong, became almost impregnable from the forces and artillery by which it was defended. Kléber had recourse to his usual manœuvre on this occasion; he resolved to turn it and attack it in front at the same time. Ney was ordered to threaten it in the rear, Lefebvre to force it in front, and Collaud to station his men on the second line, ready to support either of the two that should require his assistance. Fortunately it was needed by neither.

Lefebvre had drawn up his forces in three columns; Soult led the



left, Brunet, commanding the 25th demi-brigade, the right, and Leval the centre. The action began on the 4th of June. The French soldiers seemed to fear neither the grape-shot nor the obstacles arising from the nature of the ground, but rushed upon the batteries, and climbed the heights, deterred by neither the fire nor the steepness.

The Austrians, on the other hand, displayed the most admirable courage; attacking and attacked by turns, their resistance was most obstinate, and was overcome only with great difficulty. They were at length obliged to give way; heavy charges of cavalry completed that which the bayonet had begun. Two hours sufficed to decide the contest—in that short period all was over. It is true that never did infantry display more order and method, or cavalry more fearlessness of death, than those of the French. Richepanse animated the latter with his own energy; covered with blood, and his arm in a sling, he constantly brought his men to the charge, and unceasingly stimulated their courage. This noble conduct led to an act which must have proved highly flattering to his feelings: promotion still depending upon the election of the soldiers, the army conferred upon him the rank of General, which promotion was sanctioned by Kléber.

The French made three thousand prisoners, took twelve pieces of cannon and four stands of colours;—no victory could be more splendid. But this was not all; Ney had also made his captures. Not content with spreading confusion in the rear of the enemy, and facilitating the success of the troops who were attacking Altenkirchen, he had obtained advantages which belonged exclusively to himself. He had defeated the columns that defended Schomberg, and overthrown the forces which covered Dierdorf; he had also put to flight and pursued the enemy's flankers upon the Whittbach. But the country was intersected, hilly, and covered with light troops, and for the space of two hours he had to encounter detachments constantly succeeding each other. During this time, his front, his flanks, and his rear, were successively attacked; but, firm as a rock in the midst of the enemy, he succeeded in routing some, keeping others at bay, and, continuing steadily his march, fighting as he advanced, he thought he had at length reached the term of these annoyances: a still more dangerous attack, however, awaited him. A column of infantry, supported by a body of hussars, had placed themselves on his passage, and as soon as he appeared, they poured their fire upon his troops. This sudden explosion, however, made no impression upon the latter, who rushed upon these new foes. The infantry fled to the woods, and the horse gained Dierdorf. Ney pursued them, took some prisoners, pressed the others, and entered with them into the town, which he found well stored with hay, oats, flour, and all kinds of supplies.

Meantime Lefebvre was marching upon Oberhadamar; the Prince of Wirtemberg had betaken himself to flight; General Finck was on the eve of being surrounded at Neuwied; and the French were about

to reap the benefits of their labours and trials, and of the fatigues they had encountered in these bleak mountains.

Ney continued his movement. Montabaur had served as a place of refuge for General Finck's retreating corps; it contained provisions and noble warehouses full of supplies. Ney advanced towards it; the troops who covered the place endeavoured to stop him; but he soon routed them, and made a capture still richer than that at Dierdorf. Twelve hundred and forty quintals of flour, four hundred sacks of oats, and two hundred thousand rations of hay, were the fruits of this feat of arms.

The Austrians, ashamed, however, of having been forced by a handful of men overcome with fatigue, determined to take advantage of the night to carry off or at least destroy the stores they had proved unable to defend. The night was dark, the French soldiers were plunged in a death-like sleep, and the garrison of Ehrenbreitstein was advancing to attempt this coup-de-main; but Ney, having penetrated their design, went out, charged them, and sent them back to their quarters in the greatest confusion.

Finck having reached Nassau, and the Prince of Wirtemberg having crossed the Lahn at Limburg, the French lost the advantages which they had anticipated from their exertions. They had captured, it is true, abundance of stores, and were thus sure of supplies for some days to come; but they had no means of conveyance, for the peasantry, who had withdrawn to the mountains, had left neither cattle nor wagons. Thus the republicans experienced a real famine in the midst of plenty, and were forced to undergo great hardships.

The French soldiers, nevertheless, displayed all the enthusiasm which victory inspires. Jourdan had crossed the Rhine, Marceau was in observation before Mayence, Bonnard surrounded Ehrenbreitstein, Grenier was coming up, and Bernadotte and Championnet were on the point of debouching. Such a state of things encouraged hope, and the French were justified in anticipating success. But the aspect of affairs had sadly altered with the Austrians. Wartensleben had succeeded the Prince of Wirtemberg, and fresh troops from the left bank had come to encourage and support those which had been beaten. These first reinforcements not being deemed sufficient, the archduke had ordered part of the force commanded by Wurmser to join him; and putting himself at the head of the masses he had thus assembled round Blaumholder, had advanced upon the Lahn. He had made his movement by Mayence, whilst Jourdan was accomplishing his by Neuweid. The archduke having sixty-four thousand rank and file, and the French only forty-eight thousand to oppose them, he resolved to bring the latter to action, and accordingly pushed on to Wetzlar. The engagement was warm, and long obstinately contested by so inferior a force; but the archduke's columns continued to debouch, night-fall was approaching, and Lefebvre was severely

bruised by a fall from his horse. The republicans were therefore obliged to fall back to their former position.

This check was of little consequence, and scarcely deserving of attention; for the archduke had been forced to evacuate the left bank, and Wurmser deprived of part of his force, was not in a situation to oppose the passage of the Rhine. Thus the object of the movement of the French army was obtained, and its general-in-chief did not think proper to commit the result of his combinations to the hazard of a battle.

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#### CHAPTER IV.

IN the mean time, Kléber, who was not yet aware of this determination, nor of the check which had led to it, was preparing to cross the Lahn. He had sent for Ney, and was examining with him the approaches to this river, when the news reached him. Instantly perceiving the danger incurred by the troops he had despatched to the left, he ordered this general to join them with a reinforcement of some hussars who happened to be at hand.

“Go,” said he; “you cannot arrive too soon. Perhaps Soult has already a swarm of Austrians upon him.”

Nor was he wrong in this conjecture. Scarcely was the vanguard in retreat ere the imperialists pushed forward to Herborn, and prepared to attack the feeble force that occupied it. The hussars of Caneville and the legion of Bussy were at the head of the assailants. Soult, in ignorance of what had occurred, sallied boldly forth to meet them; but large bodies of emigrants were collecting on the plain. Six thousand men had already debouched, fresh columns were still coming up, and Soult was soon surrounded, and summoned to lay down his arms. Men who once called themselves Frenchmen, were about to slaughter their own countrymen for the benefit of Austria. The French General and his soldiers were indignant at such conduct. The firing commenced and caused great havoc among the emigrants; but no sooner was one squadron dispersed than another took its place, and the action became every instant more destructive. Seven charges made by the imperialists completely failed; but the ammunition of the republican troops was nearly expended, and the men exhausted with fatigue. The dragoons of Bussy and the emigrants were therefore preparing to make a last, and probably fatal charge, when a column of cavalry unexpectedly appeared upon the field of battle. This was Ney and his detachment, who, guided by the firing,



had reached the scene of action, where attacking and penetrating through the ranks which pressed upon Soult, they at length reached him and his handful of intrepid soldiers.

The Austrians soon formed again, and renewed the attack with fury; but in the mean time Ney and his men had taken breath. Their movements were calm and precise. They broke the shock of a tumultuous charge of the enemy's cavalry, and acting on the offensive in their turn, drove it back with great slaughter. But this was not sufficient; some squadrons still preserving their ranks, Ney determined to attack and disperse them; but in coming up to the charge, a grape-shot struck his horse, and he was dismounted. Three emigrants immediately rushed upon him, and ordered him, as he valued his life, to cry "Vive le Roi!"

"Vive la Republique!" the General cried, and with a blow of his trusty sword, he cut down one, sprang upon his horse, and attacked and put the two others to flight. But fresh squadrons continuing to make their appearance, it became necessary to rally, receive their charge, and protect Soult's infantry, which the enemy still persisted in trying to overpower. Ney advanced to meet them, and a fresh collision took place. Emigrants and Austrians were all obliged to give way. Soult, still fighting, and marching, and manœuvring, at last effected his junction with General Bastout, whilst Ney's carried to Kléber an account of the noble defence made by his brother in arms.

The army retreated by the same road it had taken in its advance. Jourdan reached Neuwied with the divisions of Grenier, Championnet, and Bernadotte, whilst Kléber fell back upon Dusseldorf with those of Lefebvre and Collaud. This occurred on the 15th of June. The march was orderly, the retrograde movement simultaneous in each division of the army, and the Austrians seldom made any attempt to harass the republican forces in their retreat.

The left wing, however, operated alone. On the 18th June it was abreast of Ukerath, and had taken up a position upon the road leading to Weyersbuch. Collaud stationed his right against a precipitous hillock, at the foot of which ran a deep ravine, occupied by light troops. Lefebvre's division extended as far as the Sieg, and two of its battalions occupied Blankenberg. The rear-guard established itself upon the heights which separated the camp from Weyersbuch. Soult, stationed upon the right bank, protected the rear, and the army seemed in a perfectly secure position; but strong patrols of Austrian hussars, guided by the country people, penetrated into the midst of its advanced posts. The night was dark, and the road by which the enemy had come, being almost impracticable, their approach was not perceived, and they succeeded in putting to the sword a whole guard of infantry.

Two men only escaped from this butchery, and gave the alarm to the van-guard. Kléber immediately set out with some officers, reconnoitred and visited the advanced posts, and found all in a state of

apparent calmness and security. The Austrian patrols had disappeared with the same celerity as they had displayed in their approach, but their guides being still in sight, were immediately seized. However, no further motion being perceived, or noise heard, the men returned to rest, and the remainder of the night was passed without accident. Soon after daybreak, the Austrian columns again made their appearance, preceded by a numerous artillery. Kléber sent General Richepanse to keep them in check, whilst he took his measures to oppose them.

The cavalry being already mounted, General Richepanse advanced to meet the enemy, received several charges, and made some himself; but the numerical superiority of the Austrians being too great, he was obliged to evacuate the avenues of Wassemberg, and fall back upon the camp. The enemy continued bringing up fresh forces, until the woods and heights were covered with their columns, and their intention of bringing the French forces to action was made evident.

Kléber resolved to be beforehand with them, and strike the first blow. Having sent for Richepanse, Collaud, Ney, and Sorbier, he gave his instructions to each of these officers. He directed the latter to bring the artillery as fast as possible to bear upon the Austrian columns. Ney was to attack their left with a demi-brigade and three hundred horse; Collaud was to take the command of the reserve, and remain in the camp ready to cover a retreat, should it become necessary; Richepanse was to put himself at the head of the 11th and 12th dragoons, and the 6th and 7th chasseurs, and rush upon the flank of the Austrians the instant it should be exposed; and Laval was impetuously to attack their right with the 105th demi-brigade and some cavalry. Lefebvre's battalion of grenadiers and the 96th were to remain in close columns ready to proceed wherever they might be wanted.

The parts thus distributed, each general took his station, and the action soon commenced.

Ney, with a body of dragoons, trotted down the ravine which separated the republican army from that of the imperialists, and ascended the height upon which the latter seemed to intend waiting for their opponents. As if from emulation, they pushed forward to meet him. The conflict was sanguinary and obstinate; the contending forces broke, formed again, and fought with fury. Richepanse arrived on the field of action with the remainder of the cavalry, and the Austrians likewise sent for reinforcements. The action became more extended, and the troops on both sides fought with fluctuating chances of success. By degrees the French gained a decided ascendancy. Ney had already overthrown a squadron of hussars, the hulans were about to give way; when Kléber perceiving the indecision of the latter, took immediate measures to force them.

The adjutant-general, Cayla, formed the 96th; Leval headed the left wing, Bastout the right, and the general-in-chief put himself at

the head of the 83rd. The action was now general from one extremity of the line to the other. The enemy soon began to give way, and the French were about to snatch the victory from them. Unfortunately for the latter, the ground was so rugged and difficult that the cavalry could not follow up its advantages. The Austrians therefore regained confidence, and their battalions, which an instant before had betaken themselves to flight, now took up formidable positions, and waited without flinching for their opponents. Nevertheless, the latter had gained some advantage ; their infantry were under cover in ravines and patches of wood, whence they supported the cavalry with their fire. Having attacked an Austrian battery, which spread destruction through their ranks, a large body of Hungarians was suddenly unmasked, and opposed a desperate resistance, which it took a considerable time to overcome. Kléber, tired of this ineffective musketry firing, brought up his artillery, and Sorbier, by turns commander, gunner, and grenadier, directed and animated all around him ; but the enemy, whose numbers increased as they retreated, directed their cavalry upon the right of the French, and were about to break its line, when Ney, perceiving the movement, put himself at the head of the 14th dragoons, and charged the hostile squadrons, without, however, being able to stop them. His clothes were pierced with balls, he was obliged to retreat, and it was a miracle that the flank of the French army was not turned. But the Austrians, afraid to trust to fortune, were fearful of endangering their success ; they therefore halted. Kléber, on the other hand, who only wished to maintain his position, made no attempt to resume the attack, but continuing his movement, on the 21st entered Dusseldorf,



## CHAPTER V.

KLEBER's stay at Dusseldorf was but short. The Directory, to whom Jourdan had reported the enemy's proceedings, did not consider them so serious and so important as they really were, but imagined that the army at Sambre-et-Meuse, turned on its left wing, would at most have fallen back upon the Sieg. Meanwhile Bonaparte was pursuing the course of his unparalleled triumphs in Italy. Each day was marked by a fresh victory ;—on each day was some fortress carried, some river crossed, some position surprised, or some treaty concluded. His army constantly in action, marched, fought, and left the enemy not a moment to breathe. Victorious at Borghetto on the 30th of May, this extraordinary man carried Peschiera on the 1st of June, occupied Verona on the 3rd, and invested Mantua on the 4th. Seldom was his army found in the morning where it had taken up its quarters the night before. This continued series of movements—this succession of battles and manœuvres, had produced the effect that might naturally be expected. The Aulic Council, which had a stronger partiality for Italy, where its power was established, than for the conquests that might eventually be made upon the Rhine, despatched Field-Marshal Wurmser to collect the scattered remnants of the Austrian forces, then wandering in the mountain passes of Tyrol and Carinthia. Wurmser was an old warrior, whose career had been rendered illustrious by more than one act of prowess. Slow and methodical, but resolute, able, and fruitful in resources,—if he had not always commanded with success, he had at all events always evinced courage and talent. The undertaking now entrusted to him was one of great magnitude ; but he began it at the head of thirty thousand practised soldiers, accustomed, like himself, to all the chances of war, and like himself stimulated by their successes on the Rhine. They reached Tyrol full of hope, which was, however, soon cruelly destroyed. On the other hand, Wurmser's departure with this force had raised the spirits of the Directory ; for a diminution of thirty thousand brave men in the enemy's force, offered many favourable chances.

General Bonaparte's victories had raised the courage of every French soldier ; like him, all determined to conquer. The Directory participated in the enthusiasm which his successes had inspired, and Moreau was directed to press and harass the enemy, and to imitate the rapid marches of his competitor.

“ By transferring the seat of war to the further bank of the Rhine,” said the Directory in one of its despatches to Moreau, “ you must not

expect to maintain yourself there except by the destruction of the enemy. Pursue and engage them therefore without intermission, and by rapid and unexpected marches, give them no time to look about them and combine their movements. Endeavour on all occasions to give them battle, until they are not only broken and repulsed, but utterly defeated. It is to this wise policy that the glorious successes of the army of Italy are due. The example of preceding campaigns, and the impetuosity of republican courage, enable you to make a constant and energetic application of this principle to the decisive circumstances under which you are placed.

“The army of Sambre-et-Meuse acts upon the same plan of campaign as that under your command. Thus, after having beaten Wurmser, and dispersed the wreck of his army, threaten the rear of Prince Charles; you will thereby make General Jourdan resume the offensive, which he has ceased to do only for a time, in consequence of having drawn upon himself forces which might have added to the difficulties of your glorious undertaking, with the success of which all Germany must resound. Affect to talk loudly of marching upon Vienna, and let public report represent you as at the head of a hundred thousand men, a portion of whom is on its march to take Beaulieu in the rear, whilst the other is proceeding to effect its junction with the army of Sambre-et-Meuse, towards Franconia, thence to proceed to the Danube.

“The terror which always precedes a victorious army, is a powerful engine that must not be neglected, any more than all that can revive and stimulate the courage of the generous defenders of the republic. Above all, let discipline be attended to; for it is apt to become lax during success, particularly in conquered countries. Severe examples at first, and watchful care afterwards, are sufficient to maintain it.”

The French government, to whom Jourdan's retreat did not appear to lead to the serious consequences we have pointed out, was still more pressing with this general. According to the Directory, this retreat had only caused a removal of part of the forces which covered Brisgau. Moreau had crossed the river, and the army of Sambre-et-Meuse had halted upon the Sieg. The offensive they said, must now be resumed, and the armies act in concert, and proceed without intermission until the enemy were annihilated. This project, though a good one, was built upon facts which had never occurred. Jourdan, far from having taken up his position upon the Sieg, had, as we have already shown, been obliged to recross the Rhine; whilst Moreau, on the other hand, was far from being able to cross it. The French revolution had produced a profound sensation upon the inhabitants of the territories on the further side of that river. Every generous heart had been moved by the declaration of rights; all had felt a revival of that passion for equality which sometimes sleeps, but is never eradicated from the human breast; all accordingly wished to proclaim the

principles of the republicans, and effect the same reforms as had been effected in France. They therefore applied to the French for assistance to obtain that which the latter had already succeeded in obtaining; but although they agreed upon the principle, they differed on the mode of proceeding. Some proposed to have recourse to arms; others fancied they had discovered means still more effective; each, in short, conspired according to his own views. The Directory resolved to let them do as they pleased, and accept the assistance of all parties. The French government had an agent in Switzerland—a doubtful one perhaps, but active and cunning—who represented an insurrection at Brisgau as infallible.

Orders were despatched to Moreau, to wait for and support it,\* and not to cross the Rhine until it had broken out.

\* CITIZEN MINISTER,

Since my return from Berne, I have not ceased my exertions in execution of the plan for the furtherance of which you sent me the necessary powers, and you may rely upon it that nothing shall be wanting on my part fully to realize the expectations of the Directory. Pray give this assurance to General Carnot.

General Laborde has communicated to me the letter he has received, acquainting him with the undertaking in contemplation. Hence I have thought it right to enter with him into a confidential communication respecting the contents of the letter addressed, as I have before informed you, to the King of Verona, who first raised in my mind doubts with regard to that General. I am satisfied with the explanation which has taken place, and the General will derive this advantage from it, that it will lead him to examine with more attention the extremely suspicious individuals by whom he is surrounded, and to take care of himself.

I have already undertaken a journey with the General, to examine the course of the Rhine from New Brisack to this place, fix upon a spot to cross it, and ascertain at the same time the feeling which exists among the soldiers. I think we have fixed upon the passage at Huningen, because the insurgent inhabitants, directed and seconded by us, will be in sufficient force to destroy at once the Austrian posts, put the men to death, and spike the guns. With regard to the troops I have seen, I am perfectly satisfied with the spirit that exists among them, notwithstanding the hardships they still endure. It would be an easy matter to make them embrace our views in a very few days. I compare their moral situation to a loaded cannon, which I have no doubt that with a little address it would be easy to fire.

I dined to-day with our conspirators of the Margravate. I am satisfied with their report, and the ardent zeal they display in the cause. I afterwards visited the right bank of the Rhine, and the enemy's batteries opposite Huningen, accompanied by an adjutant-general, whom I intend to put at the head of the peasants, to lead them during the commencement of the insurrection. To-morrow I have an appointment with General Laborde, to examine where we can place our bridge, and have the cartridges and flints made, of which the inhabitants are in want, and which in a few days we shall be able to send to them.

We are waiting for General Moreau to decide definitively upon our measures, and fix the day for the attack. I am desirous that it should take place as speedily as possible, for there is money in the Margrave's exchequer, and I am apprehensive it will be removed. If General Moreau can supply us with from five and twenty to thirty thousand men, there will be no limits to



"The Directory is informed, citizen General," wrote Carnot, "that an insurrection is preparing in the Margravate and at Brisgau.

our success. Assure the Directory of this fact ; state also from me, that if I am left master of my actions, I will never importune it with details, nor tire it with calls for provisions or money. I can already perceive that from the very day of our passage, if I am not thwarted in my schemes, the army will be paid and fed by our friends, and supplied with horses by our enemies. There are ecclesiastical domains which will reimburse the former. We have already taken our measures for the organization of a provisional government. Whilst I am occupied with the means of execution, Bassal is busy about a plan of regulations, and his zeal is not inferior to my own. We have already collected a portion of the necessary documents ; and as soon as the troops arrive, and we have every thing else we want, we shall begin to act, and that, I can assure you, in so rough a manner, that our enemies shall not easily forget it. If our debut be serious, as I trust it will, and as indeed, from the precision of our calculations, we have a right to expect it will, every Austrian, from Fribourg in Brisgau, and Old Brisach, to Constance, will be exterminated, and all their guns and stores captured. Next, according to the steps adopted by General Wurmser, we shall take measures either to enter Suabia by the valley of Keusch, and get them before him in the event of his retreat ; or to harass to excess his left wing, whilst our new republic will be quietly forming, and we shall be revolutionizing on a grand scale in that portion of Germany which we are occupying.

May I beg, citizen minister, you will not forget that in my last I requested you would obtain for me from the Directory sufficient authority for my requisitions to be obeyed, and that you would also place some funds at my disposal, which I am unable at present to do without. You must be aware that I have a great deal to lay out, not only for the travelling expenses of my agents, but in the necessary preparations for action. Once settled on the other side of the Rhine, if I have sufficient authority to give the impetus and personally to direct this great undertaking, I shall ask you for no further supplies ; and if you hear of us, it will be only the recital of our success, which, when operations are once begun, will be rapid in spite of the efforts of the malignants who overrun the country.

You will receive, by the next express, the first set of maps of Switzerland that has been found. A sheet is wanting to complete the collection, but it will arrive to-morrow. I will forward at the same time a more detailed account of the intrigues of our enemies. Switzerland is the principal seat of all their plots. Take care at Lyons and in the South. I expect to receive some valuable information respecting all these atrocities. I have gained an intimate friend at Wickham ; and shall make good use of all this, at least I hope so.

The second letter which you had delivered to the Canton has produced an admirable effect. All Switzerland trembles at it. Be firm, and above all things take advantage of this first moment of alarm to insist upon the removal far beyond the frontier of all the banished priests and emigrants, without exception. Fix a term of eight days at the utmost, and I will answer for your obtaining all you ask.

Adieu, Citizen Minister ; receive with your usual kindness the assurance of my fraternal and respectful attachment.

POTERATZ.

P. S. Allow me to offer you a piece of good advice. Whilst the whole of Italy is in a state of alarm, why should you not signify officially to all neutral and allied powers, without exception, that not only they who shall admit

It is acquainted with the chiefs of the intended revolt, and has directed the minister for foreign affairs to entertain relations with them through the medium of citizen Poteratz, charged at Basle with this mission. This circumstance seems to offer a great and favourable opportunity for introducing freedom into Germany, and making a powerful diversion upon the Rhine. This patriot party expect to raise twenty thousand men in the Margravate, and ten thousand in the Black Forest, with arms, provisions, and every thing requisite for an army.

“The plan of operations laid down by the Directory for the forces under your command, is very proper to second the insurrectional explosion, and to impart to the operations of the patriots all the importance which they have a right to expect from us.

“General Laborde, who commands on the Upper Rhine, must receive confidential instructions from you on this head, and must be authorized to concert measures with citizen Poteratz.

“The latter announces the certainty of making the passage of the Rhine easy by means of a rising which will break out on the other side of the river, and also of making it easy to force the enemy’s batteries and works, which are but feebly guarded.

“You will easily perceive, Citizen General, the full importance of this undertaking. Its execution, like that of all important enterprizes, requires secrecy, vigour, and despatch. The Directory, in which you have a just confidence, relies upon you for the prudence and activity of the means you will employ to carry its intentions into effect.

“CARNOT, President.”

“Paris, 14th Prairial, Year IV. (3d May, 1796.)”

Such were the instructions that kept Moreau upon the left bank, and such was the attempt he was to support. That which was preparing in central Germany was of another kind. The minds of the population in that part of the country were more cultivated; notions of justice and freedom more prevalent. The aim here was to proceed without violence, and to act in the name of the law. The movers of the intended revolution, uncertain at first with regard to the place to be selected as the seat of the insurrection, fixed at length upon Franconia. Almost touching the frontiers of the republic on the one hand, and on the other mixed up with all the dissensions which agitated Germany, this circle derived from its situation a high degree of importance, greatly increased by the good feelings of its inhabitants. Nor was this its only advantage. It possessed rich abbeys, and an

English vessels into their ports, but also individuals of whatever nation coming from the ports of England, shall be treated as enemies? By such a measure you would force the squadrons of that scoundrel nation to leave the Mediterranean, where they would no longer find a place to refit their ships. By attacking their commerce, you will soon reduce them to submission.

assembly of the states, formerly holding sovereign power, but which no longer met nor was any longer consulted.

Franconia therefore had all the necessary elements for effecting a change in its form of government; they only required putting into action. The means of doing this were very simple. It was only necessary to impose heavy contributions—which the Directory was always ready to do—and invest the states with the power which the law gave them. The latter would then distribute these charges, always attendant on war, among the inhabitants. They would fix with equity, and without respect of persons, the share which each individual was to pay. The people, delighted at finding they were not to be utterly despoiled, would naturally support an order of things that afforded them protection. The nobles, on the other hand, could not dispute the power vested in the states without appearing to throw upon the poor the full burthen of the impost; they would therefore be forced to bend their necks and assent to the change. They would also, no doubt, affect disinterestedness, and patriotism, and being frightened into justice, would themselves ask to be taxed, and claim to bear their share of the common burthen.

The assembly would in this manner be acknowledged; and its legality once established, the sanction given to its proceedings on this one point, would soon extend to others, and thus the change of government be consummated.

The resources raised by the contribution would however prove insufficient, and other means must be devised to meet the expenses of the occupation. Neither nobles nor plebeians would like an additional impost, and the possessions of the clergy would naturally be thought of. The abbeys would consequently be secularized, the prebends alienated, and the priests, confined to their spiritual duties, would henceforward be without influence in public affairs, whilst their lands would once more become alienable. The seigniories would then be subject to imposts; and the people, freed from tithes and average,\* would pay no further dues, and each would furnish his contingent of taxes in proportion only to the extent of his property.

Suabia, agitated by the same feelings and passions as Franconia, would naturally become a sharer in the destiny of the latter. Lower Saxony would follow the same example, and the Germans once in arms, would perhaps of themselves drive the Austrians beyond the Ems.

Such was the plan, and such the means of execution, intended to be adopted by the chiefs of the insurgents. These magnificent views produced, however, no alteration in the preparations already made. They required neither the movement of troops, nor a display of force; they merely formed, in the great drama that was preparing, an incident which was accepted with all its chances.

\* Labour due by the peasant to the lord.



There was, however, some advantage in the project, for such enterprizes always conciliated a portion of the inhabitants, and spread uneasiness in the enemy's rear. But this advantage, this uncertain co-operation, could not counterbalance the increase of force added to the enemy's ranks. Each day brought swarms of fresh recruits from the hereditary states; each day fresh columns came to occupy the place of those which Wurmser was leading towards the Brenta; and what was still more serious, the Archduke Charles was invested with the command of the whole of the Austrian forces.—Empowered to act as he thought proper, taking counsel from himself alone, and guided only by events, this prince was about to impress a uniform direction, and simultaneous impulse upon the armies of the Upper and Lower Rhine; whilst the different bodies of troops opposed to him, carried on their operations independently of each other, and according to instructions from which they could not depart.

Unable to remedy this evil, the French general-in-chief had taken his measures against any attempts to harass his rear, and secured his line against attacks from the garrisons of Mayence and Ehrenbreitstein. General Moreau, who had once before kept these places in check, was again sent upon the same service. But Jourdan was able to spare him, for this difficult undertaking, only twelve thousand eight hundred infantry, and fifteen hundred horse. This was but an inadequate force for the service required to be performed; but Moreau well knew how to make up for the weakness of his means by the vivacity of his attacks, and the rapidity of his movements. The general-in-chief trusted therefore to his courage and well-tried talents.

Every thing was ready, time sped on, and yet operations were not begun. Jourdan complained of this to the Directory, to whom he exposed the weakness of his force, and the danger which must inevitably result from delay; but appearances had already changed. Ten battalions of infantry and eight squadrons of cavalry suddenly arrived from the army of the North. The conspiracy of Brisgau had been discovered, and Moreau, no longer detained by any of the considerations which had stopped him so long, had begun the campaign. He had alarmed the enemy at Manheim, and scarcely were they grouped upon the Neckar, ere, by a sudden and masterly manœuvre, he surprised the passage below Strasburg. This skilful movement having succeeded, the army of Rhin-et-Moselle peaceably crossed the river, and on the 24th was engaged with the Austrians.

## CHAPTER VI.

MOREAU being now in line, the army of Sambre-et-Meuse had no longer to contend single-handed against the archduke's forces, and the French general began to execute their instructions. Kléber had been already seven days in the entrenched camp at Dusseldorf; his two divisions had rested themselves, and were once more eager for battle. He therefore began his march, rallied the troops under the command of Grenier, who had crossed the Rhine at Cologne, and proceeded towards the positions which the republicans had twice before taken and as often lost. Lefebvre was sent to occupy Siegen. The country was wild, and intersected with lofty mountains, almost impracticable for artillery and cavalry; and this general had the greatest difficulty in executing his movement. He accomplished it nevertheless, and selecting the road which seemed the easiest, at length reached the river he was to cross. Collaud had arrived at Troisdorf, Grenier had advanced towards Minden, and the whole of the left wing was in position. But neither the Acher nor the Sieg was fordable, and the troops were impatient to encounter the enemy. Ney took advantage of this impatience; and putting himself at the head of the 6th hussars, attacked the Austrians, drove them from one river to the other, and pursued them fighting as far as Siegburg. The bridge still existed, and whilst the enemy were endeavouring to set fire to it, he charged and overthrew them, and succeeded in saving it from destruction.

The infantry having thus the means of crossing the river, continued its movements; but the Austrians having rallied, came boldly to meet it. Twelve hundred Austrian troopers prepared to charge the four hundred chasseurs by which it was accompanied. The chances were unequal; but as usual, this disproportion of numbers was counterbalanced by superior ability. Ney ordered the charge to be sounded, and rushing upon this formidable body made it break ground. Rallying immediately upon the heights, the Austrian troopers were prepared to resume the attack; but this attempt was not more successful than the former. Nevertheless, there were dangers and difficulties attached to the situation in which Ney was placed; he had a river in his rear, and in front, forces which, by returning continually to the attack, must in the end overpower him. Obligated therefore to temper courage with prudence, and feeling the necessity of giving the infantry time to come up, he extended his front, paraded, and amused the Austrians with useless manœuvres. At length he contrived to take them in the rear, at the same time that the infantry appeared and formed in front of them. They perceived their error too late; they

were broken and completely overthrown. Such as escaped the edge of the sword were either dispersed or taken prisoners.

The imperialists being thus routed, and the French generals anxious to ascertain the numbers and positions of the forces which covered Ukerath, Kléber ordered the movement to be continued. The dragoons marched in front, and with such promptitude that they were enabled to seize upon the avenues leading to the place. But this rapidity had weakened them; the engagement, which had lasted three hours, the length of their march, and more particularly the obstinate resistance made by the enemy, had exhausted their remaining strength, and they were forced to halt. The road was very narrow; for the space of a whole league it presented only wood and naked rocks, and there was not in the whole of this extent a single spot where a body of troops might be drawn up in line. Ney advanced nevertheless at the head of his chasseurs, whom he stimulated, so as to make them forget their fatigue and danger. They attacked the enemy with a vigour increased by the resistance offered, and drove them upon Ukerath. But the imperialists, who had been constantly defeated in the mountains, now sought their revenge upon the plain. The French horses were spent with fatigue; those of the Austrians were fresh, their forces numerous, and Ney tried to avoid an action which must prove fatal to him. He headed one charge, eluded another, and alarmed the enemy without committing himself. The French columns at length appeared, the Austrians withdrew, and the position was gained solely by skilful manœuvring.

Jourdan had crossed the Rhine, and the army was in line. The movement was continued, and the whole force directed upon Altenkirchen. The enemy occupied it in strong force; but they were wavering and undecided. It did not appear that they now intended to defend those heights which during the preceding campaign they had so obstinately disputed. The position was soon carried, and the forces which attempted to cover it, put to the rout.

Jourdan had received instructions to keep as far from the Rhine as possible—reach the Upper Lahn—push towards the Kentzig, the Maine, and the Rednitz—harass Wartensleben's right without intermission, and if he could not beat him, drive him into Bohemia, or force him upon Ratisbon. The latter, on the other hand, had orders to avoid coming to action, and to dispute the ground foot by foot, but without endangering his forces. To counteract the plan of his opponents and yet avoid a battle, was the object he had in view.

Jourdan, thinking that the Austrian army was assembled at Limburg, advanced thither with all his forces, directing his left wing upon Wetzlar, in order to turn the enemy. Lefebvre debouched by Siegen; Collaud having reached Dillenburg, advanced to meet the latter, but instead of his colleague, with whom he expected to effect a junction, he encountered the Austrians, whom he was certainly not seeking. This unexpected meeting might have proved fatal, but for the intre-



pidity of the commander of the van-guard. The instant Ney perceived the enemy, the charge sounded. The action was hot and obstinate, and the victory long remained doubtful; but the skill and courage of Ney triumphed over a force vastly superior. The French, about to consummate the victory, were already in pursuit of the flying enemy, when heavy columns of the latter again appeared to receive them. It happened that Wartensleben was not at Limburg, but at Neukirchen, and the forces of the latter now made their appearance. The preparations for the attack were soon changed, and those for the defence were not less rapidly made. The forces routed by Ney in front of Dillenburg were again overthrown by Lefebvre behind Wildendorf. They were beaten in front and in flank; and for fear of being surrounded they precipitately recrossed the Lahn.

The republican troops were however worn out with fatigue; the weather was very unfavourable, for it had not ceased raining during a whole week; but the Austrians were retreating, it became necessary to pursue them, and the movement was continued. Lefebvre pushed on to Giessen, Bonnard to Lein, Collaud to Wetzlar, and Ney, advancing by the road to Frankfort, soon overtook the enemy's rear-guard.

This was now commanded by General Kray, one of the best officers in the Austrian army. It had halted in the plain of Butzbach; its infantry was placed between Obermarle and the Witter; its cavalry extended in front of Windermarle. It could not have chosen a more favourable position than this, which offered every advantage of ground.

Formidable as it was, Ney did not hesitate to approach. He attacked the enemy on the 9th of July, and obtained at first some advantage; but Kléber, who considered this action only a skirmish, did not support him. He had not one-fifth of the numerical forces opposed to him, and he was therefore obliged to give way. The 20th light infantry appearing on the field, Ney again formed his men, once more attacked the Austrians with this reinforcement, and obliged them to abandon the position. They retired in confusion, and were eagerly pursued. They rallied, nevertheless, for they had reached a formidable esplanade, connected with the position occupied by the main body of the army, which now made an attempt to save its routed rear-guard. The action was renewed with increased vigour, and Kléber feared it would become general; he therefore directed Ney either to discontinue or slacken his fire. But Kray, indignant at the flight of his rear-guard, determined to avenge its defeat, and recover the ground it had lost. Every man in his camp accordingly prepared for action. Collaud, who perceived what was doing, also got ready for the contest, and in a very short time his arrangements were made. Ney overthrew with the light cavalry the hulans who covered the esplanade, and who soon after fell into an ambuscade, of which we shall give an account. On their being

routed, the 6th chasseurs who had put them to flight, were sent in pursuit of them, and with the 11th dragoons overtook their dense columns, now forming Kray's only hope. They attacked and threw them into confusion, then retreated as if seized by a sudden panic. The surprised Austrians uttered cries of triumph, and having formed again, eagerly and tumultuously pursued their assailants. But the retreat of the latter was only a feint, which was soon made manifest to their pursuers by dreadful explosions of artillery, which showed them the snare into which they had fallen. A murderous fire of grape-shot and musquetry was opened upon them, and to complete their misfortune, their mutilated squadrons were again beset by the intrepid dragoons, whom they fancied they had just conquered. The rout was complete, and the men who escaped death were dispersed in the woods.

From that period the left wing was more peaceable ; but on the right the warfare became more and more animated. The republicans had taken the village of Obermarle, and thereby intercepted the high road. The Austrians, anxious again to open the communication, pushed both infantry and cavalry towards this point. The shock appeared irresistible. Unable to repulse them in front, Ney had recourse to stratagem. He allowed the enemy's masses to come in collision with a few battalions intended only to keep them in check, and attacking them in the rear as soon as he saw them engaged, he routed and dispersed them. Though the ground was covered with slain, and his loss tremendous, Kray, irritated at his want of success, urged his troops to fight to the death. Scarcely had one attack failed, ere he headed another. Repulsed three times, he returned to the charge a fourth time without having any better success. He yielded not, however, to discouragement ; but having again formed his men, brought them up against the village with such renewed energy and impetuosity, that he succeeded in carrying it. But Ney, throwing himself into the midst of the French infantry, rallied them, scolded the men, and succeeded in communicating to them their former impulse. They again attacked the enemy with all the fury arising from the shame of a defeat, overthrew their forcés, and drove them back to the heights. The conquerors, however, did not follow up this success as they might have done.

Kléber hoped that such a lesson as this would not be lost upon the Austrians ; but the latter, little affected by it, maintained their positions. Next morning it was perceived that if they were making no preparations for attack, neither did they appear to avoid an engagement. Lefebvre, who was on the right bank of the Wipper, received orders to cross the Wetzlar and attack the enemy on their flank and rear. Collaud was directed to engage them in front ; but not to fire a shot nor make a single movement, until the firing announced to him that Lefebvre was first engaged. The Austrians, thus attacked

in their communications, could not fail to move immediately; and Ney was then to harass them without intermission.

Every thing occurred as Kléber had anticipated. So soon as the enemy perceived the French columns debouch, they fell back and yielded two leagues of ground; but on reaching Rosbach, and finding the position good and well sheltered, they halted, determined once more to try their fortune. The French columns pressed hard upon them, and they exerted all their resources to prevent the latter from debouching. Charges of cavalry and the effect of artillery were both tried; but this display of force only tended to excite the French, who climbed the heights, carried the positions, overthrew the columns, and spread confusion and disorder through the Austrian ranks. The latter, taken in the rear by Lefebvre, were still pressed in front by Ney, who had given no respite to the column opposed to him, and constantly attacking and attacked, had driven it as far as Hoostadt. But here the contest assumed a different aspect. Ney had only two pieces of artillery, and fifteen were opposed to him; he therefore thought it expedient to endeavour to gain time, until the arrival of some of the columns in his rear. The Austrians, aware of his design, determined not to leave him this chance. But he charged, manœuvred, gave way, and rallied by turns, and succeeded by his boldness and prudence in stopping the masses which were constantly debouching upon him. General Jacopin having at length arrived at the head of the 43rd infantry and 11th dragoons, the Austrians were driven back, and their assailants appeared before Friedberg. The gates of this town were closed, and the Hungarians, who defended it, opened a destructive fire upon the French. The latter advanced nevertheless, and without summoning the garrison to surrender, broke and beat down the hersees with cannon-balls, and hatches, and crow-bars—with every thing in short they could find. They succeeded at length in getting into the place, where their muskets and bayonets soon avenged the rash resistance they had encountered. Those of the garrison who were not put to the sword fled far away.

Ney pursued the fugitives, and was soon engaged in a fresh action. But his guns were dismounted, and his van, exhausted by marches and combats, and unable to head the storm about to burst upon them, were about to give way, when Bonnard came up with the reserve. The men were again formed, after giving them little rest, and the pursuit of the enemy resumed. The movement of the columns, the impetuosity of the several attacks, and more particularly the approach of the last corps, which threatened their line of battle, at length threw the Austrians into dreadful confusion. They hesitated, gave way, and only thought of saving themselves. Ney pressed them with vivacity, Richepanse harassed them without respite, and both, stimulated with the same ardour, drove them back, and did not stop till the darkness of the night and fatigue forced them to halt. The Austrians had two thousand killed; the French only six hundred.



hors de combat. The latter lost an officer of great promise, Captain Rouilly, one of General Lefebvre's aides-de-camp. This young officer had displayed the most daring intrepidity, and his zeal could only be compared to his modesty and elevation of mind.

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## CHAPTER VII.

THE retreating Austrians were driven to Frankfort, a place by no means prepared to sustain a siege, though its ditches, the artillery which covered its approaches, and the troops which had sought refuge within its walls, gave it some importance. Kléber, wishing to economise his resources as much as possible, appeared before it as if with the intention of immediately storming it. Having made a display of his mortars and scaling-ladders, he summoned the population, consisting chiefly of timid traders, to open their gates. The Austrians, whom they had received into the town, did not however allow them to comply with this demand, and a sort of bombardment was begun by the French. Adjutant-general Mortier followed up the effect produced by the shells; the place surrendered, and the French took possession of all the stores which it contained.

The inhabitants of Frankfort had always evinced a feeling of aversion towards the French. In 1792 they had welcomed the emigrants with unusual kindness, and received the republican troops with dislike, soon followed by an act of base treachery. Whilst the latter were engaged with the Prussians, the citizens of Frankfort sallied forth and assailed them in the midst of the action with knives and hatchets,—an act of perfidy to which their defeat may be attributed. Again, in 1795, the French forces, obliged to retreat, had been several days without bread, or rations of any kind, when they arrived under the walls of Frankfort. They applied to the merchants and magistrates of this city for sixty thousand rations. The application was favourably received, and the provisions ready for delivery; but as there were no funds in the military chest, and the rations could not be paid for in ready money, they were withheld. These same rations were afterwards sold to the Austrians. In vain did the French general remonstrate, state the wants of his men, and offer an undertaking to pay; the merchants and magistrates were inexorable, and the army was forced, for want of provisions, to cross over to the left bank of the Rhine. In the present instance the French appeared as conquerors.

During the war, Frankfort had amassed immense wealth, and had not ceased to supply the Austrians with clothing, provisions, and am-

munition. The French now thought that they also had won the right of sharing in that which was so prodigally lavished upon their enemies. Their soldiers were in rags; Frankfort possessed in abundance every thing they stood in need of, and the inhabitants were called upon to supply it. Lenient, however, towards a population that had behaved so ill, Jourdan did not exact all that he was instructed to do; he even protected the inhabitants of Frankfort against the demands of the Directory,\* the turbulence of his soldiers, and the industrious

\* "Frankfort has always been rich, and has increased its wealth by the present war. It has not ceased to assist our enemies, it ought therefore to make some exertions in our favour. The Directory leaves it nevertheless to your discretion to augment or diminish the amount of its contributions.

"Frankfort contains immense stores of leather, cloth, provisions, and other objects necessary to an army. We naturally presume therefore that you will, at the expense of the city, supply the French troops with every thing they are now in need of, or of which they may be in need hereafter.

"All the stores you do not want, you will immediately send to the left bank of the Rhine, where we shall find them when they are required.

"For the due payment of the contributions which the Directory has just mentioned, and to put it out of the power of the malignants of the city of Frankfort to form a second plan for betraying us, you will demand and send to France a very considerable number of hostages. The Directory does not fix the number; but you cannot send too many, or select them with too great care from among the richest of the families most devoted to the Austrians.

"The Directory, ever anxious to collect on the territory of the French Republic the most noble works of art, requests you will forward to the Minister of the Interior, the most celebrated pictures and every other object of art which may be worthy of a place either in our museum of arts, or in that of natural history. Among the pictures, the Directory deems it sufficient to mention only that by Piazzetta representing the twelve apostles.

"The Directory further directs that you will send to Paris such of the jewels used in crowning the emperors, as may have been left at Frankfort, together with the original of the Pope's golden bull, and the register containing the names of the citizens of Frankfort.

"You will entirely disarm the city of Frankfort and its inhabitants; and to this effect you will use the promptest, and if need be, the most rigorous measures. You will send to France the powder, guns, and muskets you do not want.

"You will give the command of the place to General Marceau, as also that of the blockading force at Mayence, Ehrenbreitstein, and Konigstein; and if the division now under the command of that general is not sufficient for this service as well as that he was before performing, you may increase its numbers to any extent you think proper. He must have a sufficient force to keep the enemy's garrisons and the inhabitants themselves in awe, and establish a firm point of support for the army. Frankfort must, in some degree, become our central point.

"Put no garrison in Frankfort; let there be no troops in the city but those which you send in, daily and successively, to guard the gates and prevent all individuals of the army from entering, who are not bearers of a formal order from you. The troops composing these guards must be taken from a camp which you must form in the vicinity of Frankfort, and make of sufficient strength to keep the population of that city in awe.

cupidity of the swarm of employés and speculators who always follow an army. These he did not allow to enter the place. He levied a contribution upon the city of eight millions of francs ; upon the territory between the Sieg and the Lahn, he levied one million ; and three upon that extending from the Lahn to the Maine. The military chest was beginning to fill, and the troops thought they had reached the term of their privations ; but the chest was always open to receive money, but never to pay any. The troops, who had filled it with the fruits of their victories, were left in the most deplorable state of destitution, and the officers were worse off even than the men. The administration issued no clothing to them, and the assignats, in which they received their pay, were of little value ; so that they had neither food, clothes, nor pay, and were obliged to exist upon a share of the plunder which they received from the privates. Their situation could not well be worse.\* They, however, became resigned to it for a time longer ; and the movement was resumed.

“No employé in the military administrations must be allowed to enter the city, with the exception of the chief-commissaire-ordonnateur, and any six or eight individuals whom he may select. You will give orders to the Jews of the city to behave with the greatest circumspection, on pain of severe punishment. They are not to be allowed to visit the camp.”

*Instructions to General Jourdan.*

\* THE GOVERNMENT COMMISSARY OF THE ARMY OF SAMBRE-ET-MEUSE,  
TO THE DIRECTORY.

*Neuwied, September 14th, 1795.*

There is a point to which I cannot too strongly draw your attention ; namely, military discipline. Since I have been attached to this army, I have had too many opportunities of observing its extreme relaxation. Excesses of all kinds have been committed, and many corps have dishonoured themselves by pillage. It is true that the reprimands of the general officers, and the example of several battalions sent to the rear, have produced some effect ; whilst a severe regulation of my colleague Gillet, remedies the evil in part, and makes up in some degree for the insufficiency of the military laws during actual service. But these palliatives do not eradicate the cause of the evil, namely, the dependence in which, from their wants, the officers are placed with regard to the privates. The latter have resources arising from the portion of their pay which they receive in cash. The officers have none whatever ; for it cannot but be evident that their pay is of no value to them. They therefore deem themselves fortunate when the privates come to their assistance, admit them to their meals, and share with them the vegetables and other provisions which can be procured with ready money. The officers are consequently obliged to overlook the misdeeds of marauders, such as thefts of provisions, poultry, and other stock. Were they not to do so, they would be reduced to the most dreadful necessities and the most wretched existence.

Under circumstances such as I have described, the soldier shows no respect to the officer in distress, who lives in some measure at his expense. and is thereby driven to the necessity of tolerating the most monstrous abuses. No law that could be framed would prove any more than a weak palliative to this evil. There is only one remedy for it, which is to relieve the officers from this wretched state of destitution, which degrades them in



Wartensleben, taking advantage of the halt which the French had made at Frankfort, had collected his forces, and established his position at Wurtzburg. The Maine, after running from the north, turns suddenly towards the south, and again alters its course at Schweinfurt; the French army would therefore have been obliged to appear before this river, without the means of constructing bridges to cross it. To avoid this obstacle, Jourdan marched upon Gemunden. As soon as Frankfort had opened its gates, Collaud and Lefebvre proceeded towards the Kentzig, where Grenier and Championnet effected a junction with them. Bernadotte likewise advanced upon Aschaffenburg, and the French army was then in line. This was effected on the 20th of July. The heat of the weather was excessive, the country mountainous, and provisions had for some time been growing scarce; but the enemy were unable to make a formidable resistance on any point. The moment they perceived the French forces, they would take up a position, fire a few shots, and then run away. Their reverses had annihilated the courage, and destroyed the confidence of the Austrian soldiers. The movements of Wartensleben now seemed nothing more than a prolonged defeat—one continued act of pusillanimity. Fifteen hundred deserters joined the French in the space of three days; others were still coming over, when Ney, suddenly debouching upon a column, heard very unusual exclamations, and saw a portion of the men composing it violently throw down their arms. These were Turks, formerly made prisoners of war; and having been

the eyes of the soldiers, places them in the most humiliating dependence upon their subordinates, and forces them to take no notice of the disorders which occur even in their presence.

If an officer received at least eighteen francs a month in cash, he could live honourably without depending upon his men. He could, moreover, make a decent appearance, and resume, with a dignified demeanour, that ascendancy without which all discipline is at an end. It would then be easy to repress the lamentable excesses which disgust the inhabitants, drive them from us, and deprive us of those means of subsistence which the country might otherwise supply.

I am aware how difficult this plan is of execution, in the present state of the republic's finances; but I am positive—and such is the opinion of all the generals of the army—that it is the only means of restoring discipline, and preventing the disorganization of the army. If the state could support this increase of expense for two or three months, I have no hesitation in assuring you, that it would have the most happy influence upon the issue of the campaign. However brilliant our success, we have always reason to fear that disorder, pillage, and the disbanding of the troops—consequences attendant upon a want of discipline—might bring reverses upon us.

On the right bank of the Rhine we find the greatest difficulty in procuring supplies of provisions; for hitherto we have only passed through unfruitful and exhausted countries. I am about to employ all means in my power to collect the few resources which the country affords. There is greater abundance on the banks of the Lahn.

Health and Fraternity.

JOUBERT.

forced to serve in the Austrian ranks, they took this opportunity of claiming to be sent back to their native country. Ney restored them to freedom; another French general afterwards liberated Austrians and Bavarians, whom a similar vicissitude had thrown among the militia of Mourad Bey.

The discouragement to which the Austrian army gave way, inspired the French troops with fresh confidence. On the 23d of July the latter arrived at Arstein. Their position reached from Schweinfurt to Carlstadt. Bernadotte marched upon Wurtzburg; the hostile forces came in sight of each other, and both expected an engagement; but Wartensleben, little disposed to run such a risk, recrossed the Maine. Unable to get at the imperialists, Ney made an attack upon Wurtzburg. He had only a hundred horse with him; but his attitude was so threatening, and his movements so rapid, that the governor lost all confidence, and capitulated.\*

Wurtzburg was certainly not a place of importance, but it contained ammunition and a great many pieces of cannon; it was likewise well calculated for a depot, and could receive both stores and sick. All the advantages, however, which had been anticipated, were not derived from it. Bernadotte had not finished his movement; he knew not where the army of Rhin-et-Moselle was, and the troops whom victory had led to the Maine, were disheartened at the prolonged distress in which the government left them. Jourdan was obliged to halt and endeavour to relieve the intolerable distress of his men.

Providence fortunately came to his assistance. The Austrians had then upon the Rhine numerous convoys of provisions and stores, part of which Championnet captured, and Bernadotte the remainder. By such means the French forces obtained flour, forges, and bedding. They took all that was useful to them, but unfortunately they had no means of conveyance; and, what was still worse, General Ernouf had entered into an unaccountable convention with the deputies of the

\* TO GENERAL CLARKE, DIRECTEUR OF THE CABINET TOPOGRAPHIQUE.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Wurtzburg is ours. It surrendered yesterday, the Austrians having evacuated it on the 5th. There only remained in the town the prince's garrison, consisting of about two thousand infantry and three hundred horse. Adjutant-General Ney appeared before the place, and having driven back some detachments of the legion of Bussy, he manœuvred so well with a hundred cavalry, that his forces seemed doubled. His bold movements having intimidated the garrison, he advanced, and formally summoned the Governor to surrender. A capitulation was asked for; the General-in-chief sanctioned it, and to-day we took possession of the place. The appearance of Championnet's division, which arrived during the negotiation, assisted in hastening the Governor's decision.

The surrender of this place is of the greatest importance. It secures the right bank to the army, and affords facilities for marching to the Upper Rhine.

ERNOUF.

circle. We have already stated the hopes in which the latter indulged, and the measures they purposed pursuing;—Ernouf adopted all their views, and entered into their combinations. Like them, he was desirous that the revolution should be legal, that it should break out on a fixed day, and that it should not be disgraced by excess. To secure its marvellous results, he feared not to abandon the police of the army to the direction of the deputies, whom he authorized to apprehend and punish any soldiers who should stop their patrols, and to whom he even left it to fix the time and decide upon the mode of acting towards Prussia. He thus sacrificed the interests of the army to chimerical schemes, and injudiciously raised state questions in a military convention. The general-in-chief was obliged to annul these untoward arrangements; but such an act, though necessary, was not the less attended with deplorable consequences. The people considered it a denial of justice, the magistrates, an act of servility towards the King of Prussia, and they all became hostile to the French.

Meantime, stores and provisions had been collected to a certain extent, matters had assumed a new aspect, and the enemy had provided the republican troops with the means of subsistence. The army of Rhin-et-Moselle, whose fate had remained so long unknown, was now about to debouch. The position of the French army had therefore become free and secure, and the latter was preparing to advance in pursuit of Wartensleben. This general had established his quarters beyond Zeil; his reserve occupied Camburg, and his light troops extended along both banks of the Maine. All seemed to indicate that he had made up his mind to encounter the republican forces. His position was difficult of access, and his cavalry numerous. The French therefore advanced towards him with circumspection; but this was a needless precaution, for before they had debouched, he had broken up his camp and retired. They pursued, pressed him, tried every thing to induce him to give battle; but in vain did they force him to take up a position; his ground was always so well chosen, and his forces so well distributed, that he could not be got at without running too great a risk.

It being impossible to reach him in front, an attempt was made to attack his wings. Manœuvres were tried on his right flank, and the left of the French advanced; but the mountain passes became more rugged and difficult of access; and, on the other hand, Wartensleben attempted to turn the left of his opponents. Thus it was found impossible to bring him to battle.

The French continued to harass his forces. Jourdan, attacked with a violent fit of illness, delivered over the command to Kléber, who pushed forward to the Rednitz. The fortress of Konigshofen was at a short distance. General Soult, taking with him a picket of hussars, and a company of carabineers, went and summoned the commandant to surrender. The latter was far from desirous of gathering laurels in an honourable defence; but annoyed at its being



supposed that he would yield to a single escort, he haughtily replied that he had provisions and ammunition, and would see what he should do when a larger force appeared ; but until then he would keep the place. The fact is, he only wanted a pretence, which was immediately furnished him ;—Lefebvre appeared with his division before the fortress ; the gates were immediately opened, and all parties were satisfied—he at having saved appearances, and the French at being masters of the fort.

The left wing of the French army was now secure ; the enemy could no longer surprise or injure it. Konigshofen was, moreover, easy of defence, it being surrounded by marshes and extensive inundations. It was truly a valuable capture ; but had it been less so, it was certainly worth what it cost.

Things were conducted less peaceably at Zeil. Collaud, who had advanced thither to support his colleague, as we have already stated, had no occasion to assist him. Ney was in front, and had brought the enemy to action, which was obstinate on both sides, without, for a long time, any decided advantage on either. Ney was in very inferior force ; he had only four hundred horse against double that number. He again availed himself of his superior talents, to give a new character to the engagement ; he charged less, manœuvred more, and taking advantage of every mistake of the enemy, at length succeeded in routing them.

This defeat did not, however, destroy the courage and resolution of the latter. Thrown in disorder upon Obelsbach, they had joined a body of infantry, and immediately rallied. But Ney was in close pursuit ; and the 20th light infantry debouching, he formed them, and supporting them with his cavalry, made a furious attack upon the village, overthrowing all that opposed him. The imperialists again betook themselves to flight, and cavalry and infantry scrambled, pell mell, to the opposite bank of the Main. Four boats, laden with corn and flour, were coming down the river ; Ney sent some chasseurs after them, and they were captured.

The Austrians, beaten upon the right bank, still kept up a powerful resistance on the left, which Championnet's vanguard could not overcome. The adjutant-general, Cacate, who commanded it, had in vain exhausted his means of attack ; the Austrians, occupying a position defended by the river and the mountains, counteracted all his efforts. Masters of Eltemann, and of the bridge across the Main, they stationed on either bank dense masses of troops supported by artillery. Ney, informed of the dangerous situation in which his colleague was placed, hastened to his assistance, and by his presence restored the confidence of the exhausted troops. The action was then resumed, and the enemy completely overthrown.

At Burg-Eberach also, the Austrians were defeated. Unable, under such disasters, to maintain themselves at Bamberg, they crossed the Wiessent, and on the 6th of August took up a position at Aich.

Their right was protected by the river, their left, at Rednitz, was covered by Forcheim. Situated at the conflux of the two rivers, Forcheim derives further importance from its proximity to the neighbouring mountains, which makes it both difficult of capture and easy to succour. Numerous bastions, half-moons, counter-guards, deep ditches, and the waters of the Rednitz, render it, if not a strong hold of the first magnitude, at least a place of sufficient strength not to apprehend either a coup-de-main, or the attack of any number of troops unattended by a powerful artillery. In this position, protected by rivers, and by such advantages of ground, Kray seemed fearlessly to await Kléber's arrival. He had not to wait long : the French had crossed the Wiessent in the morning ; before night Grenier, Bernadotte, and Championnet debouching upon the Reich-Eberach, drove in the Austrian light troops, whom Lefebvre and Collaud forced to fall back upon the left bank of the Wiessent. Kray's field of operations was thus narrowed, and the French vanguard was about to reach him, when its commander received intelligence that Ebermanstadt was occupied by a column of the enemy, consisting of twelve hundred infantry, six hundred horse, and several pieces of artillery. Such a force seemed formidable, and Mortier was directed to march against it. This he did at the head of a battalion of infantry, four squadrons of horse, and two pieces of cannon. The action was hotly contested, but it lasted only two hours.

The French having remained masters of the field of battle, were now able to continue their operations on both banks of the river, prolong their patrols, and carry even to the enemy's rear.

Whilst Mortier was forcing Ebermanstadt, Collaud was advancing upon Forcheim. He had orders to drive back whatever forces appeared on the plain, and dislodge all that covered the place. This was a difficult undertaking ; for all the approaches, the outlets, and the heights were carefully occupied, and Wartensleben exhorted his men not to suffer themselves to be driven from positions which ought to be impregnable. And, in truth, these positions were defended by all kinds of natural obstacles ; the ground was precipitous, tortuous, covered with wood, and intersected with deep ravines. To these natural defences were joined those of art ;—masses of soldiers were placed upon one peak, batteries upon another ; infantry at the bottom of the gorges, and cavalry at their entrance. But Ney was not intimidated by these formidable obstacles ; and advancing at the head of a handful of men, he began the action. He had only two pieces of artillery ; the enemy unmasked fourteen. Ney's men were broken for an instant, but inured to all the mishaps of war, and undismayed, they re-formed almost immediately, continued the attack, and after an obstinate contest, succeeded in throwing the Austrian's ranks into confusion. Meantime, reinforcements having successively arrived, the Austrians were at length driven from their strong holds.

The imperial army having betaken itself to flight, the garrison were terror-stricken, and Ney, taking advantage of this feeling, summoned them to open the gates to the French. They hesitated to obey, and Ney getting angry, talked of bombarding the place if they did not comply. The commandant was an irresolute and pusillanimous man, who wished to avoid the consequences of an attack, and at the same time those of a too easy surrender. Intimidated by Ney's threats, he imagined a mode of reconciling these clashing interests. He consented to surrender the fortress; but, as Wartensleben was still in sight, he wished to delay doing so until the latter was entirely gone. Ney refused to accede to any such arrangement; he knew the value of time, and was anxious to pursue the flying enemy. Bursting into a violent rage at such useless obstinacy, he swore he would put the whole garrison to the sword if the surrender were delayed another instant. Such a menace had the desired effect; the alarmed commandant capitulated, and delivered up the town and fortress of Forcheim to the French, together with arms, ammunition, and a considerable store of provisions.

Kléber, delighted with this display of energy, expressed his satisfaction to Ney in the highest terms. In the presence of his men, he said the most flattering things respecting his activity and courage; and suddenly interrupting himself, he added: "But I shall not compliment you upon your modesty; because, when carried too far, it ceases to be a good quality. In sum, you may receive my declaration as you please, but my mind is made up, and I insist upon your being General of Brigade."

The chasseurs clapped their hands in applause, and the officers warmly expressed their satisfaction at the general's determination. Ney alone remained thoughtful. He seemed still in doubt whether he should accept a promotion which he had already declined, and he uttered not a word.

"Well!" said Kléber, in the kindest manner, "you appear very much grieved and confused; but the Austrians are there waiting for you; go and vent your ill humour upon them. As for me, I shall acquaint the Directory with your promotion."

He kept his word in the following terms:

"Adjutant-general Ney, in this and the preceding campaigns, has given numerous proofs of talent, zeal, and intrepidity; but he surpassed even himself in the battle which took place yesterday, and he had two horses killed under him.

"I have thought myself justified in promoting him, upon the field of battle, to the rank of general of brigade. A commission of this grade was forwarded to him eighteen months ago, but his modesty did not allow him then to accept it. By confirming this promotion, Citizen Directors, you will perform a striking act of your justice."

Ney again set out in pursuit of the Austrians, as Kléber had



directed him. Championnet and Grenier put their divisions in motion, and forming a junction, pressed the enemy on all sides, drove them from the heights, and pursued them down the hills. But still they kept possession of the villages, and poured upon the French a destructive fire from their batteries. Kray watched with anxiety the vicissitudes of the combat. He animated his men, led them on to the attack, boldly faced every danger, provided against every check, and displayed, in short, the great talents, of which he had before given numerous proofs. But whilst his attention was divided betwixt all these cares, Bernadotte debouched on the right, whilst Bonneau, at the head of his cavalry, turned the Austrians on the left. All this was executed with a precision seldom seen on the field of battle. Kray, disconcerted, no longer knew what manœuvre to oppose to that of his skilful adversaries. He hesitated and wavered, and the French columns, stimulated by his indecision, of which they could perceive the effect, rushed upon his forces with irresistible impetuosity, overpowered, broke, and obliged them to retire with the utmost precipitation.

## CHAPTER VIII.

NEY pursued them with equal rapidity, and drove them close to Nuremberg, a great and beautiful city, containing a noble-minded population, still smarting under recently inflicted injuries. Prussia, as heir to the power of the ancient burgraves, continued to assume the rights which the latter had formerly enjoyed. Sometimes she would claim a toll, sometimes a portion of territory; and by successive pretensions and usurpations she had extended her limits even to the gates of Nuremberg. As a free city, Nuremberg protested against these encroachments, and appealed to the Imperial Chamber at Wetzlar; but Prussia being strong, harassed the city, impeded its commerce, and did, in short, all that great powers are wont to do when they wish force smaller ones to merge into them. The daily vexations inflicted by Prussia, not however producing the effect she anticipated, she had recourse to more decided measures. She seized upon the suburbs, levied tolls at the gates, and intercepted all communication with the neighbouring country. The inhabitants thus shut up within their walls, were obliged to call for mercy. In despair they intreated that they might negotiate with Prussia; but the haughty and harsh aristocracy which governed that kingdom, was insensible to the sufferings of the humble citizens of Nuremberg. They turned over to Austria those who had been the spokesmen in detailing the popular sufferings, and treated the proposals of the latter with the greatest contempt.

Ney knew the feelings of the inhabitants of Nuremberg; and that the citizens were greatly irritated at the ambition of Prussia and the insensibility of their own magistrates. Desirous of profiting by these circumstances, he left the pursuit of the Ausirians, and pushed on to that city. The place was open; and he took possession of it without opposition, but without any appearance of welcome from the inhabitants. The latter had just been informed that General Ernouf's convention was nullified, and that instead of the eight millions of francs imposed upon the circle, Nuremberg alone was to pay two million five hundred thousand francs in money, and supply three hundred horses, fifty thousand pairs of shoes, ten thousand pairs of boots, fifty thousand pairs of gaiters, and fifty thousand shirts. Such a contribution was unreasonable, and the inhabitants were thinking how they should elude it. There was only one mode of doing so. The possessions of the King of Prussia being free from war contributions, they resolved to become Prussians, and raise the standard of Prussia. Ney having assembled the deputies of the circle who took the lead in this project, endeavoured to bring them to more reasonable views; but he among them who had hitherto shown himself the most zealous and liberal in

the cause of freedom, seemed now totally to have abjured his principles, and to be the most eager of all to submit to Prussia. Ney expressed his astonishment at so sudden a change.

"It is, however, very easy to conceive," the German replied; "I thought I was escaping from that most iniquitous constitution bequeathed to us by the middle ages—I mean that which now governs us; and I thought that the French, by grafting freedom upon their victories, would save us from a power about to put a yoke upon our necks; but as such expectations are not to be realized—as all my hopes are annihilated, and the indignant populace about to rally round the aristocracy whom I wished to destroy—I shall now give myself up to Prussia; for hitherto, at least, Prussia has protected freedom of thought. That she has her *obscurantins*, I am well aware; but they are about to give up the ghost; whereas in Austria, the taste for warped ideas and stupid measures still prevails."

"What cruel treachery!" cried another. "We were on the eve of conferring upon Germany the same institutions as govern France, and that without trouble or exertion. A simple operation of finance would have made the legislative power pass into the hands of the people;—a war contribution would have sufficed to overthrow feodality for ever. But now, instead of a moderate tax that would have made Germany a confederation of free and independent states, an impost is laid which crushes the people, and places them once more in the hands of that proud aristocracy which ought to have been lopped off as a useless excrescence. How can men love an order of things that ruins them? How can they cherish reforms which inflict upon them charges beyond their means of endurance?"

Ney was obliged to dissolve this noisy meeting; but the people were in a still greater state of exasperation than the deputies. They knew that an offensive alliance was in agitation; and that the French were not insensible to the pleasure of seeing those who had fought against them, now arm in their favour. They trembled lest their territory should become the price of a useful co-operation, and in their blind fury they seemed ready to commit every kind of excess. Another circumstance contributed to increase this feeling. The Prince of Hohenlohe commanded the Prussian forces in the territories of Anspach and Bareuth. This Prince, being directed to protect the possessions of his master, and keep them free from the charges attendant upon war, pretended that the territory of Nuremberg formed part of those possessions, and claimed for it the benefit of the treaty of Basle. This pretension threw the whole weight of the contribution upon the city, and raised the already irritated inhabitants to the highest pitch of excitement. Nor was this all. The reader may recollect the march of Clairfayt upon Wetzlar, and the unfair manner in which the Prussians had lent themselves to his violation of the line of neutrality. Hohenlohe, who then commanded them, was still at their head. Fortune was now favourable to the French, who were in the



centre of that Prince's possessions, and the Directory, still indignant at his base conduct, had transmitted orders to demolish his castles, and give up his domains to plunder.

Hitherto this order had not been acted upon; but Hohenlohe now came forward in an official capacity. He described the situation of his estates, claimed for them the Prussian "safeguard," and claimed an extensive territory for his liege lord. It was therefore no longer possible to elude the orders of the Directory; they must be executed, and the question decided between the King of Prussia and the Nurembergians. Ney was as little desirous of ministering to the vengeance of the latter, as of discussing the pretensions of the former. Fortunately, the general-in-chief cut the matter short. "He had," he said, "personally to complain of Hohenlohe; for he thought that, during the last campaign, the latter had not behaved towards him with the honourable feelings of a gallant soldier. Nevertheless, to demolish castles might indispose the King of Prussia, and could answer no good purposes." He therefore changed this measure to a war contribution, and would listen to no remonstrances on the subject.

The population were thus freed from a part of their burthen; nevertheless they became not a whit more tractable. Ney was under the necessity of recurring to threats to keep them within bounds; but he soon after received orders to resume his pursuit of the Austrians; and after delivering over the place to Bernadotte, he set out on this service.\*

Having pushed on beyond Lauffen, he found the enemy in the act of taking up their positions. Wartensleben had already extended his line on the one side to the river Pegnitz, and on the other to the fort of Rottenberg. This fort, situated upon a hill, commanded the plain, the high road to Bareuth, and that to Bamberg. It gave a sort of consistence to the Austrian columns. Wartensleben had concentrated all his forces, and united all his detachments. The French general-in-chief, who had just joined the army, fancying that his opponent wanted again to try his chance in a battle, took his measures accord-

\* JOURDAN, GENERAL COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMY OF SAMBRE-ET-MEUSE TO GENERAL COLLAUD.

Head-quarters, Buchembach, 22nd Thermidor,  
Year IV. (August 9th, 1796.)

I return you, Citizen General, the letter written you by Adjutant-general Ney, to inform you that he is in possession of Nuremberg. General Bernadotte, as you may have perceived in the general orders for to-morrow, is to march to that city with the whole of his division; consequently, you must direct Adjutant-general Ney to remain at Nuremberg until relieved by the troops under the command of General Bernadotte, and then proceed upon the service which you shall direct him to undertake, in execution of my order of this evening, for the movement of to-morrow. Ney must reconnoitre Lauffen.

Health and Fraternity.

JOURDAN.

ingly ; but the instant the Austrians perceived this they acted precisely as they had done before at Zeil and at Wurtzburg ; they raised their camp during the night, and at daybreak only their rear-guard was to be perceived pushing into Hersbruck.

Ney again set out in pursuit of them ; but fearful of not overtaking them, he attacked the fort with his small body of cavalry. The approaches being rugged and precipitous, he had some difficulty in climbing them ; but having at length surmounted the ascent, he was preparing to summon the commander, when he perceived a flock of sheep proceeding towards the place. An idea instantly entered his mind, and seizing the opportunity the moment he saw the bridge encumbered, he sent his adjutant, at the head of a few hussars, among the sheep which were crossing it. The adjutant and his men passed through the gate, and boldly demanded the surrender of the fort. It contained a garrison of two hundred men, together with provisions and ammunition sufficient to enable it to hold out a long time. But such was the stupor with which the officer in command was seized, that he opened the gates and surrendered.

Ney immediately resumed his pursuit of the Austrians. The country was hilly and difficult ; it was intersected with deep ravines, narrow roads, and impenetrable forests. He had no map, neither could he obtain any useful information from the inhabitants. He proceeded onward nevertheless, and after exploring rugged mountains,—after surveying defiles, and glens, and gorges,—after leaving no wood unexplored, no path unexamined, he transmitted to headquarters a report of his long excursion. The general-in-chief, much pleased with what Ney had done, forwarded to him the following flattering note, an enclosure contained in a despatch from the War minister.

“ I enclose you, General, your commission of general of brigade, which I have just received from the War minister. Government has thus discharged a debt which it owed to one of its worthiest and most zealous servants ; and it has only done justice to the talents and courage of which you daily give fresh proofs. Accept my sincere congratulation. Health and Fraternity.

“ JOURDAN.”

“ Head-quarters, Hersbruck, 28th Thermidor,  
Year IV. (15th August, 1796.)”

Nothing could be kinder than this letter, and Ney determined in his next action with the enemy to prove the value he set upon the praises of his commander. He continued to lead the van ; and pushing forward, came within sight of Sulzbach. The army followed the movement ; Lefebvre was approaching Neukirchen, Collaud pursuing the road to Hohenstadt, Grenier advancing by Pachetzfeld, Championnet marching upon Heinfeld, whilst Bernadotte, who had

been directed to effect a junction with Moreau, and at the same time to keep in check the archduke's cavalry, which was beginning to bear upon the right flank of the French columns, was proceeding to Neumarck. The whole army was in march, and converging upon Sulzbach.

Ney was in the van, and debouched in front of a range of platforms, and hills strongly fortified and covered with numerous forces. The artillery commanded the road, ready to thunder death and destruction upon the French as soon as they should appear; whilst the Austrian cavalry was likewise prepared to receive those who might penetrate within the line of fire, and attack and cut to pieces such of the French columns as might be thrown into confusion by their artillery. To reach the positions occupied by the main body, a swarm of sharpshooters must first be driven in, and the light infantry overthrown which filled the larch groves spread along the foot of the hills. The fire of the latter must be braved, that also of the field-pieces which defended the road, that of the batteries protecting the plain, and lastly that of the troops formed along the skirts of the wood.

The obstacles were immense, but Ney hesitated not to attempt forcing the position. After halting and resting his men, he formed them; then making a short but energetic harangue, he ordered the charge to be sounded. The light infantry advanced upon the wood, the flankers towards the hill; and this mode of operation, by dividing the enemy's attention, rendered the chance less unfavourable. Hohenlohe, however, was at the head of his men, whom he stimulated by the most energetic appeals. The French were received with a tremendous fire, which took them in front, in flank, on all sides in short, and made a dreadful havoc in their ranks. But they remained firm, and rushing impetuously towards the wood, at length reached the imperialists. The onslaught now became dreadful; the men fought hand to hand, and the earth was strewn with corpses. At last the Austrians fell back, and left the French masters of the field. The Prince of Hohenlohe attempted to rally his troops; but Ney came suddenly upon them, overthrew them, and galloped towards their commander, who was exhorting them to resistance, and who escaped only by the fleetness of his horse.

The French now prepared to follow up their success. Masters of the outer positions, and the enemy being in full flight, they were about to crown the heights; but Kray's columns were already in motion, and the ground becoming more and more rugged and difficult, they were forced to halt and prepare to receive the attack of that general. This was impetuous, and great courage was displayed on both sides. The French obtained at first some slight advantage, forced back the Austrians on the left, and ably maintained their ground in the centre; but fresh forces were constantly coming up to the assistance of the imperialists, and the republicans were pressed on one side by General



Fink, on the other by Montfort, whilst General Elsnitz, at the head of a heavy column, threatened to flank them. They could therefore no longer maintain their ground, and were forced to fall back.

The general-in-chief now arrived upon the field of battle, and sent reinforcements to the troops engaged. The republicans again moved forward, manœuvred on their wings, and changed the aspect of the battle. Lefebvre advanced by Neukirchen; Grenier penetrated into the wood which covered the opposite flank of the mountains; and whilst the one endeavoured to turn the right of the enemy, and the other the left, Ney, supported by troops withdrawn from the main body, attacked the centre. Between the point of action and Sulzbach the ground is covered with woods, intersected with small plains and furrowed with deep ravines; consequently no manœuvre could be executed with rapidity, nor could the marching be simultaneous. Grenier drove back the enemy without being able either to shut them up in the gorges, or confine them within the passes they were defending;—so far from it, that they fell back from post to post, and from peak to peak, until they occupied the last and most formidable of the hills.

In front of Sulzbach is a rock covered with larch firs, whose summit forms a platform upon which five or six hundred men may be drawn up. Inaccessible in front, it was defended on every other side by troops and artillery. The high road runs along its left flank, which forms an easy ascent, and is covered with fir trees. Further to the left is a little plain surrounded with wood, which could not be entered from the side on which the French forces were, except through a narrow defile. In the middle of the plain was a hamlet, with plantations containing trees and hedges. The enemy having no fear for their left, had neglected to occupy either this position, or that part of the wood which extended beyond the plain in the same direction. This fault soon became fatal to them. General Olivier, an active officer; with an excellent eye and tried valour, who led the van of Grenier's division, threw himself into the wood and occupied it. The enemy then perceiving the error they had committed, sent an overwhelming force to retake the position; but their efforts were vain: Olivier maintained himself in it, and assuming the offensive in his turn, drove his assailants back upon the rock. Nor was this the most serious of their checks: Ney, as well as Olivier, had taken advantage of their oversight, and whilst they were endeavouring to retake the road, he occupied the hamlet, and lined it with infantry. This movement had escaped them, and they fell into the snare so ably laid.

A few companies of chasseurs debouched from the hamlet, and the Latour dragoons hastened to meet them; but perceiving that they hesitated and seemed little disposed to receive the charge, the dragoons charged full gallop upon the hamlet, where, instead of an easy victory, they found only confusion and death. The infantry allowed them to come within twenty paces, and did not fire until the horses

were close to the bayonet-points. Men and horses bit the earth, and they who escaped reached in great disorder the rock whence they had set out. It was now seven o'clock in the evening, and the combat had never ceased since the morning; it was, on the contrary, increasing in vehemence, and both parties redoubled their efforts. No artillery could approach to aid the republicans;—it might, it is true, have been brought up on the right flank; but on the left it was impossible, for the enemy occupied the heights commanding the road; the contest, therefore, remained to be settled at the point of the bayonet. Tired of fighting without success, the French grenadiers attempted to scale the rock. It was soft, its projecting parts gave way, and they got only scratches and contusions for their pains. At length General Lefebvre, having completed his movement, debouched and attacked the heights. The engagement now became an act of desperation on both sides. Night came on without ending the struggle; the firing continued, and the hostile forces sought each other in the dark.

At eleven o'clock, the French made a fresh charge; their opponents fell back upon the glacis of Sulzbach, and, covered by a ravine which separated them from the rock, took up a position still more formidable than that from which the French had found so much difficulty in dislodging them. At this unexpected movement, the republicans made a desperate charge, succeeded in breaking the Austrians, killed great numbers of them, drove the remainder among the precipices, and Ney accomplished his attempt to reach the road which leads to Sulzbach. Here he sent forward his chasseurs, who charged the flying enemy, and brought in a whole column of them as prisoners. This was the end of French success on that memorable day. The night was dark; and General Championnet, engaged with the enemy on the heights, was unable to debouch.

The Austrians retreated; the French pursued them, and took possession of Amberg. This town is situated at the foot of a hill, on the right bank of the Wills, and is surrounded by a beautiful plain, interspersed with gardens and orchards, and bounded by woods. The road from Amberg to Ratisbon leaves this plain on the left, runs through pines and larch firs, and then branches off into two parts, one leading to Bohemia, the other to Ratisbon. Wartensleben followed the first of these branches, and took up his position with his left on the Naab, and his right against the wood-crowned heights behind Wolfering. This latter wing and the centre were protected by morasses and felled trees. Numerous batteries commanded the openings of the wood, and covered the other wing. The position was formidable, and Collaud attempted to turn it. He despatched Ney to Nabburg, and proceeded in person against Wolfering, which Kray occupied with a considerable force. The action was long and obstinately contested; Grenier and Lefebvre were obliged to come up with their forces.

Ney, stationed in the rear, beheld with anxiety an engagement in

which he could take no share. We have already stated that he occupied Nabburg, and the heights of Wolfering commanded a full view of the plain. In vain did he attempt several times to debouch upon Schwartzefeldt; an overwhelming force always came to meet him, and obliged him to suspend his movement. One of his charges at length succeeded; the Austrian lines were broken, and he hoped to be able to reach the field of battle. But Kray had taken precautions to foil this attempt, by placing troops at short distances; and the country was moreover covered with woods and ravines;—so that with all his exertions, Ney could not overcome the obstacles opposed to him. His attacks, however, gave the Austrians great uneasiness; and Wartensleben, already assailed in front, and anticipating an attack upon his flank, retreated, and the French army reached the Naab.

The republicans, now on the confines of Bohemia, and about to assail Austria in its very vitals, were sanguine in their hopes of soon bringing to a close the obstinate war which, during the last six years, had caused so immense a loss of human life. Their long and tedious march had yet procured them no decided advantage, the Austrians having always declined a battle; and their progress was marked by no brilliant victory, nor by any striking success. But fortune had not deserted them. They had entered upon their campaign without provisions, and almost without the means of carriage; and in their state of destitution, they showed what men can achieve under the inspiration of courage and patriotism. They never received rations of food until they had first fought for them; they never obtained necessaries, such as shoes and clothing, until they had taken them from the enemy. Obligated to exist upon what the countries supplied through which they passed, they were often reduced to the most painful extremities. Frequently in want of cattle for their wagons, they were even sometimes destitute of ammunition; yet notwithstanding all this, they attacked the enemy with the most admirable courage, and pursued them with an intrepidity which nothing could resist. In much less difficult situations, many celebrated armies had been on the point of dissolution. The army of Sambre-et-Meuse displayed extraordinary firmness: it had called the Austrians to account for the privations it endured, attacked them with the feelings of exasperation, roused by unmerited suffering; and it had never encountered them, without achieving a victory. It had defeated them on the 4th of July at Wildendorf, on the 9th at Butzbach, on the 10th at Friedberg, on the 5th of August at Zeil, on the 17th at Sulzbach, and on the 20th at Wolfering. It had taken Siegen, Frankfort, Friedberg, Wurtzburg, Schweinfurt, Konigshofen, Forchheim, and Rottemberg. It had occupied Bamberg, Aschaffenburg, and Nuremberg. Although without the means of constructing bridges, it had never been stopped by any of the numerous streams which intersect the difficult country in which the scene of its operations lay. It had crossed the Sieg, the Lahn, the Nidda, the Maine, the Kentzig,



the Reich-Eberach, the Wiessent, the Rednitz, the Aurach, the Schwalbach, the Pegnitz, and the Wills. Always in pursuit of a retreating enemy, it may almost be said never to have beaten them, but with the produce of a former defeat. The ammunition found at Frankfort enabled it to conquer upon the Wiessent; that which it took at Nuremberg and at Forchheim, aided its triumph at Sulzbach and at Wolfering. It had been supported by its conquests, which had provided stores for its artillery, and funds for its military chest. It had taken four thousand muskets, ten flags, nine hundred and thirty-three pieces of ordnance, and it had now ammunition sufficient for several battles.

These results were certainly not very great for six weeks of marches and warfare; but the Austrians had constantly declined giving battle, and the army could only seize such opportunities to distinguish itself as fortune offered.

## BOOK THE THIRD.

## CHAPTER I.

THE Austrians had retreated to the other side of the Naab, pursued by the French, who were on the point of reaching Ratisbon, when an untoward event completely altered the aspect of affairs. The archduke, keeping Moreau in check with a portion of his forces, unexpectedly debouched with the remainder upon the river Lahn. Bernadotte fought valiantly; but neither the resistance of the latter at Teining, nor the skill and bravery he displayed at Neumarkt, could stop the progress of the Austrian Prince. The French army was threatened in its rear; and it became necessary to halt, make the advanced columns fall back, and keep the communication open. The artillery was immediately directed towards Sulzbach, and it began to retreat on the morning of the 23rd of August. The troops followed at ten o'clock the same evening. They were now pursued in their turn by Wartensleben; and the archduke was coming upon them by the road leading to Amberg. The former pressed upon their rear, the latter threatened their flank, but the movement, though in danger of being stopped, was nevertheless accomplished.

The whole army had crossed the Wills, with the exception of Ney, who was alone with his brigade on the left bank, when the enemy came in sight. For a long time he fought and manœuvred to secure the retreat of the division to which he belonged. His men were worn out with fatigue, and his instructions not very pressing.\* The Aus-

\* "Collaud's division shall begin their march this evening at ten o'clock, follow the high road, and encamp upon the heights behind Amberg. The rear-guard of this division, commanded by General Ney, shall set out at midnight, and cover the march of this division, and also that of Grenier's division. General Ney shall halt at the extremity of the wood behind Freyholtz, to give the two divisions time to gain an advance upon him; he shall then continue his march, and take up his position upon the heights in front of Amberg, where, by posts and patrols, he shall keep open a communication with General Lefebvre. Collaud's division shall leave a battalion at Amberg for the defence of the town."—*Order of the 23rd of August.*

The instructions for the following day were not more pressing than these.

trians, broken in three successive charges, did not seem disposed to renew the attack, and Ney thought he might give his men some rest. He accordingly halted amid the groves and gardens with which the plain, extending to the left of Amberg, is intersected; but scarcely had he quitted his stirrups, ere a host of Austrians poured upon his small force. Kray himself had come up to give a fresh stimulus to the exertions of the Austrian van; and infantry, cavalry, and artillery crowded in appalling numbers upon the French.

As there was nothing to be gained by a further contest, Ney wished to avoid coming to action, or at all events to circumscribe the attack of the Austrians. He had with him two battalions of the 23d light infantry; these he ordered to retreat, whilst at the head of his hussars he advanced upon the debouching columns; but these were so numerous, and at the same time so impetuous, that he found it impossible to keep them back. They poured in, and spread like a torrent upon the plain, and in a short time surrounded the French force by which it was occupied. The contest was soon reduced to a handful of brave men contending for a passage through the ranks of their enemies, whose masses became every instant more dense. Nevertheless, Ney did not lose confidence: his soldiers fully appreciated their very critical situation;—they were silent, attentive, prompt in obedience to the word of command,—in a word, they were such as French soldiers always are in the hour of imminent peril. Ney was obliged to defend himself on the one side, and attack on the other. He fought and manœuvred with the most extraordinary coolness, and for an instant succeeded in disengaging his cavalry; but a ball having killed his horse under him, his ranks were thrown into momentary confusion. The Austrians took immediate advantage of this circumstance, formed afresh, and succeeded in surrounding the two battalions of retreating infantry. In vain did Ney attempt to extricate them; the hostile columns, by which they were assailed, rapidly increased in numbers, and he was forced to leave them to their fate. They were commanded by Dehay, an able and intrepid officer. As extreme courage sometimes commands fortune, Ney still hoped that they might be able to force their way. They attempted to do so by forming themselves into a square and continuing their march. The Austrian cavalry made a charge upon them; they received it with calm firmness; and having repulsed it, continued their movement. The imperialists charged again; Dehay and his little force halted and again drove them back. These repeated attacks exhausted the men; but Dehay encouraged them and raised their drooping spirits. Having formed in front of this square a rampart of the bodies of the slain and the carcasses of horses, he boldly awaited the attack. The Austrians dared not approach this living citadel, and therefore, instead of men, determined to employ grape-shot for its destruction. They brought up their artillery to batter it in breach; they furrowed it with their missiles—they poured their projectiles upon its ranks;—and when



those ranks were broken—when the brave men composing them were nearly swept away by the artillery, the Austrians rushed upon them. All who escaped the sword's edge were trod to death by the Austrian cavalry; but the rear-guard had in the mean time cut a passage through the enemy, and the honour of the French arms still remained untarnished.

But the republican army was in a very critical situation. The inhabitants of countries forming the theatre of warfare, always wreak their revenge upon defeated armies for abuse of power when victorious. The French, after raising the most flattering hopes in the countries they had conquered, had, instead of giving them reform and freedom, oppressed them with intolerable burthens. There was, on this account, a general exasperation throughout the country. They, who had called for the French with the greatest impatience, were now the most incensed of their enemies. The Count de Sodres appealed to the mass of the population; and this titled *sans-culotte*, whose imagination had before run wild with the anticipated delights of revolution, now represented the French as ferocious invaders, who ought to be hunted down and exterminated—as a race of oppressors who deserved to be massacred without pity. *Mémoires*, on the other hand, had much less regard for the rights of man than for his own independence. He saw that Prussia was about to subdue his country; the French had refused either to interfere or to treat with the circle, and he could not forgive them for their conduct on this occasion. His reputation stood very high—he was extremely popular, and he used these advantages to the detriment of the French, with a vehemence which betrayed feelings of personal, not public interest.

“You see,” he cried, in the midst of a multitude by whom the name of the King of Prussia was held in execration—“you see what we have to expect from the French. They promised assistance to nations, and support to freedom. Behold them now the obsequious courtiers of an insatiable despot, to whom they betray a generous people. They destroy the hopes which themselves excited; they refuse to treat with the circle; and that tyrant who attempted to strangle French liberty in its birth—that tyrant who raised all Europe against them, who nearly destroyed their republic, exhausted its treasure, and immolated the best blood of its youthful citizens, is now the object of their courtesy and predilection, to whom they would fain sacrifice and betray us.”

Harangues like this, the exactions of the soldiery, and more particularly the number of hostages carried off each day, excited a lamentable spirit of hostility throughout the whole country; a feeling of opposition and dislike to the French was every where manifested. A portion of Prince Charles's forces had continued to advance upon the Pegnitz, whilst the other pushed on towards the Naab. The communications of the French army were cut off; it was forced to throw itself into the mountains, and trust solely to the information and indi-

cations furnished by the inhabitants. It could not, however, place much reliance upon the latter; still, as the country was difficult, and the gorges of the mountains deep and extensive, it was sometimes necessary to use the information given by these peasants; but, whenever this was the case, the republicans had ample proofs to what excess of perfidy a people may be led by disappointment. At one time the French army was led into a defile, from which it had great difficulty in extricating itself; at another it was diverted from the only good road which the country afforded. It nevertheless continued to advance; but reverses and misfortune destroy the confidence of soldiers in their commanders, and some of the troops obeyed but imperfectly, others slowly marched on with listless apathy. Jourdan, who was never acted upon by personal motives, thought himself called upon to resign the command, and he did so with noble candour. He addressed the following despatch to the Directory.

"As, in accepting the chief command of an army, I was actuated by no other ambition than that of serving my country to the best of my humble abilities, and so long only as I could, in my own judgment, do it with advantage, it is my duty to make known to you, that the good of the service requires I should no longer retain the command of the army of Sambre-et-Meuse. I have lost the confidence of the Generals under me, and have no doubt that they consider me unworthy of being at their head. Nevertheless I think they will do justice to my probity, zeal, and readiness in every thing relating to the service, and that on these points I enjoy their esteem.

"You must feel, Citizens Directors, that as I have lost the confidence of the Generals under my command, I shall soon lose that of the subordinate officers, and ultimately of the common soldiers. My recall is therefore urgent, as well as the appointment of a commander-in-chief whose military talents will inspire the confidence which I have no longer the power of inspiring. I think the Generals would be pleased were they to see General Kléber at their head.

"You will doubtless perceive, Citizens Directors, that in this step I am actuated solely by my devotion to the public weal, and the desire of being useful to my country, even when I quit her service."\*

The army had struggled during seven days among rugged and barren mountains; both officers and men were worn out with fatigue and want; yet the privates had not, like the Generals, lost confidence in their leader. Still actuated by the same ardour and courage, they could not bear to be driven back by troops whom, during the last three years, they had been accustomed always to beat. On the other hand, Latour had been defeated on the banks of the Lech; the disproportion of the hostile forces might change from one instant to another; and a rapid march might carry back the French army to Nuremberg: Jourdan consequently halted. The archduke continued

\* Schweinfurt, September 1, 1796.

to follow the republican army with his whole force. The battle of Wurtzburg only aggravated the situation of the latter: the French were defeated; and all the peaceable inhabitants of the country took up arms, cut off the French detachments, and surprised their convoys.

The woods and defiles were equally fatal to the republicans, who never approached a glen without being assailed with a thunder of musquetry and cannon. They nevertheless overcame every difficulty, crossed the Lahn, and debouched upon the Acher; but the rapidity of their march tended to increase the hostility evinced by the inhabitants of the country, who, supposing the French completely lost, aimed only at securing the spoil of what they deemed a discomfited army. A detachment had nearly reached Attendorn. A report was spread that it escorted the military chest, and such was truly the case. The people ran to arms; bailies and burgomasters co-operated in the attack, and the chest was captured. But the country authorities, though united for the attack, did not agree in dividing the spoil. One thought his share too small, another cried out with indignation at the portion assigned to a third. The public treasury interfered, the nobles set up claims, and the whole country was thrown into confusion. Ney, knowing the cause of this turmoil, took his measures for bringing the quarrel to an issue. He was aware that the burgomaster, who had led the attack, was an old miser, whom the hope of booty had rendered valiant; and that the principal accomplice in the feat was a manufacturer of steel, who likewise had become warlike upon speculation. Both were men of considerable property. He therefore turned back, routed the troops that covered Attendorn, and succeeded in carrying off these two men, whom he forced to return to the military chest fourteen hundred thousand francs, which they had taken as their share of the booty.

The Austrians were but lukewarm in their pursuit of the columns they had defeated at Wurtzburg. But they did better; they followed the chord of the arc they had been forced to describe in their progress, and proceeded to meet the French force under the command of Marceau. They hoped to beat the latter as they had done his colleague, and by interposing betwixt the two armies, and preventing their junction, either to annihilate the French entirely, or to drive them across the Rhine.

Marceau's situation was critical. With only an effective force of seventeen thousand men, he saw an immense army, flushed with victory, debouch upon him. But he displayed equal talent and intrepidity. He raised the siege of such places as he could no longer expect to carry, concentrated his force, marched towards the Austrians, routed the first detachments he fell in with, fought, manœuvred, and gained time. He at length effected a junction with Jourdan; and if the French army had undergone reverses, it nevertheless withdrew without having encountered any fatal defeat. But it met with an irreparable loss in the death of one of its generals. Marceau received



a gun-shot wound which in a short time assumed so dangerous an appearance that he could not be removed. But a wounded enemy is always treated as a friend by soldiers of honour. The Austrian Generals showed how much they were touched at his misfortune. The archduke paid him a visit; and the brave and venerable Kray, much more afflicted than Marceau himself, did not quit him until he had breathed his last. Marceau expired amid the homage paid by his noble enemies to his great qualities as a man and a general. All commanders have not been so fortunate.

The army had reached the Sieg when Bournonville joined it. He found the men almost naked, and in the disorder and discouragement attendant upon defeat. The task he had undertaken was one of alarming responsibility, and it quite appalled him. Brave, but without experience in war, he saw in the tumultuous state of the retreating columns only the most irremediable disorganization, and in the petty pilfering produced by starvation, nothing but the most profound immorality. He treated the common soldiers like a mob of Vandals, and included in the same reprobation officers and generals. Some of the latter could not repress the disgust excited by their long sufferings, and resigned. He treated these in the most outrageous manner, threatened to have them led at the head of the army with their hands tied behind them, and then shot as cowards deserting their colours at the moment of danger.

Ernouf and Jourdan persisting in their resignation, his anger exceeded all bounds. Imagining that they wanted to make away with the papers they were to deliver up to him, he uttered the coarsest invectives against them, and in his despatches to the government, brought charges against both.

"Not," he wrote, "that I attach great importance to the services of Ernouf; for what can be expected from a staff officer who always keeps himself at a distance of thirty leagues from the field of battle, mislays his correspondence, and loses even his orderly book? But I will not, however, suffer him to retire from the service until he hands over to his successor all the documents he possesses. Jourdan seems to participate in these criminal intentions, and I shall consequently adopt the same line of conduct towards him as towards Ernouf. I will not allow him to withdraw from the army until he has delivered up to me a true list of every thing he leaves behind, and furnished authentic evidence of the state of the troops on my assuming the command. I must confess, Citizens Directors, that I expected better things from this general. I proposed to him to share with me the command of the two armies; he should have kept the right, and I would have taken the left. Not only has he declined this offer, but he will not even retain the command of the army of the North. Although he has not been quite candid in his communications to me, since we have been brought into connexion with each other, I would nevertheless have made it my glory to preserve his reputation. But

I cannot with decency ask of you any thing for a general who forsakes his army at the period of a complete rout and total disorganization.”\*

Nor in truth could he ask for any thing; for what could be offered to a man devoid of ambition, who had disinterestedly devoted his whole life to the service of his country, and who, raised by fortune to the command of an army, had only accepted it at the cost of his personal feelings?

“During five years,” Jourdan wrote to the Directory, “I have served the republic in different ranks, and I have neglected nothing in my power for the fulfilment of my duties. I know not by what chance I was raised to the rank of general of brigade, and successively to that of general-in-chief. I never solicited such promotion, and I have always declared that I was not qualified for such an important office as the latter. Having, however, been forced under peculiar circumstances to accept it, I have worked day and night to acquire military talent, and have endeavoured to make up for want of experience by the greatest activity. If my endeavours have not always been successful, I have at least done all in my power to make them so. I have been supported, in the toilsome career I have run, by my earnest love of freedom. I have ever proved myself a friend to order, and an obedient slave to the law. The feelings of my heart have led me to command by the confidence of friendship; and from the moment I perceived that these feelings were not reciprocal, I did not hesitate to sacrifice my military renown and my personal interest, by demanding my recall. I never belonged to any faction; and whenever any internal commotion has occurred in the republic, being too far off to be able to appreciate its causes, I have always calmly awaited the result, occupying my mind only with the means of defeating the foreign enemies of my country. Such, Citizen Directors, has been my military conduct; if you think it merits your approbation, I should be proud to receive an intimation of it. At all events I beg to assure you, that although I have returned to the rank of simple citizen, the republican government will ever find in me a sincere and zealous defender. I shall busy myself, in my retirement, with studying the art of war; and shall seek to acquire the knowledge necessary to a general who would perform his duties worthily; and if, when I have joined a careful study of the theory to the experience acquired during a practice of five extremely active campaigns, I could be usefully employed in the service of the republic, I would then with pleasure accept such employment.

“I have likewise the honour to inform you that Citizen Marceau has died of his wounds. The zeal, military talents, and bravery of this officer must make his loss severely felt by every true patriot, whilst the qualities of his heart must render him an object of true re-

\* Bournonville's letter to the Directory, dated September 20th, 1796.

gret to his personal friends. The Austrian generals have done justice to his military merit. During the short time he lived after his wound, they showed him the most distinguished attention and kindness, and the Archduke Charles allowed his body to be brought back to the army by the officers I had left with him. He will be buried with military honours, of which he is in every respect worthy, at the camp of La Chartreuse near Coblenz.

“Health and Respect.

“JOURDAN.”

“Cologne, September 25th, 1796.”

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## CHAPTER II.

BOURNONVILLE's debut was not a happy one ; but the enemy were at hand, and his conduct was overlooked in the occupation caused by their progress. The different corps were nearly assembled, and had been joined by fresh generals with reinforcements. The masses were organized anew, the different commands distributed, and each took possession of his post.

With the right wing, General Ligneville covered the Moselle and the Sarre ; the centre, commanded by Kléber, formed a corps of observation along the Rhine from Bingen to Cologne ; and Macdonald took up a position with the left upon the Strunderback. The latter is a torrent, which was each day swollen by the rain ; but its volume not being considerable enough to stop an enterprising enemy, it was fortified and intrenched ; and as it was intended to secure from incursions the plains of the Duchy of Berg, which still offered some resources, Ney was directed with a corps of flankers to keep the approaches clear and protect them against the enemy. This corps, consisting of the 6th and 9th chasseurs, the 20th light infantry, and a battalion of the 105th was assembled at Opladen. Ney assumed the command on the 25th of September, and on the following day began his march towards Sollingen. He immediately extended his patrols along the banks of the Sieg, thereby spreading uneasiness in the Austrian cantonments. His object was less to fight than to observe—less to join the enemy than to penetrate their intentions. He pushed his parties through their lines of posts, sent his agents among their rear, explored their works and establishments, and discovered at last that the earth which they were moving at Ukerath, and their pretended works at Neukirch, had no other object than that of keeping the French in a state of alarm ; that, suffering like the latter



from famine, the imperial army was unable to attempt any offensive operation.

This was of some consequence, no doubt ; but the enterprizes and exertions of the enemy were matters of but secondary importance. That which rendered the situation of the French army more complicated was, the irremediable want of the first necessities of life—the cruel state of deprivation which accompanied it every where. The republicans had performed a march of three hundred leagues ; men and horses, both equally exhausted with fatigue, required to have their strength recruited, and they found, upon the banks of the Acher, the same deplorable abandonment which they had encountered on those of the Wiessent. There were neither stores, nor provisions, nor pay ; yet the enemy were at hand, and the cold weather was becoming daily more intense. The troops could not withstand this excess of wretchedness, and Ney was forced to come to their assistance.

He seized the forage which was still in the fields, and levied imposts upon the villages, demanding bread from some and cattle from others. In this manner he contrived to collect the provisions which ought to have been provided by the civil administration attached to the army. The latter was at that period under the charge of a man who pretended to principle, who supplied the troops with nothing, and yet would not have them become a burthen to the country in which they were. He charged the former to exact nothing, and the latter to supply nothing. Strange as this may seem, it was nevertheless the plan he pursued. The commanders of the army, persuaded that he had the means of providing necessities for the troops, suspended their demands upon the inhabitants of the country. For two days they expected that rations would be issued ; but as none came, they had recourse to their former expedients. The burgomasters, however, had now a pretext for eluding the charges of the occupation, and availed themselves of it with the most inflexible cruelty. If a soldier invoked their humanity in his own behalf, they opposed to his solicitations the order of the government commissary ; if he begged a handful of hay for the animal which had shared his dangers and often saved his life, they threatened to sound the alarm-bell. The men were reduced to live by their industry, and the horses either to feed upon rye straw, or browse in the woods. Dreadful as such a situation was, neither the commander of a wing nor any other general officer on duty dared to put an end to it. Each feared to commit himself with the stern proconsul, who, himself well sheltered and well fed, coldly condemned the poor soldiers to starvation.

Ney, less timid, allowed the government commissary to pursue his philanthropic course, and once more made his flankers live at the expense of the country. This the inhabitants most strenuously resisted ;—both peasants and magistrates refused to bear the burthen ; rigour became necessary to enforce it, and, thanks to the imprudent measure

of the proconsul, the troops which had at first been well received in every village, were now in open hostility with the population. Ney persisted nevertheless, for the necessities of the army were imperious. He assembled the burgomasters, laid before them the exact state of things, and persuaded them to grant with a good grace the supplies they could not ultimately avoid contributing. The meeting took place at Huckeswagen, and the magistrates immediately proceeded to fix the amount of contribution which each was to bear, assessing indiscriminately those who had suffered by the war and those whom it had not touched. This cold indifference roused the indignation of Ney, who, merciful even amid such trying circumstances, demanded that such as had been ruined by passing events, should be exempted. The magistrates of Wipperfurth seemed little disposed to yield to this demand; but Ney took a pen and wrote a few lines, which he handed to them, to the following effect.

“In consideration of the losses which a great portion of the citizens of Wipperfurth sustained at the period when that commune was almost entirely destroyed by fire, the magistrates and burgomasters of the town are hereby enjoined not to include, under any pretence whatever, any inhabitant who suffered by the fire, either in the charges of provisions and forage to be supplied to the troops of the republic, or in the share of contributions imposed upon the said commune of Wipperfurth. The villages, farms, and hamlets shall alone support the expenses of the war.”

“Huckeswagen, 3rd Frimaire, Year V.  
(November 23, 1796.)”

This lesson of humanity was not lost. The magistrates felt that the general who watched over the interests of those whom they governed, had a right to force them to provide the necessaries of life for his soldiers. They therefore collected cattle, bread, and forage; and if they did not supply all that circumstances required, they at least saved the troops from starvation. On the other hand, Ney sought the means of indemnifying them for their supplies. Some of the inhabitants of Attendorn were still in possession of the funds of which they had robbed the military chest. This hostile population supplied the Austrians with provisions and forage; they were filling the storehouses which Elsnitz had built at Weyerbusch; and Ney thought it not impossible to recover from them what remained of their spoil, and to exact from their villages the provisions of which the French army was still in need.

The sky was clouded, and the rain fell without intermission. This appeared to him the most favourable moment, and he accordingly sent out parties and detachments in all directions. These glided through the woods, took advantage of the inequalities of the ground,

and alternately prudent and daring, succeeded in debouching on the other side of Attendorn. They dispersed the guards, seized the provisions, and spread confusion and terror among the inhabitants.

On receiving intelligence of this coup-de-main, Elsnitz ran to arms: withdrawing his forces from the spot where his forage was, in order to carry assistance to those who had supplied it, he advanced to Attendorn, accusing the French of having violated the line of neutrality; but this was not the case, for the latter had passed Attendorn under cover of the fog and rain. It was of some importance, however, to remove this imputation. As the French had been beaten, Prussia, always disposed to side with the strongest, only wanted a pretence for hostility, and Ney was anxious not to give her one. He therefore combated and discussed the complaints made to that power, and proved that he had neither violated its territory nor its rights. In explaining away, however, a grievance of which the King of Prussia might take advantage, he did not neglect his own interests. The sudden movement made by General Elsnitz, and the rapidity with which the latter had brought his forces towards Attendorn, had revealed his weakness, and the indication was not lost. A blow, moreover, had been already struck; the Austrian cavalry had been driven back upon the rear, and the infantry was deserted in the midst of the mud. Ney prepared to attack and force it back upon the Sieg; but Bournonville being himself about to attempt a diversion for the purpose of relieving Moreau, who was still exposed to the brunt of Austrian masses, this operation was deferred. The General-in-chief exaggerated to himself the importance of his own undertaking, and in his dispatches to Ney spoke of nothing but the difficulties which it presented.

"They are less than you seem to think," Ney wrote to him; "and if I had notice in time of the movements you intend to make, I could render them still more easy. I could without trouble attempt a useful diversion, force the enemy upon Attendorn, and carry off, or at least destroy, the stores collected at Weyerbusch. This coup-de-main would render the passage of the Acher and that of the Sieg much easier, should the enemy attempt to defend them, and perhaps it would bring us by a single leap to the Maine."

Bournonville did not aspire to such high renown. Waiting or planning was now impossible; it was necessary to act immediately. The enterprise was however beyond the strength of that general, and he thought only of resigning the command, or at all events of sharing it with some other officer. He now offered to Pichegru what he had formerly proposed to Jourdan; but Pichegru having become odious to the Directory, Bournonville was informed that such a thing was out of the question, and he must cross the Lahn and proceed to the Rednitz. This despatch threw him into a dreadful state of anxiety.

"The Lahn!" he wrote in consternation, "the Lahn! I can doubt-



less reach it, provided I have bread to enable me to cross the desert which separates me from it, and wagons for my wounded, that I may not leave them to the ravens of the forest. But the Rednitz! No, Citizen Minister, that can never be. I have neither bread, hay, meat, nor oats, and I cannot push on to the Rednitz. Confide the enterprise to some one who fears not being beaten. Appoint Kléber, or Scherer, or Hoche. You will kill me if you insist upon my performing this painful pilgrimage.”\*

The Directory gave the preference to Kléber; but the latter, who enjoyed the embarrassment of his commander, and delighted in laughing at him, declined the proffered honour.

“I know,” said he to Bournonville, “the influence you have had in this flattering appointment. But can I accept it?”

“Why not?” inquired Bournonville.

“I will tell you,” Kléber replied, with his habitual irony. “To be a commander-in-chief requires qualifications which I am far from possessing; the leader of an army like ours must be able to unite to the talents required for the practice of war, those of administration; and I am a mere soldier.”

The government commissary, who was present, uttered an eulogium upon Kléber’s modesty, and called to mind the courage and ability of which he had given so many proofs.

“This is all very fine,” said Kléber; “perhaps I might be able to command one or two divisions; nay more—perhaps with such a force I might obtain some success,—at least I have done so before.” And, looking hard at Bournonville, he added: “To carry on operations with the courage and audacity which lead to victory, is easy to one who is attentive to his duties; but to combine manœuvres, and make all their different parts proceed simultaneously, it is necessary to be a great man,—one peculiarly gifted by nature.”

Bournonville, at first disconcerted by these ironical remarks, soon recovered himself. He had the conviction of his own incapacity, and was particularly anxious to lighten the burthen under which he was sinking. Unable to shift it entirely from his own shoulders to those of Kléber, he endeavoured to make the latter share it with him. But in this he was not more successful, and all that he gained by the attempt was a fresh eulogium upon his talents as a commander. The Commissary now thought proper to add his entreaties to those of Bournonville, but let slip some unhappy expressions relative to the perseverance and discipline of the army. Kléber stopped him at the very outset of his speech.

“The army,” said the latter, “has given proof that it can fight and suffer. I do not think that any one can attribute its reverses to a want of either discipline or courage. If our troops have given way, it is because human suffering has its limits, and that the bravest men

\* Letter dated October 4th.

cannot long contend against hunger. Make for the soldier but one half of the sacrifices which he daily makes for you ; let him be sufficiently clad to brave the inclemency of the weather—let him have now and then wherewith to drag on his painful existence—let him see in his rear a wagon to carry him off the field when wounded, and you will then perceive what he is capable of doing, and to what a pitch of heroism he can elevate himself. The insubordination to which he has for an instant given way is the result of the culpable indifference with which he is treated, and the constant want in which he is kept. Obviate the dreadful penury which overcomes and exasperates him—force the people in your own department to perform their duties, and your contractors to fulfil their engagements, and you will then obtain victories, and no more have to reproach the troops with defeats caused by your own negligence.”

Kléber had waxed wroth. In vain did the commissary protest that he had collected a store of clothes and shoes, and that for the last *three days* there had been no want of bread. Kléber withdrew, censuring his culpable neglect of his duties, and Bournonville was obliged to retain a command in which he could find neither a successor nor a colleague. The time for action was thus consumed ; Moreau reached the left bank, and there was no further necessity for pushing on towards the Lahn. But inaction was soon succeeded by disgust. Some of the generals retired from illness and disappointment, and for these it was necessary to find successors. Grenier and Championnet recommended some generals to fill up these vacancies, whom Bournonville proposed in the following despatch.

#### GENERAL BOURNONVILLE TO THE MINISTER AT WAR.

“ Bonn, January 10th, 1797.

“ You inform me, Citizen Minister, in your letter of the 6th instant, that General Lefebvre, commanding the van-guard of the army of Sambre-et-Meuse, is to join the army on the coast under the command of General Hoche, and you direct me to transfer the force under his command to another officer.

General Kléber likewise quits this army the day after to-morrow, and General Bernadotte has already left it with a column proceeding to Italy. Lastly, General Ligneville, whose constitution is destroyed by a disorder of the chest and the fatigue of the service, has just been obliged to retire, for the recovery of his health, behind his line of cantonment.

“ The following, Citizen Minister, are the changes I beg to suggest to you under these circumstances, and I likewise beg leave to add my observations upon those who abandoned me prior to the armistice, and whom, on my arrival at Paris, I should have proposed to you to intersperse among the other armies.

“ General Kléber has real talent ; but it would be difficult to find a

vain man, or one more susceptible of offence and fonder of domineering. I think him badly qualified for subordination ; but as he knows how to enforce it, I proposed him to you as general-in-chief. Had he accepted this nomination, he would doubtless have performed brilliant feats. It is, however, bad policy to retain a man so disgusted with the service, and I protest that I have neglected nothing to raise his courage.

“Generals Lefebvre and Bernadotte are entirely devoted to Kléber. They are two valiant soldiers who have been withdrawn from this army. It was perhaps necessary for us to separate, and I should have brought this about had I resumed offensive operations ; but it is too bad at present to deprive of such men an army so deficient as this is, in able generals.

“It is very probable that the delicate state of General Ligneville’s health will henceforth prevent him from pursuing any very active mode of warfare. I consider this officer one of the best commanders of a column which this army contains. He is brave, prudent, and bold when requisite. He possesses real talent, is acquainted with the art of war, and is well qualified to command a military division.

“The following, Citizen Minister, are the appointments which I venture to suggest, in consequence of the changes that have taken place as above stated.

“I recommend your proposing to the Directory that brigadier-general Ney be appointed general of division, to command the van-guard in the place of General Lefebvre. This officer, intrepid in action, has during the campaign, covered himself with glory. He has always commanded corps in the van-guard, and is the only one I know who could efficiently command that of the army of Sambret-Meuse.

“I have provisionally appointed General Bonnard successor to General Bernadotte ; but this officer, who has been taken from the artillery, is better qualified to command a fortified place.

“I would propose to you, as commander of a wing, General Souham, commanding the 24th division. This officer, who has often asked to serve in line, greatly distinguished himself in the North ; I can send General Ligneville to succeed him at Brussels.

“By this arrangement Generals Souham, Ney, and Bonnard, would take the places of Generals Kléber, Lefebvre, and Bernadotte. General Moreau can determine, when he arrives, whether or not he will retain General Bonnard, who has also evinced military talent.

“May I request, Citizen Minister, that you will propose the above promotions and changes to the executive Directory ? I must observe that I remain alone with Generals Grenier and Championnet, and that, under the circumstance of the army being so weakened, it is indispensable that no vacancy should be left unfilled. It is moreover



urgent that every General should be at his post to organize the several divisions, and put them in a fit state to enter upon the campaign.

“Health and Fraternity.

“BOURNONVILLE.”

Such was the opinion which Ney had raised of his abilities and courage, and such the destiny allotted to him. But the Directory now felt how dangerous it would be to impose upon a commander a task which by his own confession was beyond his power; Bournonville was therefore recalled, but the other appointments were made as he had recommended.

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### CHAPTER III.

THE rigour of the season increased daily, and the consumption of each day rendered the supplies of the morrow more uncertain. The sensitiveness of the Directory was therefore unattended to, and a suspension of arms concluded. The army, peaceably reposing in its cantonments, imposed no very arduous duties upon its commander, and Moreau was directed to add to the duties of his own command that of directing the several corps under the command of his colleague. He accordingly set about making such changes in the latter as accorded with his own views. He organized them afresh, and gave them new commanders; he sent Ney from the left wing, which had now no active duty to perform, to the right, which was to be ready for sudden and energetic attack on the renewal of hostilities. But the Directory was too jealous to leave so large a force under the control of one man; and Hoche, who had just been prevented by contrary winds from landing in Ireland, was despatched to take the command of the army of Sambre-et-Meuse.

This general now appeared on the banks of the Rhine after an absence of four years. He had in the mean time overcome the emigrants, pacified La Vendée, and alarmed England: he was therefore received as a man ought to be, who united the genius of a statesman to his military talents. Lefebvre, Championnet, and Grenier, his lieutenants of the army of Moselle, were delighted to be under his command, and the veteran soldiers exclaimed, as when he first appeared upon the Saare, “Courage and confidence, fellow soldiers; we shall now awake from our trance. Our new commander

is young as the revolution, and robust as the people. He will lead us as Frenchmen ought to be led.”\*

General Hoche arrived at Cologne on the 23d of February, where he found Championnet and Moreau. Though bound to the former by ties of the closest friendship, he had never seen the latter; but both had entered the service at the same period, and both were among the most famed of the French generals. Their first interview was highly gratifying to both. “Hoche was delighted, Moreau evinced real satisfaction, and each had no other wish than worthily to beat the enemy.” The former, nevertheless, was anxious to ascertain the feelings of the troops, and the events which had led to so unaccountable a retreat. It appeared that all who composed the French forces were not particularly fond of the field of battle; but the real patriots had at length gained the upper hand, the disorganization had been checked, and, thanks to the exertions of Championnet, the whole army had been preserved from ruin.

These details naturally led to painful communications. The sources of the evils against which the army was struggling, were pointed out, and all the frauds and artifices of the civil administration attached to the army, laid open to General Hoche, who resolved to reform all abuses. He had an explanatory correspondence with the Directory on the subject, whose attention he again called to the complaints which had already been made against the agents for provisioning the troops. He determined to do without those administrations always attached to the French armies, and who seem to consider it their duty to leave the men in want of the very necessities of life. The complaints against them were general, and every one loudly exclaimed against the excesses in which they indulged.

Had such administrations been composed even of the most honest of men, Hoche would still have been of opinion that they ought to be suppressed. They were, in his judgment, very expensive without doing any real service. Most of the individuals employed in them were ignorant of the language of the country, and had no knowledge whatever of the productions of the soil or of the fortunes of the different inhabitants. They were moreover opinionated, unreasonable, and devoid of talent. Their imprudent exaggerations—their bad political and administrative notions, seemed to the general calculated to injure the cause of the revolution, and cast odium upon the republican government.

Instead of the multitude of rapacious men then employed, it seemed to Hoche much more advisable to restore to the inhabitants their natural administrators, the bailies, and to place the church property once more in the hands of the chapters, by whom it had been so long administered.

\* Journal of the army of Moselle.

Economy seemed to dictate these measures, and he did not think that good policy would disavow them. Administration, he observed, is a family matter; and no one can well administer that with which he is unacquainted. To distribute equitably the charges which each is to bear, it is necessary to know the personal resources of each individual—to have an exact notion of what he possesses. The burthen is much lighter when its weight is properly distributed; the population remain peaceable, and the supplies derived from them are more abundant. The chapters had shown the superiority of a well understood administration of property. Such among them—and as an instance let us adduce Closterbock\*—as could not provide food for seven or eight hundred men when their estates were in the hands of the French agents, fed ten thousand when the same estates were administered by the monks.

This seemed decisive to Hoche, and he resolved to adopt a plan sanctioned by experience. He therefore purposed to restore to the inhabitants, their own government, tribunals, and magistrates, and direct the chief Commissaire-Ordonnateur, under his (the general's) own inspection, to demand the supplies which the troops might require. This project seemed strange to many with whom the old system of French exaction was in especial favour, but it was a wise one.

Hoche, in his personal opinions, had already yielded to influence from which no one is exempt, that of time; he no longer displayed that tender solicitude which he had formerly shown in favour of the sans-culottes, whom he did not now think of clothing in “satin waistcoats and velvet breeches.”† He had no longer “the mania of *municipalizing* Europe. Experience had corrected him; and he now scarcely thought that the Palatinate, the Archbishoprick of Treves, and the Duchy of Berg, ought to enjoy the constitutional regime. He had discovered that men do not become republicans in a day; and

\* An abbey in the neighbourhood of Coblenz.

† CITIZEN HOCHÉ, COMMANDER OF THE ARMY OF MOSELLE, TO THE MINISTER AT WAR.

Deux-Ponts, 1st Frimaire, Year II.

(November 21st, 1793.)

I have to inform you that, unwilling to lose an instant, I employ the leisure moments which my military occupations allow me, in making requisitions. The consequence is, that horses, cattle, church plate, cloth, linen, leather, shoes, and a multitude of other objects, are all brought to the camp.

We have plenty of emigrants, and I think that, without inconvenience, we may despatch looking-glasses, clocks, mattresses, and other pieces of furniture to the interior.

The poor sans-culottes ought not always to work without profit. They will have freedom; and the velvet breeches, satin waistcoats, and coats with large sleeves, shall clothe them.

All the tailors and shoemakers are at work. Do you not approve of what I am doing?

HOCHÉ.



that when despotism is without taxes, nations do not care to exchange it for an expensive freedom.\*

Tired of war and insurrection, Hoche was anxious to settle the condition of his country, and crush the league of Kings which for five years past had forced its inhabitants to shed their best blood upon the field of battle. Prussia no longer inspired him with that sovereign contempt which he had formerly shown towards her generals; nor did he now feel any repugnance to correspond with Brunswick, or communicate with Kalkreuth.† The interests of Prussia and those of the republic were the same, and he proposed forming an alliance with that power. He was not however blind to the ambitious views of Prussia, whose government, he knew, was sedulously watching events, and would take advantage of every turn of fortune. But he thought that for some time to come, King William would not be able to resume his connexion with the Emperor, who had submitted their differences to the Germanic confederation. But the French might easily overcome the irresolution of the Prussian monarch by making him a sharer in their successes—by giving up to him Wurtzburg, Bamberg, Nuremberg, and Schweinfurt, and thus forming a province for him of which Erlangen should be the centre, and in which even Frankfort might be included. King William, who had long coveted these territories, would not resist such an offer. When once engaged, he would remain attached to France, and a continental peace would be secured; for if the Prussian eagles were but united to the tricolour standard of the French republic, all the other powers of Europe would lay down their arms. The only thing necessary was to strike the first blow with a firm hand, and commence hostilities with some great and brilliant feat of arms. Moreau was of the same opinion, but he hesitated as to the means to be employed, and the place where this first blow should be struck. Before fixing upon any plan, Hoche was desirous of making himself well acquainted with the resources at his disposal; he therefore carefully inspected the army. In the in-

\* Letter from Hoche to the Directory, dated 14th of Pluviose, Year V. (February 2nd, 1797.)

† To GENERAL VINCENT.

I am not sorry that you put the brigands before you on the alert. The day of vengeance is coming; and remember that it must be terrible.

I forbid your corresponding with Kalkreuth in any other way than with cannon balls and fixed bayonets. The object of the letter which you sent me yesterday is, to ascertain who commands this army. I will make myself known to him on the field of battle. Would that vile slave of tyranny attempt to employ means which have been but too successful . . . . . Do not you condescend to reply to this Kalkreuth, who is every man's humble servant.

The moment you receive the order from me, pounce upon the enemy like the eagle upon its prey. Let us smite the satellites of kings so lustily that none who escape shall attempt to meet us again the field. Take your measures accordingly.

HOCHÉ.

fantry, the men were in good health, their arms in excellent order, and their clothing, without being good, still serviceable; all were eager for war and battle, and he was highly satisfied with their appearance and bearing. The state of the cavalry was much less satisfactory. The horses were there, effective, able, and in excellent condition, it is true; but fatigue and the want of forage had destroyed a great number at the end of the preceding autumn, and the squadrons in effective force did not amount to a third of their complement. Ney explained to the general-in-chief the appalling privations they had undergone, and the means to which he had been obliged to resort, in order to alleviate their sufferings. Hoche listened to these details with emotion.

"Well," said he, "you have lightened sufferings which you could not possibly have foreseen, and as usual, you have deserved well of your country. But you have still much to do. We require horses, provisions, and money, which I shall not ask government to supply, but which we must find somewhere. You know to whom I must entrust the care of providing these things."

As Hoche was speaking, many of Ney's men appeared, some carrying branches of trees, others pushing before them rickety carts groaning under the weight of a few logs of wood. The general-in-chief stopped short in what he was saying, and seemed trying to guess the meaning of what he saw. Ney explained it. The commissaries for providing fuel, who cost the country several millions of francs annually, had supplied none for several years past. He was therefore obliged to find his own fuel; and as on his arrival on the Rhine, his brigade had been deprived of the wagons which it had preserved during the retreat, he sent his hussars a league and a half for the wood they wanted, rather than suffer the hedges in the neighbourhood to be destroyed, and the trees cut down. The men generally carried the fuel on their shoulders; but they took it from the government forests; and if the duty was hard, it had at least the effect of diminishing the charges of the occupation.

This information, together with the complaints which Bournonville had not ceased making against the carriage agents, roused the anger of the general-in-chief. He desired to know the nature of this agency to which both the army and the inhabitants paid so much deference; and the information he received was even worse than he had anticipated. Three chefs-de-service had formed this establishment in the following manner: Bournonville being in want of carriages in order to resume the offensive, a requisition for nine hundred carts was made in the country between the Meuse and the Rhine. The peasants obeyed it, but had scarcely reached the place of rendezvous, ere means were found to make them abandon their carts and teams. Thus nine hundred carts and eighteen hundred horses were obtained, and appropriated by these chefs-de-service to their own purposes.

They were let to the government on favourable terms, as may be

easily supposed; and at a rate indeed which in a few days covered the first expenses in fitting them for immediate service. The profit, however, not appearing sufficient to these rapacious men, they resorted to means whereby its amount might be still increased. Among the horses so easily procured, there were many strong and serviceable ones; these were exchanged for such as were worn out and unserviceable, and the pretended damage carried to the account of government. This seemed but fair to the Commissary-General, who was ignorant of the trick; and it was agreed that Mullens, the individual put forward in this affair, should receive four hundred francs for every horse that died. The mortality after this arrangement was very rapid; three hundred horses expired in a few weeks; and the funds intended to provide subsistence were soon exhausted in these indemnities. The treasury of the conquered country was then resorted to, and thus was the money which was to have supplied the wants of the army, continually diverted to another channel.

General Hoche was indignant at such acts of dishonesty, and Ney having informed him that there was a fresh interruption in the service of the forages, he sent for the contractor, whom he received very harshly. But the latter, cold and unmoved, at first opposed the phlegm of a calculating speculator, to the general's impetuosity. To the harshest reproaches he only made this laconic reply: "I have no funds."

"What!" said Hoche, "have all been employed in paying for the supplies? You never furnish any thing yourself, yet you constantly oblige the commanders of corps to make requisitions; and your sole employment seems to be to buy up their receipts. These you obtain from the unfortunate peasants at a discount of eighty per cent, and your worthy partners at home receive the full amount from the treasury. I shall know how to put an end to such disgraceful speculations."

The contractor now became alarmed, and altered his tone, protesting that he never participated in such culpable transactions, and that the want of funds alone prevented him from fulfilling his engagements.

"That is singular," said Hoche.

"And yet true," the Munitionnaire replied.

"Are you sure of it?" retorted the General,\* opening the lists be-

\* It was easy to make the calculation. The company of contractors were to have commenced their supplies on the 1st Pluviose, (January 20th, 1797,) and they had then reached the 15th Ventose (March 5th). Thus they were supposed to have met the consumption of forty-five days. The army of Sambre-et-Meuse contained 15,000 horses, and 55,369 men; but to cover losses and double rations, the number of men were taken at 65,000.

There were therefore of bread, per diem, 65,000 rations,

or  $65,000 \times 45 = 2,925,000$  } 5,850,000.

of meat do.  $= 2,925,000$

Forage, 15,000 rations per diem, or  $15,000 \times 45 = 675,000$ ,



fore him, which showed him the strength of the army in Alsace and in Holland. He knew the amount of the advances made by the treasury, and also of the proceeds of the requisitions issued on Belgium. He therefore took a pen, made out an account of receipts and

The army of Rhine and Moselle had 18,000 horses, and 75,193 men. Let it stand 80,000 men, to cover losses and double rations. Thus, there were

80,000 rations of bread, $\times 45 = 3,600,000$	} 7,200,000.
Meat - - ditto 3,600,000	
Forage, 18,000 rations, $\times 45 = 810,000$ .	

The army of the North contained 12,000 horses, and 48,082 men; but part of this army was employed in garrisons in Holland, and consequently paid by that state. Another part had joined that of Sambre-et-Meuse; so that there only remained to provide for 15,000 men and 4,000 horses.

Thus 15,000 rations of bread, per diem, $\times 45,000 = 675,000$	} 1,350,000.
Ditto meat ditto 675,000	
Forage, $4000 \times 45 = 180,000$ .	

General total of rations.	{	Bread and meat	} 14,400,000.
{	{	5,850,000	} 1,665,000.
		7,200,000	
		1,350,000	
		675,000	
{	{	810,000	} 1,665,000.
		180,000	

The company had received a considerable stock of provisions. A cwt. of corn was considered to contain 75 rations of bread, and the same weight of meat, 50 rations. The consumption of a horse per diem was fixed at 10 lbs. of hay, 10 lbs. of straw, and three-quarters of a bushel of oats; or 30 lbs. of hay in lieu of all.

The price of the ration of bread was fixed at 4 sous 10 deniers; which for the army of Sambre-et-Meuse made 15,708 francs, 6 sous, 8 deniers, or in round numbers 15,708  $\times 45 = 706,860$  francs.

The ration of meat was fixed at the same price, thus making 706,860 fr.

The ration of forage was fixed at 1 franc.

Thus,  $15,000 \times 45 = 675,000$  fr.

Total 2,088,720

The expenses of the army of Rhine and Moselle during the same period amounted to 2,549,970 fr.

Those of the army of the North were less considerable, amounting only to 506,250 fr.

Total 3,056,220 fr.

Which together with the other total of 2,088,720 fr.

Made a general total of 5,144,940 fr.

Now, the company had received the following advances:—

1st Pluviose, from the 4th quarter of the sale of national property	1,600,000 fr.
24th Pluviose, from the arrears of contributions	4,500,000 fr.
5th Ventose, from the customs	500,000 fr.

disbursements, and found that this company, without funds when any thing was to be supplied, had still in their hands a sum of two millions of francs, which was without employment.

Hoche was thunder-struck at the result of his investigation. Harshly dismissing the contractor, he immediately sent for the Chef-d'administration, not doubting that the skill of the one fully corresponded with the industry of the other. His surmises were but too just, and he determined to unravel the tissue of fraud which had been so fatal to his unfortunate soldiers. His questions were concise and positive, and he soon discovered that the administration yielded not the palm of roguery to the members of the agencies. It had not only issued illegal requisitions, and committed arbitrary acts, but it had appropriated to its own use the proceeds of the imposts. The contribution of the Archbishopric of Treves, for instance, amounting to 300,000 francs a month, was not sufficient to cover the emoluments of those who administered this archbishopric, and recourse was had to the public treasury. "'Tis well!" said Hoche to the Chef-d'administration; "but every dog has its day, and I am determined to do things at a much less expense. I will form a new administration, which I warrant you, shall not cost 15,000 francs a year, including every thing. Nobody, indeed, shall make a fortune, on pain of being shot; but then the army will profit by the subsidies which the country supplies, and the inhabitants will no longer be shamefully plundered."

When they began, they found in the warehouses of the Rousseau company, and in those of the republic, corn, flour, biscuit, and forage, valued according to estimate at - 1,500,000 fr.

They received from contributions in kind, and from the national domains, provisions, value - 1,500,000 fr.

On the 17th Nivose a requisition on Belgium produced:—

Hay	-	-	1,060,000 cwt.
Straw	-	-	60,000 ditto.
Oats	-	-	410,000 ditto.
Wheat	-	-	850,000 ditto.
Rye	-	-	28,000 ditto.

All had not yet come in, it is true; but several departments had supplied the wants of the troops, kept on the move. Thus the immediate consumption, and what was still to come, might be valued at 2,500,000 francs. Thus:—

	1,600,000
	4,500,000
	500,000
	1,500,000
	1,500,000
	2,500,000
Make the general total of receipts	12,100,000 fr.
Total general of consumption	5,144,000 fr.
Difference	6,956,000 fr.

General Hoche said this with emotion. The impunity with which this system of plunder had been carried on, and the long suffering of the soldiers, had excited his deepest indignation. The administrator had disappeared, long ere Hoche recovered from his astonishment at the soldiers not having risen and inflicted summary justice upon the herd of depredators who were fattening upon their misery. This feeling was manifested even in his despatches.

"I have read," he wrote to the Directory, "that the King of Prussia, of venerable memory, built palaces with the money gained by war; and I could not comprehend how, after so many conquests, we were obliged to sell our houses to cover the expenses necessary for the defence of freedom; but I am now better informed. What treasures, what mines of gold could suffice for the scandalous extravagance of some of our military officers, the splendid equipages of our army contractors, the magnificent houses of our commissaries of all classes, and employés of every rank! Is the luxurious opulence in which these men live, to be wondered at? The public fortune has passed into their hands, whilst our country's defenders go bare-footed, lie sick in the hospitals which are unprovided with the necessaries of life, and die for want of broth or ptisan. Oh virtue! how great is thy power over the heart of a French soldier!"



## CHAPTER IV.

It required time for the useful reforms of the general-in-chief to produce their full effect. The season was however advancing, the first days of March were already passed, the weather was mild, and the snow had disappeared; Hoche therefore took measures to open the campaign. He did not now pursue the method he had hitherto adopted in the distribution of his forces; he did not mix the divers corps, and associate horse and foot soldiers; but he grouped together troops of the same arm, united those men who had similar views and feelings, and formed distinct masses. His object was to try the effect of emulation. We give his views in his own words, in a letter addressed to General d'Hautpoul.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,

"As you have accepted the command of the cavalry permit me to make you a few necessary observations.

"The cavalry generals, Ney, Richepanse, and Klein, have received their several instructions relative to the command of the divisions, to which I have appointed them.

"General Ney, with his hussars, will clear the march, cover the wings of the army, and perform the general reconnoitring service, in conjunction with the engineers and adjutants-general appointed to this duty. He will also levy contributions, and force the inhabitants of conquered countries to comply with the demands made upon them. I shall generally employ his corps when I myself reconnoitre.

"The corps of chasseurs, quite unconnected with the hussars, will be attached to the van-guard of General Lefebvre's division, which, properly speaking, will, in the line of battle, form the right wing of the army. I deem it for the good of the service not to separate General Richepanse, commanding the division of chasseurs-a-cheval, from General Lefebvre, *who esteems and honours him*.

"General Klein, in command of the dragoons, is attached to the service of the reserve, commanded by General Championnet, *whose friend he is*; and as heretofore, this corps, in the present order of the army, will form its left wing.

"The four divisions of infantry of the main body will each have only one regiment of horse; and these will be chasseurs. The division of cavalry will generally remain with the centre of the army, under the command of General Grenier. May I beg that you will place, under the personal orders of that officer, either Brigadier-general Palmarole, or Brigadier-general Oswald. You will attach Adju-

tant-general Becker to the corps of hussars, and the corps of chasseurs; Becker (of the North) whose letters of service I enclose, you will attach to the division of dragoons, and Adjutant-general \* \* \* shall remain with the cavalry division. From your command, my dear comrade, you will be the general commandant of all these corps. When in winter quarters, you will pay attention to their drilling, their appearance, their discipline, and to the goodness and salubrity of their cantonments. When in the field, you will station them, and give them such orders as you may think fit. If it be my intention in the field to applaud deeds of valour, it is also my intention to reward such deeds. When an officer loses his horse, it shall either be replaced or he shall receive its value in money. No man, whatever be his rank, shall take cannon, colours, or standards from the enemy, without receiving a reward upon the field of battle. You cannot, my dear General, make these my intentions too public; they are engraven on my heart, and I will never depart from them.

"The friendship you have shown me, and your attachment to the government, convince me that your constant exertions will tend to the good of the service. Believe me, my dear General, when I say that I shall neglect no opportunity of making known your own services to the French people, both in past and in future campaigns.

"L. HOCHÉ."

"Head-quarters, Cologne, 18th Ventose, Year V.  
(March 8th, 1797.)"

Ney had already received his instructions.\* The general-in-chief concluded his despatch with some flattering expressions, and Ney

\* Head-quarters, Cologne, 17th Ventose, Year V.  
(March 7th, 1797.)

GENERAL,

I have to inform you, that it being my intention to form, from the different arms composing the cavalry of the army of Sambre-et-Meuse, so many distinct divisions, I have given you the command of the division of hussars. You will accordingly organize it on the banks of the Simmern, and place the different corps which the chief of the general staff has received directions to send you, in such cantonments as you may deem most eligible with regard to provisions and military order, and which offer the greatest facilities for effecting an immediate junction, whether for the purpose of encountering the enemy, or for the mere drilling and exercising of the different regiments.

The corps under your command will consist of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th regiments; and you will take from the depot of each, every serviceable man mounted and equipped for actual service, and give orders to the councils of administration to forward to the commissary-general an abstract of the articles the men are most in need of,—so that whatever is ready may be immediately issued from the stores.

You are to be attached to no particular division, and you will receive your orders either from General d'Hautpoul, who commands the cavalry of the army, or from myself. Allow me, general, to express my satisfaction at serving with you, whose military merit is so generally known and appreciated.

L. HOCHÉ.

professed equal confidence in the talents of his new commander. "I sincerely participate," he wrote to the latter, "in the delight of all my comrades at your arrival among us. The confidence with which your presence inspires the whole army, is a sure presage of your success. I shall be too happy if I can at all contribute in bringing your undertakings to a successful issue, and thus deserve your esteem."

Ney proceeded to the Simmern, cantoned his hussars on both banks of this stream, and applied himself to give them the necessary consistence. Most of them had seen service, but having been constantly engaged in contending either against the enemy or against famine, they had had neither time nor opportunity to become skilful in manœuvring or in making evolutions in line. Another inconvenience of the long marches of the army, was the dispersion of the men, a great many of whom had been taken from their regiments.

One hussar had been forced into one direction, another into a different one; this man had served as orderly to a general officer, the other had been attached to the baggage trains, to the store wagons, or to the artillery. In this manner the men had been dispersed, and the corps which ought to have had their full complement, were, in fact, mere skeletons.

Ney soon remedied this. He sought out and brought back the soldiers to their respective regiments, and began exercising them in manœuvres. Personally inspecting, and often directing their evolutions himself, he soon imparted to his division the simultaneous action and suppleness which triumphs over superior masses deficient in the same discipline. Unfortunately there was something more to be done than to put his corps in a situation to appear with credit in the field: it was necessary to provide arms and provisions for the men, and forage for the horses; and the barren mountains around them, devastated by four years of war, could scarcely supply them with the most scanty fare. Ney, unwilling to add to the already excessive distress of the inhabitants, had tried to make his own resources suffice, by putting up to auction all that was unfit for service in his division. But the proceeds of sale of the unserviceable horses were not sufficient to pay even the expense of shoeing the horses of the war squadrons. Necessity was therefore imperious, and he was forced to have recourse to the usual measures. He issued requisitions, levied imposts, and by patience and menaces succeeded, not only in obtaining from these barren mountains wherewith to feed his troops, but in forming reserves, and laying in provision and forage to meet the consumption which must follow the breaking off of the armistice.

The other generals followed Ney's example, and like him, assembled and disciplined their troops. Both officers and privates were impatient for battle. The imperialists however did not share in this eagerness; they were tired of warfare and sighed for peace. The difficulty of proposing it when fortune is uncertain, and the engagements into which they had entered, had long prevented them from



making overtures ; but at length the voice of reason and humanity was listened to. They applied to Marceau, and that ill-fated general was about to transmit their proposals to the Directory, when he was cut off by death.\*

Hoche, like Marceau, was noble, generous, and magnanimous, and Kray did not despair of renewing with him the negotiations which had been broken off by the death of his predecessor, or at least of slackening the preparations of the French army, and thus gaining the time he wanted. Hoche had inspired him with real esteem ; he had often expressed a wish to see the French general, and express to him in person the high estimation in which he held his activity and military talents. Kray, who had just arrived at Coblenz, proposed a meeting ; Hoche acceded to the proposal, and set out for the place of appointment, accompanied by Lemoine, Lefebvre and Championnet. The interview took place at Neuwied, and was pleasing to all parties. The conversation naturally turned upon the war, and upon those events in which each had been an actor. Kray, who was a profound admirer of daring acts of heroism, was loud in his praises of the undaunted valour displayed by the French troops. They had, he said, shown themselves ardent and intrepid in their successes, and had nobly borne their reverses. They had won the glory attendant upon both good and evil fortune, and their names were now imperishable. But the glory in which they delighted, had not the same charms for him, because it reached him amid grief and mourning, and the vapour of blood tarnished its splendour. Hoche was much of the same way of thinking. Like Kray, he deplored the blindness of men in granting admiration only to those among their fellow-creatures who slaughter or betray them. He regretted that he had no authority to accept the overtures made to him ; he contented himself therefore with endeavouring to pave the way for their success, and with ascertaining the real feelings of his adversary. This was

\* GENERAL HOCHÉ TO THE DIRECTORY.

Cologne, March 15th, 1797.

CITIZEN DIRECTORS,

I am informed that the Austrians have long wished for peace. Their generals offered it confidentially to Marceau, who was about to apply for your orders on the subject when he was killed. Prince Charles has forced us to retreat in spite of himself, for he was in hopes of encountering greater resistance. He is furious against the Bourbons since the marriage of the daughter of Louis XVI. to the Duke of Angoulême ; and he wishes for peace at any price. Nevertheless the preparations for war are great, and continue to be carried on with great activity. I have these facts, Citizens Directors, from one who is well informed on the subject.

After this information do you not think it necessary to instruct me as to the line of conduct I am to pursue, in the event of proposals being made to me ? I have reason to expect that proposals will be made, as I march towards the Maine, which the enemy cannot defend against the army under my command. In a short time, Citizens Directors, we shall know what we are to expect on this head.

L. HOCHÉ.

easy enough; for Kray was really anxious for peace, and could not understand why it should not be forthwith concluded. Was it, he asked, on account of the treaties which bound his government to Russia? Why, policy had made them, and policy could also annul them. Was it on account of Belgium? His cabinet cared little for the loss of those rebellious provinces; and the bishopric of Bamberg, or Saltzburgh, or some other, might form an equitable indemnity. The course of the conversation led them to mention Prussia. Kray became warm, and was very vehement against King William, whom he accused of endeavouring to destroy the Germanic confederation. Hoche now interrupted him.

"Where would be the evil," the latter said, "if it were made advantageous to the emperor;—if you obtained Bavaria, and Belgium were given in exchange to the Elector?"

"Then," replied Kray in the same tone, "matters would be bearable;—we would suffer violence and say nothing."

The conversation again reverted to the Prussians, and Kray resumed his invectives against them.

"They are deceiving you," he repeated several times; "they are deceiving you. The day shall come when you will rue the weakness you are showing in their favour. Things have already come to such a pass, that we cannot conclude a peace with you without immediately declaring war against them."

Hoche had nothing to do with such a quarrel, and merely observed that if the Prussians were troublesome to Austria, the English were equally so to France. Kray, who had, no doubt, his instructions from Prince Charles, whose friend and counsellor he was, said he cared as little about England as Hoche cared about Prussia. He did not therefore go out of his way to laud those islanders, but stuck to the object he had in view. His mode of argumentation was powerful, intellectual, and full of point. He demanded with a species of ascendancy in his manner, that the armies should remain in statu quo, or at all events not resume the campaign until the harvest was over. He urged the state of exhaustion of the right bank, and insisted upon the necessity of awaiting the result of the negotiations begun in Italy. Hoche took good care not to yield to such arguments. He knew that the Austrian government was making levies, and that recruits were reaching the Rhine from all parts; he therefore resolved not to give his adversary time to bring them into line.

The conference had lasted four hours, when Hoche put an end to it, and expressing to the Field Marshal the esteem he had for his noble character, took his leave.

## CHAPTER V.

THIS long conversation revealed to Hoche the anxiety with which the Austrians contemplated their future prospects, and the little confidence they had in their own resources. He therefore hastened his preparations, which were nearly complete. Ney having laid in stores of forage, and Championnet collected some provisions, the army was put in motion, and the left wing crossed the Sieg on the 17th of April. The remainder of the forces assembled round Andernach, crossed the Rhine at Neuwied, and debouched, on the 18th, at day-break, in front of the formidable positions occupied by the Austrians. Kray, who for some days past had constantly talked of peace, and had even proposed an armistice, thought that Hoche would become more complying when he saw the obstacles he had to encounter. The two armies were within cannon shot of each other, and the Field Marshal again proposed to suspend the attack, and see if they could not come to an accommodation. Hoche consented; but insisted upon the surrender of Ehrenbreitstein and the evacuation of the Upper Lahn, as a preliminary measure. The bearer of the Austrian flag of truce rejected such conditions, and both parties flew to arms.

The front of the imperialists was covered with redoubts friezed and palisaded, and their two wings occupied strongly fortified villages: the right Hellesdorf, and the left Bendorf. The little river Seyn increased the strength of a position already covered with works. Hoche however determined to attack it, and pointing out the redoubts whence the enemy dealt death and destruction upon their ranks, "A thousand francs for each piece of cannon," he exclaimed. "Agreed," the soldiers replied. The infantry was formed, and the cavalry and artillery occupying their respective stations, advanced in the same order with the infantry, and soon came to close action. Bastoul was at the head; Olivier and Bonnet supported the movement. The attack was fearfully impetuous, and the bayonet was soon resorted to; it overcame all resistance, and in a very short time the right wing of the Austrians was overthrown. On the left, the action was longer and more obstinate. Lefebvre, Gratien, and Spital threw the ranks of the imperialists into disorder, without, however, being able to break them. Ney was more fortunate: he had taken up a position in front of Neuwied, and having despatched the 2nd hussars to the space between the redoubts at the tête-de-pont, he threw himself with the 3rd and 4th into that between the redoubts at Heltershorf, cut to pieces the infantry which guarded the intervals, made a great many prisoners, and took several pieces of cannon; then falling with the same impetuosity upon the masses which covered Hellesdorf, drove them



into the defiles of Braunsberg. But scarcely were the Austrians dislodged from the village, ere they became aware how critical their situation was. Having perceived the impossibility of maintaining themselves upon the line they had formed, they immediately took measures for occupying the woods and defiles leading to Neuwied. Heavy masses of their troops advanced for this purpose; and two columns with a numerous artillery were about to attain the position they sought; but Ney, who perceived all the importance of the movement, and that if it were successful, the fortune of the day would again become dubious, did not hesitate with his comparatively small force to attempt counteracting it. Notwithstanding the fatigue which his men had already undergone, he divided them into two bodies, and marched boldly to the attack. Though the nature of the ground, and the exhaustion of his troops, gave him but slender hopes of success, both men and horses seemed on a sudden to arouse at his voice, charged the Austrians with irresistible spirit, and spread destruction through their ranks. They gave way, and those who escaped death, being stopped in their flight by the baggage-wagons with which the road to Neuwied was covered, were obliged to call for quarter. The whole of the Austrian column was either taken or destroyed; Ney established himself on the plain, and took up his position upon the road to Dierdorf at the entrance of the mountain gorges.

His attitude was threatening; and the enemy, broken throughout their line, perceived that they were in danger of being shut up in the plain of Neuwied. They therefore resolved upon a fresh attempt to occupy the woods. Columns of infantry, much stronger than the former, advanced under the support of a numerous body of cavalry and artillery, but were unable to debouch. Ney's hussars, stimulated by victory, kept them in check, and drove them back each time they attempted to force their way. The battle had now lasted many hours, and the manner in which the French troops behaved was fully appreciated by their general-in-chief, who did ample justice to the decision Ney had shown, and the ability of which he had given such proofs. In his despatch, Hoche thus speaks of him:—

“Ney proceeded with rapidity to Dierdorf, where he found the reserve of the Austrians, six thousand strong, and still untouched. With less than five hundred hussars, he engaged this body during four consecutive hours, and by his skill and energy succeeded in gaining time until the arrival of our infantry and reserve of cavalry.”

The French were now a match for their adversaries, whom they overthrew on every point. Ney pressed upon them, and allowed them no time to breathe. He had already driven them from Dierdorf and Steinberg, and was preparing to force them beyond the Lahn, when they again sounded the charge, and came towards him. Unable to account for this sudden change, he advanced and soon discovered its cause. The French hussars had forced an Austrian column to lay down their arms, but were still stopped by a line of sharp shooters.

Anxious to disperse the latter, and drive them from the heights which they occupied, they employed a field-piece to effect this. The Blankenstein hussars, perceiving this fault, hastened to take advantage of it, and returned to the charge supported by the Coburg dragoons. The troops advanced on both sides, fought round the gun, and both parties struggled for it as the prize to be won.

The ground was bad, and the numbers of the Austrians very superior; but Ney succeeded in throwing their ranks into confusion, and they gave way. The French were now in hopes that they would be unable to return to the attack, and were congratulating themselves on their victory, when fresh squadrons came up to the assistance of the Austrians. The republicans were now broken in their turn, and it was in vain for Ney to resist the torrent which swept his forces along. His horse fell, and rolled with him into a ravine. He was covered with bruises and blood, and to complete his disaster, his sword snapped in twain. The enemy surrounded him, and he had no further hope of escape. He resisted, nevertheless; for he perceived the 4th about to make a fresh charge, and he was anxious to give them time to come to his assistance. He therefore used the stump of his sword, struck, parried, and kept in check the crowd that pressed upon him. Such a struggle could not last long;—the ground was slippery, Ney's foot slid, he fell to the ground, and the Austrians succeeded in seizing him. He was thus made prisoner, and conveyed to Giessen.

The fame of his capture had preceded him thither, and every one was eager to behold a man whose deeds seemed fabulous. The women, more particularly, could not imagine how he had dared to resist a whole squadron, and, for a time, with some appearance of success. As they were taking him to head-quarters, through a by-street, these fair admirers of courage begged that he might be led through the public square.

"Really," said an Austrian officer, annoyed at their importunity, "one would suppose that he was some extraordinary animal."

"Extraordinary indeed," replied one of the ladies, "since it required a whole squadron of dragoons to take him."

This sally put every one in good humour, and each yielded to the admiration which Ney's heroism inspired;—some among the fair Germans calling to mind his valour on one occasion,—others the humanity and disinterestedness with which he always treated the people he conquered.

Ney was received at the Austrian head-quarters in a manner worthy of his high reputation. Each condoled with him on his mishap, and on the vicissitudes of war. But the conversation soon turned on battles and military manœuvres; and the prisoner was discussing each general's share of merit, when he perceived his horse, with an Austrian upon its back. The animal seemed weak, lazy and obstinate; in spite of the spur, it would not advance. Ney exclaimed against the awkwardness of the rider, and was answered by a joke about the

worthlessness of the animal. An officer jestingly proposed to purchase it; and its points and capabilities seeming matter of doubt, Ney approached it.

"I will show you," said he, "the value of my horse."

An opening was immediately made, Ney sprang upon the saddle, and taking the direction of the French army, soon left in the rear those who accompanied or followed him. The horse which had appeared so powerless to the Austrians, carried him off like the wind, and he was near escaping; but the trumpets sounded, and the heavy and light cavalry rode off and soon stopped up every issue. Ney then turned back, and with equal celerity reached the spot where the Austrian generals stood aghast.

"Well, gentlemen," he said, "what think you of the animal now? Is he not worthy of his master?"

Their scattered squadrons sufficiently proved the affirmative. A little confused at their mistake, they henceforth guarded their prisoner more carefully, and took care not to jest again about his horse.

A French orderly having been sent to the Austrian head-quarters with intelligence of the preliminaries of peace, signed at Leoben—the news having just reached the army of Sambre-et-Meuse—the attention of the generals of both armies was now turned to the terms of an armistice, in order to stop the effusion of blood. But the communication of this important circumstance was not the sole object of the message. Hoche was attached to Ney, whose loss he regretted; and he wrote to the latter expressing his deep regret at his captivity, and the steps he had taken to bring it to a close.

"You know me sufficiently, my dear general," he wrote, "to give me credit for the affliction I feel at your misfortune. I depend sufficiently upon the reciprocity with which the Austrian generals will act, to trust that they will treat you as we have treated those of their colleagues whom we captured in Italy. I have requested M. Elsnitz to send you back on parole, and I am awaiting, in the most anxious impatience, the moment when I shall embrace you. Write to me, and inform me what pecuniary assistance you require. Adieu, my dear Ney; rely upon my sincere and constant friendship."\*

Ney required no assistance. Meantime Hoche expressed to the officers under Ney's command, how highly he was satisfied with their conduct. He gave a horse to one, a sword to another, a sash to a third; he also insisted upon Ney's receiving a memorial of his esteem and friendship, and accordingly forwarded to him a magnificent belt, with a letter still more flattering.

"In sending you," he wrote from Friedberg, three days after, "the belt which the bearer will deliver to you, I do not pretend, my dear General, to reward either your success or your merit. Pray there-

\* Head-quarters, Giessen, 2nd Florial, Year V. (April 1st, 1797.)



fore accept it only as a feeble pledge of my personal esteem and unalterable friendship. Give me news of your health."

The Directory, who did not evince less kindness, or less regret, at the accident which had placed Ney in the power of the Austrians, sent him a strong and flattering letter. And indeed his talents, his impetuous valour, and the ability he had displayed before Giessen, made the Government the more sensible of the loss of his services; but it trusted that one of the most efficient officers in the service would in a short time be restored to the army, and that his future deeds would soon avenge the check which the French cavalry had received.\*

Warneck, who commanded the Austrians, had however no desire to set Ney at liberty. Several communications had taken place on this subject, and the captive, who was expected to return every hour, did not appear. Hoche at length got out of patience; he knew that the archduke had forbidden his officers, under the severest penalties, to disoblige the French generals, and he threatened to complain to that prince. The Austrian field-marshal was not proof against this, and pretending to perform an act of courtesy towards his prisoner, sent him back on parole.

Hoche received Ney with the most lively satisfaction. The share which the latter had had in the victory of Neuwied, and the talents he had displayed before Giessen, were subjects of high eulogy on the part of the commander-in-chief, who, as if these praises were insufficient, determined that his impatience to see such an officer again in activity of service, should be stated in a public document. It was so, and in the following terms:

"Head-quarters, Friedberg, 17th Florial, Year V.  
(May 6th, 1797.)

"Brigadier-general Ney may retire to Giessen, whenever he pleases, until such time as his exchange, so anxiously desired by the general-in-chief, can be effected. And in the event of his private affairs requiring his presence in any other part of the territory occupied by the army of Sambre-et-Meuse, he is at liberty to proceed thither and remain as long as he may find it necessary. HOCHÉ."

The wished-for exchange at last took place. The Directory set General O'Reilly at liberty, and the Aulic Council liberated Ney from

\* THE DIRECTORY TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL NEY, EMPLOYED IN THE ARMY OF SAMBRE-ET-MEUSE.

The Executive Directory is truly afflicted, Citizen General, at the accident which made you fall into the hands of the enemy. The impetuosity of your courage before Giessen, and the brilliant manœuvres which you executed at the head of the squadrons under your command, make this event still more to be regretted. The Directory trusts that the army will soon again behold one of its bravest general officers, whose absence is particularly regretted by the general-in-chief. LETOURNEUR, President.

Paris, 12th Florial, Year V. (May 1st, 1797.)

his parole. This negotiation lasted three weeks, and no sooner did Hoche learn its termination than he forwarded the news of it to Ney.

"I send you, brave Ney," he wrote, "the certificate of your exchange, which has reached me through the Government. Come and resume your station in the army, and be assured that when we begin again, I will place you in a situation to win the praises of both our friends and enemies."

This promise was flattering, and Ney determined to justify its performance. Although the campaign had been short, still it had been attended with great loss of life; and Ney applied himself to repairing the losses among his hussars, by filling up the gaps which the different battles had made in their ranks. He collected horses, mounted and drilled recruits, and in a few weeks his division was more numerous and stronger than at the outset of the campaign. This circumstance, which would have rendered him more formidable in the field, was, rather an impediment to him in cantonments. The general-in-chief had imposed upon the country, contributions in kind, but the bailiwicks were slow in their supplies, and had become much more so since peace had been talked of. The evacuation of their territory by the French seemed at hand; and they flattered themselves that by delay they might possibly elude the burthens which weighed upon them. The French, moreover, had neither warehouses nor the means of making bread; and Hoche had just given up to Moreau, the million of francs which the army of Italy had presented to that of the Rhine. The situation of the troops was therefore not very brilliant. But Ney, anxious to avoid extreme measures, had recourse to an expedient which succeeded. He knew that the inhabitants, so averse to the delivery of their produce, were easy enough on the score of domestic consumption. He therefore treated them accordingly, and in lieu of contributions, quartered his men upon the villagers. The latter are naturally hospitable; the soldiers did little jobs for them, and every thing went on amicably. The peasants consumed only a little more bacon and vegetables, and an additional quantity of milk and cheese; whilst the soldiers had abundance of food, and soon regained that strength which lightens the burthen of life, and disposes the mind to acts of daring.

The negotiations, meantime, dragged heavily on. Royalism had once more reared its head; it agitated the French nation and reigned in its councils. The revolution seemed again in danger, and Austria, emboldened by the royalist conspiracies, became daily less complying and more haughty. But the armies destined to defend the liberties of France against kings, defended them also against treacherous legislators; the emigrants were punished, and the empire, deprived of its auxiliaries, at length signed a treaty of peace.

The Continent was now undisturbed. Great Britain alone remained hostile, and it was determined to assault her upon her own shores. An army was formed for this purpose, and called the army of Eng-

land. The pacificator of Campo-Formio was to lead it; but obliged to pursue in Germany the negotiations which he had commenced in Italy, he left to Dessaix the care of assembling and distributing its force along the sea-coast. This general, an able statesman and warrior, was anxious to put an end to the wars which desolated Europe, by destroying the source whence they sprang. He considered this a great national undertaking, and was therefore anxious that all the armies of the republic should share in it. This induced him to select troops from those armies which had fought in the North, as well as from those which had rendered themselves illustrious in the South.

Ney was put at the head of part of the forces supplied by the army of Sambre-et-Meuse, and accordingly set out for Amiens with his division of hussars, where he arrived on the 14th of March, 1798. It soon, however, became evident that the means of execution were not adequate to the greatness of the project. The warehouses were empty, the arsenals were without arms or ammunition, and the pay of the troops, which their victories did not afford the means of discharging, was ten millions of francs in arrear for the armies of the Rhine alone. General Bonaparte was not discouraged: he considered that a descent in England would secure for many years the peace of the Continent, and he resolved not to forego his intention of trying it, until he had a firm conviction that it was impracticable. He therefore directed General Dessaix to survey the coast from Havre-de-Grace to the mouth of the Loire; and he sent Berthier to survey the coast along the Channel. Both were directed, likewise, to ascertain the number of ships, together with the nature of the stores in each sea-port, and to examine the state of the arsenals. They found distress, neglect, and want every where, and both returned with the conviction that an attempt upon England could not be made with any prospect of success.

Unable to reach England in a direct manner, General Bonaparte resolved to attack it indirectly. The peace had brought back an expensive army to France, the treasury was empty, and a host of necessitous and enterprising men, whom the war had trained to arms, already tired of peace, displayed the uneasiness attendant upon forced inaction. The Directory was fully sensible of the critical state of things, and felt that it was as impossible to meet the public expenditure, as to keep down the effervescence of these men. General Bonaparte therefore offered to diminish the one and give employment to the other. He proposed, that after the example of Spain, Portugal, and Holland, these individuals without employment should be sent beyond seas in search of adventures, and their activity of mind and of action, which at home might become dangerous to the state, thus turned to its advantage. The Directory accepted the proposal, and the expedition to Egypt was resolved upon. The plan was not, however, suffered to transpire; on the contrary, every exertion seemed to be directed towards hastening the expedition to England; but the



forces which were to have formed the latter, were distributed for the undertaking they were really to pursue. Some recrossed the Alps, others marched westward and reached the frontier. The hussars were included in this last measure, and Ney was despatched to Lille to take the command of the 6th and 10th dragoons, and 10th chasseurs, forming the cavalry of General Grenier's division.

Every thing was again prepared for a renewal of war. Italy was in violent commotion. The new republics, though disagreeing among themselves, had united to attack and revolutionize Piedmont. This state, supported by all that was still monarchical in the Peninsula, prepared to make a stout resistance; whilst Austria, on the other hand, daily assumed a more hostile attitude. It had already agitated the Grisons, made military movements upon the Adige, and seemed now prepared to come to extremities, when an incident occurred which placed its intentions beyond a doubt. Bernadotte, who represented the French Republic at Vienna, had received instructions to endeavour to overthrow Thugot, then directing minister. The French general accordingly applied to the Empress, revealed to her certain double dealings on the part of the minister, and the rich reward he was to obtain for certain acts of perfidy. The Empress was indignant; but Thugot obtained intelligence of the scheme of the French ambassador, and perceiving his danger,\* hastened to put a stop to such dangerous conferences. The French embassy being about to be adorned with a tricolour flag, he seized this opportunity, raised the populace, and directed them towards the house. Bernadotte, indignant, demanded satisfaction, but finding it neither prompt nor suffi-

\* BERNADOTTE TO GENERAL M \* \* \*.

26th Florial, Year V. (March 15th, 1797.)

Thugot, the soul of the coalition, who seeks to renew it, and who is a sworn enemy to the republic, was near falling into the snare which I had laid for him. But as a clever and experienced courtier, he felt that my third audience of the Empress would have either totally ruined him, or at least placed him in inaction. To avert the storm, he conceived the project of getting me either assassinated or ill-treated. The affair of the flag was adroitly taken advantage of by him for this purpose. This flag had been ordered at the tailor's three days before, and there was plenty of time to get up the riot.

The planting of the flag, however, which was done without thought, frustrated my measures. Nevertheless, Thugot's perfidy has furnished me with fresh weapons against him. The informations given to me after the danger was over, have fully convinced me that he was one of the principal promoters of the disturbance. His silence during five hours, and the tardy arrival of a military force; the inertness of the latter, and of the police;—all these circumstances authorise me to cease all communication with him, and to accuse him before the tribunal of public opinion, as well as before the supreme chief of his nation. The sovereign has replied to my complaint through the medium of another minister;—thus Thugot's credit and respectability are on the wane. The Government has only to pursue the plan laid down by its ambassador," &c.

cient, quitted Vienna. This insult, the object and particulars of which were unknown, seemed a declaration of war. Ney left his dragoons to proceed to the army at Mayence, and arrived on the 1st of September, 1798, at Friedberg.

Nevertheless, the political horizon seemed to clear up a little; negotiations were opened at Seltz, and the turbulence of the Italian republics had been repressed. For a moment there were hopes that no fresh conflagration would burst forth; but principles, such as gave rise to these commotions, must receive their full developement, and it is impossible to avoid their consequences.

## CHAPTER VI.

THE French were announced as the avengers of nations, and the decision which, as umpires, they had rendered in the affair of Valteline, had sanctioned this title. It is known that the Valtelinians, having submitted to the Grisons, were soon after abandoned to the latter by the house of Sforza; but only on certain conditions, and with franchises for which this princely house became guarantee, but which the Grisons had never yet allowed them to enjoy.

The yoke of the Grisons had therefore become intolerable, and the Valtelinians attempted at different times to shake it off; but each time that the Sovereign people\* had the disadvantage, the federal aristocracy came to their assistance, and riveted still more firmly the chains of the poor oppressed mountaineers.

The popular cause at length triumphed, and General Bonaparte having subjected Italy to his laws, the oppressed Valtelinians submitted to him their cruel grievances. As this affair was closely connected with the interests of Switzerland, it might from that very cause endanger the peace of Europe. Bonaparte, therefore, felt repugnance to interfere in these differences; but having conquered the Milanese territory, he had thereby become invested with the rights of the Dukes of Milan, and could not consistently decline their duties. He accordingly accepted the office of umpire, and having admitted that the stipulations had been violated, decided that a people could not be the subjects of another people, and that the Valtelinians were free from the yoke of the Grisons. This decision soon spread through the valleys of Helvetia; the sovereign population perceived what they had to fear, and the enslaved mountaineers saw their franchises acknowledged and supported by a powerful nation. All was in agitation in the Swiss mountains; some cantons claimed their rights, others defended their privileges, and, as it always happens when states have no confidence in their own strength, and have powerful neighbours, each appealed to the particular government whose political doctrines favoured its own peculiar views.

The people of Argau, St. Gall, and the Pays de Vaud, appealed to France; the aristocracies of Basle, Soleure, Berne, and Zurich, to Austria. Thus the balance was far from even; the people were in favour of the French, but their rivals were all powerful in the council. The former only elicited a useless sympathy, the latter wielded the power.

Such a state of things was not to be endured. France could not

\* The Grisons assumed this title.



allow Austria to obtain such ascendancy in Switzerland, and thus dispose of all the resources of the confederation. The internal struggle in the cantons became daily more intense; the Pays de Vaud claimed its rights and privileges, and Berne overran it with troops. This territory was contending against evils of the same nature as those which had afflicted the Valteline. Like the latter, it had been alienated, but on condition that its franchises should be respected. It now only demanded the execution of the solemn treaty made at that period; it required nothing more than the franchises specified in the declaration of rights guaranteed by France. The Directory could not, under these circumstances, do less than one of its generals had done, and it interfered; but in a manner worthy of the government of a great people,—with a view only to conciliation.

The effect of such interference did not answer the expectations of the French government. Battles were fought, much blood was shed, and whole tribes were swept from the face of the earth. But these troubles had originated in the noblest feelings; and if they led to fearful results, it was because foreign ideas, combined with local influence, had obtained but too much weight in the Swiss councils. This is proved by the following despatches, which, though they have no direct connexion with Ney's life, still point out the causes of a struggle in which he afterwards became an actor. They also show the feelings existing in a country which at a subsequent period he was sent to pacify; and they clear one of his brethren in arms, afterwards proscribed and sacrificed, from the base imputations with which it has been lately attempted to stigmatize his memory.

## I.

“GENERAL BRUNE, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN  
HELVETIA, TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY.

“Head-Quarters, Berne, March 17th, 1798.

“CITIZENS DIRECTORS,

“I yesterday saw the deputies of the democratic cantons of Ury, Unterwalden, Schwitz, Glaris, and Lower Zug. In their address to me, you will find the expression of the friendship of their constituents towards the French republic. Twenty deputies from Argau came, at the same time, to ask me for authority to form a separate canton. It was granted to them immediately, and they promised me to proceed with activity in constituting new authorities, enlightening the people, urging the neighbouring countries to the same resolution as themselves, and carrying into execution the constitution drawn up by M. Ochs. In these deputies I perceived great ardour, zeal, and openness. I send you their address; it contains thanks on the subject of the instructions I sent to them.

“The Canton of Zurich, torn by hostile parties, has yet come to no decision: nevertheless the partisans of the new constitution are very numerous there, and will carry it into effect without being obliged

to secure their triumph by an appeal to arms. At first, Citizens Directors, you desired that Switzerland should form a single republic, one and indivisible ; but on taking into consideration some difficulties in the constitution which was to have served as its basis,—and perhaps on reflecting upon the consequences which might arise from the neighbourhood of a great political machine whose motions would be prompt and uniform, and from whose effects we should have greater occasion to preserve ourselves than to make any use of it, you have come to the conclusion that the whole of Helvetia might form three independent republics.

“The execution of this plan is now taking place. One of the three republics, consisting of all those parts of Switzerland in which French is spoken, is almost wholly formed. You will find its composition in the document of which I enclose a copy.

“The canton of Berne, already deprived of the Pays de Vaud and Argau, will further lose the whole of the Oberland, which begins at the lake of Thun and terminates on the other side of Mount Grimsel. It will also lose the country between the lake of Brienz, the Sanen, and the Aar, as far as Buren. The territory of the new republic requiring width, and it being necessary to secure to France good communications with Italy—such communications being more difficult in the south of Switzerland, whose inhabitants are refractory and ill-disposed—it is expedient to form, at the two extremities of the lake of Neuschâtel, points of contact which may facilitate our influence. As the Rhone runs through a considerable portion of this republic, and supplies with water, if it does not pass through, the beautiful lake Lemán, I have called this country Rhodania. Thus we may say the Rhodanians, and the Rhodian republic.

“As it is not your intention to trouble the small democratic cantons of Ury, Schweitz, Unterwalden, Zug, and Glaris, their federative form shall not be meddled with. They will compose a confederation, with a central and representative body to watch over its general safety and manage its foreign relations. In this confederation the Grisons may join. There is nothing to prevent this country from being called Tellgau, or Tellgovia, which signifies country of William Tell ; and we may denominate its inhabitants Tellgovites. The capital might be Schweitz, or Altorf in the canton of Ury.

“The third republic, the most important in extent, commerce, and population, will consist of twelve cantons or departments. Its metropolis may be either Lucerne or Zurich. This country may be called Helvetia. It will be easy, after what I have done to prepare the public feelings on the subject, to establish in it the constitution drawn up by M. Ochs ; but with some modifications,—perhaps the same as I have thought necessary for Rhodania.

“I must now explain why I have not placed Appenzel among the number of cantons which remain pure democracies. Appenzel touches the hereditary states of Austria on several points ; and by

placing it in Tellgovia, Austria would be enabled to exercise a greater influence over that republic, and consequently over Helvetia, than at present. We ought not to neglect warding off danger, however distant and insignificant it may seem. If the Helvetian republic, which joins our territory in several places, contained Appenzel, we should be able to perceive the action of Austria upon this most important part of the country; for we may reckon as nothing any attempts of the enemy upon the country of the Grisons, which forms at the back of Tellgovia a rampart of inaccessible mountains.

“Health and Fraternity.

“BRUNE.”

## II.

BRUNE, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN HELVETIA, TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY.

Berne, 1st Germinal, in the evening, (March 21st.)

“CITIZENS DIRECTORS,

“The resolution I had formed, and which I communicated to you in my despatch of this morning; is no longer practicable. Your last plan was no doubt known to M. Ochs, for he invokes your will, and almost your name, to hasten the return to unity. In yielding to his sarcasms, the people think they are obeying the executive Directory of the French republic, and by this line of conduct he has obtained almost an unanimity of suffrages.

“M. Ochs has evinced towards me a degree of cunning which approaches duplicity. After applauding the motives which induced me to delay for some days the execution of your plan, he had no sooner left me than he used the most impetuous haste in precipitating the union; thus depriving me of the merit of bringing it about myself. He travels as President of Switzerland rather than of the canton of Basle. He has two flags suspended to his carriage: one green, and the other red, white and black; a numerous escort accompanies him. I must end what I have to say concerning him by stating, that he gave me an almost scandalous account of the formation of his constitutional project.

“Health and Fraternity.

“BRUNE.”

## III.

TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY.

“Head-quarters, Berne, 5th Germinal,  
Year VI. (March 25th.)

“CITIZENS DIRECTORS,

“The work of Swiss liberty is in progress, and before I leave I shall have the satisfaction of seeing it sufficiently advanced to make the enemies of the federative system lose all hopes of success. Berne has appointed its electors and its municipal officers; and the primary



assemblies have met without any disturbance. In your last despatch you directed me to complete the overthrow of the Bernaise oligarchy, and prevent the provisional government from publishing the project of a constitution, in preparing which several of its members were occupied. I informed you in my last that all this had been done. The exclusion is pronounced. In my last, I also sent you copies of the several decrees which I have felt it my duty to promulgate; I now transmit you a copy of an explanatory letter I wrote to the commune of Berne, and in which I extend the exclusion even to the families of the oligarchs in office.

“ There is a difficulty on this head with regard to Zurich. It is well known, that, in the council of that city, ten or twelve members formed, in spite of the aristocracy, an opposition which has resisted the greatest political storms. The courage of these citizens deserves to be rewarded, and the inhabitants of Zurich are desirous that it should be. The national assembly of Zurich have sent deputies to me, to express a wish that the people should have the power of placing among those whom they intend to honour with their confidence, the men who have earned their share of it by such generous sacrifices.

“ You will perceive the precautions taken by the assembly of Zurich to prevent this exception from being made an improper use of; and I scarcely know how a general measure, whatever be its rigour, could resist such considerations as these. Besides, the men in whose favour Zurich makes such a demand, have protested against the petition, and declared that, for the term prescribed, they renounce all public employment. This new species of courage renders the members of the Zurich opposition still more deserving of the confidence of their fellow citizens, and I have deemed it right to yield to the wishes of the national assembly.

“ Although the aristocracy of Friburg are not worthy of so extensive an exemption, nevertheless, the citizens of Montenach and Wonderveidt ought to be included in it. Both enjoy the esteem of the friends of liberty; and I am indebted to the latter for much useful information, given prior to the capture of Friburg.

“ Claims have also been made in favour of certain members of the council of Soleure; but as General Schauenburg is exclusively acquainted with every thing that takes place in that canton, whether political, military, or financial, he will act in this matter to the best of his judgment.

“ As for Berne, there may be some patriots among the members of the ex-council, but I regret that I do not know them; and I am of opinion that, in this part of Switzerland, the exclusion should remain entire.

“ I leave on the 8th instant for Italy, in conformity to your orders, and I therefore do not think it necessary to trouble myself about the aristocracies of Lucerne and Schaffhausen, which can inspire but little interest, as not a single voice is raised in their favour.

“The small cantons may become alarmed at the reports circulated in spite of my protestations, regarding the necessity which would be imposed upon them of joining the rest of Helvetia, and changing their democracy into the representation system; but I know your intentions sufficiently, Citizens Directors, to be persuaded that the inhabitants of these little states will not be troubled. The openness and even the freedom of their declarations, prove that you may depend upon their attachment to, and faithful observance of the treaties.

“The resident Mangourit, who arrived here the day before yesterday, informs me that Valais is extremely averse to form part of Helvetia, and that it would feel difficulty in belonging to any republic of which it did not form the total. This feeling, in the event of its not being overcome by persuasion, would not be in any wise disadvantageous to us, because, by way of the department of Mont Blanc, we have only Valais to cross in order to establish our passage into Italy. Thus the formation of this country into an isolated state, could not, at all events, prove a very great political error.

“Generally speaking, the political state of the whole of Helvetia is satisfactory. The different ranks of constitutional authorities are being established there, and an ordinary degree of watchfulness is alone necessary to prevent an injury to the interests of France.

“I must inform you, Citizens Directors, that copies of the letters and instructions which you send me, are in circulation through the country, and more particularly at Basle and Lausanne.

“I am certain that citizen Laharpe has written from Paris—from the Directorial palace, nay, from the very Salle des Drapeaux—that you are about to decide upon the unity of Helvetia, and that no attention is to be paid to any measures that may be pursued by the French ministers and generals in opposition to this determination. You may easily imagine, Citizens Directors, the difficulties which may be raised by these communications, and their effect in delaying the execution of your orders.

“I send you all the vouchers of monies due, which I have been able to procure. They are very considerable, and bear not only upon England, but upon Austria, Denmark, and several states of Germany. All these vouchers form a deposit which I send to Paris, and which my aide-de-camp, Captain Guillemot, is instructed to take care of, and deliver into the hands of any person you may appoint to receive them. I despatch at the same time the ex-treasurer and ex-director of the mint at Berne, now military commissary-general of the same canton. His name is Jenner. He is able to give you every information concerning both the vouchers and the mode of converting them into cash; likewise the amount of the specie at the mint and in the treasury. You will see by the accompanying copy of an abstract of which he will deliver to you both the original and

the several *procès verbaux* connected with it, that the sums found in the treasury pretty well correspond with the entries in the books.

“The sums which I have applied to the use of the troops, amount to nine hundred thousand francs, taken at two different periods; namely, five hundred thousand francs the first time, and four hundred thousand the second. I send you the account of the paymaster to the division of Italy,—a document proving the taking and application of this money, and showing that the troops have been paid up to the 15th instant, as you desired.

“Sufficient still remains in the treasury to meet the wants of the troops under the command of General Schauwenburg, until contributions, which may certainly be abundant, and the amount of which you will fix, are raised to supply any other exigences that may occur. The surplus of the treasure shall be sent to Mayence; I will leave instructions for my successor to this effect.

“I likewise send you a list of the vouchers of the canton of Friburg, for sums due by the inhabitants of the country, as well as by France and foreign nations.

“You will, at the same time receive an account of the cannon taken from the enemy. They amount to two hundred and ninety-three pieces of cannon of different calibres, thirty-eight howitzers, and thirty-two mortars. General Schauwenburg is directed to evacuate these pieces upon Huningen and Carouge. One hundred and sixty-three are already evacuated.

“Health and Respect.

“BRUNE.”

This correspondence shows the injustice of the imputations lately raised against Marshal Brune; it shows how little this General deserved the reproaches of perfidy and cupidity applied to him. It also shows that far from taking an undue advantage of his victories, he constantly pleaded the cause of the conquered inhabitants; that he felt the same confidence in them as he sought to inspire; and that no one could be more careful, or take greater precautions in verifying and proving the amount of the treasure that fell into his hands.



## CHAPTER VII.

THE French having made an irruption into Switzerland, the Austrians penetrated into the country of the Grisons; and besides increasing their force upon the Lech and in Tyrol, sent troops into Brisgau. The attitude thus assumed by them, was formidable: they could, on the one hand, cross the Splugen, reach Chiavenna and Lago Maggiore; on the other, they had it in their power, by penetrating through the valley of Urseren, to occupy Mount Tavesch, force the St. Gothard, and reach Airolo and Bellinzona. They might further direct a movement upon Schaffhausen, spread their forces through the Frickthal, force the valley of Scion, debouch upon Aost, rally the Piedmontese troops, involve the French army in a system of irremediable manœuvres, and divide the army of Italy into two parts, cutting them off from each other. The Directory, anxious to provide against the power of producing such serious consequences, seized the strongholds of the King of Sardinia, reinforced the French armies in Italy, in the Roman states, and in the cantons of Helvetia, and organized two fresh armies upon the Rhine. The one intended to operate in Suabia and Bavaria, under the orders of Jourdan, was called the army of Mayence; the other, commanded by Bernadotte, was denominated the army of observation. The latter was intended to protect the forts on the river Huninguen at Dusseldorf, prevent an invasion of the left bank, spread through Hesse-Darmstadt, and take Manheim and Philipsburg. Ney, who had been for several months on the banks of the Lahn, naturally belonged to the latter army, which was to have contained forty thousand men, but was reduced to a mere handful of soldiers. Nor were these in a fit state to enter upon a campaign;—one had no musket, another no bayonet—and what was still worse, the whole of them, worn down by a long agony of want, displayed no appearance of regularity, order, or even primitive organization. Coats in rags, waistcoats of different materials, rent breeches, and gaiters of all colours;—such was the condition and appearance of these patriotic soldiers, cruelly pinched by hunger, and yet most ardently devoted to their colours. In vain did the superior officers interfere to alleviate the sufferings of their men; if their exertions were sometimes successful, and they obtained a little forage from the administration, the quality of the article was so bad that it was really not worth the trouble taken to procure it. If ready-made articles of clothing were given out, the shoes were not sewn, or the cloth had never been wetted; thus, the former fell to pieces at the commencement of a march and the coats burst on the first shower of rain. If the materials were demanded instead, it was still worse; the appli-

cants were made to come and go, and wait, and the most tedious and painful solicitations often remained unanswered. The stores were distributed throughout the territory of the republic; each town had its well-filled warehouses, and yet none contained all the different items of a soldier's dress and accoutrements. At Cologne there were plenty of coats, but neither waistcoats nor breeches; there was, at Mayence, a large store of stout leather for soles, but no upper leathers. There were shirts at one place, stockings at another, gaiters at a third.

The same confusion reigned in the ordnance department. At one place there were swords, but no belts; at another plenty of cartridge-boxes, but nothing to hang them upon. If an officer overcame the disgust he felt at such a system, and made an application in behalf of his men, he would generally receive an order on the stores of Liege, or Brussels, or any other place than the one he was at. If he required, for instance, fifteen hundred coats, he was obliged to send for them at a great expense; and then perhaps, instead of obtaining what he wanted, he received only a few yards of cloth to clothe a whole brigade; or blue cloth was perhaps given him for the coats, but no red to make the facings; or if there were red cloth, there was no white, and nothing for linings;—in a word, the delivery was never complete. All this was monstrous, but it must in justice be stated that the government was not alone the cause of it. The conscription had just been adopted; it was the only mode of recruiting the army which the local councils had left to the government, and the formation of the list of conscripts, as well as the examination of all claims to exemption, was entrusted to the communal administrations. Now it is well known what lukewarm zeal is always shown by the municipal magistrates in such cases; and to this cause of delay was added another equally powerful. The treasury was empty, and the minister, obliged to meet an immense consumption, had only national property and delegations at his disposal. If horses were wanted, a delegation was offered upon the door and window tax; if new clothes were required, a domain was offered in payment. For arms and stores the same means of purchase were proposed. But be the cause what it might, the state of absolute wretchedness to which the troops were reduced, rendered their situation most deplorable.

Before appearing on the field of battle, it was necessary that the French army should have the means of doing so with effect. General Ney, who had fought and sojourned in the country, well knew its localities and resources. He commanded men in want of every thing, even the greatest necessities of life; but at a little distance from their cantonments, commanderies were to be seen which contained every thing in abundance, and whose superfluities he thought might be applied to the craving wants of his men. His means were, however, greatly out of proportion to the obstacles he had to contend against; but celerity and boldness are likewise powerful means, and he resolved to try his fortune.

When about to set out with his little force, some unexpected occurrences increased his danger, though they gave great additional importance to his undertaking. Manheim and Philipsburg were garrisoned by troops who seemed but little disposed to defend them. The French revolutionary principles had penetrated among the soldiers, who had become agitated and uneasy; they were weary of shedding their blood only to rivet their own chains; whilst their officers, disgusted with a war in which no personal renown was to be gained for themselves, only felt a more ardent longing for those generous and liberal institutions, which could alone permanently fasten their colours upon the car of victory. There is always a great advantage in cultivating the favourable dispositions of an enemy, but in the present instance they derived a most powerful importance from their local power. If these two places were carried, Lower Alsace would be covered, and a portion of the Palatinate sheltered from irruptions. The petty princes of the empire would then be forced to subscribe to a treaty of peace, and the French would take the lead in the campaign. This changed altogether the object of Ney's operations.

His plan was therefore altered, and he resolved to attempt to surprise Manheim, and, if successful, to force Philipsburg. But the troops he had at his disposal were scarcely sufficient for this double undertaking; and yet an attack upon the one would give the alarm to the other. He resolved, however, to ascertain in person the extent of the difficulties he had to encounter, and accordingly crossed the Rhine under the disguise of a peasant. Having entered Manheim, with a basket upon his arm, he proceeded through the streets, made his observations, and obtained precise information as to the force which defended it, and the provisions it contained. The garrison were ill disposed to defend the place, and the duty was carried on in a slovenly and unequal manner. He was about to leave the fortress full of hope, when he perceived a soldier of the garrison supporting a female in the last stage of pregnancy. Having accosted the woman, he expressed an interest in her situation, and his fear that her illness might begin before the night was over.

"No matter if it does," the soldier replied; "should this be the case, the commandant will allow the drawbridge to be let down at any hour of the night, so that the instant she is taken ill she can have assistance."

This was all Ney wanted to know; and he soon recrossed the Rhine to make his preparations.

He selected a hundred and fifty of his bravest soldiers, crossed the river with them in skiffs, went rapidly forward, and concealed them under the walls of Manheim, in the hope that the woman's labour pains would soon come on. She did not disappoint him: her sufferings began, the bridge was lowered, and an instant after Ney and his men took possession of it. The latter, with their general at their head, then pushed forward, and the weakness of their force was



masked by the darkness of the night. Ney threatened and alarmed the garrison, and succeeded in obtaining a surrender of the place.

Being master of Mannheim, Ney advanced towards Philippsburg. But the garrison of that town having taken the alarm, he was obliged to halt, and wait till fortune should come to his assistance. He established his force in the neighbouring villages, and the garrison having pleaded the negotiations that were open, hostilities were suspended. The hostile forces lived at first in the most perfect understanding; but the French dragoons at length got tired of seeing the enemy's patrols going through their quarters. Disputes arose, and the hussars of Bamberg were very roughly handled. The governor immediately took the alarm, and cried out against the aggression. Ney sent to quiet his fears, and mounting his horse, proceeded to ascertain how things were. He pushed on towards Waghausel; and the enemy's troops stationed in the villages retiring on his approach, he followed them and came in sight of Philippsburg. Being so near the place, he resolved to demand an interview with the governor, the Rheingrave of Salm, a haughty, reserved, morose, and bigoted aristocrat. This proud chieftain did not condescend to see the French general, but despatched a chief of the advanced posts to represent him, with authority to accept any proposals which Ney might make. This was of good augury. The French general feigned to be desirous of sparing the garrison, and offered a suspension of arms. The chief of the advanced posts at first eluded the proposal, but being a man of weak judgment, and devoid of energy, he soon suffered himself to be led by Ney, and the suspension was accepted.

Thus was Philippsburg blockaded upon parole, and Ney became free in his movements. During this interview he had found an opportunity of ascertaining that every one in the place was not averse to being treated with, and that a little glittering gold was alone requisite to obtain all he desired. Now, his troops had nothing immediately on their hands, and the rich convents of the Necker were not far off. He therefore boldly offered the wealth of these convents to those who would deliver up the place. The proposal was eagerly accepted; but each estimated himself at a very high price. To save appearances, bridges were to be constructed, a pretended attack was to be made, and a place of retreat provided for the traitor, in the event of failure. A first excursion supplied the means of meeting these expenses. Generals Gudin, Sorbier, and Darnaudat, had assembled the men they wanted to secure the passage of the river, and begin their march. Ney, full of confidence, pressed Bernadotte to come and assume in person the direction of the siege, which he required only four hundred horse, four companies of infantry, and two pieces of cannon, to cover. But the Austrians were advancing, and Bernadotte knew not where Jourdan and Masséna were. He feared the coming of the archduke still more than he coveted the possession of Philippsburg; and he adjourned the capture of this place until he had ascertained the mo-

tions of the Austrian prince. This delay led to other difficulties. Great Britain had her emissaries everywhere ;—burgomasters, editors of newspapers, and postmasters, richly remunerated by that power, embarrassed, and watched the movements of the French army, giving publicity to every attempt made by its generals to open secret negotiations. Nevertheless, Ney contrived to keep open a channel of communication with the inhabitants : he had established a sort of agency whose members had explored the country extending from Ulm to Wurtzburg ; thus he was able to allay the apprehensions of the general-in-chief, and he repeated his former demand of troops.

“You fear,” he wrote, “that the Austrians will come upon us. They may doubtless do so, and it is a miracle that we have not before now been confined to the walls of Manheim. But you know their tendency to procrastination ; and so slow are they in their operations, that we should have time to take Philipsburg, and afterwards go to meet them. Send me, then, some troops and a few pieces of cannon. As for the money demanded, I will undertake to raise it upon the convents and the seats of the nobles. I will not touch the cottages.”

This was all well ; but easy as Bernadotte was on the score of funds that came not from his own military chest, he was nevertheless not so when troops were to be displaced. He did not consider himself in a state to attempt to carry the place by storm, and he therefore confined his efforts to seduction.

“It is very unfortunate, my dear Ney,” he wrote to the latter, “that I cannot spare a body of troops sufficiently numerous to invest Philipsburg. You know how feeble my means are, and they have not increased since our last interview. I am waiting until the orders which the Government must have given, are executed.

“Promise five hundred thousand francs—promise six hundred thousand, or more if necessary ; I pledge my word of honour that the money shall be paid on the very day the fortress is delivered up to us, or at latest within twenty-four hours after, by means of contributions. We will raise funds to meet every thing. Sati  te your emissaries with gold. Endeavour to correspond with the most influential among the officers ; for he who is not brave, my dear Ney, will always allow himself to be corrupted with gold. To profit by his weakness, is an art which must be used ; and when once an opportunity has been let slip, another is not easily found. Busy yourself in sowing dissensions among the troops composing the garrison ; this might induce the commandant to put us in possession of at least one of the city gates.

“Manage this business, my dear Ney, with discretion and foresight. It would be striking a great political blow to obtain Philipsburg by our secret negotiations alone ; for besides the advantage which our armies on the Rhine would derive from the occupation of that fortress, it would raise suspicion and uneasiness among the leaders of our enemies, and we might thus lay the foundation of a brilliant campaign.

"It is lawful, my dear Ney, to employ all kinds of means in the service of our country, and in contributing to the glory of its arms. Let me hear from you every day by express.

"Yours ever,

"BERNADOTTE."

"Mayence, 19th Ventose, Year VII. (March 19th, 1797.)"

This theory may be true enough ; but the governor was also putting it in practice, and he was very near obtaining all the advantages of it. He had called the Austrians to his aid, and set the peasantry in commotion. The arms and ammunition were ready, and the insurrection was about to burst forth, when Ney discovered the plot, and prevented its execution. He was unable, however, to seize the noble emigrant who was to have headed it. The officer to whom he had entrusted that mission failed in address. The Baron escaped in his shirt, and went further off to plot the assassination of his countrymen. The governor was unable to deny having participated in the conspiracy ; he was therefore confined to his walls, and the place rigidly invested. He had the assurance, nevertheless, to complain, and inveigh against what he termed an act of hostility. Ney took no notice of his complaints, but so disposed his forces as to intercept all communication with or egress from the town. Certain that he had succeeded in this, he wished Bernadotte to come and judge of the fact.

"Come hither," he wrote, "and you will much oblige me. Come and tell me whether my position is well chosen."

He was less courteous towards the Rheingrave. The latter complained bitterly both of his aggression and of his silence.

"The aggression," replied Ney, "was of your own seeking ; it was a mere act of reprisals ; and my silence is the effect of pure provocation. You wanted to introduce the Austrians into Philipsburg, and commit me with the inhabitants. I have taken measures for my own security. Hostilities are opened with you personally, but the armistice continues with regard to your soldiers. You shall have a proof of this. The prisoners I made this morning shall be set at liberty."

Although Ney thus harshly treated the Rheingrave, he did not the less follow up his intelligences in the fortress. As appearances could no longer be saved, it was necessary to increase the bribe. Ney again undertook to supply the surplus funds. He resumed his excursions, levied an impost upon Heidelberg, and contributions upon the feudal castles and commanderies throughout the country. But whilst he was collecting this money, and purchasing or making requisitions for horses, an act of imprudence divulged the plot which had so far been successfully carried on. The governor was himself applied to, and an attempt made to seduce him, whereby every thing that he should have remained ignorant of, was revealed to him. The conspirators were seized and shot, and the whole plan frustrated.

Its execution, so far as it went, was not however without advantage.



With the proceeds of the contributions levied upon the convents and feudal estates, Ney purchased a considerable number of horses from the peasants. Upon these he mounted recruits, which he had sent for on purpose. Thus his three cavalry regiments, which contained only six hundred men when he first approached the Neckar, now amounted to more than double that number. His soldiers were armed, clothed, and full of ardour. He could now take the field with good effect, and he hoped the time would soon come when he should be again called upon to appear in line.

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## CHAPTER VIII.

THIS period soon arrived. Austria had invaded the country of the Grisons; the forces of that power were assembling near the lake of Constance, and upon the Lech in Franconia;—the imperial government, in short, had assumed a hostile attitude. Nevertheless the Directory still evinced the same want of energy. The army of Mayence had reached the sources of the Danube; and this sapient body was content to order that of Helvetia to make the Austrians evacuate the country of the Grisons. Masséna forthwith commenced operations, and had overthrown the imperialists, ere Jourdan knew whether he was to support him or not. The odds were however too great against the former general, whose forces Jourdan determined not to allow to be overpowered, for want of receiving instructions to co-operate with him. He therefore resolved to attempt a diversion, and accordingly advanced towards the archduke's army. A warm and obstinate encounter took place at Stockbach; and the French, after a long struggle against very superior numbers, were forced to give way. They were defeated and driven into the mountains. Had they proved successful, each among them would have been ambitious of sharing the glory of their arms; but as they were unfortunate, they could scarcely find any one to lead them. One quitted his post whilst the battle still raged; another, ere he knew that it was lost, was attacked with sudden indisposition, and withdrew from the field. Of those who did not desert their colours, one could not execute a mission because he had an open wound; another, because he considered it above his capacity;—each found an excuse for not fighting, and the army seemed on the eve of dissolution.

If some men are discouraged by danger, there are fortunately others whom it excites and renders capable of the greatest deeds. Masséna had great reason to complain of the Directory. Appointed to the

command of the French army at Rome, he had joined his troops only after they had taken possession of the capital of the Christian world. He was as much a stranger to the disorders of their march, if there were any, as to the excesses committed on their entrance into Rome. The different corps, however, broke out into open revolt, and the insurgents, at first obsequious towards the General, soon included him in the general reprobation. He summoned them to return to obedience; and they decreed that they no longer acknowledged his authority. He took no notice of this decision; but the moment he attempted to enforce an act of command, the tumult exploded with fresh fury. The Directory gave way, and Masséna, abandoned by the arm of power, which ought to have upheld him and punished the leaders of the mutiny, was obliged to withdraw. He afterwards assumed the command of the army in Helvetia; but in spite of his commission and the personal talents of which he had given so many proofs, he was never master of his own movements and operations.

Left to his own resources, when he had to effect all that the administration should have done, he was under severe control in those matters which ought to have been left solely to his own judgment. His manœuvres were always subordinate to those of the army of the Danube. Invested in appearance with a chief command, he was in fact only the commander of a wing. He was justly hurt at this conduct of the Directory towards him, and had already sent in his resignation; but the defeat at Stockbach took place, and all other considerations yielded to that of the dangers which threatened his country. Far from deserting the post confided to him, he met the danger in its fullest extent, and generously assumed the command of the wreck of an army which the other generals had abandoned.

Tharrau, Legrand, Ney, Gozan, and some others remained unshaken. They did not retreat before the peril under pretence of ill health, nor decline responsibility under that of incapacity; and Masséna, desirous of honouring in them the disinterested bravery of which he had set the example, reported their noble conduct to the Directory. Having had occasion to appreciate the ability and precision of Ney's manœuvres, he appointed this officer to the command of the cavalry attached to his right wing.

The theatre of the military operations of the French being now transferred to Helvetia, Ney proceeded thither, and assumed the command to which he had been appointed. His corps consisted of ten regiments of light cavalry and three of dragoons. As they had been neglected during the peace, he first applied himself to break them into manœuvring, and familiarize them with movements in line, to which their dispersion and want of horses had made them almost strangers. Their progress was so rapid, that he soon flattered himself he should in a short time lead a formidable body of cavalry to victory, when an incident, which ought to have flattered his ambition, threw him into a strange perplexity. He was appointed, on the 28th of March, general

of division ; but his modesty taking the alarm, he considered the charge too much for him, and only received his commission to send it back. He deemed himself qualified to lead a brigade, but not a division. He examined and measured his own powers, and determined that, for his personal advantage, the honour of the French arms should not be placed in jeopardy.

"I have received," said he, in his despatch to the minister, "your letter of the 8th of Germinal (28th March,) in which was enclosed the decree appointing me general of division. The Directory, in conferring this promotion upon me, probably yielded to advantageous reports of my conduct ; but it is my duty to be more severe on my own merits. If my talents were truly such as the Directory have conceived, I should not hesitate to accept the promotion ; unfortunately such is not the case, and I am forced to decline the honour the Government would confer upon me. I trust that this refusal will be considered nothing more than a proof of the sincere patriotism by which I am actuated, and of the disinterestedness with which I perform my professional duties. May I beg you will assure the Directory that I shall never have any other aim than that of deserving its esteem."

"Waghausel, 15th Germinal, (April 4th 1799.)"

Nothing could be more modest or disinterested than this ; but a government cannot always overlook the talents of which the possessor is ignorant. The Directory therefore maintained its decree, and the minister who forwarded Ney's refusal was directed to make known to him that the Government persisted in its decision. The following was the despatch :

"CITIZEN GENERAL,

"The executive Directory, before whom I laid your letter requesting me to tender your refusal of the rank of general of division to which you had been appointed, has directed me to inform you, that it persists in the decree which promotes you to that grade. It sees in your modesty only a stronger claim to reward for the services you have already rendered, and a valuable earnest for those you will hereafter render to the republic. In consequence of which, I herewith again forward the decree of your appointment.

"Health and Fraternity.

"MILLET MOREAU."

"Paris, 15th Florial, (May 4th, 1799.)"

This despatch was flattering ; nevertheless the new rank to which Ney was raised seemed to him so great and imposing, although he had already performed its duties, that he dared not accept the title. Fortunately he had continued to correspond with Bernadotte, to whom he stated his fears, his conjectures, and the chances offered by the



field of warfare to which he was called. His forebodings were by no means consolatory. Victory had inspired the Austrians with confidence, and, as it always happens, defeat had spread discord through the French ranks. The troops were irritated, discouraged, and deprived of necessaries. Ney made no secret either of the uneasiness to which this general want of confidence throughout the army had given rise, or of the perplexity into which he was thrown by his own promotion.

But Bernadotte did not encourage his scruples with regard to his own promotion. He well knew Ney—he well knew his vigilance and talents; and he blamed his misgivings still more strongly than Masséna had done.

“I have received, my dear Ney,” he wrote to the latter, “your letter of the 16th. The particulars you give me are not of a nature to make my mind easy with regard to future operations. But the spirit of freedom is indefatigable, and will, I trust, still perform miracles. You have doubtless read Garat’s speech upon the assassination of our plenipotentiaries.\* It reminds me of the most prosperous days

\* The following details concerning that horrible event, are not without interest, and are little known.

“The Baron de \* \* \*, minister plenipotentiary of the Elector of Bavaria, came to spend the evening with me. Our conversation naturally turned upon the subject of those men who had exercised more or less influence in the affairs of Germany.

“The Archduke Charles and M. de Thugot were in the foremost rank. An examination of the political principles of the latter led us to speak of the murder of the French plenipotentiaries at Rastadt, of which I affirmed that public opinion accused M. de Thugot, and acquitted Prince Charles.

“M. de \* \* \* manifested the same opinion. I had nothing but conjecture to support my belief; but he offered to give me the most convincing proofs, arising from what he knew and heard from the very mouth of M. de Lerbach. He then related what follows.

“A few days prior to the murder, M. de Lerbach, imperial-commissary in Prince Charles’s army, came to Munich, to make arrangements relative to the passage of the Austrian troops through the states of Bavaria. He lodged at an inn which was also inhabited by M. de \* \* \*. The two apartments were separated only by a large but very thin door. M. de Lerbach was out all day upon business, but regularly spent his evenings in his room with M. Hoppé, whom he had seen at Paris, as secretary to M. de Cobentzel.

“M. de \* \* \*, who was attached to the mission of the Commander, Jalaibert, minister of the Elector at Frankfort, had been sent to Munich with despatches relative to the matters in negotiation at Rastadt. He was accompanied by M \* \* \* \*, who at present holds an appointment under M. de Mongelas, but was then employed in the chancellerie of foreign affairs at Munich.

“One evening, M. de \* \* \* having perceived that the conversation between M. de Lerbach and M. Hoppé related to the different interests of the German princes, had his candles taken into the next room, whence they could feebly light that in which he sat, without being visible through the door of communication—thus indicating that the room was not occupied.

“He then listened in profound silence, and took notes, as did also M \* \* \*, of all that they heard. After each conversation they compared their notes,

of Lacedæmonia and ancient Rome. Every man who is a Frenchman, and above all a republican, must think as he does. It is no doubt more than necessary to destroy parties if they exist, and not to create any if their existence is only ideal. Parties raise factions, and the latter overthrow states, however powerful.

"I expect shortly to set out for Paris. After I have nursed my body, and tranquillized my mind for a few days, I shall return and share the toils of our comrades. I shall enjoy a delicious satisfaction if I am able to share in their successes, and if chance is sufficiently favourable to me to enable me to include you among the number of those with whom I shall fight my country's battles.

and formed them into a single narrative, which both of them signed, and took each day to the office for foreign affairs.

"The first conversation gave them the following information :—

"M. de Lerbach had gone to Prince Charles, and represented to him that it might prove of the greatest advantage, if the Austrian monarchy became acquainted with the connexion suspected to exist between the Princes of the Empire and France ; that numerous communications had been made on this subject to the plenipotentiaries, and there was no doubt as to the positive existence of such connexion ; but that a moral certainty alone was insufficient ; that the house of Austria, to justify its conduct towards the faithless princes of the German empire, must possess tangible evidence, and that such evidence existed abundantly in the papers of the French ministers ; that under the circumstances in which Europe was placed, and in consequence of the personal conduct of these ministers, no measures ought to be kept with them ; that the end was moreover of such magnitude as to justify the means, whatever they might be. From these motives M. de Lerbach requested that Prince Charles would give him an armed force in order to arrest these plenipotentiaries on their way to Seltz, whither they would proceed after the rupture of the negotiations, which was certain of taking place. Prince Charles opposed his repugnance to such a measure, which was only overcome on reading M. de Thugot's instructions. He yielded to a formal requisition, and placed at the orders of M. de Lerbach, Colonel Barbaczi of the Szecler hussars, and one Bourchart, who were to receive and implicitly follow the instructions of the imperial commissary.

"M. de Lerbach directed these men not only to seize the papers, but at the same time to drub well (*bien houspiller*) Jean de Bry and Bonnier, upon whom he had a vengeance to exercise, for the rudeness of the one, and the insolence of the other. He also recommended to their attention, provided he fell into their hands, the Baron d'Albini, whom in this conversation he talked of in the same manner as of the French ministers.

"On the evening of the morrow, the conversation ran upon the same topics. It was interrupted by a messenger, who brought M. de Lerbach the news of the tragic result of the expedition he had ordered. His delight at the double success obtained by his vengeance and his policy was poisoned by the horrible murder which he must have anticipated, and was therefore guilty of having perpetrated. Remorse and hatred drew from him the most contradictory exclamations.

"The unhappy men," he exclaimed, "they have been murdered! . . . That scoundrel, Bonnier, well deserved his fate! . . . But poor Rober-jol! . . . If, however, they had not let Jean de Bry escape! . . .

This evidence of M. Lerbach against himself, put in haste upon paper, and as he uttered it, must now be among the state papers of Bavaria.

"I recommend your not displeasing the Directory by your refusal of the promotion which it persists in conferring upon you. Look around you, my dear Ney, and say candidly whether your conscience does not call upon you to lay aside a modesty which becomes out of place and even dangerous when carried to excess. We must have ardent souls, and hearts as inaccessible to fear as to seduction, to be able to lead the armies of France. Who, more than yourself, is gifted with these qualities? It would be an act of weakness, then, to shrink from the career that is open to you.

"Adieu, my dear Ney. You perceive that, yielding in my retirement to the reflections excited by the quietude I enjoy, and the peaceful banks on which I dwell, I assume somewhat the tone of a Mentor; but you will, I know, listen to every thing from one who is attached to you by the ties of the warmest friendship, and the most perfect esteem.

"BERNADOTTE."

Simmern, 25th Floreal, Year VII. (May 14th, 1799.)

Ney yielded to this advice, assumed the rank to which the Directory had raised him, and was preparing to lead his cavalry towards the Thur, when an unexpected event called him to another place and to the command of a different kind of force. The following is the report of the circumstance made by the aide-de-camp of the General-in-chief.

"I arrived at Coire on the 13th of Floreal at ten in the evening, and found every body in the greatest consternation. The peasants of the vale of Disentis, those of the valleys of Medels, and Maderanenthal, and those of the Italian bailiwicks, had risen in open rebellion. They had assembled in great numbers, and were forcing the peaceable inhabitants of the other villages to join them, on pain of seeing their houses burned and their families massacred. That which was at first only a spark, soon became a dreadful conflagration. The fanatic people followed the torrent, became partners in the excesses of the peasantry, and co-operated in an unheard-of refinement of barbarity.

"The vigilance of General Menard, commanding the Grisons at that period, had, so early as the 10th, led to the discovery of the intended insurrection. He accordingly wrote to Citizen Salomon, commanding the detachment at Disentis, calling upon him for details concerning the situation of the country, and the agitation which was becoming manifest. This officer, too credulous and too confident, replied, on the 11th, to the General, that it was true a certain agitation had lately prevailed during a few days, but the peasantry had since become tranquil and gave no further cause for uneasiness; that he answered for every thing, and his care and vigilance would suffice to make the remainder of the storm blow over.

"The rapidity with which events succeeded each other,—the attack of Lucisteig, that of Davos, and the demonstrations of the enemy



upon other points, prevented this affair from being treated with all the importance it deserved. The insurrection was organized without opposition, and on the 13th the insurgents marched toward Disentis. The peasants were armed with muskets, and hatchets, and with long sticks, the ends of which were traversed by two or three sharp-pointed iron pegs, thus forming a very destructive weapon. In this state they proceeded to the church, where they heard mass with profound respect.

"The officer, Salomon, in spite of his confidence, became alarmed, and assembled the municipality, to whom he expressed his surprise and uneasiness at this rising. But he again suffered himself to be deceived by the treacherous mountaineers, and was satisfied with the assurance given to him that this vast assemblage had no political object, and that the shepherds who swarmed around him had met for no other purpose than to repair the bridges on the Rhine. As the confusion, nevertheless, went on increasing, he once more became alarmed, and again convoked the municipality. It was now only five o'clock in the afternoon, and night was not yet nigh. The protestations made in the morning were therefore again renewed; Salomon again yielded credence to them, and contented himself with throwing the responsibility of passing events upon those who brought them about.

"The soldiers having been invited to the fête, spent the remainder of the day in imprudent libations; but when night came, some of the insurgents entered the dwelling of the commandant and ordered him to surrender his sword. He then felt how fatal his foolish confidence was likely to prove, and asked a thousand questions, to which no reply was made. As he delayed delivering up his arms, they were taken from him, and he was escorted to the convent. The officer was now in safe custody, and the troops dispersed; the insurgents therefore no longer fearing a combined action, or an organized resistance, threw themselves upon the French soldiers whilst they were carousing, and beat and otherwise ill-treated them. Some of them were killed in defending their arms; the remainder were placed in the corridors of the convent.

"A sub-lieutenant had assembled a dozen men who lodged in this building. They fired from the windows, and for a long time resisted the insurgents who were trying to force it; but a menial having admitted the multitude through a side-door, the whole of our unfortunate men within its walls were instantly put to death.

"Five thousand of the insurgents then marched upon Trons, where half a company was cantoned. These brave men were prepared, met the attack with the greatest resolution, and succeeded in effecting their retreat to Ilantz, which they were likewise obliged to evacuate, leaving some of their wounded companions behind them, who were immediately butchered. The insurgents continued their movement, and

reached Richenau the same evening, where they carried the bridge by storm.

"They who had remained behind, arrived successively at Disentis. All of them were eager to vent their rage upon the bodies of the slaughtered French, and wallow in their blood, and the atrocious municipality who presided at these cannibal scenes, distributed according to the numbers of the claimants, one or two of the unhappy soldiers who had not yet expired, and whose lengthened death-throes intoxicated this ferocious rabble with delight.

"Such was the state of affairs when General Menard received information of what had occurred. He instantly took measures to put a stop to such horrible scenes. Having assembled six companies, he placed them under the command of Citizen Baulard, commanding the 109th demi-brigade; and he begged I would join his aide-de-camp in directing the attack, leading the column to Disentis, setting fire to that den of brigands, and sacrificing to the manes of our deceased comrades, a hecatomb of their murderers. Meanwhile, the General undertook to make the report to you of my mission to Engadine. Convinced that my duty called me wherever there was danger, I set out to execute these orders.

"The number of insurgents had increased very considerably. They crossed the bridge, forced the five companies back, and drove them to the gates of Coire, after wounding a hundred and fifty men. Six companies from Sargans and its neighbourhood had just arrived at Coire. The rebels, to the number of eight thousand, had retired to Richenau, and taken up a position there. We marched thither. Citizen Baulard had scarcely eight hundred men; but he took his measures with prudence. He formed his troops in line of battle, and placed his two pieces of artillery, which he supported by two companies of grenadiers, between the corps-d'attaque, and the corps d'éclaireurs. In this order we reached the platform commanding the bridge, which we cannonaded with all our might. Two companies of grenadiers, who had passed the Rhine to turn the enemy, having reached our parallel, we beat the charge, and rushed upon the bridge with fixed bayonets. The peasants defended it with vigour; but we had cut off their retreat. Some died at their post, others threw themselves into the castle, whence they opened a destructive fire; unable, however, to resist our attack, they were forced and put to the sword.

"A thousand of these wretches were slain. The night was approaching, and they who survived effected their escape under cover of the woods and of the darkness. As our men were sinking with fatigue, we made no attempt to pursue them; but on the 15th, at daybreak, we resumed our movement, and occupied Ilantz and Trons. But we only followed the insurgents, without overtaking them;—fear seemed to have given them wings, and they were on the point of escaping from us, when the idea struck us that we had better quiet

the alarms of the innocent, by separating them from the guilty; and thus we might succeed in putting an end to a contest which had already lasted too long. We accordingly issued the following proclamation.

‘ Your credulity is imposed upon; and you have proved culpable towards a people who were your friends and allies; but there are still means open to you of deserving pardon and exciting the clemency of your conquerors. Repentance is all that you have left. Deliver up those who seduced you to this criminal act, and you will find that the French are generous after victory; that they know how to distinguish error from crime, and are only to be feared by those who are still in arms.

‘ They among you who do not immediately return to their homes shall, from that single circumstance, be considered leaders of the revolt, and treated as such. Their property shall be destroyed.

‘ Wo to him whom the feelings of humanity and the interests of his fellow citizens shall not induce to return to his duty! he must expect no mercy—he will become the victim of his own obstinacy.

‘ The inhabitants, at whose houses arms or ammunition are found, shall be immediately shot, and their premises burnt to the ground.

‘ The present proclamation shall, in each commune, be translated into the language of the country.

BAULARD, *Chêf-de-brigade, Commandant.*

BURTIE, *Aide-de-camp to Gen.-in-chief.*

MASCLARY, *Aide-de-camp to Gen. Menard.’*

‘ Hantz, 15th Floreal, Year VII, (May 5th, 1797.)’

“ This proclamation produced the best possible effect upon the peasants, and before we reached Trons several communes had already submitted. The same thing occurred at Disentis, the municipalities throwing themselves upon our generosity. They expressed regret and repentance for the foul crimes which had been committed. We were here upon the exact spot where humanity had been so cruelly outraged—we were here opposite to that hateful building in which a hundred and eighteen Frenchmen had been slaughtered; and we could still behold traces of that blood which ought to have been shed only in defence of the commonwealth. I know not what may have been the feelings of our soldiers, but it required all our ascendancy over them, and all the vigilance of their officers, to prevent them from committing the most violent excesses.

“ This was not, however, the most affecting part of these bloody recollections. The inhabitants, alarmed at our approach, had carefully put out of sight all that could serve as evidence of their guilt, or even of their participation in the crime which we came to punish. They had taken from their dwellings every thing that denoted an act



of violence. The arms and clothes of their victims were shut up in a cellar of the convent. The door of the building was broken open, and our men rushed with precipitation into the dark passages leading to these relics. Good God! what a sight! muskets, clothes, and belts, pell-mell, formed a pile six feet high.

“Whilst the soldiers, in a stupor of grief, were contemplating these trophies of the good faith of the mountaineers, six light infantry soldiers appeared who had escaped, as by miracle, from the fury of these barbarians. They had succeeded in gaining the wood, and had eluded every search made to discover them. Having at length perceived us driving before us the ferocious shepherds, they had come from their place of concealment to resume their arms and baggage.

“One perceived the coat of a friend slaughtered before his face; another raised the cap of a grenadier whom he had been unable to defend; a third recognized a knapsack; a fourth a cartridge-box. The silence was profound, the emotion general; at length an old soldier sprang forward and seizing a belt with a sort of nervous convulsion, fell down in a swoon.

At this instance of grief, no one placed any further restraint upon his feelings, and groans, and sobs, and tears served to express the most painful emotions. The scene was dangerously affecting, and might have rekindled the rage of the men, had I not put an end to it by making them withdraw and ordering the doors of this horrible place to be closed.

“On inquiring into the cause of this insurrection, we were informed that it was solely the work of the priests; that these fanatics had published a statement that the Austrians had taken possession of Lucisteig and Davos; that General Lecourbe had no further place of refuge, and that the last hour was arrived of the French in Helvetia. Among the atrocities committed, we learnt that the French officer in command had expired after several hours of torture; that his sub-lieutenant had one of his legs broken, that he was afterwards thrown upon a sledge, where he was exposed to the blows and abuse of this savage people; and that he died after a long and painful agony. A store-keeper had escaped from the fury of the multitude, but his wife still in the confinement of childbed, together with her infant babe, remained in their hands. He returned to deliver them; but he was perceived, seized, and brutally mutilated. In this state he asked for a priest; one came, who declared to him that his death was inevitable, that the people insisted upon it, and that he could not possibly escape. The unhappy man, still not discouraged, begged that a second priest might be sent to him, and then a third. But neither of these ministers of the gospel would exert any influence to save his life. They all told him, that no kind of subterfuge would avail him, and he must submit to his fate. At length, after thirty-six hours of suffering, he was shot, notwithstanding the supplications of his wife on her knees, who held up to the view of the murderers the innocent

babe in her arms. Being repulsed with violence, she was herself dreadfully outraged, and escaped with her life, in consequence only of the approach of our forces. We gave this unfortunate woman a thousand francs, as a first aid in her deplorable situation.

"The moment of retribution had now come. An example was necessary, and it was considered that the destruction of the very place where the revolt first broke out would best serve as one. We accordingly assembled such of the inhabitants as had taken but a slight share in the revolt, and these, together with the women, children, and old men, we ordered to withdraw; we then set fire to the village and convent.

"We however attempted to save the house of a member of the provisional government of Rhetia, and also that of a widow who had shown kindness to the French. The wind was too high, and we did not succeed; but we saved the goods of these houses, and put a guard over them. Nothing was missing.

"Several leaders of the insurgents, among whom were two monks, were concealed in the village. The fire forced them to leave their place of concealment, and they were taken and shot. The communes were not very severely treated. They had plundered the military chest, and carried off three months' pay of the soldiers; they had likewise damaged the corn deposited in the convent. We therefore laid a contribution upon the most culpable, and thus forced them to repair the damage they had caused.

"Such was the issue of this deplorable insurrection. One hundred and eighteen Frenchmen lost their lives through the confidence they had placed in the hospitality of the inhabitants. Twenty-two perished in avenging this dreadful butchery, and one hundred and fifty were put hors-de-combat in the different actions that took place for this purpose. Of the inhabitants, twelve hundred peasants were killed, and a much greater number bearing musket-shot and bayonet wounds have since been found dead in the woods. Never was such an attempt more severely punished.

"Excited by fanaticism, combined with the attacks of the Austrians, this revolt might have been attended with serious consequences, had it not been immediately suppressed. It was necessary to strike at the root of the evil, and thereby prevent a recurrence of such scenes.

"This insurrection has been stamped with a character of cruelty never remarked in any other. The cause of this seems to lie in the great influence exercised by the priests and monks, who in the other cantons have had a less share in such risings.

"BURTHE, Captain and Aide-de-camp."

Thus was the insurrection put down at Disentis; but it had unfortunately spread beyond the narrow limits of that valley. Schweitz and Altorf had taken up arms, and there was a rising at Engadine. General Loison, unable to make head against the swarms of insurgents that

assailed him, evacuated Chiavenna ; whilst Lecourbe, who directed the defence of these valleys, had been obliged to give up Zernest, and was with difficulty retreating towards Lientz. Menard was uncovered ; the road which leads to Coire by Davos offered no defence, and the right wing was placed in a very critical situation. But the measures taken were as prompt as the necessity was urgent. Soult went against the insurgents of Schweitz, Loison pressed hard upon those of the Valteline, and Ney, leaving his cavalry, which could not venture into the deep glens, placed himself at the head of a few companies of light infantry, with which he reached Alberta. Lecourbe, who had pushed towards Bellinzona, descended into the valley of Roveredo, and beat and dispersed the insurgents. The remnant of their forces took refuge in the valley of Missox ; Ney pursued and again routed them ; but that wild country offering great natural means of defence, he soon perceived that he had something better to do than fighting, and must be content to depend upon the measures which his own skill might induce him to adopt. He accordingly went to Claro, studied the ground, and possessed himself of the passes which opened in front of the right wing. He extended his posts from the foot of Mount Bernardin, to the valley of Roveredo. All that part of the line was thus sheltered from the incursions of the Austrians. The latter, unable to penetrate through the passes, in which, from their being more strongly defended, the obstacles daily increased, threw themselves into the still open glens, and poured their columns into that of Furcula. This was rugged and difficult, and Ney did not resist their entrance into it ; but having seized the defiles, and destroyed the bridges, the moment he saw the Austrians engaged in its intricacies, he fell upon them, broke their ranks, and put them to the rout. But it was impossible to pursue them far, and he was therefore obliged to remain inactive. At length he caught a distant view of the whole Austrian army in full motion ;—he saw it form, extend its line, and ultimately disappear in the woods. Where was it going ? what could be the object of its present movement ? were questions which naturally arose in his mind. There seemed but little probability of its intending to enter the valley of the Rhine ; and for him to penetrate into the country of the Grisons seemed still more hazardous than to remain where he was. He knew not what to conjecture, or what steps to take. His scouts, having reached the summit of Mount Bernardin, discovered the remains of fires which had been lighted there the night before. They reported that the Austrian forces had passed, and that was all ;—they could give no intelligence as to the road which the Imperialists had taken. He therefore sent out reconnoitring parties, with directions to advance farther on ; but the rain fell in torrents, the warmth of the season began to penetrate among the mountains, and bad weather, hunger, and fatigue, compelled them to return without information. But intelligence of some sort being indispensable, the General took measures for sending out a party with better success. Bread was scarce ; and a small addi-



tion to the soldier's ration was an object of great desire among the troops : he therefore collected all the bread he could dispose of, and adding a few pints of wine to this meagre store, sent forth a third detachment among the eternal snow on the mountains.

This body of men being better provided with provisions than the former parties, penetrated much farther. They reached Splugen, and explored the woods and villages on their road ; but not a trace of the Austrians could they discover. Nevertheless, the successes of the latter were loudly trumpeted wherever the detachment passed. The party returned, and acquainted Ney with what they had heard. They reported that an Austrian column had taken possession of Lucisteig, another had invaded the valley of the Rhine, and that the French ran the risk of being destroyed. This news seemed so improbable that Ney at first would not believe it ; but a despatch from Lecourbe gave him still further particulars. The French had lost not only Lucisteig, but Coire, and the whole country of the Grisons ; and a speedy retreat had become necessary.

Ney called in his detachments, and reached Urseren. His operations were again becoming more extensive, and his cavalry was about to resume its former importance, when he received orders to join the army which he had before left. Lecourbe, who forwarded the despatch to him, would not allow him to depart without expressing satisfaction at his co-operation. He wrote as follows :—

“ I enclose you, my dear General, a letter from General Masséna. I regret not having the benefit of your services for a longer period. Receive the assurance of the esteem and friendship which I feel towards you. Ever yours,

LECOURBE.”

“Giornico, 3rd Prarial, Year VII. (May 22d, 1797.)”

## CHAPTER IX.

NEY, having joined his cavalry, took up his position upon the banks of the Thur, in pursuance of his instructions. The Austrians having debouched in strong force, occupied Andelfingen and Frauenfeld; and fresh columns continuing to advance, every thing denoted their intention of speedily giving battle.

Masséna would not, however, allow them to complete their preparations, but boldly bearing down upon their line, resolved to anticipate them. Paillard led the left, Ney the centre, Oudinot the right, and Soult, with the reserve, was ready to carry his forces to the assistance of any among his colleagues who might require it. The French troops, highly excited, and impatient to avenge their late defeats, made their attack with dreadful impetuosity. The Austrians gave way under the shock, but soon rallied, and having taken possession of the heights of Andelfingen, formed on the other side of Altikon, and opposed a resistance which Paillard and Ney were a long time in overcoming. The danger served but to animate the latter of these generals: he formed his cavalry into a close mass, and threw its full weight upon the columns opposed to him; still he could not succeed in breaking them. He then rallied his men, brought them up again, and charged with such impetuosity that he broke through the Austrian ranks, and his horsemen penetrated into their ranks, now thrown into confusion. He drove the infantry to the bridges, the cavalry into the Thur, and rapidly pursuing those who had escaped scathless from the battle and from the element into which he had forced them, drove them upon the columns of Paillard, who had just carried Andelfingen. The carnage then recommenced. The adverse troops mingled and fought hand to hand in the narrow streets of that town, until in the course of the action the Austrians found an opening, when they fled tumultuously, leaving twelve hundred prisoners in the hands of the French. Oudinot was less successful at Frauenfeld. After making himself master of the place, he was unable to debouch. In vain did he several times renew his attempt; the difficulties of the ground, and the columns which constantly came up from the field of battle, always prevented him from effecting his purpose: at length, however, Soult came to his assistance, and these generals in conjunction overcame the obstacles against which Oudinot had been unable to contend single-handed.

Masséna's object was thus attained: the Austrian's were beaten and driven to the right bank, nor could they for a long time to come hope to be able to re-cross the Thur. But whilst Masséna was beating Hotze at Frauenfeld, the archduke reached Schaffhausen. The dis-

proportion of the two armies now again became too great, and the adoption of other measures by the French generals was urgent: they were soon taken. The Glatt was not far off; the banks of this stream were more rugged, and easier to be defended, than those of the Thur, and it was determined to retire behind it. This was, however, no easy matter: for Nauendorf was advancing with his forces, and the archduke was ready to debouch. But Ney had assumed the command of the van-guard; great confidence was placed in his firmness of purpose, and the army having begun the movement, soon reached the positions it was to occupy.

But this was not effected without trouble:—for an instant the troops lost their usual firmness, and the staff-officers forgot part of the orders they were to have transmitted. A demi-brigade upon the Thur was forgotten, and the army was already in its positions on the Glatt before it was discovered that this demi-brigade had been left behind. Ney, in anticipation of the accidents of the movement, had assembled his commanders of corps at the advanced posts, and concerted with them upon the measures to be taken. As soon as his preparations were made, he continued his route, and pushed on to Altikon. Great was his surprise when he perceived a demi-brigade in such a situation. The enemy had already thrown bridges across the river, and the firing was beginning to be heard. Ney hastily rallied the men, and ran to make head against the columns which were advancing. He has himself given an account of this fearful action, which we think will be acceptable to the reader.

“ TO GENERAL MASSENA.

“ Zurich, 8th Prairial (May 24, 1799.)

“ MY DEAR GENERAL,

“ In consequence of the orders which I had given to the commanders of brigades in the division under my command, we proceeded at four in the morning to the front of the positions it had previously occupied. Shortly after the arrival of General Tharrau at Winterthur, the enemy attacked a reconnoitring party which I had sent towards Oberwyl, and pursued it almost as far as Wesindangen. A column of Austrian infantry extended to the right of the high road to Frauenfeld as far as Hegt, and at the same time a second column advanced against my right wing. I immediately directed General Gazan to resume the offensive; but the weak state of his force did not allow him to do so. The chef-de-brigade, Roger, commanding the centre brigade, whom I had ordered to make a movement to the right, to attack the enemy's column marching upon Winterthur, probably manœuvred according to circumstances. I received no intelligence of him during the obstinate action I had to sustain, although he perfectly fulfilled the instructions I gave him. General Walther, who commanded the reserve, retired behind the Tosz at the moment when the enemy had forced me to retreat. General Tharrau had ordered



me in your name to assume the offensive, promising to support me with General Soult's division; but whilst I was fighting in front of Winterthur, I saw neither generals nor reinforcements. The gun-shot wound I received in my knee at the gates of that town, forced me for a short time to give up the command to General Gazan, who nobly acquitted himself of the trust. After having my wound dressed, I ordered a retreat upon the Tosz, which I defended during an hour and a half. The Austrian forces had crossed this river upon different points, and I was obliged to have the heights crowned. Soon after, I received a second gun-shot wound in one of my hands, and I again lost my horse. Being thus personally hors-de-combat, I definitively gave up the command to General Gazan, who will render you an account of the end of the action. I shall only add, my dear General, that the enemy attacked me with at least fifteen or sixteen thousand men, and that I could only oppose to them, before Winterthur, three or four thousand. They have experienced a very heavy loss of men, arising from their obstinacy in making their cavalry and infantry constantly charge. I have from six to eight hundred killed and wounded; the prisoners made by the enemy do not amount to a hundred men.

"The minds of the soldiers are singularly affected by our retreat from the Thur; and the more so, because the column of attack of the chef-de-brigade, Roger, was forgotten and left upon the banks of that river, whilst the columns of General Oudinot and Paillard retired at an early hour. General Tharrau, on the very day of the retrograde movement, wrote to me to proceed to Winterthur, and assume the command of the van-guard. It was fortunate I did not think proper to comply with this request; for when at nine o'clock in the morning I arrived at Altikon, the corps of citizen Roger had not the least knowledge of the retreat of the army. By this time from twelve to fifteen hundred of the enemy, consisting of infantry and cavalry, had crossed the Thur. I nevertheless reached my former position without any loss, and it was on my arrival at Sulzbach that I was made acquainted with the panic which had seized some of our troops at Winterthur, and of which I had the honour to acquaint you last night.

"Adjutant-General Lorcet, who was by my side during the whole action, conducted himself with the most distinguished bravery. He had the misfortune to have a rib broken by a musket shot, and he begs you will allow him to remain with me until his recovery. As my wounds force me to retire for a while from the command you have conferred upon me, may I request you will permit me to go either to Colmar or somewhere else, for the benefit of my health?

"NEY."

Masséna granted Ney's request without difficulty. He knew that this general had, at the very commencement of the action, been struck

with a musket ball, which, after passing through his thigh, had spent itself in the shoulder of his horse, and that he had remained on the field after allowing some of the men to bind up his wound, and staunch the blood with their pocket-handkerchiefs. Masséna also knew that at the head of a small body of cavalry Ney had charged a whole squadron of Hungarians; that being attacked by a foot soldier just as he had struck down a hussar, he had not time to turn aside the bayonet, which pierced through the sole of his foot; that he cut down his rash assailant, who however, in falling, fired his piece, and shattered Ney's wrist.

Ney's services, and the severity of his wounds, rendered it impossible for the general-in-chief to refuse him a short leave of absence; but he did not deem Lorcet entitled to the same indulgence. He considered the wounds of the latter much less dangerous; but aware of Ney's friendship for that officer, he allowed him to take Lorcet with him.

"I would not have granted this to any other person," he wrote, "but I can refuse you nothing. He may go, since you wish it."

Both set out together, and on the road both ran a narrow risk of their lives. On their arrival at Sissach, they demanded an express to send to Basle for horses. This demand was sufficient to rouse a population already exasperated by the pressure of war. A mob assembled, and were about to offer violence to the French officers. The municipal authorities, far from repressing, rather encouraged this riot. Ney succeeded, however, in keeping the rabble in check; and he determined that the danger he had run should prove an advantage to the wounded soldiers of the French army, who each day expired under the poignards of this lawless mob. He accordingly, in the following letter, invoked the vigilance of the French authorities, and thus secured a safe retreat for the brave men who were wounded on the field of battle.

"TO GENERAL SOUHAM.

"Sissach, 10th Prairial, (May 29th, 1799.)

"MY DEAR GENERAL,

"I am going to Plombières, in consequence of the wounds I have received, accompanied by Adjutant-General Lorcet, also wounded on the 8th instant. Anxious to reach Colmar this evening, I wished, as I passed through the town from which I now write, to despatch an express to Basle, in order to obtain horses from the commandant of that place. I must now inform you that, after divers insults from Nicholas Ars, municipal officer at Sissach, during the conversation necessary to give this order, that wicked man threatened to have the alarm-bell sounded, and thus assemble all the inhabitants of the commune. This threat was followed by the commencement of a revolt, in the course of which the Commissary of the Directory dared to add, that they were a hundred armed men. The revolt will doubtless

soon be over, by the prudence which I oppose to the mob; but the fate of our unfortunate brethren in arms, treacherously butchered in other cantons of Helvetia by men calling themselves the children of William Tell, renders it incumbent upon us, for the safety of the wounded who pass here every day, not to leave such threats unpunished. Our cruel experience, purchased over the bleeding bodies of our slaughtered countrymen, particularly in the cantons I have just left, makes it our duty to take such precautions as prudence combined with resolution may dictate. I suggest to you no particular measures of repression, but you will adopt those which you may deem necessary to put a stop to the evil. Be they what they may, I beg that you will not notice me as connected with circumstances of which, for the safety of all, I have thought it right to give you information.

“Health and Friendship.

NEY.”



## BOOK THE FOURTH.

## CHAPTER I.

HAVING spent two months at a distance from the field of battle, and his wounds being healed, Ney again joined Masséna. The latter was then in a most trying situation. The defeat on the Trebia had taken place; the allies were masters of all the valleys and mountain passes, and might every moment effect a junction between the columns which had been routed in Italy and those which had been forced upon the Limath.

Masséna was occupied in preventing this manœuvre, which might prove fatal to him; and hailed the return of Ney with considerable satisfaction. He immediately gave the latter the command of a division; and as he had no less to defend his troops against the ravages of hunger than against the enterprizes of the enemy, directed Ney to provide against the one, at the same time that he counteracted the other. But this was a difficult undertaking; for the Austrian forces swarmed upon the banks of the Aar, and the Frickthal, long ravaged by war, was drained of both corn and cattle. Provisions must however be obtained; for the soldiers, who had received no rations for several days, were starving.

Ney, having ascertained the resources which the country still possessed, exacted supplies proportionate to those resources; he lowered the contributions of some, raised those of others, and thus relieved the troops without overwhelming the inhabitants. Under pretence of services and public works, the forests had been devastated and the woods nearly destroyed by the agents of the French army. Ney put an end to this odious abuse, and severely censured those who had participated in it. As cupidity does not readily quit its prey, these agents boldly declared their intention of following up the cuttings which they had begun.

"You state that you require wood," said Ney; "but have you a warrant from the commander of a wing for cutting it? Besides, is it

in the forests of a country laid waste by war, or in those of the Emperor, that you ought to procure it? Go to the latter," he added, "and let monarchs alone pay for their own follies."

Whilst Ney was wasting his energies in such obscure duties—whilst he was employed in providing food for the troops, and at the same time protecting the interests of the inhabitants, Lecourbe, entrusted with a more brilliant mission, had again penetrated into the Upper Alps. His columns, after scaling the most frightful precipices, had simultaneously debouched upon the Mitten, upon Altorf, and upon Urseren. The Austrians, attacked from Zurich to Upper Valais, had been driven beyond the mountains which separate the Reuss from the Lentz. The St. Gothard, together with the valleys whence the Rhine, and the Rhone, and the Reuss derive their sources, were in possession of the French; and the troops, which the latter had beaten in Italy, could no longer stand against those now before them.

This admirable expedition had brought the French eight thousand prisoners, but without altering, in any material degree, the disproportion of force between the hostile armies. The Directory was forming an army in the Alps, and another on the Rhine. The several corps which were to compose them, and the generals who were to command their columns, were both selected from among those who had fought the battles of France upon the shores of Egypt.

Ney was directed to join the second of these armies, and gave notice to Masséna of the orders he had received; but the latter was on the eve of encountering a fresh tempest. The Austrians had assembled upon his left wing, and might be expected every moment to cross the Aar, turn the lines of water which covered Masséna's forces, break the latter, cut them off, and perhaps drive them upon the Jura. These circumstances were too serious for Masséna to permit the departure of so able an officer, and he therefore begged Ney to remain until the danger was past.

"I was aware, my dear General," he wrote to Ney, "of the order given you to join the army on the Rhine; but I must request you will defer your departure for some days. Indeed I most earnestly entreat you to do so. You are necessary, nay, indispensable to your division, and I should feel the most lively regret if you were to leave until the arrival of the general appointed to succeed you. At all events, be assured that it is with great regret I see you taken from an army to whose success you have so powerfully contributed.

"Head-quarters, Lentzburg, 2nd Fructidor, Year VII.

(August 19th, 1799.)"

No request could be more flattering; but the storm burst sooner than Masséna had anticipated, for his letter had scarcely reached Ney ere the cannonading began. The archduke had taken advantage of the darkness of the night, and thrown bridges across the river near Dettingen. His columns were supported by heavy batteries. The

French troops, having imprudently formed upon the bank, were immediately broken and forced to take shelter in the woods. Ney arrived in the midst of the confusion, rallied and cheered the spirits of the discouraged soldiers, but could not succeed in making them debouch. The effect of the Austrian artillery was terrific; as soon as a file appeared it was mowed down. Fortunately Ney had discovered some Helvetian carabiniers in the French army. He knew with what true aim these men used their pieces, and the immense distance at which they could hit their mark. Having placed them behind some sheds which happened to be on the ground, both French and Austrians soon perceived the superiority of a true aim over the noisy detonations of the artillery. Each ball levelled its victim with the earth—each shot reached the particular person for whom it was intended. Pontonneers were soon found wanting, the time passed, the French columns came up, and the operation failed.

The Austrians being thus foiled in their undertaking, the French were about to set fire to the timbers and boats which their adversaries had collected upon the Aar. But this warm reception having cooled the courage of the latter, they no longer thought of crossing the river; they were content to return to their cantonments and maintain the positions they already occupied. They accordingly proposed that the French light infantry should cease firing, and they would replace every thing in the same state as before the attempt which had just failed. The French commander having acceded to these terms, the boats were accordingly carried away, the rafters abandoned to the stream, and each army peaceably guarded its own side of the river. Ney then departed for Manheim.

Although he had devoted only four days to assist in maintaining these important positions, yet this short delay had well nigh led to unpleasant consequences. The organization of the army was complete when he arrived; not a single corps nor a division was without a commander; and in addition, he found it under the command of Muller, although he had been officially informed that it was to be commanded by Moreau. General Muller was assuredly a worthy man, but he possessed neither the resolution, nor the spirit of enterprise necessary in the general of an army. Having been unsuccessful in his first attempts, he was fearful of committing himself farther, and aspired only to rid himself of a charge he was not qualified to bear. The distribution of the forces composing his army had already taken place, and he dared make no alteration in the columns, nor increase the number of their generals. Ney was therefore several days without having any post assigned to him. The army consisted only of demi-brigades, formed from the dépôts, of men who had neither clothes nor shoes. It therefore became necessary to make the Austrians minister to the wants of the French soldiers. Provisions must be obtained and so must money; wagons, cattle, and clothes were likewise wanted;—a spirit of enterprise must therefore be at work,



parties must be sent to a distance, and the greatest dangers and difficulties encountered. As Ney had already given proofs of his ability in such matters, he was applied to, and a sort of division formed for him, by drafting a certain number of regiments, or portions of regiments, from each of the others;—thus forming a column of fourteen hundred foot and two hundred horse, the command of which was given to him, and with which, on the 27th of August, he pushed on to Heilbronn. This was but a small force to besiege a place, almost open, it is true, but situated in the midst of a vast plain, overrun on all sides by a numerous body of cavalry. Nevertheless Ney did not despair of success. The imperialists, strong in cavalry, had at their disposal only a feeble body of infantry, and not a single piece of artillery. Ney had three field-pieces, a circumstance which seemed to him to make up for his inferiority in numerical strength; he therefore marched boldly on. An action took place on the 29th. The first shock was terrific; the Austrian squadrons vied with each other in the impetuosity of their charges. But a well-supported fire was kept up, both of musketry and artillery; and the attack of the imperialists soon became less fierce, then uncertain, and soon ceased altogether. The three guns had done excellent service, and in every manœuvre foiled the enemy, who were obliged to evacuate the field and leave Ney master of it. He had defeated them solely by his superiority in artillery; and he did not despair, weak as were his forces, of striking a still more important blow by the same means. Heilbronn, by supplying provisions and paying contributions, had satisfied the most pressing wants of the French army; Ney's men were consequently in good trim, and he resolved to push on to Ulm. This expedition was perilous; but that which he had more particularly in view was the disengaging of the army of Helvetia; and nothing was so likely as this expedition, to produce such a result. The Austrians had made a *dépôt* of Ulm, where they had collected their artillery, built warehouses, and assembled all their stores. If the attempt succeeded, all these stores would fall into the hands of the French; if unsuccessful, still it would force the Austrians to advance. In every point of view it offered advantages, and Ney therefore resolved to risk it. Unfortunately all the commanders in the French army had not his energy or his talents. The remainder of the army however followed his movement, and a column took up a position at Lauffen. The country was poor, and the troops were obliged to spread themselves through it, in order to find subsistence; but with generals as devoid of prudence as of resolution, the army lost its energy, and no sooner did the Austrian scouts come in sight than this column retrograded. This unexpected movement had well nigh led to the most fatal consequences.\* Far from being able to push on to Ulm, Ney had great

\* NEY TO THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF MULLER.

“Steinfurt, 15th Fructidor (September 1st, 1799.)

“I cannot understand, my dear General, the partial retreat just effected

difficulty in maintaining the positions he occupied. The extent of country which the army was obliged to overrun in order to live, had rendered the French odious to the inhabitants, who acquainted the Austrians with all the preparations and measures of their adversaries.

Sinzheim had been evacuated on the morning of the 1st of September, and scarcely had the night fallen ere the Szeckler hussars appeared at Hilsbach. Such things were of trifling importance in themselves; but they were enterprises undertaken in consequence of information given by the peasants, and from that fact alone they derived an importance which they otherwise would not have had. They rendered the inhabitants more bold in their opposition, and less disposed to supply the provisions without which the French could not live; for in the distress which weighed upon them, the most important object was, not victory, but to prevent the men from dying of hunger, by providing against the want by which they were worn down.

Ney took immediate measures to put an end to these understandings with the Austrians, and secure his own communications. This he was not long in effecting. The enemy had been imprudent enough, on the 6th, to establish themselves at Lauffen; on the 8th he attacked, broke, and drove them upon Stuttgart. The French column which had before retreated so precipitately, now resumed its line of battle, and the original movement was followed up. But it no longer presented the same advantages: Ulm was now defended by a strong garrison, and it was as impossible to surprise as to force the place. Still there remained another effect to be produced, and never was any operation better calculated to produce it than the movement now undertaken. The Austrian columns which had suffered defeat at Lauffen, had unsuccessfully attempted to make a stand at Wissloch and at

by the \* \* \* division. It would seem as if the enemy had pushed it in close columns. The whole country is so well satisfied with this manœuvre, that the inhabitants would soon attack and expel me with prongs, if I did not employ the means necessary to guard my forces. I should think the above-mentioned division might easily have occupied Singen without committing itself, even had it sent only a single battalion upon this service. I might then have given a useful direction to my excursions and to my reconnoitring of the interior of the country, and I might even sometimes have passed the Necker. But if my rear is to be left open and insecure, I cannot, without being considered a man devoid of common prudence, so readily place my division in jeopardy. You ask me to send you the two squadrons of the third regiment of hussars, in order that they may join the cavalry reserve. Not only, however, would they be of no use there, but you would disgust these brave men by thus sending them to the rear. Already the Chef-d'escadron, Lenougarède, who commands them, has inquired if he has lost my confidence or committed some fault, as he is to be so disgraced. I told him that the surplus of his regiment being about to join the army, the general-in-chief wished to see the regiment complete, and he would then return to me.

"Be so good, my dear General, as to leave me these men. The 20th chasseurs-à-cheval are doubtless sufficient to do the duty at Bergstadt, and I presume they would have no other to perform.

NEY."

Hoffeim. Being overthrown each time, they were unable to cover the ducal residence, and Ney, in position at Eppingen, carried his excursions even to the walls of Louisburg. Staray was obliged in consequence to hasten up with all his forces, and thus a diversion was effected.

With so small a force to oppose to them, Ney had now before him from twenty to thirty thousand Austrian troops, and his retreat might at any time be cut off. He accordingly raised his camp, and retrograded without further delay, but without haste or precipitation. The enemy's columns attempted each day to break his lines. They were guided by the peasants, and had therefore the advantage of knowing the country, as well as an overwhelming superiority of numbers. Nevertheless, they were constantly foiled in their attempts. Ney's troops were patient and devoted; and his measures being always taken with judgment, the Austrians were beaten each time they came to action. This series of engagements somewhat damped their ardour, and they halted, became less troublesome, and the French general quietly regained the banks of the Rhine.

The army had already recrossed that river; and General Laroche alone maintained his position before Mannheim. This officer belonged to a species of patriots not uncommon at that period. He was a red-hot democrat, but a cool and intrepid soldier;—he seized with rare sagacity all the advantages of a position, and skilfully counteracted its disadvantages. The position he occupied excited his apprehensions. He found it too extensive and too open, to be guarded by his skeletons of regiments, against the dense columns which were approaching him. Ney's opinion of the position was still more unfavourable. Mannheim is built upon both the Necker and the Rhine. Being situated upon the right bank of the former, it is at a little distance from the angle formed by the latter. The intermediate space, intersected with woods and canals, was susceptible of a long defence. The approaches to Mannheim, on the other hand, offered no means of resistance; nevertheless, it was determined to defend it; and what is inexplicable, the bridge had been thrown across the river at the precise spot where it ought not to have been placed. The Austrians had only to push a column to the spot where the Necker joins the Rhine, and their success was certain; for the French generals would not venture to draw their forces from their position on the Necker. The French troops, thus deprived of the means of retreat, were uncertain and irresolute, or at best devoid of enthusiasm.

Ney therefore found the position too dangerous, and recommended its being changed. He advised that the bridge should be removed to Neckerau, and that after concentrating all the disposable means within the creek, Mannheim and the banks of the Necker should be guarded by posts only. Having submitted his observations to the general-in-chief, they were no better received than those of General Laroche; and nothing was now left but patient resignation to events. The



Austrians attacked the position; their attack was resisted with spirit, but they were so numerous, and the position so bad, that the French were forced to give way, and after a complete rout, compelled to evacuate Manheim. To complete their disaster, the Austrians attacked their communications. General Vandermassen and Adjutant-general Lefol having collected a few men, threw themselves boldly in front of the enemy; but being almost immediately surrounded, some of their soldiers were put to the sword, and the remainder called for quarter. The French were now in open flight, and the whole division would have been annihilated, had not Ney come to its assistance. He had made his men fall in and prepare to march the moment he heard the first reports of the artillery; but his cantonments were far off, and the attack had been so sudden and so rapid, that he had not time to reach the spot before the rout took place.

He debouched at the head of the 16th, drove directly at the enemy, and for an instant threw their ranks into disorder. But his efforts were lost upon this immense mass of troops. All he could do was to stop and keep them in check. Part of the French prisoners rescued themselves; but the officers, and particularly Lefol, submitted to the captivity. Ney was himself twice wounded: he received a musket shot in the chest, and his thigh was dreadfully contused by a Biscayan.

The French were now completely beaten. Their opponents might follow them to the left bank in the boats which they had imprudently left, and attack them in the midst of their cantonments. Ney hastened to provide against such an occurrence. Having suffered less, he was in a condition to support General Laroche. He accordingly covered Laroche's division, and concerted with him upon future measures.

The staff officers at head-quarters, who could anticipate or decide upon nothing, were, however, very jealous of their rights. They considered that these rights had been infringed; and the cantonments as well as the intended measures of Generals Ney and Laroche, were immediately changed. The latter was directed to guard the Rhine from Spire to Neuhaufen no longer, but to face the plain, with his right towards Spire, and his left towards Hanaufen.

Laroche was thunderstruck at receiving so singular an order. The Austrians might still come up with him, overwhelm his force, and renew the disasters, whose consequences he was then endeavouring to remedy. He immediately wrote to Ney, to acquaint him with the critical situation in which he should be placed by executing this ill-judged order; nor did he conceal from the latter his opinion that "it required a strong dose of patriotism not to yield to discouragement."

"I admit," was Ney's reply, "that matters are arranged in a most incomprehensible manner. It is impossible to imagine a more painful

situation than yours. But we are on the eve of an invasion, and must make up our minds to endure its disgusts."

And in truth this was necessary. A considerable force was advancing upon Mayence, and another upon Offenburg. Everything clearly showed that the archduke, who had assumed the command of the Austrian army upon the Rhine, had resolved, as report already proclaimed, to act by means of his wings. One was to penetrate into Brabant for the purpose of assisting the British, and the other to make an irruption into Alsace, in order to harass and turn Masséna.

The situation of the French army was indeed critical; but it is in struggling against evil fortune that true courage shows its greatness. Ney did every thing that circumstances would admit of; and, fortunately for the French, the Austrians did not evince the promptitude he had anticipated. They sent, it is true, five thousand men to Mannheim; but this movement, caused by the severity of the season, was unconnected with any meditated hostile attempt. But what were they doing, and what were their plans? Such inaction was not natural, and must therefore have reference to some reverses which they had met with in Helvetia. And then again, such reverses must be great and important, thus to paralyze the movements of so considerable a force. Ney was lost in conjecture; he had received no intelligence from Masséna, and could not at all account for the lengthened halt of the archduke. It might possibly conceal a snare; the prince might have conceived the project of passing the Rhine, and extending his force along the left bank; neither was it impossible that he might descend the Necker, throw troops upon Frankenthal, and, profiting by the advantage afforded by the possession of Mannheim, land at Ogersheim. If such were his intentions, he must necessarily threaten Seltz and Brisach, and attempt diversions upon numerous points. But these two places alone offered a real chance of success, and they were therefore the only points which the French general applied himself to place beyond the power of attack. This he did by inundating part of the environs of the one, and concentrating all his available force upon the other;—he then calmly awaited the issue.

## CHAPTER II.

THE several garrisons taken from the French army having considerably reduced its strength, there remained to carry on the campaign only the skeletons of corps; and these the enemy might every moment be expected to force. Yet no orders were given, nor any thing decided upon at head-quarters. Ney, uneasy at such a state of affairs, renewed the observations which he had already submitted to the commander-in-chief. But the latter had just received his recall; and he therefore sent for Ney, to whom he delivered up the command in chief, the Directory having just appointed him to the vacant office. He at first refused to accept it. The difficult situation in which the army was placed, and his own ill health, two wounds being yet unhealed, induced him to do all in his power to get rid of the perilous honour conferred upon him. But the Directory had forwarded his commission; and the generals and other officers unanimously entreated him to put himself at their head. He therefore acceded to their wishes, but rather as a self-immolated victim, than as an officer whose ambition is crowned by fortune.

His first act was to claim the indulgence of his colleagues, and to invoke the aid of their talents and exertions.

"The executive Directory," said he in his circular, "has called upon me to assume the provisional command of the army, in the room of General Muller. You are aware of the inefficiency of my military talents for this important station, particularly in our present critical situation. I shall perhaps become the victim of my obedience; but under the circumstances in which we are placed, I am bound to accept the appointment. I therefore claim your kind solicitude for the safety of the troops under your command, as also your individual kindness towards myself. I must moreover inform you that I have signified to the Directory my intention of not retaining the command beyond ten days."

Nothing could be more modest than this address, nor show a stronger proof of the most devoted zeal. But every officer in the army had the strongest confidence in Ney's talents. The different commanders of corps, whose assistance he solicited, had fought with him, some in Helvetia, others in the army of Sambre-et-Meuse; all knew his ability and daring courage, and all were delighted at seeing him assume the command. General Gillot congratulated the army upon having Ney at its head;\* and General Legrand, though

\* Head-quarters, Nancy, 8th Vendemiaire, Year VIII. (September 29th, 1799.)



confined with fever, was impatient to receive and execute his orders.\*

The sincere and candid Leval, so little given to flattery, was still warmer in his congratulations. His letter, which moreover alluded to the difficulties of the situation in which the army was placed, was calculated to give Ney confidence in himself. It ran thus:—

“If in the whole course of my life, my dear comrade, I ever experienced sincere satisfaction, it was on receiving the news of your appointment to the chief command of this army. It is, of a certainty, weak, but it is composed of soldiers who greatly esteem you. You are sufficiently well acquainted with my sincerity to be assured that I do not seek to disguise my real sentiments. You are calculated to inspire confidence; and it is with redoubled zeal that I shall study to execute scrupulously the orders you may give me. I shall, in obedience to your letter of the 5th instant, immediately pursue those prompt measures which you direct, concerning the storehouses in the places you mention. I thank you, General, for your approbation of the steps I took to secure two decades of pay to the men under my command, namely the 20th and 43d demi-brigades, and the 17th regiment of cavalry. I feared I had exceeded my powers; but I am sure you have admitted the purity of my intentions.

“To speak candidly, my dear General, I must state that if you would give orders to withdraw the letter, relative to the cutting of the woods and forests belonging to the princes, you would confer the greatest service upon the unfortunate inhabitants of this country. Matters have been so managed, that the Prince of Nassau-Orange is included in the exceptions;—he who is, at this very moment, one of our most determined enemies.

mand of the army of the Rhine. The executive Directory, in conferring this office upon you, has calculated upon your talents being equal to the danger; and your modesty will give an additional value to what it expects from you.

You may depend, Citizen General, upon my vigilance for the safety of the troops under my command, and believe me when I say, that I will always exert myself to deserve your esteem and friendship.

GILLOT.

\* Head-quarters, Metz, 1st Vendemiaire, Year VIII. (September 29th, 1799.)

The last courier, my dear General, brought me the news of General Muller's departure for Paris, and your appointment to the chief command of the army. This gives me the most lively pleasure. I must inform you that I have received from General Muller a leave of absence during two decades, to recover my health at Metz. The fever left me but a few days since, and although I am still very weak, pray let me know if you think my presence would be of service to the army before the expiration of my leave. The promptitude with which I will proceed to whatever post you may assign me, will prove to you how much pleasure I feel in serving under your orders, and the sincere attachment of your comrade and friend,

LEGRAND.

"Believe me, General, when I say that I will neglect nothing to prevent all kinds of oppression, and at the same time to promote the interests of the republic. I cannot speak with the same confidence concerning the collecting of contributions, because I have not a single company to spare. Two millions of francs are due, and I have not the means of getting them paid into the treasury of the department. A regiment of cavalry would be of great service to me for this purpose; for we cannot conceal the fact that, in this country, force must be employed on such occasions.

"I herewith enclose the last report which has just been made to me concerning the movement of the Prussians. I will take care to send you intelligence of their march, and of the motions of our enemies.

"Any commander but you, my dear General, would be displeased perhaps that in this my first letter I should declare that I am entirely without funds. I think you will feel the urgent necessity of placing some at my disposal.

"You may rely upon my neglecting nothing to contribute to the success of your undertakings. That is the first proof I will give you of the satisfaction I experience at being under your command.

"Rely also upon my sincere devotion and friendship. LEVAL.

"Head-quarters, Coblenz, 7 Vendemiaire,  
Year VIII. (September 28th, 1799.)"

Ney having assumed the command, it became incumbent upon him to provide for the security of the frontier, by adopting the measures which he had before recommended in vain. But nothing is more variable than the theatre upon which the interests of nations are contended for. The Austrian army, which lately threatened Holland, was now in full march towards Switzerland. Numerous bodies of troops, it is true, were collecting on the banks of the Maine and the Necker; but these corps were calculated only to cover and threaten fortresses, and not to strike any decisive blow. Every act of offensive warfare was therefore to be undertaken by the army under the command of the archduke.

The Austrian prince had accordingly assembled his equipages-de-pont, and Lambesc, who had been directed to penetrate into the Low Countries, was replaced by Condé. The imperial troops were to take no share in this latter adventurous undertaking; the French emigrants were alone to run the hazard, and confront the dangers of the attempt. The archduke therefore concentrated his forces on the left bank for no other purpose than to make an irruption into the territory of the Upper Rhine; for with the French reserve on his right, he could not think of attempting to press upon the centre of the republican army. Mayence stopped him on one side, Landau embarrassed him on the other; and at that season of the year, he could no more blockade those places than he could take them. Seltz, at first a

point of no importance, was now the only one by which he could reach the French army with any chance of success. The French general, however, had no direct intelligence of the motions of the archduke's army; and as in so important a matter mere conjecture was not sufficient, he directed General Nansouty to observe the march and movements of the Austrians, and prevent their establishing themselves in the Hundsruck hills. This country, the actual possession of which offered the greatest advantages, had acquired peculiar importance from the circumstances under which the French were placed. Luxemburg was almost without troops and provisions; and the archduke, if once master of these mountains, would find no further obstacle to his progress. He was trying to intercept every communication between the places which the French held on the Rhine, and was pushing on without opposition towards the Moselle. Ney endeavoured to frustrate both measures.

Having distributed and grouped his forces, he put himself in a situation to strike with vigour on whichever side the Austrians should appear. But his army was so weak, and the line he had to defend so extensive, that he had strong misgivings as to the course of events, which he was watching with the most intense anxiety, when he perceived the Austrian general call in his columns, and soon after ascend the Rhine. What could be the cause of so extraordinary a movement? Had there been a battle in Helvetia? Were the Austrians defeated, or was it the reverse? Was the archduke himself proceeding to consummate the overthrow of the republicans, or was he hastening to rescue the wreck of the coalition from their hands? Ney knew not what to think. But he concluded that the march of the Austrian general could only have been undertaken with a view hostile to the French forces; and he resolved, if not to make him suspend it, at least to slacken his movements. But from the point which Ney occupied, he could do nothing: Manheim was no longer in his power, and he had neither bridges nor equipages;—he had therefore no immediate means of harassing the archduke. To cross the river by main force, was totally impracticable; and he was forced to remain inactive. But that which it was impossible to do from the position which Ney then occupied, might be effected elsewhere. The republicans were masters of Kehl, they had a strong force at Brisach, and he therefore ordered General Collaud to debouch upon these two points.

Collaud, as may be seen in a former part of these memoirs, was a cold, reserved man, without ambition or ardour. Too little enterprising perhaps, he was unable to create opportunities; but he well knew how to seize and take advantage of those which offered. This instinctive quality rarely deceived him, and his vigilance was still more rarely at fault. The movements which had aroused Ney's attention, had also excited that of Collaud. His forces were already engaged with those of the archduke, when the order reached him to



harass the latter ; but this attack, advantageous as it was when made, proved nevertheless inadequate to the occasion ; and Ney soon became aware of this, by learning the secret of the archduke's manœuvres. A pitched battle had been fought under the walls of Zurich, in which the French had beaten and cut the Russians to pieces. Those among the latter who had escaped the sword, had taken refuge in the mountains. The archduke was proceeding to the assistance of the vanquished, for the purpose of assembling and saving the wreck of an army so formidable before its defeat ; and Ney determined to do all in his power to counteract the archduke's intention.

Success having once more returned to the French arms, each individual soldier was full of confidence and courage, and each thought that an attempt which he would not have ventured upon a few days previous, could not now be otherwise than successful. But scarcely were the Russians defeated, ere a host of fresh enemies appeared. The population inhabiting the banks of the Necker had taken up arms, and the Prussians seemed disposed again to join in hostilities against the republicans.

The former, seduced by the enemies of France, affected to apprehend an invasion of their country by the French armies. The latter, taking advantage of the aspect of affairs in Holland, pretended that it was expedient they should adopt measures of precaution against the British army, which the French did not seem strong enough to keep in check. The forces of the one, increased by the Schwarzenbach militia, were forming in the neighbourhood of Hulsbach ; those of the other were assembling at Vesel, where five battalions of infantry and as many squadrons of horse were already collected. But these were not the only enemies against which the French army had to contend ; treachery and fanaticism were at work in its very ranks.

Whenever new principles are proclaimed, men of exaggerated opinions are to be found who carry such principles to the extreme of abstract theory, as well as adroit hypocrites who affect a like exaggeration as the best means of combating them. The army of the Rhine contained many individuals of both these classes ; the French troops on the left bank as well as on the right, had their fanatics, and likewise their hypocrites in patriotism. Both were equally dangerous ; and both calculated to excite mutiny and dissension among the soldiers. The army required tranquillity ; it wanted a spirit of consistency and concord ; and Ney determined to put down the agitation raised by these two classes of men. He refrained however from coercion ; leaving it to time and victory to correct the evil. But time only increased the exaggeration of the one class and the perfidy of the other ; and victory, far from keeping either in check, only hastened the explosion of their violence. The Austrians, as usual, instead of a defeat, had announced a great triumph. This report had reached Bonn, and the people persuaded that the archduke had crossed the Rhine at Neuwied, crowded to the banks of the river to see him arrive. Some capuchin monks

were at the head of the multitude, whom they entertained with the same fables as they had employed in agitating the country-people in the departments of the Sarre and Mont-Tonnère. In vain was the falsity of their statements exposed, and facts related as they really were; these fanatics obstinately persisted, during three days, in praying for the appearance of the army which the republicans had defeated.

Matters were much worse at Coblenz, where General Leval commanded. This officer, who was somewhat of an invalid, was generous and benevolent, and he equally abhorred both turbulence and perfidy. Fond of order, and severe in matters of administration, he had managed to keep all parties under control. The pretended and the true jacobins were obliged to contain themselves within just bounds; but both, impatient of the restraint he had imposed upon them, were only seeking an opportunity to shake it off. The news of Masséna's victory had just reached Coblenz; the city was illuminated, and the republican soldiers exulting in the event. This seemed a favourable time for appealing to opinions which were now getting out of date. The president of the municipality had been secretary to Prince Charles. He had returned to his native country about eighteen months before, had first glided into the municipal administration, and then subdued the other members to his will: he now reigned over it in despotic sway. His colleagues had adopted his views, were penetrated with his principles, and co-operated in all his plans. Rude towards the citizens, and brutal towards the soldiers, these men effected an exaggeration of feeling which strangely contrasted with their actions.

Though this singular patriot calculated his plans with cool deliberation, he accused those who daily exposed their lives to maintain the institutions of their country, of coldness and want of energy. His colleagues, obedient to his beck and call, like him affected exaggeration, appeared thoughtful and uneasy, put on the disguise of stern and unflinching republicans, and pretended to lament that freedom should have been placed under the protection of guardians who had proved themselves so unworthy. Popular feeling had just been excited, and they did not let this opportunity for agitation escape them. A great crowd assembled, and, headed by the municipal magistrates, proceeded through the streets crying, "Long live the jacobins!" They applied the most approbrious epithets to every French soldier they met; the French officers were likewise insulted, termed aristocrats and Vendéans, and pursued with the cries of "Down with the Chouans!" To the latter exclamation some among them replied, "And the jacobins likewise!" This they said merely from irritation at the ill usage they received. At this answer, which seemed very natural, the mob rushed upon them, ill-treated them, threw them on the ground, and stamped upon them. The guard, having come to their assistance, was likewise attacked, and with great difficulty succeeded in extricating itself from the riotous multitude, who, being assailed in their turn, were dispersed.

The aspect of affairs was therefore not very brilliant with the French. On the one hand the Austrians appeared with hostile demonstrations, on the other the Prussians with equivocal assurances; in front was an insurrection, and attempts at revolt in the rear. The French army was thus menaced on all sides. If it had only had to face the enemy, or guard against ambuscades, the danger would not have been greater than usual; but demagogues had suddenly sprung up among its ranks, and transforming the ardour of war into the fever of revolt, threatened to paralyze the feeble battalions which composed it. This, of all the obstacles Ney had to encounter, was the most dangerous. But he little heeded loquacity, and turbulence still less; those who gave way to them, were severely reminded of their duties. Of two general officers who had fired the train by inflammatory speeches to the men, one was as bad a soldier as he was a furious jacobin; and having no letters of service, was dismissed without ceremony. The other though a bustling demagogue, was nevertheless a good and brave officer, and Ney was hesitating as to the steps he should take, when the officer himself put an end to this embarrassment. He had commanded upon the Rhine during the last war, and had had a violent altercation with Moreau. It is known that the latter general blamed the addresses of the army of Italy, and opposed such addresses in his own army. His lieutenant, the officer in question, paid no attention to Moreau's orders to this effect. The men belonging to the right wing, which was under his orders, having expressed their desire to protest against the project of Clichy, he assembled them, libelled the manifesto, and excited to a pitch of rage the hatred which they already bore to the emigrants. Moreau, provoked at seeing his authority thus slighted, suppressed the protest. A violent altercation ensued, and the powers of the too impetuous commander of the right wing were soon taken from him. The speedy arrival at Ney's army of the officer he accused of this disgrace, being announced, he availed himself of the repugnance he felt at being under the orders of this individual, to apply for employment in a subordinate rank elsewhere. All dissensions now ceased among Ney's troops; the men resumed their warlike habits, and forgetting politics, directed their attention solely to their duties as soldiers.

The republican forces, reduced to live as it were upon what they could take from the enemy—being without pay, clothing, or shoes—were under that degree of irritation which leads men willingly to the field of battle. Coblenz was in a state of siege, and there were neither revolts nor insurrections to be apprehended in the rear. Ney thought he had reached the end of his difficulties; but he had only got out of one to fall into another. His forces being so feeble, he endeavoured to supply this defect by courage and promptitude. He organized his army afresh, and placed at the heads of columns young men like himself, all ardent and vigorous, fearing neither fatigue nor peril. He stationed in the rear those whom age and obesity had ren-



dered less active. This was enough, however, to set the whole of the field-officers in a rumour. One vehemently claimed his place in action; another appealed to the tenour of his commission; a third was indignant "at being confined to one place;" a fourth could not submit "to march in the rear of the ammunition wagons." Even the members of the commissariat became angry, and invoked their rights of precedence. In the midst of this species of mutiny Lacombe Saint-Michel arrived from the army of the Danube, and having found Sorbier at the head of the light artillery, "fancied himself transformed into a guard-general." He would not countenance such changes, he said, and claimed his station in the line. As he had distinguished himself both in the field of battle and at the tribune, Ney considered him entitled to an explanation.

"Would you wish," said Ney, "that the muster-roll should have greater weight than the good of the service; and that for the sake of complying with vain pretensions of precedence, I should risk the success of my operations?—for, in sober earnest, are you active enough to be attached to my suite?—are you supple and strong enough to be constantly in the field? Leave then to Sorbier the fatigues which his youth will enable him to bear; he will correspond with you, and will not cease being under your orders."

Lacombe was convinced. "It is all right, General," he cried. "I had not the honour of being known to you; and as I possessed the confidence of the whole of France, I thought it hard that you should refuse me yours. All is now explained; send me your orders, and you know how I can execute them."

## CHAPTER III.

THE peasantry on the right bank had, as we have already stated, taken up arms, and were tumultuously assembled round Frankfort. They were already twenty thousand strong. As this movement might become serious, Ney resolved to punish these villagers for interfering in a quarrel which did not concern them, and at the same time make a useful diversion. Having settled his plans accordingly, General Leval pushed a column upon Limburg, whilst General Rousset crossed the Rhine at Seltz, and Nansouty at Frankenthal. The Imperialists, being menaced on their wings, dared not weaken them; and General Lorcet, who led the real attack, debouched without obstacle upon the dense ranks of these unhappy peasants, whom a sort of infatuation had brought to the field of battle. They were established upon the Maine; their position was strong and well chosen; but the French troops were irritated at this rising, and rushing upon them with fury, overthrew and cut them to pieces. They who escaped with their lives from this foolish attempt, returned peaceably to their cottages. There remained however about fifteen thousand in arms, whom it afterwards became necessary to punish also.

This act of energy produced a good effect. Scarcely had the Austrian reserves received the news of the rout of their militia, ere they ran to its assistance. Schwartzberg quitted Mannheim with precipitation, and threw himself into Frankfort with the ten thousand men he commanded.

The French thus cleared the approaches of the river; but the stores which they had hoped to seize, and the contributions they had expected to levy, escaped them with this place. Resignation was again their only remedy, and they were once more reduced to expedients to alleviate their intolerable sufferings. But this was now a more easy task. The Directory had given orders that an active and vigorous diversion should be made, and the reinforcements which it had announced for this purpose were beginning to arrive. Ney had now from eighteen to twenty thousand men at his disposal; the field of action was consequently larger, and the operations were more extended and more certain. The enemy had established themselves upon the Neckar, and Ney determined to go there and meet them. His columns were put in motion, and he was preparing to follow, when news reached him that Lecourbe had been appointed to the command of the army.

He had formerly served under this general, whose sagacity, enthusiasm, and precision in conducting attacks, Ney well remembered, as he did also the praises he had received from Lecourbe. The opera-

tion which he had planned seemed sure, and he hastened to offer its direction to his new commander.

"The Austrian troops assembled upon the Necker," he wrote to the latter, "do not amount to half the number of ours. Hasten hither, and put yourself at our head; every one expects you, and particularly myself, with the most sincere impatience. Your presence will excite fresh ardour among us. We shall, under your command, be more certain of success and proceed with greater confidence."\*

But in warfare Lecourbe loved only the field of battle. He had just arrived at Strasburg, where he found nothing but want and misery. Having entered the town on the 10th of October, when the weather was cold and rainy, he beheld the soldiers parading about the streets in rags. Nor were their arms better than their clothing: one had no musket, another no sabre; all bore evidence of the most cruel neglect, and all bent under the weight of distress. Nothing in this deplorable picture flattered Lecourbe's passion for military glory, and he was on the point of resigning his command. Meantime the army was following up the advantages it had gained; it had taken Grosgerau and Treben, and was advancing upon Heidelberg. A new action was about to take place, and Ney again offered his new commander the honour of leading it. He was aware of the hesitation of the latter about retaining the command, and he thought he could overcome this hesitation by giving Lecourbe an account of the vigour with which the troops, represented to him as so weak, had attacked the enemy.

"Come quickly," he wrote; do not suffer yourself to be influenced by any one respecting the situation of the army. It is capable, whatever some may say to the contrary, of making a vigorous diversion."

It was impossible to be more pressing or more friendly; but Lecourbe having met at Strasburg all those whom Ney had sent to the rear, had listened to their statements, and replied with coldness to these kind entreaties. Ney had the Austrians in front of him, and revenged himself on them for the injustice of his commander. He attacked them on the 15th of October in front of Heidelberg, and such was the force of the shock that neither the hussars nor the Hulans could withstand it. Not but that they fought with courage; indeed their resistance was heroic. Prince Lichtenstein, who commanded during the action, was overpowered, and Count Esterhazy taken prisoner, before they would give way. The different corps upon the Necker had also been defeated, and Prince Schwartzemberg, who commanded the Austrian army on the Lower Rhine, had made all possible haste to Stuttgart.

The diversion ordered by the Directory having thus been effected,

\* Mayence, 19th Vendemiaire, Year VIII. (October 10th, 1799.)



Masséna, more at his ease, could now extend his operations. But these successes, far from allaying angry political feelings, tended only to inflame them the more: one did not without rage see his predictions fail; another was angry that the army could do without him; and wounded vanity being more powerful than a sense of duty, Ney encountered nothing but opposition and malevolence in those who ought to have given him their most strenuous support. This was lamentable; but man is so formed. Ney however was not discouraged, and only determined to push on his operations with redoubled vigour.

Philipsburg was still in the hands of the Landgrave, or, more properly speaking, in those of the Austrians; and he resolved to try whether an attempt to obtain possession of it would not be now more successful than at the beginning of the war. He accordingly marched thither, and found it as little able as formerly to offer an effective resistance. The garrison was badly provisioned, not numerous, and its ranks further thinned by desertion and sickness; so that the place could not possibly hold out six days after the trenches were opened. Weak as Philipsburg was, it however required a certain display of force to reduce it; ammunition, artillery, and from twenty to twenty-five thousand men were requisite to cover the siege. Ney had only fourteen thousand; he therefore deemed the operation too hazardous, and contented himself with blockading the place.

His force, however, though insufficient for a siege, was greater than a mere blockade required. He therefore took with him all the troops he could spare, and determined upon a fresh attempt in favour of Masséna.

Stuttgart continued the dépôt of the Austrians, and he doubted not that, if he threatened that place, Prince Charles would hasten to its assistance. Having made his preparations, he sent for the commissary and the chief of his staff. The latter contented himself with eluding the order; but the former, stung to the quick at Ney's uncompromising integrity, boldly declared that all connexion between himself and Ney had ceased; that both had now another commander, and that the latter had retained him near his person. So long as this malevolent feeling did not lead to acts detrimental to the service, Ney took no notice of it; but as such was now its effect, he visited it with the full weight of his displeasure. The staff officer having done duty with the army, Ney was content to treat him as a man who had forgotten himself. But the commissary, who had done nothing during the whole campaign, had provided nothing, and had left the soldiers in a state of the most dreadful destitution, he treated with greater severity, and at the same time with the most cutting contempt. He ordered him to join the army forthwith, and organize the administration attached to it; and further, to produce the order which authorized him to remain at Strasburg. The commissary had indulged in the

opposition which embarrassed Ney's operations, and given way to his malignant feelings towards the general, under the idea of receiving support from General Lecourbe, who, being dissatisfied, and naturally fond of finding fault, left the burthen of the war to his active predecessor, and yet took a secret pleasure in the malevolent reports spread against him.

Ney could with difficulty endure that Lecourbe should encourage such opposition, and took care to let him know it. But Lecourbe was always wavering; still undecided whether or not he should accept the command, he nevertheless thwarted Ney in every possible manner. Sometimes he said that it was dangerous to cross the Rhine, at others he wanted all operations to be suspended. Thus Ney being pressed on the one hand by government, who directed that the war should be pushed to extremities, and kept back on the other by the general-in-chief, who only sought to throw obstacles in his way, soon became weary of these contradictory instructions, and requested the war minister to put an end to such a state of things.

"I beg to inform you," he wrote, "that since General Lecourbe's arrival, I experience nothing but opposition to every thing I undertake. The Commissary-general Lamartellière, and the Chef-d'Etat-major General Baraguey-d'Hilliers, are with him at Strasburg, and are constantly throwing obstacles in my way. Have the goodness, Citizen Minister, to force General Lecourbe immediately to exercise the honourable office with which the executive Directory has invested him, and no longer leave me exposed to the annoyances of men who would do much better in attending to the welfare of the army.

"NEY."

"Manheim, 29th Vendemiaire, Year VIII.  
(October 20th, 1799.)"

Ney, having forwarded a copy of this letter to Lecourbe, set out on his expedition. His forces, though far from numerous, were composed of steady and experienced troops, each soldier being actuated by one common feeling of hatred to the Austrians and of devotion to his country. The imperialists, with all their numerous battalions, were unable to withstand this handful of brave men, who, on the 29th of October, encountered and drove them back at Hislack. On the following day, as the French columns were advancing upon Slocksberg, the cuirassiers of Anspach and those of Frantzmailand appeared, to give them battle. The first regiment of French chasseurs immediately advanced, the light artillery prepared their pieces, and the action began. The attack of the French was, as usual, dreadfully impetuous; but the resistance of the imperialists was most determined, and for a long time no advantage was obtained on either side. At length the Chef-d'Escadron, Dubois-Crancé, having at the head of his squadron charged the Austrians with extraordinary energy, succeeded

in shaking them. The Prince of Hohenlohe rode forward, rallied his men, and the action was resumed with fresh spirit, and with such determined obstinacy that neither party would give way. But the French artillery being brought to bear upon the Austrians, its fire proved so destructive that they gave way, and the prince himself made off with all haste for Louisburg, in order to effect a junction with the Duke of Wirtemberg, and rally his forces under the walls of Ulm. Ney might have pursued him, driven back the Austrian troops on his right, and seized Stuttgart; but his cavalry was too weak to venture into the vast and fertile plains through which the Necker runs.

Meantime Lecourbe had joined the army and assumed the command. He seemed but little disposed to second Ney's enterprises; he had not forgotten their late altercation, and it seemed his constant aim to mortify his late locum-tenens, whom he ordered one of his aides-de-camp constantly to follow, under pretence of rendering his communications with head-quarters more rapid. Ney at first treated this measure with silent contempt, and feigned not to perceive the motive in which it originated; but Lorcet, who commanded one of his brigades, having complained to him of similar treatment, he determined to take the matter up. The fact is, Baraguey, the chief of the staff, pretending to entertain suspicions of Lorcet, sent an officer to observe his conduct, and more particularly to watch his proceedings in levying contributions on the villages. So long as the insult had been confined to himself, Ney had not complained: but the moment it was directed against one of his officers he gave vent to his anger. After expressing his feelings with regard to the chief of the staff, he arrested certain agents or spies which that officer had sent into the villages, and then addressing Lecourbe, bitterly upbraided him with these unhandsome proceedings.

"I do not, I know, enjoy your confidence," he wrote. "Well, be it so! but then you must send me to the rear, and not subject me to the investigations of your officers; for you must know that I have the presumption to think I understand my duty and am capable of performing it. I am not, it is true, base enough to cringe to or flatter any man; but my country is the object of my sole and constant solicitude, and for it I shall find strength to make every sacrifice and support every mortification."\*

This bold and manly expostulation produced a powerful effect: Lecourbe disavowed the acts of his staff officer, and replied to Ney's letter with kind and friendly professions. He then seemed to restore his confidence to the latter, and acted upon all his suggestions. Ney having several times complained of the small number of his cavalry, and of the constant delay in pursuing the enemy, Lecourbe now sent

\* Letter of the 10th Brumaire, Year VIII. (Nov. 1st, 1799.)



him the first regiment of cavalry, with an intimation that he was about to direct a march upon Stuttgart. As this movement required stores of provisions, and means of carriage, he directed Ney to collect all the money and horses still remaining in the villages. This was an unpleasant duty, but it was commanded by circumstances; Ney therefore directed one of his brigades upon Wimpfen, advanced upon Bruckenheim at the head of the other, and, by alternately fighting and assuming a threatening attitude, succeeded in reaching the Entz.

This bold and skilful march placed the imperial army in a very critical situation. Masséna was at Basle with a heavy column of grenadiers, and Ney had crossed the Necker; the former was about to make an irruption into Suabia, the latter to penetrate into Wirtemberg. Both the flanks and the communications of the archduke's army were thus exposed; and this prince, if he could not secure his menaced flanks from danger, was anxious at least to keep his communications open. He had marched to the assistance of Hohenlohe, and had directed that Heilbronn should be occupied and maintained at any sacrifice. Hohenlohe having pushed forward, and extended his lines from Gross-Botwar to Besigheim, Ney resolved to attempt driving them back. He accordingly threw a part of his left brigade upon Marpach, placed the remainder round Lauffen, and advanced with his right brigade upon the Austrian columns which had taken up their position at the conflux of the Entz. The weather was most unfavourable, and the inhabitants of the country, tired of the presence of the French, and otherwise discontented, were zealously devoted to the archduke; this prevented Ney from ascertaining the strength of these columns, but on the 3rd of November he formed into line in front of them, with the 1st cavalry, the 10th chasseurs, and two battalions of the 8th demi-brigade.

When the French debouched, the imperialists were themselves about to march in pursuit of them. The Austrian force consisted of three thousand horse and four thousand foot, and they attacked the French with all the confidence inspired by a greater superiority in numbers. They rushed like an irresistible torrent upon Ney's little band; but its brave leader succeeded in checking their career. The French infantry received them with admirable coolness, and the 10th chasseurs made some very effective charges. By degrees the action became more developed, and, notwithstanding the great disproportion of force, the French maintained the contest during six hours without any decided disadvantage.

Night was however approaching, and strife seemed to become every instant more animated and more deadly. The French artillery fired with admirable precision, and the grenadiers of the 8th demi-brigade evinced an extraordinary degree of courage and fortitude, which the increasing danger seemed only to stimulate to greater daring; but a body of three thousand Wirtembergians having come up to

the assistance of the Austrians, Ney was forced to give way. The retreat of the French was at first conducted with order and precision; and every attempt of the enemy to trouble it was frustrated. But the imperialists, vexed at seeing so small a force escape from them, made a desperate charge, and fell in overwhelming numbers upon the artillery and infantry by which it was supported. The grape-shot of the French artillery stopped the career of the Austrian cavalry, but the infantry of the republicans was not so fortunate. The men were exhausted by forced marches and by the fatigue of the action; they lost their steadiness at the sight of the swarms of cavalry rushing upon them, and gave way in confusion.

Ney lost six hundred men killed or made prisoners, and could no longer stem the torrent which was sweeping all before it. He therefore prolonged his movement, and took up a position with his right at Stockberg and his left at Helmstadt. Lecourbe did not think this a good position: he wished that the 8th demi-brigade had crossed the Entz and effected a junction with the right wing under the command of Legrand. But Ney had ascertained that the great mass of the Austrian forces were in front of him, and he perceived that their object was to surprise Sinzheim; he therefore represented to the commander-in-chief the importance of maintaining his position and the latter yielded to his opinion. The confidence he displayed restored that of his troops; nevertheless it could not prevent the evil consequences always attendant upon defeat.

The reader may remember Ney's attempt upon Philipsburg at the beginning of the campaign, and the causes of its failure. The Directory was now desirous of repeating this attempt, in the conviction that, with a display of force before the place, the former secret negotiations with the inhabitants, which had well nigh placed the town in the hands of the French, might easily be renewed. It was to no purpose that Ney represented that the circumstances were no longer the same; that the commanding officer of engineers, and the town-major had been changed. The weak and haughty Rheingrave of Salm, so fond of intriguing and plotting against the French, but so little qualified to meet them in the field, was still governor of Philipsburg; but the Austrians who, prior to the battle of Stockach, were spread through Suabia, had now a considerable force on the Rhine, and Ney feared to risk, on the opposite bank of that river, a train of artillery which he had no adequate means to protect. Having stated the amount of his own force, and that of the Austrians, together with the number of troops which such an operation would require, and what was necessary more particularly for the opening of the trenches, he showed the danger and probable failure of the enterprise. But the Directory having persisted in its orders, Ney invested Philipsburg, and defeated part of the forces employed to defend it; but this led to no advantage. At a former period the French had

been forced to retire after bombarding the place, and in the present instance a slight check forced them hastily to withdraw their artillery and convey their guns and wagons to the left bank.

Hohenlohe, at the head of a numerous force had pursued the French, and his columns having ascended the Necker, seemed likely to reach the Elsenz. Ney therefore felt the necessity of stopping their career, and directed Montholon to assume a position in front of Waughenzel. This officer had just been appointed chef-d'escadron.\* He possessed daring courage and a good eye; and he did his best in this emergency. But the Austrians having debouched in great numbers, forced the position, and compelled Ney to a retrograde march.

The loss on this occasion was very trifling; nevertheless the check placed the rear of the French in jeopardy, by giving the Austrians possession of the entrance into the valley of the Necker; and this circumstance made it of some importance. Ney did not conceal from Lecourbe the consequences to which it might lead.

"I think, my dear general," he wrote to the latter, "that you would do well to make your posts fall back from Weinheim, keep only Heidelberg, strongly barricade the bridge communicating with the right bank of the Necker, and send companies of observation to the fords of Helwesheim and Ladenberg. Your forces would be then more concentrated; Necker-Gemund might be preserved by the garrison of Heidelberg, and if the enemy were to attack me in strong force, I could easily effect my retreat upon Wislock. But is the division of General Legrand not to make a retrograde movement? Consider of it, my dear general;—the position of Obstadt, or that of Mengelsheim, keeping Brucksall notwithstanding, might perhaps be a suitable one for him under present circumstances!"†

This advice, though excellent, was but an imperfect remedy for the evil. The checks which the French troops had undergone had renewed with frightful energy their former destitute condition. They were in rags, without food, and constantly exposed to a beating rain, which a sharp wind rendered cruelly piercing. Discouragement and hunger now extinguished their remaining energy, and they could

\* THE GENERAL OF DIVISION, ACTING COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

Considering the advantageous reports which have reached me concerning the conduct of Citizen Montholon, captain in the 1st regiment of chasseurs-à-cheval; considering, moreover, the talents and bravery which that officer displayed in the action of . . . Vendémiaire, in which he forced and carried the tête-de-pont at . . . below Frankfort, defended by two thousand Austrians and peasants, I appointed him upon the field of battle, chef-d'escadron in the same regiment.

NEX.

Head-quarters, Hoëscht, the . . . Vendémiaire, Year III.

† Head-Quarters, Homberg, 16th Brumaire, Year VIII. (November 7th, 1799.)



neither fight nor any longer struggle against their wants and privations. Masséna was however still at Basle, his preparations were nearly made, and Lecourbe felt unwilling to continue his retreat when he might expect every day to receive succour. But the discouragement evinced by the men was by no means in keeping with his own firmness, and having expressed how deeply he lamented his lot, and that of his subordinate generals, in seeing the soldiers under their command fail in resolution at such a trying moment, he requested Ney to employ his influence in rekindling their courage, rousing the energy they were capable of displaying, and again exciting that confidence in themselves which had so often led them to victory.

Ney had no great difficulty in effecting this. His own men had undergone the same sufferings as the rest of the army, but had always been patient, obedient, and ready to undertake any act of daring proposed by their general. The first division had seized upon a convoy of provisions belonging to that of Ney: the men went in a body to their commander and complained of this unhandsome proceeding.

“What would you have me do, friends?” said Ney. “Our fellow-soldiers have certainly not treated us like friends, and it is no doubt because they know that the Austrians are followed by immense stores of provisions, and that they cannot flatter themselves to attack and capture these stores with the same courage as you.”

The poor men had however been two whole days without rations, and would doubtless have preferred bread to praises; nevertheless they resigned themselves to the loss with a good grace, and determined to revenge themselves upon the Austrians for the sufferings they endured. The example of Ney's division soon restored the energies of the whole army. The Austrians had begun to form in line in front of Herberg, and Ney's forces marched up to them; but the imperial columns increased every moment in numbers, and completely turned the position, so that Ney's division was obliged to fall back, and amid the charges of the Austrian cavalry took up a position upon the skirts of the wood of Schasthausen.

Hohenlohe had been unable to prevent the retreat of Ney's division. He was defeated each time he had attacked it; but he had always returned to the charge, and from one attack to another had reached Wistock, where there was space to form his columns in line. This he did, and rushed impetuously on the position. It was defended by a very small number of men of the most determined bravery, who being aware of the importance of the position, determined not to evacuate it till the last extremity. The first charge of the Austrians made no impression upon them; but the numbers of the foe were too unequal and they could not long maintain the conflict. After a most energetic resistance, they were about to give way, when Ney, appearing at the head of his division, took the Austrians in flank and dispersed their whole force. But the reserves of the imperial army were formi-

dable ; they advanced and covered the columns which had just been routed ; these rallied, came up again, and in an instant the action was resumed with ten-fold energy. But the French troops, elevated by the success they had already obtained, fought like lions ; the infantry engaged a part of the enemy's masses, and kept the remainder in check, whilst the 10th chasseurs, charging the dense columns already crippled with the fire of the French musketry and artillery, overthrew them all, and even the Frantz-mailland cuirassiers, who were proceeding in all haste to their assistance. Ney then pushed forward and re-occupied his position upon the Elsatz.

This successful combat restored the confidence of the French army, and the hopes of its soldiers revived. They again saw the Austrians flee before them, they again raised contributions, and once more enjoyed the abundance attendant upon victory. But an event of great importance now occupied their attention. Bonaparte, the conqueror of Italy, had returned from the expedition to Egypt ; and his first act on landing in Europe was one of kindness and benevolence. He had sent assistance to the demi-brigades which occupied Corsica ; he had put an end to their privations, had fed them and covered their numerous scars with warm and comfortable clothing. That which he had done for the troops on a distant and isolated station, he was about to do likewise for all the French forces who were fighting around the circumference of the republic. He was about to renew the wonders of Lodi and of Castiglione, and also to provide for the wants of the brave men who were on the banks of the Rhine fighting the battles of the republic. Both officers and men now gave way to the most flattering anticipations.

Some of the former thought that an immediate stop would now be put to the cruel agitation which pervaded the interior of the country ; others expected to see the end of that series of reverses which had pursued the French arms upon the Rhine. General Boyé who had a command in the army of the Danube, applauded the return of a man devoted to the popular cause, and enjoyed in idea the vexation which it would cause among the royalists. Baraguey, who had come from Malta to the Rhine, congratulated his comrades and the country upon the fortunate results to which Bonaparte's arrival in France must lead. General Championnet, who was fighting his way among the rocks of Liguria, went further than this : in his opinion Bonaparte alone could restore to the French arms the ascendancy which their continued ill-fortune had made them lose. He hoped to see this general once more at the head of those veteran bands which he had so often led to victory, and he nobly resigned his command in Bonaparte's favour. The courage of each soldier seemed to increase in a tenfold ratio with the return of this extraordinary man : each felt that his country was on the eve of a great and favourable crisis, and that some striking event

was about to take place which would restore the ancient splendour of France and attach fortune once more to her standard.

Lecourbe, eager to take advantage of this enthusiasm which was general in the ranks of his army, determined to attempt something against the enemy. Having received some reinforcements, and the weather being dry, he was able to spread his forces and keep the inhabitants of the country in check. The country itself was extremely intricate and difficult; nevertheless he resolved to make a continued series of attacks upon the Austrians. The population evinced the most malignant feelings towards the French who were again reduced almost to starvation, when Ney succeeded in capturing some provisions which relieved their most pressing wants, and in routing the imperial generals, who encouraged the hostility of the inhabitants and excited uneasiness and agitation among them. The republican army now prepared to push forward; for the plots of the Austrians were defeated and could injure it no longer. The pensioned officers, postmasters, and bargomasters, who, being in constant intercourse with the French troops, had given intelligence of their movements to the Austrians, were unable to do further mischief being all taken prisoners. The Bailly of Hoest, more alert than his colleagues, had at first made his escape. But he was too dangerous to be left at liberty. His extreme cunning, and the influence he enjoyed in the country, rendered him a very formidable enemy, and Ney tracked, pursued, and at length succeeded in taking him. The villages, being thus deprived of men capable of exciting and leading their inhabitants, soon resumed their wonted tranquillity. The republicans had now no foe to surprise their rear, or any one to betray their plans and preparations. They could advance in security, and they took advantage of this circumstance to march up to the Austrians. Bonnet was at the head of the right wing, and Rouyer led the left; they came up with the imperial forces in front of Hoffheim, engaged, and drove them in disorder upon Sinzheim. The obstinacy which Ney had before displayed in defending this position had revealed its importance to the Austrians, and they made great exertions to maintain it. Ney cut off the approaches and crowned the heights near it, but still the defence was most determined, and the French troops were a long time in overcoming it. At length the position was carried, and the dense bodies of Austrian cavalry which defended it, driven to Rohrbach, where, with the aid of a body of infantry already in the place, they endeavoured to make a stand. But the French grenadiers having rapidly pursued them, they were again defeated and sought refuge at Steinfurt. The Austrian reserve now came to their assistance, and the arrival of Prince Hohenlohe restored their confidence; but the French columns having debouched, attacked them again, and a sanguinary action was the result. For a long time the fortune of the day remained equally balanced; but Ney, at length, made an attempt



to fix it to the republican standard. He manœuvred on the left and prepared to make a tremendous charge. This the Austrians dared not withstand, but fell back and retreated towards Heilbronn. Ney was about to pursue them, when proposals for an armistice were made at head-quarters. Having in consequence received orders to stop all pursuit, he halted and took up a position.

## APPENDIX.

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### No. I.

GILLET, REPRESENTATIVE ATTACHED TO THE ARMY OF SAMBRE-ET-MEUSE, TO THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

Head-Quarters, Poetershem, October, 1794.

MY DEAR COLLEAGUES,

Adjutant-general Ney does not spare the enemy's equipages. A few days since he captured all those of a foreign minister upon the Rhine. They contained a great deal of silver plate, which I have handed over to the paymaster.

Near Clèves also, he captured the courier of Holland and Vesel, who was the bearer of several letters from emigrants, and others, relating to the affairs of the day. I enclose some of them.

You will observe that several of these letters relate to La Vendée. Is it not possible to destroy this last hope of our enemies?

The traitor, D'Artois, has, it appears, just embarked for England. Is he not a mannikin which the atrocious government of London intends to thrust forward for the purpose of rekindling that execrable war of La Vendée?

I am well persuaded, my dear colleagues, of your eagerness to extirpate this political cancer. But recollect that this war has become serious only from the bad choice of those selected to put an end to it. It has been perpetuated by their incapacity and corruption, and by the perfidy of some among them. Send hither well-intentioned, active, and able generals, and all will be safe. How is it that Finisterre, when revolt had burst out in so alarming a blaze, did not become a second La Vendée? Why, because Canclaux, who then commanded at Brest, put himself at the head of fifteen hundred brave soldiers, and pursued the rebels until they were dispersed and exterminated. The revolt lasted only a fortnight.

Pardon me, dear colleagues, for these observations ; but the subject interests me in every way. I am indignant that a handful of rebels should dare still to lift up their heads in our country, when the whole of Europe is trembling before our victorious armies.

Health and Fraternity.

GILLET.

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No. II.

THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY TO THE REPRESENTATIVE GILLET, DELEGATED TO THE ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND SAMBRE-ET-MEUSE.

Paris, September 21st, 1795.

DEAR COLLEAGUE,

The national convention, and we ourselves, have learnt with the most lively satisfaction the constant success of the army to which your mission attaches you, since it has crossed the Rhine. We could have wished that all the brave men composing that army had witnessed the expressions of delight which burst forth at almost every sentence uttered by the reporter. But if the defenders of the republic were deprived of such enjoyment, the published report, the bulletin of the convention, and public papers, will furnish them with the proofs of esteem and gratitude which the whole nation feels towards them.

Doubtless, after such constant fatigue, the officers and men must have rest ; but never let us, citizen colleague, lose sight of this fact, that nothing is yet accomplished while any thing remains to be done. Above all, let us not forget that the blows struck up to the present day are only preparatory ; for our duty is less to humble the princes of the empire, than the house of Austria, which has at all times shown itself the bitterest enemy of the French nation. And indeed, the princes of the empire must, sooner or later, throw themselves into our arms. We are necessary to their existence. But as for the house of Austria, the more we mulet it, the farther we advance towards repose and happiness. It is therefore against the armies and dominions of that power that our efforts must be directed. We must march without delay upon Suabia, after terminating what remains to be done upon the Lower Rhine ; that is to say, after having taken Ehrenbreitstein, driven the enemy beyond the Maine, and blockaded Mayence. Then, dear colleague, it will remain for the army of Rhin-et-Moselle, strengthened by its junction with that of Sambre-et-Meuse, to ascend the river in its turn and carry the war into the dominions of our real enemy.



We have learnt with much pleasure that the newly conquered territory produces more than you expected, and promises to yield still more. The time for mildness is gone by; our enemies must positively be deprived of the resources which they might one day find in these territories, and we must be provided with what we require. The English have for a time closed the sea against us; therefore the land must supply that which we cannot obtain by means of the other element. Although we have no reason to fear being forced to recross the Rhine, still let us bring within this boundary of the republic all that is not indispensable to the daily wants of the army. Yes! citizen colleague; to take Ehrenbreitstein, blockade Mayence, seize the states of the house of Austria situated upon the right bank, convey to France all the provisions and stores not absolutely indispensable to the wants of the inhabitants of the countries under the rule of the princes of the empire, and carry off all the produce of every kind from the hereditary provinces of the houses of Austria—such is our plan, which nothing must frustrate. There lies the glory of our undertakings, and there lies the road to peace. Point out forcibly these two great objects to the generals and soldiers to whom you are delegated. Render unanimous every opinion and every will, and you will see that we shall execute with facility that which, in other times, no one would have dared to plan.

Rely upon it, citizen colleague, that the committee will neglect nothing to secure the due execution of an undertaking which alone can lead to a speedy and lasting peace.

Health and Fraternity.

CAMBACERES,  
LETOURNEUR,  
MERLIN.

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### No. III.

THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY TO THE REPRESENTATIVES ATTACHED TO THE ARMY OF SAMBRE-ET-MEUSE, COLOGNE.

September 15th, 1797.

CITIZENS COLLEAGUES,

You are aware that one of the first principles of military administration is to make the war supply the wants of the war.

If ever circumstances imperiously required the strict execution of this principle, it is at the present time. No doubt we must spare as much as possible the countries we have conquered, and alleviate; as

far as we are able, the evils which conquest always drags in her train; no doubt, we must make the inhabitants suffer the least we possibly can for the folly of its rulers; no doubt, we must make a distinction between the countries under the dominion of our most inveterate enemies, and those whose governments are ready to effect a reconciliation with us; no doubt, we must also separate from the former those which have only shown timidity or weakness: but all are not the less bound to help us with their contributions to support the burthen of a war which either their malevolence or their weakness has excited against us.

We are unable, dear colleagues, to determine either the quantity or the species of contribution which you are to exact from the conquered countries. Your decision on this head must depend, first, upon the political considerations above mentioned; secondly, upon the wants of your army; and, thirdly, upon the wealth of the conquered countries.

And generally, let us not forget, that it is the unjust distribution of a military impost which makes its burthen more severely felt.

Let us not forget either that a dilapidation of the articles supplied by such contributions renders them of no use to those who receive them, and a grievous burden to those by whom they are paid.

Let us always remember that the poorer classes, and those who owe their existence solely to manual labour, have the greatest claim upon republican commiseration.

Let us always have this truth present to our minds; that the greatest enemies of the French republic, throughout Europe, are the nobles and the priests.

Let us likewise never lose sight of this principle, that when a conquered country has paid the contribution imposed upon it, both the persons and property of its inhabitants ought to be held as sacred as in the centre of the republic.

Besides the contributions which you are to impose, either in produce or in money, you will doubtless take measures for securing, by right of pre-emption, all the provisions for men and horses which the conquered country can supply, without ruining its agricultural interests, and depriving its inhabitants of the articles necessary for their own consumption. By these means we can pass our assignats, and economise the produce of our own agriculture and manufactories. We want peace, and it is refused to us! Well then! let us provide for a continuance of the war by laying in great stores of provisions, and taking away the supplies of our enemies.

You will no doubt think it right, dear colleagues, after having provided, by means of storehouses built upon the right bank of the Rhine, for the momentary subsistence of the army, to send the surplus of your purchases to the left bank of that river. In so doing, we shall have nothing to fear from the enemy, nor from those mis-

fortunes to which the chances of war sometimes lead. Even were we to take up our winter quarters on the right bank, still this precaution would be advisable.

LETOURNEUR.

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No. IV.

THE REPRESENTATIVE JOUBERT, ATTACHED TO THE ARMY OF SAMBRE-ET-MEUSE, TO THE COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC SAFETY.

Hadamar, October 15th, 1795.

DEAR COLLEAGUES,

In vain did we flatter ourselves that we could maintain the position which the enemy's manœuvres had obliged us to assume on the right bank of the Lahn. The retrograde march of the army on this occasion has convinced us of the necessity of resuming our position on the left bank of the Rhine. It is no doubt painful to be forced to give up all idea of success in so brilliant an expedition; but instead of continuing to yield to illusions, it has been the first duty of the generals, and my own, to endeavour to preserve for the republic one of its strongest and most formidable armies, which would surely have been lost, but for the steps we have taken, and upon which we have not hesitated to stake our responsibility.

The following are our reasons for doing as we have done :

In the first place we could not but admit that the retreat upon the Lahn, regular and well combined as it was, very deeply affected the feelings of the men, who, accustomed as they were to advance, were unable to account for this retrograde movement. They could not conceive the reason for retreating without having been beaten; and it must be confessed, that there exists not among the French that blind confidence in their officers which makes soldiers look with indifference upon the various movements of an army. Exclamations were heard, taxing their commanders with treason; and, as during the first days of the war of liberty, the disorder and disorganization attendant upon defeats were greatly to be apprehended.

There has been no difficulty, it is true, in bringing the army to a proper state of feeling, by reminding it of its victories, and the fidelity and talents of its generals; and the unfavourable impressions, arising from the natural effect of an unusual movement, were soon eradicated. But the movement itself has convinced us of the extreme weakness of our means, and the dreadful penury we are in with regard to the articles most necessary for the march of an army.



It was only with the greatest difficulty, and by the most violent means, that we were able to provide food for the troops on the banks of the Maine. The soldier's ration was reduced to a pound, three-quarters, and often half a pound of bread, and oftener still the army was three or four days without receiving any rations.

The attitude of victory, and the hope of acquiring fresh resources by enlarging the circle of its conquests, had, until the moment of our departure, kept the men within bounds, and their patience was not less admirable than their courage. On the other hand, the hope of seeing the wagons arrive which had so often been asked for, and so often promised, and the want of which alone was the cause of all our sufferings; the prospect of being seconded by a movement of the army of Rhin-et-Moselle, which would have driven the enemy from the territory of Darmstadt, and opened to us fertile countries abounding in resources of every kind; the facility which this operation would have given to the navigation both of the Rhine, and of the Maine as far as Mayence, and the communication which it would thus have been easy to open between the left bank of the Rhine and the Palatinate;—all these grounds of hope, I must confess, made us participate in the confidence of the troops, and imparted to us, under the painful circumstances in which we are placed, that patient perseverance which famine alone could overcome. My correspondence, my dear colleagues, that of the generals, and that of the chief commissaire-ordonnateur, must have proved to you the extent of our resolution and firmness on this point.

But the inaction of the army of Rhin-et-Moselle has rendered our energy of no avail; and the fruit of our crossing the Rhine and of our rapid marches has been lost.

I know not whether an absolute impossibility be the cause of the inaction of the army of Rhin-et-Moselle. I am ignorant of the resources of that army, and must not therefore hazard an opinion; but it has been clearly shown that the passage of the Rhine could not be attended with good results, and procure for the republic the advantages anticipated from it, except with the co-operation of the army of Rhin-et-Moselle. All the projects of government, and the ultimate plans of our military operations, were combined under this supposition; and it was Pichegru's place to carry the terror of the French arms into Brisgau and Suabia, cut off all communication between the armies of Wurmser and Clairfayt, force those two generals, whose troops were struck with consternation, to seek an asylum towards the Danube, yield us all the provinces bordering upon the Rhine, and give us an opportunity of surrounding Mayence by the occupation of the territory of Darmstadt. Such, it appears to me, was the duty of the army of Rhin-et-Moselle; and had this duty been performed, the enemy would have been ruined, and peace have been the fruit of this series of victories! I know not, I again repeat, whether that army was in a state to pursue this plan.

Be that as it may, Clairfayt's corps was reinforced with nineteen chosen battalions of infantry, and twenty-three squadrons of cavalry, from the army of Wurmser.

Having nothing to apprehend in his rear, he bore with rapidity upon our left, crossed the Rhine at Selingenstadt, and, as I stated to you in my last, instead of risking a battle, which we impatiently expected, and in which we should have beaten him, he contented himself with a simulated attack, and with rapidly passing our left wing through the neutral territory, threatening at the same time to turn us with his numerous cavalry. We had therefore no other alternative than to retreat upon the Lahn. This measure would have produced no further consequences, had it not had the double effect of shaking, as I have before stated, the confidence of the army in its commanders, and of showing us the insufficiency of our means, particularly in provisions and wagons.

From our mode of living on the banks of the Maine, and in the event of our being able to make further progress, no danger would have resulted from our penury; but a retrograde movement has laid open and made us sensible of all its consequences.

That which more particularly struck the troops, and has made a deep and lasting impression upon them, is, the obligation under which we found ourselves to leave behind us, for the want of the means of carriage, five hundred and fifty of our wounded, who are in the hands of the enemy,—and this after having put them to flight in their simulated attack upon us near Redda and Hochst.

The retreat was well managed, and executed with admirable precision. The firm bearing of our troops prevented the enemy from giving us much uneasiness; but some artillery wagons, four pieces of cannon and howitzers, and several tumbrils, have fallen into their hands from our want of horses, and because those which we had left, worn out with fatigue and want of forage, could not render us the service we expected, and the country could not supply our deficiency in this respect.

The troops being obliged to live by requisitions, experienced on this march the most dreadful privations. The discipline which the salutary law on the police of the army had restored, gave way to the necessity of living. The most dreadful and irremediable disorders were the consequence: many of the horses fell from fatigue, whilst many others, having lost their shoes, which there were no means of replacing, became lame, and were of no further use.

Such was our situation when we reached the banks of the Lahn, and it was aggravated by the want of provisions,—an inevitable result of our being without the means of carriage.

Under these circumstances, it was found impossible to maintain this position without exposing ourselves to lose every thing. The enemy are aware of our want of means, but they are also acquainted

with French valour. It would have been too imprudent for them to have risked a battle, as they had with them the most certain means of completely destroying us, which means they seemed to be employing. An endeavour to turn us with a large body of light troops, and cut off our communications with the countries whence we derived our subsistence:—such would have been their tactics towards an army whose provisions are so precarious, and which has no store-houses within reach of its rear, and can get nothing for want of wagons.

These points were discussed by the generals in my presence. The chief commissaire-ordonnateur declared that he knew no means of providing for the wants of the army; the commander of the artillery repeated what he had already stated as to the utter impossibility of bringing into play the numerous artillery belonging to this great army. Every combination was discussed, in order to find one which could secure the position of the army upon the right bank; and all were unanimous in the opinion that to persevere any longer would only lead to the absolute loss of an army which had hitherto sustained no loss, and experienced no reverses, but was forced to give way before a host of untoward circumstances which no power could alter.

If the army resumes its position on the left bank of the Rhine, it may be saved for the republic, and may there await the reinforcements absolutely necessary to establish its means of carriage. Its artillery may likewise be repaired, whilst the army itself will cover the conquered territory by opposing an invincible force to every attempt the enemy may make to cross the Rhine.

However painful our situation, do not imagine, dear colleagues, that courage has deserted the soldiers of the republic. These can make their colours respected; and this very evening the enemy had proof that their audacity is of no avail against our brave men.

A body of Austrian troops pressed a little too closely on the column of retreat commanded by General Lefebvre. Our troops charged it, and the enemy left upon the field of battle a somewhat considerable number of slain, and three pieces of cannon. There exists this difference between the enemy and us, that if we lose a few ammunition wagons and a few guns, the weakness of our means of carriage is the cause of it; whereas we only obtain their artillery sword in hand, and after having beaten them.

Citizen Dufalga, whose talents are known to you, is charged by the general and by me to deliver this despatch into your hands. He will give you full particulars of our situation, for in the present despatch it is impossible for me to enter into them fully.

I feel, my dear colleagues, the impression which this event must make. I feel, and the thought painfully affects me, that the enemies of the republic may derive some advantages from it; but it must be made known to Europe, that if the army of Sambre-et-Meuse has been



obliged to yield to the force of circumstances, its glory has not been tarnished by a single check. It remains wholly to our country, and so soon as its means are restored to it, will become only more formidable to the enemies of France.

Health and friendship,

JOUBERT.

P. S. I had forgotten to say that the army will preserve the beautiful tête-de-pont which Dusseldorf affords it. This place, the repairs of which will be made with the greatest expedition, will be in a state to oppose a resistance of greater power, because it will be supported by the army upon the left bank. By thus preserving the two têtes-de-pont of Manheim and Dusseldorf, we may be able, the moment the armies are filled up, to establish ourselves without difficulty upon the right bank, or at all events keep the enemy constantly in check, and frustrate every attempt they may make to cross the Rhine.

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No. V.

TO THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMY OF SAMBRE-ET-MEUSE.

Paris, 2nd Messidor, Year IV.  
(June 20th, 1796.)

CITIZEN GENERAL,

The Directory has received your letter, dated Montabaur, the 29th of Prairial. The retreat which you have ordered from the Lahn to the Seig, may not prove disadvantageous to our arms, provided it draws a portion of the enemy's forces upon you, so as thereby to disengage, for a time, the army of Rhin-et-Moselle, and enable General Moreau to cross the Rhine at Strasburg, as he purposed doing in the event of this operation, which he hoped to be able to execute on the 30th of Priaral (18th of June,) not having taking place at this present time when we are writing to you. But the retreat of the left wing of the army of Sambre-et-Meuse would have an injurious effect if the confidence of its soldiers were shaken, and the enemy succeeded in making us abandon the entire right bank of the Rhine. It is a truth which it is important you should bear in mind, and which the experience of the last campaign has sufficiently proved, that you ought carefully to avoid taking up positions exactly parallel to the Seig or the Lahn, and approaching too near the Rhine on its right bank, because by so doing you would give the enemy an extreme facility in extending their front beyond our left wing, and of bringing forces on that side sufficiently strong to drive us from our positions.

Another consideration deserves our most serious attention : it is that by boldness and extreme celerity alone in our military operations we can become successful in Germany. To this we owe our victories and our conquests in Italy. A single day of rest given to the enemy when defeated, often enables them to resume offensive operations, which their numerical superiority always renders them impatient to do. It is only by a succession of defeats following close upon each other that we may hope to exterminate their armies, and dictate terms of peace in the midst of astonished Germany.

The armies of Sambre-et-Meuse and Rhin-et-Moselle must likewise act together. Their combined operations must prevent the enemy from directing the whole of their force, at any time, against either, as during the last campaign.

The Directory sees all the advantages which, by forming in itself a central point of military operations, it derives in bringing about this simultaneous action of the two republican armies upon the Rhine ; and it hereby instructs you as to the measures it has determined to adopt, and the execution of which it confides to you and the General-in-chief, Moreau.

The left of the army of Sambre-et-Meuse will resume the offensive on the receipt of this despatch. If the movement of the enemy should have forced it back upon the Wupper, which the Directory does not apprehend to be the case, it will immediately approach the Sieg, place its right against that river, and keep as far from the Rhine as it possibly can without danger. It will take up a position nearly parallel to the Acher, which will prevent the enemy from turning it by throwing a strong force upon its left flank.

It will remain as short a time as possible upon the Sieg, and advance with rapidity towards the Lahn, occupying positions almost parallel to that I have just mentioned. On its arrival near the latter river, it will place its right at Weilburg, or in preference at Wetzlar, and extend its left as far as Marburg, and even beyond it. At the time of executing this movement, it will be joined by the French troops occupying the line of the Rhine, which begins opposite to the mouth of the Sieg, at its conflux, and extends as far as Coblenz, as well as by such other troops as you may think proper, Citizen General, to call to the right bank for the purpose of reinforcing this wing. A sufficient force must keep the garrison of Ehrenbreitstein in awe, and a small corps of observation be placed upon the right bank of the Lahn, from Wetzlar to its mouth, to prevent the enemy from crossing.

That part of the army of Sambre-et-Meuse now acting upon the right bank of the Rhine, will, as soon as possible, change its position from Wetzlar to Marburg, attack the enemy with impetuosity, and keep towards the Kintz, with its right upon Hanau. The small corps of observation which it had upon the Lahn will, after receiving reinforcements from the left bank, seize upon Frankfort and Offenbach,

whilst the portion of the army of Sambre-et-Meuse remaining upon the left bank of the Rhine, shall, after having occupied Kreutznach and Bingen, march upon Seltz, in sufficient strong force to keep the garrison of Mayence in awe, and shall throw upon the heights of Hocheim a sufficient number of troops to observe this place, situated upon the right bank of the Rhine.

The army of Sambre-et-Meuse shall next enter Franconia, for which orders will, at a future period, be sent to it by the Directory.

The army of Rhin-et-Moselle will cross the Rhine at Strasburg. It will leave a corps of observation on the Pfirrm to keep the garrison of Mayence in check, and troops in front of Manheim to resist the attempts of the hostile forces which occupy that place. It will then advance with rapidity upon the Upper Necker, after having detached a sufficient force to occupy the mountain gorges of the Black Forest.

Such are the formal instructions which the Directory thinks it right to give you, and the General-in-chief, Moreau; the fate of the present campaign depends upon their being implicitly followed.

It is the intention of the Directory not to suffer the French armies to undertake any siege. Its wish is that they should seek the enemy on the right bank of the Rhine, and encounter them with that boldness and impetuosity which characterize the warriors of the republic, and are sure pledges of victory.

The plan we have adopted is one of great magnitude, and requires vigour of execution. It cannot be confided to soldiers more worthy of so glorious an undertaking, or to generals who better deserve the national esteem. You have long, Citizen General, been held in the highest estimation by the Directory, and no misfortune could make you lose it. Thus the Directory places its confidence in your probity, your patriotism, and your military talents. With a certainty of the support of the Directory, and the good wishes of all the friends of freedom, you have now only to act with boldness and rapidity, and reap those laurels which will prove harbingers of an honourable and lasting peace consequent upon our successes in Germany.

The Directory has just received intelligence that the army of Rhin-et-Moselle obtained a marked advantage on the 26th of Prairial, before Manheim; also that the Austrians had detached twenty-five thousand men from their armies on the Rhine, to reinforce General Beaulieu in Italy.

CARNOT, President.



## No. VI.

## THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY TO ADJUTANT-GENERAL NEY.

Paris, 5th Messidor, Year IV. (June 23rd, 1796.)

The passage of the Sieg, Citizen Adjutant-general, and the affair at Altenkirchen, must have raised some anticipations of your success at Montabaur. The General-in-chief, Jourdan, has made a most satisfactory report concerning you to the executive Directory, which hastens to express its satisfaction at your conduct.

A true copy.

CARNOT, President.

By order of the executive Directory,

LETOURNEUR. Secretary-general.

## No. VII.

KLEBER, GENERAL OF DIVISION, COMMANDING THE LEFT WING OF THE ARMY OF SAMBRE-ET-MEUSE, TO GENERAL OF DIVISION, COLLAUD.

Head-quarters, Bornheim, 25th Messidor,  
Year V. (July 13th, 1796.)

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Your men must fall in at four o'clock this afternoon, leave their camp, advance, and at nightfall take up a position before Frankfort, so as to be perceived in their full development. You will form the battalions in two ranks, making a wide interval between them; and if the ground should prevent any of the battalions from being seen from the city, you will place the second line at a distance of three hundred paces from the first. Let all the men stand at ease, but without stirring from their ranks.

The companies of sappers shall be immediately assembled at the toll-tower, and placed at the disposal of the artillery officers.

A true copy.

KLEBER.

COLLAUD.

From the above order, my dear Ney, you perceive that your men are to fall in at four o'clock, and that you also will have to make a demonstration. Do not, however, expose your cavalry to lose horses; but shelter it as much as you can from the enemy's artillery.

COLLAUD.

## No. VIII.

KLEBER, GENERAL OF DIVISION, TO GENERAL COLLAUD.

Head-quarters, Lohrhaupton, 1st Thermidor,  
Year IV. (July 19th, 1796.)

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I have just read with considerable interest the report that you have sent me from Adjutant-General Ney, who may remain at Lohr until he is relieved by the divisions of the right wing; for our plan is to file off on the left upon the Schweinfurt.

I hereby authorize Ney to levy a military contribution of one hundred louis, on account of the sum to be hereafter exacted from that town. He will give a special receipt accordingly, which, in the event of a fresh impost, may be returned as cash. This sum shall be handed over to you for secret service money, and other extraordinary disbursements.

Direct Ney, I beg of you, to obtain the most precise information concerning Gemunden, Wurtzburg, Schweinfurt, and the nature of the roads leading to these places; and to try to discover the position, strength, and motions of the enemy.

It is stated by mistake, my dear General, that on the ground pointed out to you, your van-guard is to cover your left wing, since it is to communicate by the right with General Grenier. I am convinced that you have rectified this error, which indeed is rectified by the fact itself, since Ney is at Lohr.

Health and friendship,

KLEBER.

## No. IX.

THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL NEY, ARMY OF  
SAMBRE-ET-MEUSE.Paris, 27th Thermidor, Year IV.  
(August 14th, 1796.)

In the battles of Zeil and Ebersbach, you have shown, Citizen General, what the impetuosity of French valour can effect. These battles do great credit to your courage and to your prudence, both of which being already well known, the executive Directory feels a lively satisfaction in assuring you of the high estimation in which it continues to hold your zeal and military talents.

A true copy.

L. M. REVELLIÈRE-LEPEAU, President.

By order of the Directory,

LAGARDE, Secretary-general.

## No. X.

## GENERAL HOCHÉ TO THE DIRECTORY.

## CITIZENS DIRECTORS,

Being on the point of taking leave of you, allow me to submit to you some reflections which the good of the service has suggested to me. The state of the army which you have just placed under my command, likewise requires that I should address to you a series of requests, upon the compliance with which its interests and its fame perhaps depend.

Numerous complaints have been made and repeated to the Directory, against the French administrations established in the country occupied by the army, and which is not united to France. All the soldiers of the army loudly accuse these administrations as the cause of the famine against which it is forced to contend, if not in the seat of abundance, at least in a country not wholly unprovided with food. Would it not be advisable to abolish these administrations, which, supposing them composed of the most honest persons in the world, are an immense expense to the country, without being in any wise useful?—for most of the commissaries who compose them are ignorant of the language of the country, and, as foreigners, have no knowledge of its productions, nor of the private fortunes of its inhabitants. Is it not, moreover, to be feared that these commissaries, whose manners, tastes, and habits cannot resemble those of the population inhabiting the banks of the Rhine, should by injudicious exaggeration, and false political or administrative principles, disgust the latter with the French revolution, and the republican form of government?

Would it not be better and more useful to restore to the inhabitants of the territories occupied by the army of Sambre-et-Meuse, their natural administrators the bailies!—and the ecclesiastical estates to the management of the chapters? Economy alone seems to call for this measure, which policy will not disavow. Who shall say that it will not bring back to the republic those affections which the rudeness and the errors of the French administrators have alienated? The man who is called to the management of public affairs in his birthplace, is acquainted with the private means of each of his fellow-citizens, and he makes each share, in due and equitable proportion, the common burden imposed upon the country. Experience has proved that a chapter which, when its revenues were administered by its monks, could provide subsistence for ten thousand men, can now scarcely feed six or eight hundred. The abbey of Closterbock, near Coblenz, is an instance of this:—and let not this difference be attributed to the constant presence of armies, and to exhaustion: improper administration of the property is alone the cause of it. Let the most enlightened men of the army be consulted on this head: Jourdan, Joubert, Kléber, Lefebvre, &c. It would therefore seem advisable to restore to these



countries their administrations, their civil tribunals, their magistrates, and their own customs. Let the chief commissaire-ordonnateur, or his subordinates, under the inspection of the general-in-chief, make the demands of corn, cattle, horses, and generally of all things required by the defenders of the state.

But, it may be said, are you not going backward? will not public spirit be destroyed in the country? and if the territory should remain attached to France, will not hatred of the republican name remain deeply implanted there? Experience ought to have counteracted our desire to *municipalize* Europe. Moreover, I deny that the inhabitants can ever hate us more than they do at present; and in the supposition that a treaty of peace were to leave us strictly the left bank for our limits, I doubt the expedient of establishing the constitutional regime in the Palatinate, the Hundstruck, the Archbishopric of Treves, the Duchy of Berg, &c. No people can become republicans in a day, and they who purchase freedom at so high a price seldom love it, after being accustomed under a monarch to pay no taxes, or at least scarcely any. Therefore, before we ascertain whether our opinions may become those of the Germans, from whom nature has formed us so different, let us wage war at their cost, since their sovereign forces us to make war. You are not going backwards. When you introduced laws into the conquered territories, which could take place only after peace, it would then be time to send commissioners thither; and as they would then have no exactions to make, they would no doubt succeed if they conducted themselves with prudence.

It is highly important that I should know what line of conduct I am to pursue towards foreign princes, whether allies, neutrals, or enemies; upon what terms I am to conclude a suspension of arms with the latter; what the intentions of the government are with regard to the opening of the campaign, and what the nature of the operations to be pursued; finally, what general officers I am to serve with, and upon what reinforcements I may depend.

Of our northern allies, the King of Prussia is certainly the principal. No doubt, his government is attentively watching events, and will take advantage of them. But whatever these events turn out to be, it appears to me presumable that, at least for some time to come, the Prussian government cannot renew its connexion with the emperor, who has just denounced its conduct to the Germanic confederation; and it may be assumed, without fear of mistake, that the ambition of the King of Prussia, which could not be displayed more positively than during the last campaign, would lead that monarch to join us, were he assured that at the proper time we should grant him that which he is so eager to obtain: namely, a province, of which Erlangen should form the centre, and which should contain Wurtzburg, Amberg, Bamberg, Nuremberg, Schweinfurt, and perhaps Frankfort. Doubtless such a conquest is worthy of defence, and he certainly intended to defend it, when, through his minister Hardenberg, he pro-

posed to Jourdan to purchase all the artillery which the French army found in the different fortresses it had captured.

But, it may be said, you are making the King of Prussia very powerful! What matters it? Do you think that the house of Austria would ever consent to such a transaction, of which, after all, the King of Prussia must have weighed all the consequences? Your object is a continental peace, which you will obtain if your ally declares war but an instant, and you will, during a long period, get rid of the uneasiness of seeing him renew his connexion with England, whilst this power will thereby be able to economise nothing for a continuance of the war, or for the purpose of raising up new enemies against France.

I have considered it my duty to offer these reflections to the government, and to give, in some measure, the assurance that the King of Prussia is not averse to declaring war. I almost convinced myself of this, yesterday 14th, in a conversation with Sandoz, the Prussian envoy. You may suppose I maintained the strictest reserve, so as to be able to break off when I thought proper, a conference brought on by chance alone.

I shall not dwell upon the other points. I only beg that the Directory will be so good as to send me answers to them as soon as possible. The situation of the army, and the motions of the enemy, seem to require my immediate presence in the field.

It remains for me, Citizens Directors, to thank you for having placed the whole of Belgium under my command; I hope to derive from it the assistance of which the army is so much in want.

L. HOCHÉ.

P. S.—It is not for me to prejudge the intentions of the government; but, if it expressed a wish to have my opinion, I would submit to its consideration some ideas which, under certain circumstances, might prove useful.

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## No. XI.

### GENERAL LAROCHE TO GENERAL NEY.

Ogesheim, 3rd Complémentaire, Year VII.

Doubtless I explained myself badly, my dear General, since you supposed that I guarded the Rhine from Spires to Esenhofen, whilst on the contrary, I am to face the plain with my right at Spires and my left towards Hanofen, with a line of bridges from Otterstat as far as Schiferstat. It was this order, which must appear to you as singular as it does to me, that induced me to write to you as I did this morning.

In order that you may be convinced of its existence, which you never can be by a simple assertion, I enclose you the letter I received to this effect, and which can bear no other interpretation.

I shall establish myself to-night with my feeble division in two lines, and I shall have my head-quarters at Spires, in order to be able to communicate with General Collaud.

Health and friendship.

LAROCHE.

## No. XII.

GENERAL LAROCHE TO GENERAL NEY.

Head-quarters, Ogershein, 3rd Complémentaire, Year VII.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

You must have received an order which does away with the measures we determined upon. I cannot conceal from you that it requires a strong dose of patriotism and devotion to serve in this manner.

In order not to render the movement which you have begun useless, I will, if you like, commence mine, and proceed to the singular positions assigned me: my right at Spires, my left towards Hanofen, and my advanced posts at Otterstat.

I am impatient for your answer.

LAROCHE.

P. S.—We shall no doubt receive other orders in the course of the day, which will again alter what we are going to do. Alas! alas!

## No. XIII.

BRIGADIER LERY TO GENERAL NEY.

Mayence, 4th Complémentaire, Year VII.

Cassel has not been surprised, my dear General, as you were informed it had; and up to the present time no one has any knowledge of troops going that way, with the exception of a body of cavalry to take possession of Wisbaden, where there is no garrison.

We were also informed that the enemy had crossed the Rhine at Worms and at Philipsburg. All these reports had their origin in fright and malevolence.



It is certainly lamentable that time and circumstances have not allowed us to pursue, in our defence of Manheim, the plans agreed upon, and that the principal defence and retreat of the army were not concentrated in Neckerau. The most unfortunate part of this catastrophe is its moral effect upon the feelings of the men. Let us hope that more fortunate measures will soon cause a change in our situation. The news from Holland is very good: the British have been repulsed by General Brune, and it is hoped that he will force them to re-embark.

Measures are here in agitation for carrying on a seige, and I am far from thinking that these surprises can succeed.

I am delighted that the present opportunity enables me to give you the assurance of my constant and sincere friendship. LERY.

#### No. XIV.

LECOURBE, GENERAL-IN-CHIEF, TO GENERAL NEY.

The point of Neckerels was vigorously attacked yesterday. The troops withdrew to Wissenbach and to Necker-Gemund, where they were even reinforced.

Should you take up a position farther back, that is to say upon the Elzath, you will give notice of it to General Legrand, who ought also to fall back a little, always however occupying Gochrau and Bretten by means of advanced posts.

I am not easy with regard to the points of Dunlach and Philipsburg. The enemy will probably make attempts upon the latter; and it is expedient that you should be nearer General Legrand, in order that the latter may be able to make a movement from left to right.

I shall remain some days at Manheim; write to me often, and watch carefully the progress of the enemy upon your left, at Necker-Gemund.

We shall, in a short time, receive good accounts of Masséna. An express from him is just arrived. If a large force comes against us, so much the better; we must however maintain our positions even against wind and tide.

You know that I cannot replace the 8th for you. General Bonnet will proceed and join your division.

Health and friendship.

LECOURBE.

## No. XV.

LECOURBE, GENERAL-IN-CHIEF, TO GENERAL NEY.

Head-quarters, Manheim, 16th Brumaire,  
Year VIII. (Nov. 5th, 1799.)

It appears, my dear General, that the enemy are making attempts upon our left; they have even, as I am informed, forced the point of Necker-Gemund. It is important that you should co-operate in the recapture of this place, and fall upon the rear of the enemy if they are pent up in the gorge of Rorbach and Heidelberg.

I perceive with pain that the troops are disheartened; there are so many individuals in the rear of the divisions who spread alarm among them; and so many others who, being gorged with booty, wish for a retreat in order to put their plunder in a place of safety.

It behooves you, my dear General, and my other assistants, to put a stop without pity to all that is immoral; and force the men to do their duty.

Should you be unsuccessful in the recapture of Necker-Gemund, send a portion of your forces down upon Heidelberg, in order to defend the Necker and succour the 4th division. The enemy cannot have collected a large force upon this point.

Fraternal salutation.

LECOURBE.

## No. XVI.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL BOYE TO GENERAL NEY, COMMANDING THE  
ARMY OF THE RHINE.Head-quarters, Kloten, 29th Vendemiaire,  
Year VIII. (Oct. 20th, 1799.)

I had the pleasure of writing to you, my dear General, on my arrival at the army of the Danube; and having received no answer, I presume my letter never reached you.

I congratulate you on the success obtained by the army of the Rhine whilst under your command. Bravery and able tactics are so familiar to you, that soldiers commanded by you cannot fail to conquer.

I do not mention to you our brilliant days from the 3rd to the 16th instant, as the particulars must be known to you; I shall merely state that I never beheld a more complete rout. The Russians will remember it, as will their worthy chief Suwarrow surnamed *the Italic*. The Emperor Paul was to have conferred upon him the surname of *the Helvetic*; and he is still mad enough to do it. Victory has at length returned to our standard, and I hope she will not again leave us. From Holland to Italy the enemy has been beaten. *Vive la Republique!*

I am very sorry Bernadotte has quitted the ministry. I know not where he is, and would thank you, my dear General, for his address, as I wish to write to him.

The return of General Bonaparte will make all good republicans rejoice, and the royalists burst with spite.

I hope to be more fortunate in this instance, and that all my letters will not be lost.

Our friend Kléber has remained in Egypt; probably General Bonaparte has left him in command of the army.

I hope that the armies of the Rhine and the Danube will soon shake hands.

Adieu, my dear General.

Believe me ever your sincere friend, BOYE.

#### No. XVII.

LEFEBVRE, GENERAL OF DIVISION, COMMANDING THE LEFT WING OF THE ARMY, TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL NEY.

Head-quarters, Wetzlar, 13th Frimaire, Year VI.

I am very sorry, my dear General, that you should have applied to yourself what I wrote to you, in my two last letters, concerning the complaints with which I am beset. My intention never was, nor shall it ever be, to give you the least pain; quite the reverse: nobody is more attached to you than I am; and so far from depriving you of your command, I should be delighted to confer upon you one of greater importance. Give way no longer to so erroneous an impression, and do me more justice. You and all your comrades owe me this; for I may justly flatter myself that no one has given them stronger proofs of attachment than I have done.

I have just read over the two letters of which you complain, and I really cannot see in them any insult to yourself. Point out to me any part of them that has justly offended you, and I will with pleasure make you every reparation in my power; for no loss would be more severely felt by me than that of your friendship.

Health and friendship.

LEFEBVRE.

P. S.—I give you notice that I have just sent orders to General Tharrau to despatch, on the 15th instant, the 4th hussars to Cologne, whither they are to proceed as rapidly as possible. In the mean time, until their return, I give you the 13th chasseurs. Do not fancy on this occasion that I am making a movement for the purpose of giving you pain. You will, in a very short time, know the object of it. Adieu. I embrace you.



MEMOIRS  
OF  
MARSHAL NEY.

PUBLISHED BY HIS FAMILY.

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MEMOIRS  
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BOOK THE FIFTH.

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CHAPTER I.

GENERAL COLLAUD TO GENERAL NEY.

"Strasbourg, 21st Brumaire, Year VIII.  
(November 21st 1799.)

"MY DEAR GENERAL,

"THE director of the telegraph has this instant forwarded to me the following despatches.

'18th Brumaire (Nov. 9th, 1799.)

'The legislative body has removed to St. Cloud. Bonaparte is appointed commandant of Paris. All is quiet, and every body satisfied.'

'19th, at noon.

'The Directory has resigned. Moreau commands at the palace of the Directory. All . . . . .'

"This last word announces something yet to come.

COLLAUD."

The incomplete sentence of this telegraphic despatch was calculated to excite the most intense anxiety in the two French generals. They knew that a revolution of some sort had taken place; but who had assumed the reins of power, or what new forms or modifications the government had undergone, was still unexplained, and they were most eager to obtain further intelligence. The circumstance of Bona-

parte commanding in Paris, and Moreau at the Luxembourg, led them to infer that the popular cause was safe ; but the tribune, like the field of battle, had its fluctuations, and it was not without uneasiness that they awaited the clearing up of their doubts and fears. The news came at length. The legislative councils at Paris had been divided in opinion ; the minority in the one had joined the majority in the other, and each party, on the eve of coming to blows, had invoked the assistance of the troops.

The latter, placed between these two divisions of the legislature in collision with each other, had obeyed the call which appeared to them the most legal, and a new power has in consequence assumed the place of the old one. Bonaparte was certainly calculated to inspire unlimited confidence. As a great statesman and an able commander, he was equally qualified to govern nations and to command armies. But so many men had reached the highest eminence only to fall to the ground, and so many great reputations had melted away on the burning pinnacle of power, that the troops saw the elevation of their leader with cold indifference. A sort of mistrust of the future seemed to pervade the minds of all ; and each left it for time to show what opinion he ought ultimately to form. The trial turned out favourable.

Bonaparte had found both the treasury and the storehouses empty ; yet the army was succoured almost immediately, whilst the weak tools of the Directory were suddenly superseded by a set of men strong in mind and honest in principle, and each branch of the service was confided to prudent and able hands. Ney did justice both to the choice and to the acts of the new government ; but still he withheld his confidence from it until time had verified whether it would continue to justify the expectations of the people. The following letters to Ney give an idea of the feelings of the army and the generals on the subject.

“ Wagausel, 4th Frimaire, Year VIII.  
(November 25th, 1799.)

“ MY DEAR GENERAL,

“ I arrived four days since, to take the command of this division, Laborde having obtained leave of absence.

“ I am of your opinion with regard to the movement of the 18th Brumaire. Time alone will inform us whether we shall be happier or not. Nevertheless matters begin to look more auspicious ; but I have no belief in our obtaining peace. Our unhappy sisters\* will throw obstacles in the way. A promise was made that they should remain inviolate ; for my own part, I care not a rush whether they do or not. It is sufficient for us to defend our own unhappy country. Vampires have sucked its life's blood, and our brave republicans have fought only to enrich the swarm of advocates and attorneys that

\* The impromptu republics established by the Directory.



batten on its vitals. Each year must the war be prolonged and their families gorged with wealth. I expect General Lecourbe every moment; he is on his way to Bruxal. Adieu, my dear General, believe in my warmest friendship for you. COLLAUD."

"Wagausel, 5th Frimaire, Year VIII.

"I wrote to you yesterday, my dear General, by General Lecourbe; you will no doubt receive my letter to-day.

"I am positively informed that Championnet has tendered his resignation, which has been accepted. General Moreau is to command an army, and is to marry a relative of Bonaparte's. It is rumoured that another general-in-chief has also resigned. This appears to be Masséna. Others say that he was dismissed. It seems certain that there will be a congress at Aix-la-Chapelle, Cobentzel, the author of the treaty of Campo-Formio, having received orders to return immediately from Petersburg to Vienna. It is equally true that the Elector of Bavaria is trying to make up matters. He has sent to Paris, as minister, M. de Otto, formerly his minister at the circle of the Upper Rhine, at Frankfort.

"The Revolution of the 18th of Brumaire has received its full consummation at Paris. The enthusiasm in favour of Bonaparte is at its height, and several of the Fructidorean laws are said to have been already repealed. It seems that the Consulate will act in all these matters with prudent delay, in order that the anarchists may have no pretence for exclaiming against a royalist reaction. Let us hope that the 18th will produce the effect anticipated by the true republicans.

"It has frozen very hard all night. If the Rhine once begins to drift ice, good-bye to the cables, and the bridge of Nekerau, and the communication with Spire by means of boats.

"We risk the trip to Frankfort. I do not think we can remain long upon the right bank.

"Health and Friendship.

COLLAUD."

Ney at length began to share in the same ideas and hopes. He perceived that every day some ferocious order, or some petty tyranny was suppressed. As a substitute for the forced loan, a slight tax had been imposed, and the hostages set at liberty. Each individual Frenchman could now marry, and work for his livelihood in any manner he thought proper. No man had now to dread the interference of a free agent of the Directory; it was no longer necessary to sever the ties of his dearest affections, or submit to prescribed hours of rest and sleep: in fine, civil liberty remained unshackled. Nevertheless the power of government having become concentrated, it had encroached upon certain rights; and men do not readily forego franchises which they have already enjoyed. The privileges of the city were reduced, and elections were no longer direct. The

representatives voted, but did not debate the laws they passed. The tribune had long been considered a safeguard to liberty; and Ney, who till now had cared only for war and battles, saw with regret, that it was reduced to silence.

Other acts displeased him still more. The laws which excluded the nobles from public employments, had been repealed; and individuals who had been banished for crimes against freedom, were admitted into the Senate. Soldiers, though they care little about theories, are extremely susceptible concerning the choice of men appointed to put these theories into practice; and the troops therefore felt some mistrust at the appointment of individuals who had shown themselves hostile to free institutions. Ney was an enemy to oppression, and would neither perpetuate nor extend it; but he would enter into no pact with the emigrants, still less would he suffer them to command those by whom they had been conquered. Like Moreau and Macdonald, Lefebvre had concurred in the establishment of the Consulate; and to him Ney confided his fears, asking him with a sort of bitterness, if the brave soldiers of the army of Sambre-et-Meuse were to become a prey to intrigue, and be delivered up to those whom they had defeated in battle? In this letter, Ney showed that his heart was lacerated, and Lefebvre hastened to apply balm to the wound.

"No, my dear Ney," he replied; times are altered, places are no longer bestowed by intrigue, and every personal consideration must now yield to the public good. Do not believe, then, all that is told you about the government, which, you may be assured, is wholly devoted to those who, like you, have rendered eminent services to your country. You see a proof of it in the confidence I have obtained; and another, in the appointment of Mortier, who was totally unknown here, to the command of the 17th division. Be not therefore uneasy any longer, and depend upon it, my dear Ney, that all will go on well.

"Health and Friendship,

LEFEBVRE."

"Head-Quarters at Paris, 26th Germinal,  
Year VIII. (April 16th, 1800.)"

This assurance, together with those made by Bernadotte, quieted Ney's apprehensions. Living in retirement at Malgrange, where his still unhealed wounds confined him to his bed, he was already beginning to give himself up to favourable anticipations, when the publications by the government accounting for the failure of certain negotiations for peace entirely restored his confidence, and with it his enthusiasm. We have already stated, how strongly the want of peace was felt, and that hopes had been raised of its being soon concluded; the First Consul had applied all his energies to realize the expectations of the people.

The various sacrifices of the allies, and their vain attempts to

humble France, must have made them feel the hopelessness of their war against liberal institutions. They had exhausted their resources, and a feeling of false glory alone could prompt them to a further sacrifice of human life by a continuation of the war. A single advance might perhaps lead to the pacification of Europe, and the First Consul accordingly made proposals of peace to Austria and to Great Britain. The first of these powers sent an evasive answer, but without bitterness or recrimination. This was not the case with Great Britain; that power sent an insulting reply to France, and displayed unequalled benignity in her own favour. She was, as her government stated, ever desirous of peace ;\*—she had assumed arms only to repel an unjust aggression ; but being under an obligation to

\* The following is the substance of Lord Grenville's reply:—

"The King has given frequent proofs of his sincere desire to see a permanent peace re-established in Europe. He neither is, nor was he ever, engaged in any contest from motives of vain and false glory. He has never entertained any other views than those of protecting the rights and happiness of his subjects against all aggression.

"It is from these motives that he has resisted an unprovoked attack; and it is from the same motives that he is under the necessity of still continuing the struggle; nor has he any hope that, at the present moment, he could obviate such necessity by negotiating with those whom a new revolution has so recently placed at the head of affairs in France. In fact, no real advantage can result in the furtherance of so great and so desirable an object as a general peace, until it shall distinctly appear that those causes have ceased to act which originally occasioned the war, have lengthened its duration, and have more than once renewed its consequences.

"That system, the dominant influence of which France justly considers the cause of its present misfortunes, is also the same that has dragged the rest of Europe into a long and destructive war, of a nature contrary to the present usages of civilized nations.

"It is to extend that system, and overthrow all established Governments, that the resources of France have, from year to year, been lavished and exhausted, even in the midst of the most unparalleled distress.

"To this spirit of destruction, which could respect nothing, the Low Countries, the United Provinces, and the Swiss Cantons—those ancient friends and allies of his Majesty—have been sacrificed. Germany has been ravaged, and Italy, now torn from the grasp of its invaders, has been the theatre of rapine and anarchy to the greatest extent. His Majesty has himself been driven to the necessity of maintaining a difficult and expensive struggle in order to secure the independence and existence of his dominions.

"Neither have these calamities been confined to Europe alone; they have reached the most remote parts of the Earth—nay, they have even extended to countries so far removed from the seat of the present contest, both in their geographical situation and with referencé to their local interests, that the very existence of the war may be unknown to nations who have suddenly found themselves involved in all its horrors.

"So long as such a system prevails, and the blood and treasure of a populous and powerful nation are lavished to support it, experience has proved that no other opposition could efficaciously prevail against it, than open and energetic hostility. The most solemn treaties have only paved the way to fresh aggression; and it is to determined resistance alone that the preservation will be due of all that remains of stability in Europe, as connected with individual liberty, social order, and the free exercise of religion.

"In providing for the security of these essential objects, his Majesty cannot place confidence in the simple renewal of mere general professions which announce a



protect Europe, and save it from the pillage and devastation which every where attended the French arms, she could not lend herself to a transaction which would save her from the violence of war only to make her a victim of the machinations of peace. The French, according to the statement of the British minister, bore a blind hatred to the rest of Europe, which they had forced into a destructive and obstinate struggle of a nature long since exploded among civilized nations. They had pillaged the United Provinces, spread fire and sword through Switzerland, devastated the Low Countries, and covered Italy with ruins. Not satisfied with all this, they were again ready to invade Europe, and resume the course of their depredations. But England, indulgent as she ever proved herself to be, was ready even now, at the eleventh hour, to grant them her pardon, and abandon to them the enjoyment of their ancient territory ; but on one con-

wish for peace. Such professions have been repeatedly proclaimed by all who have successively directed the resources of France towards the destruction of Europe—by those very individuals whom the present rulers of France have declared, from the beginning and at all times, incapable of maintaining relations of friendship and of peace.

“ His Majesty will certainly feel the most lively satisfaction when he shall perceive that the danger no longer really exists which has so long threatened his own dominions and those of his allies ; when he can be convinced that resistance is no longer a necessity ; when, after so many years of crime and misfortune, he shall see better principles prevail in France ; when, in fine, those gigantic projects of ambition, and those plans of destruction, which have made even the existence of civil society a problem, shall be totally abandoned.

“ But the conviction of such a change, agreeable as it would be to the wishes of his Majesty, can result only from the experience and evidence of facts.

“ The most natural, and at the same time, the best guarantee of the truth and stability of this change, would be the re-establishment of the race of princes who, during so many centuries, were able to preserve the internal prosperity of the French nation, and to secure for it external consideration and respect. Such an event would have overcome, and will at all times overcome, the obstacles opposed to negotiations for peace. It would secure to France the undisputed enjoyment of its ancient territory, and would give to every other nation of Europe, by tranquil and peaceable means, that security which they are now forced to seek by other means.

“ But however desirable such an event may be, both for France itself and for the whole world, his Majesty does not exclusively attach to it the possibility of a solid and lasting pacification. His Majesty has no pretension of dictating to France what shall be the form of her government, nor into whose hands she shall place the authority requisite for conducting her affairs as a great and powerful nation.

“ His Majesty considers only the security of his own dominions, those of his allies, and those of Europe in general. Whenever he is convinced that this security can be obtained in any manner whatsoever, whether it result from the internal state of that country whose situation originally caused the danger, or from any other circumstance leading to the same end, his Majesty will seize with eagerness the opportunity of concerting with his allies upon the means of an immediate and general pacification.

“ Unfortunately, up to the present time, his Majesty has no other alternative left, than to prosecute, in concert with the other powers of Europe, a just and defensive war, which his zeal for the happiness of his subjects will never allow him either to continue beyond the necessity to which it owes its origin, or to put an end to on any other conditions than those which he thinks may contribute to secure to them the enjoyment of their quiet, their constitution, and their independence.”

dition nevertheless : that they should disavow their long errors, and recall that very moral dynasty which, during so many centuries, had produced the happiness of France, and maintained the security of the Continent. Thus, the brave men who had perished in the field of battle, and the generals who had led them on, were to be considered traitors and rebels, and their great undertakings and splendid victories, the ignoble workings of base cupidity. It was impossible to insult an army more cruelly, or more unworthily to misrepresent history. The French government, nevertheless, swallowed the insult, for the nation wanted repose, and nothing but a statement of facts was opposed to the misrepresentations of the British minister. The reply is no doubt foreign to the private memoirs of Marshal Ney ; but it is so connected with the history of the times, that it will not be out of place here.

“ Paris, 28th Nivose, Year VIII. (Jan. 28th, 1800.)

“ The official note, bearing date of the 14th of Nivose, Year VIII. addressed to me by the Minister of his Britannic Majesty, having been laid before the First Consul of the French Republic, he remarked with surprise that it was founded upon an incorrect opinion relative to the origin and consequences of the present war. Far from war having been provoked by France, it may be remembered that from the very beginning of the revolution, she solemnly proclaimed her love of peace, her repugnance to make conquests, and her respect for the independence of all other governments ; and it is beyond all doubt that being occupied at that period solely with her internal affairs, she would have avoided interfering with those of Europe, and have remained faithful to her professions.

“ But from an opposite feeling, the moment the French revolution burst forth almost the whole of Europe united to destroy France. This aggression existed long before it became public. Internal resistance was excited ; they who opposed the revolution were well received at foreign courts, their armed meetings tolerated, their conspiracies countenanced, and their extravagant declamation encouraged ; the French nation were insulted in the persons of their agents, and England, in particular, set the example, by sending back the French accredited agent. In short, France was attacked, by overt acts, in her independence, her honour, and her security, long before war was declared.

“ Thus, France is warranted in imputing the evils which she has herself suffered, and those which have afflicted Europe, to projects of subjugation and dismemberment which have several times been attempted and pursued. Such projects, long without example, as applied to so powerful a nation, could not fail of producing the most fatal consequences.

“ The republic having been assailed on all sides, may naturally have been expected to carry on all sides its defensive exertions ; and it has made use of the means which lay in its own power and in the courage

of its citizens, with no other view than the protection of its own independence. So long as its enemies have shown a determination to deny its rights, it has relied solely upon the energy of its resistance ; but whenever they have abandoned their projects of invasion, it has constantly sought the means of reconciliation, always manifested intentions of peace ; and if its good wishes have not been realised—if, in the midst of those internal tempests successively produced by revolution and war, the present holders of the executive power in France have not always evinced as much moderation as the people have evinced courage, it must be more particularly attributed to the fatal rage with which the resources of England have been applied to effect the ruin of France.

“ But if the wishes of his Britannic Majesty are, as he asserts, in unison with those of the French Republic, with regard to the conclusion of a peace, why, instead of attempting to justify the war, does he not try to put an end to it ? What obstacle is there to prevent a reconciliation of mutual and acknowledged utility, more particularly when the First Consul of the French Republic has personally afforded so many proofs of his eagerness to put an end to the calamities of war, and of his desire to observe, in the most rigorous manner, existing treaties.

“ The First Consul of the French Republic can have no doubt that his Britannic Majesty recognizes the right of nations to choose their own form of government, since it is to the very exercise of such right that he owes his own crown ; and he cannot conceive how, in the most direct opposition to this fundamental principle, upon which the actual existence of political societies rests, his Britannic Majesty’s minister could throw out hints tending to interfere with the internal affairs of the Republic,—hints which are not less offensive to the French people and their government, than an attempt would be offensive to England and his Majesty, which should tend to produce in that country the republican form of government adopted there in the middle of the last century, or an exhortation to recall to the throne of Great Britain that family whom birth had seated upon it, but who were precipitated from it by a revolution.

“ If, at no very distant period, when the constitutive system of the Republic offered neither the strength nor the solidity which it now displays, his Britannic Majesty thought himself warranted in making overtures of reconciliation, and demanding conferences to treat of peace, how happens it that he now feels repugnance in renewing negotiations to which the present and reciprocal state of affairs promises a more speedy progress ? The voices of nations join on all sides with that of humanity in imploring the termination of a war already marked by disasters of great magnitude, and a prolongation of which threatens Europe with a general convulsion,—with the prospect of irremediable evils. It is to arrest the course of such calamities, or at least to confine their direful effects to those persons



alone who have caused them, that the First Consul of the French Republic proposes an immediate termination of hostilities by a suspension of arms, and the appointing forthwith of plenipotentiaries on both sides, to meet at Dunkirk, or in any other town offering equal advantages for rapidity of communication, there to proceed, without delay, in the re-establishment of peace and amity between the French Republic and England.

“The First Consul offers to give the necessary passports for this object.  
CH. MAURICE TALLEYRAND.”

The British Government deeming France unequal to maintain the struggle, persisted in forcing the Bourbons upon her. But whence originated the tender anxiety affected by the British monarch in favour of this good and moral family? Why, from the very fact, that these princes, being detested by the French nation, would have been unable to govern it without trouble, and that a people in hostility with an unpopular government could not, for a long period, acquire any influence on the Continent. This calculation, so cruelly realized at a later epoch, was too palpable not to strike every mind. Both the army and the people were seized with a general indignation; and preparations were made for war. Nothing was now thought of but to take vengeance for this odious coalition against the tranquility, nay, the very existence of France as a nation. Ney, suffering less from his wounds, assumed the command of the troops collecting upon the Rhine. They were already beginning to be numerous; a host of young patriots had obeyed their country's call, and the old soldiers were resuming their arms. Men, horses, and provisions were in equal abundance.

Ney was not proof against this sudden emulation: the excitement of military glory was general and spontaneous; the organization of the armies was prompt, rapid, and perfectly planned; and the wounded General had a presentiment of the greatness to which France would speedily attain. Dismissing therefore his vain alarms, he now devoted his whole attention to seconding the movement in preparation. The government had succeeded in tranquillizing and giving peace to the western provinces, and the different corps lately employed in suppressing revolt in those provinces, and keeping them quiet, were now debouching upon the Rhine. The army rapidly collected its forces, and was in a short time as powerful as in the best days of its victories.

The cold weather had ceased. Austria summoned her youth to the field, and, money in hand, bargained for all the soldiers whom Bavaria and Wirtemberg could supply. Moreau was appointed to oppose her, and was preparing to set out to join the army. The imperial troops, under the command of Kray, who had been recently gathering laurels on the Adige, were divided into four corps led by men of acknowledged ability and tried courage. The French

were constituted in a similar manner. Lecourbe commanded the right wing, Sainte-Suzanne the left, Moreau retained the reserve, and the centre, in which Ney had a command, was under Saint-Cyr.

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## CHAPTER II.

BOTH armies were ready for the field, and the powers to which they respectively belonged had made every possible sacrifice and exertion to enter upon the campaign with good effect. The Austrian army contained one hundred and thirty thousand men, and extended from the Maine to Voralberg. The French were somewhat less numerous ; but to make up for this inferiority, they were less scattered and more compact. The soldiers of their army had, moreover, the firmness of purpose always produced by profound conviction of right, and a sense of monstrous injustice. Peace had been refused to them ; they were going to win it at the sword's edge, and at length force their most implacable enemies to give repose to the world, which would thereby be able to recover from the grievous evils inflicted upon it by a war against the natural rights of mankind. Their measures were speedily taken, and they prepared to turn the Imperialists. On the 15th of April, Sainte-Suzanne made a movement upon Offenbourg, and Staray, who commanded the Austrian right wing, pressed forward to close the passes of the Black-Mountains against him. Saint-Cyr crossed the Rhine at Old Brissac, Lecourbe at Stein, and Moreau at Basle. All three debouched unexpectedly upon the centre of the Austrian army, and were well nigh crushing it. But the country was mountainous and difficult, and the centre of the French army, entangled in the intricacies of the ground, was still struggling in this wilderness densely inhabited by a hostile population, even after the right wing had conquered at Stockash and the reserve at Engen.

Ney marched at the head of the French centre. At Burken and at Nimburg he encountered armed multitudes, similar to those whom, at a former period, he had chastised on the Maine and the Elaz. After routing and dispersing them, he thought himself freed from these undisciplined hinds, when he perceived them again forming at Bromberg. As Tharrau was coming up to them, Baraguay, at the head of the 3rd, advanced to meet the regular troops by whom they were supported. Ney therefore continued his movement ; but the country became at every step more rugged and more difficult to penetrate. Here was a deep chasm, there a valley without an opening ; rocks and ravines succeeded each other, and it was with great difficulty that the French troops made any progress through these wild regions. Moreau had been informed that the country was

open and easy to cross. Some persons had persuaded him that there was a high road from Friburg to St. Blaize, leading through Todnau, and he gave particular orders that this road should be followed; but neither the peasants nor the hunters of the country had ever heard of it. Nevertheless, the general's instructions being positive, an attempt was made to obey them, and the troops became bewildered amid rocks, and glens, and precipices. The wagons and the artillery were obliged to be sent back, and the corps continued their march without cannon or ammunition. Thus lightened, they succeeded in advancing somewhat farther; but such were the obstacles which these mountains presented, that the troops were continually forced to halt, and then either turn or pass over them. The sappers worked with all their might, but they had no tools. They could scarcely obtain even a few hoes, and the soldiers helped them as well as they could with their bayonets. But this weapon was but ill-adapted to such work, in which, with its aid they made but slow progress. Nevertheless, by dint of perseverance, they succeeded in opening one passage and repairing another; and after two days of excessive fatigue and exertion they reached St. Blaize. Ney arrived there on the 15th of April; it was already occupied by a division of the reserve, from which he borrowed ammunition and artillery, and proceeded to meet the enemy, who had formed upon the Wutach. The country was covered with rugged and almost inaccessible mountains, and it was with the greatest difficulty that he effected his movement. At length he arrived in sight of a numerous column of Austrians, which occupied the heights of Stettin.

The night became so dark that he could not reconnoitre all the outlets, neither could he without danger defer seizing them until the morrow. The imperial forces were drawn up in line in the gorges of the mountains; and if he did not attack them immediately they might attack him. He was therefore anxious not to expose himself to the chances of an attack by surprise. The 54th was at the head of his column; it advanced upon the enemy, who before the dawn of day were entirely put to flight.

He pursued, overtook, routed them again, and did not stop until he came in sight of St. Atilia, which is the nucleus of a series of valleys diverging in different directions. The approaches are rugged, precipitous, and woody; and the Austrians defended them with an obstinacy which it took a long time to overcome. Baraguay at length broke and drove the Imperialists upon Zolaus. Ney continued the movement, and, keeping to the left, advanced towards Mulheim. The cannon roared at some distance in his front, and a succession of reports convinced him that they must proceed from an action not far off. He therefore pressed his march, overtook the enemy, and drove them in disorder upon Tutlingen. This position, protected by formidable heights, was further defended by the columns which had been previously routed, and had rapidly advanced from Zolaus and Moreingen; he therefore ordered Bonnet to force it with



the van-guard. The undertaking was one of great difficulty ; but as the cannon continued to thunder with increasing spirit, there was no time to be lost, and Bonnet making a desperate effort, rushed with determination upon the position, and carried it. Ney immediately let loose his columns upon the defeated troops, pressed, and harassed, and drove them upon Neuhausen ; but the imperial cavalry covering the plain, he was compelled to halt and take up a position.

The cannonading having ceased, the prisoners and deserters from the Austrian army stated that the French army had been obliged to make a retrograde movement. Ney immediately began to calculate how he should convey assistance to the latter ; for it seemed impossible to penetrate through the Austrian masses, or even to cut a passage through the dense bodies of cavalry which appeared at a distance. On a sudden, however, the firing recommenced, and having spread farther on, Ney felt assured that the right wing of the French had recovered the chance of the day. Such was indeed the case ; and the imperial troops which covered the road from Tutlingen to Stockach were already beginning to disappear. Ney followed them at a distance. He was desirous of ascertaining their movements, tracking their march, and opening a communication with such of the French corps as were engaged. He pressed and drove the enemy forward, and by dint of fighting and manœuvring, arrived at the debouches of Schwandorf. It was now eight o'clock, the evening was getting dark, and he took up a position for the night. The battle had been very hotly contested : ten thousand men were lying dead on the field, and the French had been very near sustaining a defeat at Maskich, to counterbalance the success they had obtained at Eugen.

Their centre was now in line, and as a fresh attack upon them offered no chance of success, the Austrians retreated. Ney pursued them and advanced upon Buchen, which was still occupied by a hostile column ; this he charged and overthrew ; and then, continuing his pursuit, overtook the Austrian rear-guard, which he drove as far as Kreenheistetten. The Imperialists, fearful of his turning their right, formed into line ; and in this position Ney could attack them only with a feeble van-guard. He however perceived that they were discouraged and in consternation. The defeats which they had sustained in immediate succession had damped their courage, and he did not hesitate to attack them. Their opposition was such as might be expected from an army contending for its communications. They were however unable to resist, and, driven from position to position, were at length obliged to vacate the field, leaving twelve hundred prisoners in the hands of the French. Ney closely pursued them ; and convoys, horses, baggage,—all in short that covered the road, fell into his hands.

The Austrian forces at Inzhoffen were struck with consternation ; even the imperial columns which were on their way to Sigmaringen had taken the alarm. There was a general halt, and

all formed in line of battle. In an instant Ney's feeble vanguard had thirty thousand men in front of it, and it was obliged to halt, but without slackening its fire, or ceasing to attack and overthrow the Austrian corps which successively ventured within its reach. The movement of the action had carried it upon the heights of Inzhoffen, whence it could behold the impression it had made upon the enemy's masses. The whole army of the latter, drawn up in a succession of lines, was grouped in the angle formed by the Danube, and did not occupy the space of a single division. Its two wings touched the river, whose precipitous banks covered them. Its artillery commanded all the approaches, and crowned all the heights. This was indeed a critical position; but both officers and men of the Austrian army were discouraged and disheartened, and dared not even continue the passage of the river which they had begun. In justice however, we must add, that had they even displayed the most undaunted courage, they could not, situated as they were, have avoided a terrible defeat. Every shot fired at them would have told with deadly effect, and if one line had been missed, another would have been struck: not a single shot would have been lost, and the Austrian army, mowed down by whole files, must have either perished on the banks of the Danube or laid down its arms.

The situation of the Imperialists was singularly disadvantageous, and Ney strained every nerve to profit by it. He called up his own artillery, and requested Saint-Cyr to send him more; but all that he and his commander possessed was insufficient, and he could do no more than prove that it was not through his fault that the opportunity was lost. He placed his twelve pieces in battery; but sixty being opposed to them, he was obliged to abandon the attempt.

After this failure the Austrian army resumed its confidence and finished crossing the river. Its right wing, sent so injudiciously into the passes of the Val d'Enfer, was now debouching. Thus its forces were united, whilst those of the French were somewhat scattered. The Austrians, thinking it not impossible to recover their good fortune, suddenly recrossed the river, and took up their position upon the heights of Biberach. This was a bold and well-conceived movement. Ney, with the extreme left of the French, proceeded along the banks of the river, whose approaches, besides being tortuous and difficult, were moreover infested by a numerous body of partizans. Being constantly obliged to fight, as well as to turn the natural obstacles of the place, which are numerous and close to each other, the French general was not quick enough. When he debouched the Austrians had already given way. Saint-Cyr had attacked them; and men, artillery, and approaches,—all had been carried.

Having arrived too late to take a share in the victory, Ney set out in pursuit of the vanquished enemy. He followed and harassed them without intermission, and drove them in disorder behind the Iller. Here their resistance became more energetic, and the struggle more

serious. They had twenty thousand men in line; the approaches were fortified, and the houses of the villages they occupied had embrasures. The fire of the French was well sustained, and yet the action did not seem drawing to a close. Ney, tired of this vain delay, rushed upon the intrenchments, and joining the enemy hand to hand, overthrew and drove them to Illertissen.

The Imperialists, beaten both at Memmingen and at Brauendenburg, retreated to Ulm. This place is situated in a bottom or dell, and though of no importance in itself, contained extensive store-houses. It was defended by the Michelsburg batteries; and by means of its fortifications, it gave great facilities for manœuvring on both banks of the river. The Austrian masses were grouped upon the left of the French army; and the latter could not extend itself until it had beaten them. Moreau, from the top of the Abbey of Weblengen, beheld the position of the enemy; and directed Ney to attack and oblige them to concentrate their forces upon the Guntz. The Hulans were accordingly charged, broken, and thrown in disorder upon Wizeghausen, where they rallied and endeavoured to take up a position; but on seeing the 54th French advance in double quick time, they became alarmed and dared not receive the charge.

The left bank was now no longer destined to be the theatre of operations. New combinations had been formed, and every corps pushed on to the right, towards the Lech. Ney followed the movement, and had scarcely reached the Iller, ere a heavy cannonade was heard. The Archduke Ferdinand had seized this opportunity to attack Sainte-Suzanne, who was on the point of being overpowered. It became therefore necessary to fall back upon the Danube, and proceed in all haste to his assistance.

The different corps of the army soon debouched. The centre passed along the left bank, the reserve took its station upon the right, Sainte-Suzanne and Saint-Cyr crossed the Blau, Delmas descended the Iller, D'Hautpoul followed, and the republicans seemed again bent upon trying their fortune; but every one has not the talent of seizing the opportunity. When about to strike the blow; they became alarmed; and their efforts were spent in empty air, amid vain and powerless manœuvres.

Meanwhile, the Austrians remained quiet until they should ascertain the result of the operations conducted by the First Consul. Their quarters were good, they had provisions in abundance, and to remain quiet in the enjoyment of ease and plenty seemed to them the best thing they could do. But the French, without provisions or forage, as usual,—men and horses being equal sufferers from want,—had no such motive for prolonging this strange state of inaction. Ney made this observation to Saint-Cyr, and the latter to Moreau, without either being able to obtain a satisfactory answer. On the 19th of May, as the day was declining, and Ney and Saint-Cyr



warmly debating this point, an orderly arrived with orders to the latter to fall back with his columns.

"What!" cried Ney, "at the beginning of night, and when all is ready for action?"

"It is a cruel thing," Saint-Cyr replied; "but such is the order. We must leave the spot where the enemy is to be found, to go where we shall find nobody, save only stern and invincible hunger stalking through our ranks with deadly power." And he put his columns in motion; but his colleague did not follow him: Sainte-Suzanne being again exposed upon the Iller to the attacks of the Austrians, Ney was sent to support him.

The French were aware that Moreau had scarcely reached Bavaria, ere a part of the Austrian forces had already advanced upon Guntzburg; but they knew neither what positions the Austrians had taken up, nor the description of force by which these positions were occupied. The chief of brigade, Chalbos, being sent with a detachment of the 45th demi-brigade to reconnoitre, advanced towards Neuburg. The Wirtemberg chasseurs defended the approaches to that place; he charged, and broke them, making about a hundred prisoners. This success emboldened him; and, acting on the spur of his courage, he pressed the chasseurs more vigorously, and rushed boldly upon a heavy body of hussars. But whilst he was thus pushing forward, the cuirassiers of General Mack intercepted his rear, and having with them some pieces of cannon, destroyed a considerable number of his men, but without being able to break them. Thrice did Chalbos rush upon the foe, and drive them back; but the movement of the battle had thrown him to the left, and he found himself stopped by a vast bog. His men were out of breath, and the cannonading was becoming every instant more murderous; he was therefore reduced to lay down his arms. Chalbos was a brave, able, and devoted officer, and Ney was profoundly afflicted at his misfortune.

"Behold," he said with grief, "the consequences of this inexplicable halt; behold the fruits of our cruel stagnation!"

The 8th were mounted; and he immediately despatched them to the place where Chalbos was made prisoner; but the Austrians were drawn up in great force, and to have attacked them would have brought on a general engagement. Great, therefore, as was Ney's regard for his captive officer, he did not feel justified in shedding the blood of numbers of brave men in order to rescue one from captivity.

This check was not the only circumstance which the French army had to deplore: its present state of inaction proved very prejudicial to its discipline. Some of its soldiers had shrunk, not indeed from the enemy, but from the annoyances of a faction whom they considered hostile to the best interests of their country. These soldiers had accordingly deserted their post. Others of the men committed each day the most culpable excesses. Although now abundantly supplied with provisions, they indulged, without restraint, in the dis-

orders which their previous distress had long caused to be tolerated, and plundered the habitations in the neighbourhood of their camp. Ney had several times expressed his extreme displeasure at the disorderly ill-conduct of these men, and had issued severe orders on the subject; but none of the officers seemed to carry his orders into execution. They continued blind to that which they ought to have prevented; and the whole division became culpable for want of care and vigilance. Ney, driven to harsh measures, resolved to punish those who did not prevent these excesses, as well as those by whom they were committed.

"The volunteers of the 103rd, and more especially those of the 54th," he wrote to General Bonnet, "commit every possible excess in the houses, and particularly in the mills adjacent to the camp. We must, my dear General, beat to quarters and call the roll. One battalion out of every three must form a double chain of posts round the camp, and continue to do so until the offenders are discovered."\*

The discovery soon took place. The men, being confined to the camp, and subjected either to a severe duty, or to a wearisome inaction, became discontented with this punishment, which affected them all, and they who had done nothing to deserve it revenged themselves upon those who were really guilty. The latter, being punished by their comrades, of whose unpleasant restraint they were the cause, were forced to discontinue their depredations. Several officers who had distinguished themselves by their culpable tolerance of such excesses, were brought to a court martial; and one of them was suspended. This severity put a stop to the system of pillage: no one dared again to indulge in it; and the officers became more vigilant and attentive to their duty.

The case of the vedettes was more serious, for it involved a question of capital punishment. Two chasseurs had abandoned their post, and were condemned to be shot. The council of revision annulled the sentence, in consequence of an informality in the proceedings, and a new trial was directed to take place. Another court martial assembled, and gave precisely the same decision as the first; which decision was also annulled. Ney then reported the state of the case to General Saint-Cyr, and left it to him to act as he thought proper. The despatch was conceived in the following terms:—

"You will perceive, my dear General, by the decisions in the case of two chasseurs of the 8th regiment, who basely abandoned their post when on vedette, that the decree of the General-in-chief, bearing date the 7th Florial, which specially applies to the case, has been interpreted by the council of revision, under the presidency of General Desbrulys, in a manner calculated to degrade the authority of General Moreau. The decision of the first court martial having

\* Weiler, 14th Prairial, Year VIII. (June 3rd, 1800.)

been thus set aside, I ordered a second to assemble. The latter very thoughtlessly set forth in its judgment an article contradictory of the crime, so that its sentence has likewise been quashed. As I have not sufficient commanders of corps to compose a third court martial, may I beg of you, my dear General, to submit the case to the General-in-chief, in order to prevent pusillanimous judges from thwarting, in a manner so dangerous to the discipline of the army, the provisions and moral object of his decree."\*

In spite of this deference to legal forms which protected two guilty soldiers from merited punishment, a good effect was produced upon the whole army. The fear of being tried by judges less scrupulous, put an end to every kind of depredation, and restored the powers of discipline which for a while had been relaxed.†

Moreau pursued his movement towards Bavaria; but Kray, instead of following him, collected his forces at Michelsburg, and remained in this central position to profit by the least chance which fortune might throw in his way. On the 24th of May he had been on the point of overpowering Sainte-Suzanne; and on the 5th of June he came unexpected upon Richepanse, whom he placed in still more imminent jeopardy. This officer, who had recently been appointed to the command of the left wing, was a man of the firmest resolution, and one who possessed the most powerful mental resources; but great as were his talents and courage, he could not make head against the heavy masses which were debouching upon him. His right being much less extended than that of the Austrians, and his centre broken, he was driven back upon the Roth. Ney, however, crossed the Iller, advanced rapidly towards the Austrians, and came up with them on the platform of Kirchberg. They were numerous and flushed with victory; but as the danger of remaining inactive was becoming greater every moment, and he was unable to fall back, he put himself at the head of his grenadiers, and under a tremendous fire, advanced, with fixed bayonets, and without firing a single shot. This bold attempt was successful, and the broken Austrian ranks were driven from their position. Richepanse, threatened on his left, had just made a retrograde movement; Ney was therefore forced to follow his example, and abandon the platform he had so gallantly won. The Imperialists immediately took possession of it, covered it

\* Raggenburg, 6th Prairial, (May 26th.)

† We have dwelt a little upon these somewhat unimportant facts, because, in a recent publication, they have been presented in an unfavourable light. The punishment inflicted by the soldiers themselves upon their guilty comrades, although sanctioned by the orders of the General-in-chief, is termed extra-legal. The sentences upon the chasseurs, though neither was executed, are termed acts of barbarity; and the author of the work alluded to, accompanies his account of these circumstances with the most atrocious details, the untruth of which has fortunately been proved, but which tend to show the facility with which the writer of "The Campaign of 1800," takes advantage of every calumny tending to implicate or dishonour a brother officer.



with troops and artillery, and for a moment threw the French ranks into confusion. These being crippled by the shots which were showered upon them, they were asked to be led to the charge. Having formed, they marched up in double quick time, and in a short time were hand to hand with the enemy. Every individual soldier displayed the most daring courage; both officers and men felt the same enthusiasm, and the Austrians could not withstand the shock. The reserves of the latter having come to their assistance, the combat was renewed; but General Bonnet led the attack with such talent and effect that they were again broken.

The French remained masters of the day, and those formidable masses which had come to take from Richepanse the only bridge over the Iller that he could use, now fled before them. The junction with the left wing was, however, not yet effected; some Austrian columns which occupied the woods having cut off the communications of the French forces, Ney despatched two officers to open them again,—the one a lieutenant of cavalry, the other a brave captain of infantry, whom family reasons had formerly obliged to resign his commission, but who, having some time previous returned to the army, had been unable to obtain his letters of service. In vain had Ney exhausted his interest at head quarters in favour of these two officers; justice had been done to neither. The valour of Lieutenant Daiker, and the talents of Captain Guy Descoutes, had been equally disregarded. Both were in that mood of mind so favourable to deeds of great daring. Perceiving a column of enemies, they boldly marched up and summoned them to surrender. The troops which supported these officers were at a considerable distance behind them; but boldness is a power which seldom fails to intimidate men discouraged by defeat. The Austrians laid down their arms, and quietly followed the officers to head-quarters.

The junction was now effected; and the French had captured twelve hundred prisoners with five pieces of cannon. They then marched up again to the Austrians, whom they reached upon their whole line. After a severe action the Imperialists were driven back to the place whence they had originally set out, and the left wing of the French army was saved.

But this able operation was not unattended with bitter feelings in him who had conducted it. Ney loved and honoured courage, and was always fond of bringing it forward wherever he found it, whether in an officer or in a private soldier. General Grenier had superseded Saint-Cyr in the command of the centre; and Ney brought to his notice the officers who had particularly distinguished themselves in this affair. Among others was Captain Dulaunay of the 48th, whose bravery and talents Ney held in great estimation.

“He has real talent,” wrote Ney to General Grenier; “pray do not overlook him, for you would deprive the army of an officer who will worthily run his career.”

But whilst he was unsuccessfully soliciting in favour of a man who had still to win his way to fame, he was near losing an officer who had already risen to eminence. Bonnet, in return for the talent and gallantry he had evinced at Kirchberg, was harshly received at headquarters. Disgusted at such treatment, he resolved to throw up his commission. Fortunately he could not execute his intentions, except through Ney, his commanding officer, and the latter took good care not to second them. Bonnet was a man whom he could not easily consent to lose; his talents, firmness, and daring courage, were qualities which rendered his services most desirable to Ney, who therefore sought to pacify him.

"Your determination, my dear General," Ney wrote to him, "has deeply affected me; and I place sufficient reliance on your friendship to hope that you will not persist in it. It is no doubt to the report of the General-in-chief that you owe the annoyance you have experienced; but there is not a man among us who is not acquainted with your courage, and does not do justice to your talents. The army and your comrades are unanimous in this respect, and in sober earnest that ought to be sufficient for you. I trust, therefore, that you will remain, and forget the unmerited treatment you have received. I return you your letter to the General-in-chief, and hope you will consider it cancelled."\*

Bonnet yielded to this wish, was soon after appointed general of division, and in a short time distinguished himself by several new feats of arms.

Moreau, impatient at the slow progress made by his right, resolved to carry on operations with his left. Bonnet with his division cleared the flanks of the army, and took a part in divers battles fought upon the banks of the Biber. The Austrians, defeated in every action, rallied the wreck of their forces, and spread through the valley of the Roth; Bonnet followed and again overthrew them. They who escaped him fled back to the Brentz, and no Austrian patrols or reconnoitering parties were any longer to be seen in this part of the country.

The crippled Imperialists could now make a stand nowhere. Ney was anxious to support his lieutenant, and consummate the victory which the latter had achieved.

"Let us march, my dear General," he wrote to Grenier, "upon Donawert. The Austrians are unable to resist us. We have a moral superiority over them, and they cannot escape us."

Grenier dared not take such a movement upon his own responsibility. He had just received intelligence of the surrender of Genoa. One of his officers had witnessed the joy which the news of this event had spread through the Austrian camp. He had seen the Imperialists emerge from discouragement to boldness, treat with deri-

\* Osterberg, 22nd Prairial, Year VIII. (June 11th, 1800.)

sion what was said of the successes of the First Consul, and flatter themselves that they should soon resume the offensive, and again drive back their republican adversaries upon the Rhine: and indeed fortune seemed to have returned to them, for Grenier dared not attempt the movement, urging in excuse the unlucky chances which it offered.

"Chances!" Ney replied; "I perceive none but lucky chances. The enemy are confined to the left bank; their columns are some above and some below Ulm. Could we not, if these appear too formidable, attempt a diversion? Could we not feign to surprise the passage at Elchingen, whilst in reality we crossed the river at Guntzburg? If the operation were successful, the Austrians would lose their communications; if it did not succeed, we should only have to retire beyond the Guntz and resume our present positions."

These arguments were conclusive, but neither Ney nor Grenier had the chief command, and two days more elapsed before they could attempt to cross the Danube. This was however effected almost without obstacle, on the 19th of June, and the republicans, drawn up on the plains of Hochstadt, avenged the defeat which the French armies had sustained there almost a century before.

Kray, informed of Moreau's irruption in his rear, immediately raised his camp, abandoned the position where he had so long held the French in check, and only thought of repossessing himself of his communications. But he found this by no means so easy as he had imagined. The French had crossed the Danube at Blenheim; they also occupied Donawert; and the roads, together with the heights which run along the banks of the river, were in their possession. If therefore the Austrians wished to re-establish their line of communication, they must risk a circuitous march, advance as far as Nordlingen, expose their flank, and run the chance of a speedy defeat. Field-Marshal Kray had, in the mean time, thrown a portion of his troops upon the Inn, in spite of the danger of such a movement; and having formed his infantry into two columns, he pushed them, under the protection of his cavalry, one upon Dillengen and the other upon Langenau. Ney being confined to the left bank, and obliged to guard the approaches to the Guntz, saw with regret the Austrian forces file off. In vain did he invoke Grenier's friendship; \* in vain did he urge this general to follow him, march upon

\* TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRENIER.

1st Messidor (June 20th.)

My DEAR GENERAL,

Every report I have received acquaints me with the precipitate retreat of the enemy upon Elm; and at the very moment I am writing this letter, two columns, the depth of which I cannot see, are in full march descending the left bank of the Danube. One is pursuing the Rudheim road; its head already appears beyond that village, and keeps along the Dillengen causeway. The other is proceeding through Langenau, and appears to be pursuing the same direction as the former. I calculate this force at twenty thousand men of all arms. Nothing has occurred in front of my present position, of which the enclosed is a correct plan.



Guntzburg,\* and debouch by Leipheim.† But the commander of the centre was afraid of exposing his rear, and anxious to secure its safety. Yielding however to Ney's entreaties, he crossed the Danube and joined the van-guard, which he found in the most inactive and inefficient state, negligently extended along the banks of the Brentz. He could not conceal his surprise at this inaction, and wrote thus to Grenier :

I think, my dear General, that it would be urgent to bring my forces closer together, and my cavalry near to the valley of the Aost. General Richepanse must have a very weak force in front of him : would it not therefore be advisable to urge the general-in-chief either to cause this general to be supported by us, so that he may press with vigour upon Ulm, or to cross over to the left bank of the Danube, in order to force the enemy to leave part of their force before it? This diversion would render our enterprizes more easy.

You will have work to do to-morrow, my dear General ; pray concentrate your forces in a good position, and make me come to you before the action begins.

If you think proper, I will collect my forces at Guntzburg and Reismberg to-morrow by daybreak, and I shall even expect your orders to-night. Affairs are pressing. Pray do not forget me.

\* To LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRENIER.

1st Messidor (June 20th.)

MY DEAR GENERAL,

It is two o'clock ; and the Austrian columns which I mentioned in my last are just formed into line in front of Languenau, with their left towards Nerenstitten, and their right upon Reidhen. They seem drawn up across the road to Dillengen. I believe they will remain this evening in the position I have mentioned. I am going this instant to set out for Guntzburg, and have directed General Bonnet to report to me every movement he may remark during the morning of to-morrow. I am expecting with impatience the order to follow you to the left bank of the Danube. Do not leave me here when you are fighting, for if you do I shall quarrel with you, and never pardon you for my inaction, unless circumstances absolutely require that it should continue.

NEY.

† To THE SAME.

1st Messidor (June 20th.)

MY DEAR GENERAL,

As I have received no reply to the different communications I have addressed to you during the day, I beg to inform you that I have just collected the materials necessary for the speedy repair of the bridge of Reidenberg ; the only one which, under present circumstances, seems to me adapted to operate a diversion ; for it would be imprudent to rebuild those of Leipheim and Guntzburg whilst the enemy is in force upon those points. It is even probable they will march to-night, so as to reach the Brentz by daybreak, where you will have taken up your position. They will not dare to attack you in front before they have made you develop your right towards Heydenheim, which will oblige them to leave a corps of observation in a line with Gengen. As I might easily reach Gungenfingen by the time the attack began, by passing either through Laumgen or through Reimbürg—the latter in preference,—my presence at such a juncture would enable you to give support on the right, and thus baffle, for a considerable time, the attempts of the enemy, so as to give the general-in-chief, Moreau, sufficient time to come up with the centre and part of the right wing. Perhaps the latter forces are already near you ; for it is certain, my dear General, that the first days of Messidor must necessarily decide the fate of the campaign. The enemy have committed an irretrievable fault in allowing themselves to be forced to receive battle in their rear. Let us profit by it ; the moment is favourable.

“They will escape us if we do not march; they will be too far off if there is any further delay. Forward then, my dear General, forward! And if we cannot follow them,—if the army is not ready to debouch, at least let the cavalry follow them, push, press, and force them to lose time.”

Neither infantry nor cavalry stirred, and yet matters were becoming every instant more serious. The Austrian Field-marshal was rapidly advancing towards the Naab, and his grand park of artillery was proceeding by forced marches to Amberg. Ney again entreated that he might be permitted to pursue him.

He wished, he said, “to march upon Newremberg, force the imperial army constantly to develop its right, and threaten the rear of its divisions upon the Maine.”

His desire was complied with; he put his troops in motion, and in two consecutive actions, broke the Austrian rear-guard. The news of the battle of Marengo soon followed that of the surrender of Genoa. The French, elated at this intelligence, were rapid and energetic in their operations. The Austrians, on the other hand, were sinking under the despondency caused by their reverses. Ney pierced through the curtain which covered their retreat, and witnessed the terror by which they were stricken. The opportunity appeared to him favourable; he gave notice of it to the commander of the centre, and appealing again to the energy and vivacity which ought to be the concomitants of a pursuit, he added:

“If the General-in-chief would order a march of two successive days, and force the enemy to receive battle, I think the army of Baron Kray would soon encounter a fate similar to that of the Baron de Melas, if not a worse. An officer sent with a flag of truce has acquainted the Austrian generals with our brilliant success in Italy. They are struck with consternation at the news, and have attempted no concealment as to the extent of their disaster. They are in despair of themselves and of their monarchy, and seem more disposed to flee from us than again to risk the hazard of arms. You see then, General, the chances which fortune holds out to us; let us not neglect them. Never was there an opportunity of striking a more powerful blow.”\*

These pressing instances were unattended to; the time was frittered away, the opportunity lost, and Kray completed his manœuvre.

The Austrian army being in position at Neuberg, Ney was instructed to harrass it. But the Prince of Reuss was engaged with another part of the French army; Moerfeld had been defeated at Dachau, and the Archduke Ferdinand at Landshut; Lecourbe and Deccaën had beaten other corps of the imperial army, and Field-marshal Kray having continued his retreat, had established himself at Muldorf. Ney followed his movement, advanced upon Ingolstadt, and pushed

\*Hochaltingen, 6th Messidor, Year VIII. (June 25th, 1800.)

the heads of his columns under the very batteries of that place, then commanded by the Austrian General Neu. This officer, though a man of valour and energy, was proud, haughty, obstinate, and a little addicted to vain boasting. It was he who, after the retreat of 1795, affected to inquire what had become of the army of Sambre-et-Meuse. Having been formerly successful in surprises, he was resolved to try whether they might not succeed on the present occasion.

He accordingly put himself at the head of part of his garrison, and fell unexpectedly upon the French posts. But the republican forces, no longer exposed either to the severity of winter or to the ravages of famine, were on the alert, guarded with care, and the Austrian general was foiled in every attempt.

Nevertheless a severe action took place; the cannon roared, and the rolling fire of the Austrians produced a terrific effect. Ney advanced at the head of a squadron of hussars. Laughter and gaiety had seized upon his men. They had just forced the payment of the contributions, and had witnessed the ludicrous scenes and whimsical subterfuges to which an operation of this kind always gives rise. Here, a chapter would not suffer a patrimony of St. Peter's to be touched; there, an abbot was ready to suffer martyrdom rather than part with his money. Nowhere did God's ministers give up their worldly wealth without the most lamentable wailings.

These anecdotes had lightened the toils of the march; the men continued their gossip and their amusing stories even after they had reached the field of battle. The troops received the order to form; still the conversation did not cease, until an old hussar put an end to it by a sally.

"We have other amusements now, friends," he exclaimed; "Here we are, *nez à nez*\* (Ney à Neu). Let us see how matters will come to pass."

And in truth they came to pass very favourably for the French troops, who immediately formed and advanced towards the enemy, amidst shouts of laughter. The Austrians were driven back upon the town; but having immediately received reinforcements, they rallied, reformed, and prepared again to advance upon the French. Ney spared them part of the trouble, and, rushing upon them, broke through their ranks, put them completely to the rout, and took six pieces of cannon, together with six hundred prisoners.

Receiving, almost immediately after, intelligence of the Armistice of Parsdorf, he gave information of it to General Neu, and proposed a suspension of hostilities; but the obstinate old German, exasperated by his defeat, replied that he had no instructions, and was not at all disposed to allow himself to be shut up.

\* *Nez à nez* (nose to nose), pronounced Ney à Ney. The pronounciation of the German Neu is between the name Ney and the English monosyllable Nigh. Thus the English reader may easily understand the double-entente.



"Very well," Ney replied; "your will be done. To keep you in, is not what embarrasses me. I only wish to place upon your shoulders the responsibility of the blood which will be uselessly spilt. I therefore await your pleasure."

This softened Neu, and the strife of war ceased at Ingoldstadt, as it had along the rest of the line. But the Austrian commander, obliged to give way on the main point, was stubborn in matters of less importance.

One day he established his troops in the villages contained within the line of demarcation, and on the following, refused to permit an account to be taken of his force. Ney's remonstrances against this were of no avail; the old German would never admit the unreasonableness of his pretensions. In vain did the French general urge, that, although authorized to let the provisions pass which were necessary for the subsistence of the garrison, he would not allow the governor to rob the farmers of their crops, nor to introduce into the place a stock of provisions beyond its present wants. Neu took no notice of these objections, and persisted in his measures. Ney was therefore forced to give way on one point, in order not to ruin the villages; but he was inexorable on the other;—he stopped the governor's wagons, seized his convoys, and cut off his provisions. The Austrian was now in his turn obliged to give way, and furnish a statement of his situation, which he had before obstinately refused.

There was another measure equally unpleasant, which Ney felt compelled to adopt. The Austrian general had flattered himself that the occupation of the villages would procure him the resources he wanted. But Ney had an exact inventory made of the corn, the cattle, and even the wood included in the line of demarcation, and it was not without considerable vexation that the governor perceived he could make away with nothing.

The war operations being thus suspended, the republicans flattered themselves that a peace would soon follow. The conditions had been not only discussed but agreed upon, and their ratification was expected to take place immediately. But Austria never negotiates except to take breath. She had still a very numerous army remaining, and she determined again to try the chances of war. On a sudden she raised scruples to entering into any treaty without the concurrence of Great Britain; and a refusal was actually given to receive the officer despatched to present the preliminaries to the Emperor for ratification. This subterfuge led to preparations for an immediate renewal of the campaign. Ney gave notice to the Governor of Ingoldstadt of the rupture of the armistice, and summoned him to yield the ground he could no longer defend, and quietly evacuate the villages which he occupied. This was a demand by no means pleasing to the Austrian commander, but his memory was good, and profiting by the lesson which the French had before given him, he yielded compliance.

The Austrian forces accordingly re-entered the place. Bonnet occupied Abach; General Desbrulys was in position on the right bank of the Danube; General Goba held the left bank; and Ney was preparing to act vigorously against the garrison of Ingoldstadt. But the Austrians now eluded the war, as they had just before eluded peace. In order to prolong the cessation of hostilities, they gave up Ingoldstadt, Ulm, and Philipsburg. Great Britain, so haughty at the commencement of the campaign, now not only consented, but even solicited to treat for peace. All seemed to promise a term to this horrible destruction of human life; and yet it was as far distant as ever.

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### CHAPTER III.

THE interference of the British Government rendered the question under debate much more complicated than it really was. France demanded that Great Britain should be placed in the same situation as herself; that the war should cease on the sea as it had ceased on the land. The cabinet of St. James's considered this demand unreasonable, and pretended that a compliance with it would prove very detrimental to British interests. This might be true; but, as the cabinet of St. Cloud observed, if a long suspension of hostilities were prejudicial to Great Britain, a lengthened armistice was not less so to France. The then state of things must necessarily lead to a speedy settlement of the question of peace or war. The maritime armistice would serve as a guarantee to the Consular Government of the sincerity of the British Government in the establishment of a peace; whilst the continental armistice would be security to the latter government of the sincerity of France in her exertions for the same object. Austria, in the state in which the chances of war had placed her, was necessarily anxious for a prompt solution of the question. The three powers were thus in a situation not to hesitate about the sacrifices which each might have to make in bringing the point to an issue. These observations were just; but what is just, is not always that which Great Britain is the most ready to adopt: the cabinet of St. James's therefore eluded the point, and Austria, making common cause with it, refused to follow up negotiations in which her insular ally did not participate. This was carrying her complaisance to a great length indeed, and the French republic determined to demand satisfaction; but Austria was herself quite ready to take the field again, and her troops so long in their cantonments, had now lost the fatal impression made by their defeats. They had acquired strength from repose, were numerous, and were commanded by new generals.

Thus they had all the elastic enthusiasm of a new army—of men first going into the field. They were commanded by the Archduke Ferdinand, a young, ardent, and resolute prince, who united to that handsome and martial appearance which pleases the soldiers, great personal bravery, a good eye, and a vigour of execution by no means common.

Ney had repulsed the Austrian advanced posts, which he had driven from Haag and Mattenpot, and forced back upon the Iser. The archduke hastily advanced to avenge their defeat, and attacking the republicans in his turn, endeavoured not only to beat but likewise to turn them. He passed the Iser on the 29th of November, debouched by Muldorf and by Crayburg, bore upon the left of the French army, and threatened to cut off its communications. This was a bold and well-concerted manœuvre; but the ground being wet and full of deep ruts, the Austrian forces were obliged to take up a position. They established themselves in front of Ampfingen, and covered the plain and the heights with their columns.

Night having set in, Ney contented himself with following the line of their advanced posts along their front; but daybreak was still distant when he perceived them in motion. He saw them first reduce, then extinguish their fires; and not doubting that they were preparing to march towards him, he made ready to receive them. Nor indeed were they long in debouching. They threw heavy masses of cavalry upon his centre, drove in his advanced posts, and, threatening his right wing and rear, pushed dense columns of infantry towards the woods of Archau and Hasslach. But Ney, who had a quick eye upon their motions, despatched General Ruffin to the woods, and directed General Deperrières to occupy the village. Both of these officers were active, brave, and devoted, and the archduke exhausted himself in useless efforts to dislodge them. In vain did he bring up his columns to the charge—in vain did he press upon the centre and left wing of the French: he was always repulsed and kept in check upon every point. The courage of the republican soldiers vied with the talents of their leaders: and they not only drove back the enemy's columns, but pursued, overthrew, and forced some of them to lay down their arms.

The disproportion in numbers was, however, too great to allow of Ney's further continuing the contest; he therefore retired slowly and in good order, without allowing the cavalry which pressed upon him to obtain the least advantage. A piece of cannon, twelve hundred prisoners, and so unequal a combat maintained during a whole day, already formed a noble feat of arms. But what rendered it still more admirable, and stamped it with real importance, was the fact that it broke the movement of the archduke, and gave Moreau time to collect his forces.

The Austrians fancying that the French army was retreating, began to pursue it. Kinmayer was advancing upon Darfen, Baillet marching



towards Prieendorf, and Riezel endeavouring to reach St. Christophe. The prince himself occupied the causeway of Haag; and the Austrian army resuming its movement, persisted in endeavouring to turn the French. Unfortunately for the imperialists, the season was not favourable to such vast combinations. The ground, as we have before observed, was broken up, and the lateral columns were obliged to follow narrow and difficult roads, cut up by wagons and rendered almost impassable by the heavy rains. That alone pursued by the archduke had a firm and spacious causeway. This difference in the roads necessarily caused a great difference in the march, and it was upon this circumstance that Moreau formed his plan of battle.

Ney, and the remainder of Grenier's troops, had established themselves on the left of Hohenlinden; Grouchy held the approaches to the forest, which extended as far as the village; and the reserve, in position on the right, reached from St. Christophe to Ebersburg. Moreau perceived all the advantages which time and locality offered him, and did not despair of overpowering the centre before the forces by which it was to be supported could be formed into line. Grenier received orders not to seek the enemy, but only to endeavour to check their advance if they appeared. Richepanse was sent into the forest to take them in flank; but they already occupied every glade and every path, and the French general was obliged to engage them, although separated from the forces which followed him. He continued to advance nevertheless, and reached the nucleus of the defile. The Austrians being here entangled in deep glens, he charged and broke them.

Their ranks being thus thrown into confusion, Moreau soon perceived their wavering and indecision. Judging therefore that Richepanse was driving them before him, he forced them back into the wood. But as Ney directed this part of the action, we shall give an account of it in his own words, by inserting his report.

“At six o'clock in the morning the enemy, with considerable forces, consisting principally of artillery, attacked us near Hohenlinden on the high road to Muldorf, directing their greatest efforts against the right of General Grouchy, who received them with vigour. Soon after, my division was warmly attacked, and the enemy began to gain the heights of Krainaker. The general-in-chief, judging that they were not yet entirely free from the defile, ordered a general attack. The columns of attack debouched upon Hohenlinden, in order to reach the height on the left near Krainaker, and that on the road to Buckrain, which the enemy already occupied in strong force. The velocity of the manœuvre, together with the vigour of the attack, obliged the enemy to make a precipitate retreat. It was now twelve o'clock. At this juncture Grouchy's division, on my right, forced the enemy's left to make a retrograde movement, and the rout of the latter was soon complete.

“ Having become masters of the defile of Mattenpot, a quantity of artillery and ammunition-wagons fell into our hands. General Heudelet's brigade, in which was Adjutant-General Ruffin, pursued the routed enemy as far as the last named village, and effected a junction with Richepanse's division, which had just debouched upon this point, and was vigorously beset. The two generals acted in concert to force the latter to a complete retreat upon Haag. Meanwhile the column on the right, under the command of the Archduke John, began to debouch upon Pireserdorf and Hartofen, in order to develope the left of Bonnet's division, whilst a second column from Burkrain had already begun to emerge from the forest and advance by a cross road upon Hohenlinden. But the two last battalions of the 103rd, the battalions of grenadiers, the 76th, the 13th dragoons, and the 19th cavalry were placed by échelons upon the several openings. These, in conjunction with Bonnet's division succeeded not only in keeping the enemy in check, but even in repulsing them with loss.

“ General Heudelet's brigade having skirted the wood and driven the enemy as far as Haag, I directed that it should return towards Schnauping with the 8th regiment of chasseurs, in order to follow the enemy, who seemed to be obtaining some success on our left. This brigade took up its position in front of the village, and was upon the flank of the enemy, who had taken up theirs behind Burkrain. It was now seven o'clock in the evening.

“ The combined movements of the neighbouring divisions, together with the vigorous exertions of that under my command, made us masters of eighty pieces of cannon, an immense number of ammunition-wagons, many pairs of colours, and about six thousand prisoners, among whom were several general officers and a great number of distinguished field officers.

“ The brigadier-generals of my division generally, the officers of every rank, and the men of every corps, did their duty on this memorable day. The emulation in deeds of glory displayed by so large a portion of the troops under my command, prevents me from naming for the present those who distinguished themselves in such a manner as to deserve the notice of the general-in-chief and of the government ; nevertheless, from my personal observations, I must, my dear general, request the following promotions :

“ The rank of general of brigade for Adjutant-general Ruffin, on account both of former services and of his conduct during the present battle.

“ The rank of adjutant-commandant for Commandant Passinges, one of my aides-de-camp, chief-de-bataillon and acting head of the staff of my division, in reward for his talents and courage, of which he furnished a signal instance in charging at the head of twenty-five chasseurs of the 8th, a large body of cuirassiers and hussars forming the escort of the Archduke John, who was forced to detach more than a hundred and fifty men to drive him back ; he retreated with

order, and after wounding several of the enemy with his own hand, rejoined his corps covered with blood.

"The rank of chef-de-brigade in the 103rd for Citizen Brayer, chef-de-bataillon in the same corps; a promotion due to his zeal, courage and talents.

"The rank of chef-de-bataillon in the 103rd for Citizen Schwiter, captain-adjutant-major in the same corps. This promotion is solicited by the corpse itself,—a daily witness of the merit of this officer.

"The rank of captain in the 2nd regiment of hussars for Citizen Daiker, lieutenant in the 4th hussars; this officer having quitted the former corps only since the last organization. Citizen Daiker has already distinguished himself by his valour and capacity. On the present occasion he had a horse killed under him and another wounded.

"For Citizen Randon, lieutenant engineer-geographer, his confirmation in that rank, which he has been unable yet to obtain, although he has performed its duties ever since 1791. I ask for this confirmation in favour of Citizen Randon's talents and capacity in this branch of the service.

"For Citizen Perrier, private in the 9th hussars, and orderly to Adjutant-commandant Ruffin, the rank of quarter-master-serjeant, in justice to his courage, and to the services he has rendered since the opening of this campaign, more particularly on the 12th, when his horse was wounded."

Such was the fate of the archduke's forces. Pressed and forced back upon each other, the columns could not withstand the shock of the French army, and they either dispersed or laid down their arms. The lateral columns were not more fortunate. Before night the French had taken a hundred pieces of cannon and eleven thousand prisoners. Six thousand Austrians were left dead on the field of battle, whilst the French had not three thousand hors-de-combat.

Having achieved this splendid feat, the republicans made ready to gather the fruits of their victory. They accordingly marched upon the Inn, and prepared to turn the Tyrol, for the purpose of seizing the communications between Vienna and Italy; but the undertaking was by no means unattended with difficulty. It was necessary to cross a deep and precipitously imbedded river, which Turenne himself had pointed out as a formidable line of defence. Nevertheless, if the passage were not surprised, it would be impossible to isolate the scattered corps of the imperial army. Moreau therefore resolved to make the attempt. His centre and right wing rested upon Rosenheim; Ney advanced upon Muldorf, to carry the tête-de-pont which covered that place. Unfortunately the immense plain which separates the Inn from the Iser prevented him from pressing the work with vigour. The enemy might have debouched from Crayburg, and placed the French army in peril. Ney sought a means of securing it from this danger, and calculated on the possibility of carrying



Crayburg, which would enable him the more easily to become master of Muldorf. Having explored the banks of the Inn, he fancied he perceived a ford at a little distance from Ensdorf. On questioning the peasants, he found all of his opinion that the river was fordable in that place. The unanimity of their opinions on this point made him resolve to try what confidence might be placed on their information. He therefore directed his engineers to sound the depth of the water, and ascertain whether or not the troops could cross. The engineers expressed some doubts; but as the capture of Crayburg would have offered so many advantages towards effecting that of Muldorf, by bringing to a term the movement on the right, and forcing many very important openings, he insisted upon trying the experiment. The water was too deep, and he was forced to give up all idea of this coup-de-main.

Though unable to carry the place, he determined at all events to occupy one of the hamlets which supported it, and requested the Austrian general opposed to him to give him up Altmuldorf. As Ney's artillery commanded the position, the Austrian dared not refuse. He sought, however, to gain time; and answered that Kinmayer alone could order the delivery of such a post. Kinmayer, he said, was absent, having been sent for by the archduke; but was expected to return in a few hours, and would doubtless before night comply with the French general's demand. Kinmayer did not however return, but was superseded by Schwartzberg, who gave up two-thirds of the village to the French. The latter general then applied to Ney for the suspension of arms during four hours. Ney granted him three, and all seemed again to promise peace.

The right wing of the French having crossed the Inn, the Austrians continued their retreat, and Ney advanced upon Muldorf. He found the imperialists still occupying the right bank; they were beginning to destroy the bridge. He therefore pressed his march and summoned them to retire immediately. They refused at first, but he threatened to destroy them with grape-shot if they delayed, upon which they withdrew. The citizens then ran to the bridge and soon extinguished the fire which had begun to consume it. Ney immediately pushed on to Crayburg, saved also the remains of the bridge of that town, and then proceeded to Burkhausen. Here the discussion was longer, and the negotiation less successful.

The place was strong, well stocked with provisions, not very distant from Brannau, then occupied by the Austrian forces, and the garrison was well disciplined. Colonel Wacquant refused to surrender without the usual ceremonies. Ney urged that it was as easy to turn him as to crush him with shot and shells; still this stickler for the forms of war would listen to nothing, and insisted upon a regular summons. During this parley the cannon began to sound in the direction of Salzburg; a sharp action was taking place there, which rendered the governor more anxious for delay; but Decaën had

advanced to Lauffen, and was busy in the destruction of the hopes with which the Austrian beguiled himself. Ney refused to submit to his ridiculous demands and pay him the honours which he solicited. He therefore prepared to cross the Salza. This proved sufficient; Wacquart in alarm abandoned the place and retreated to Brannau. Lauffen and Salzburg also opened their gates to the republicans.

The Austrians could no longer maintain themselves in the Tyrol. The French were also on the point of communicating with the army of Italy. Thus would the two republican armies be soon able to act in concert, and their operations consequently become prompt and decisive; and thus would Austria be forced to submit to peace. And indeed General Meerfeld soon presented himself with a flag of truce at the advanced posts of the French; but the Aulic Council, always infatuated with Great Britain, again pretended that they could not treat without the concurrence of that power. The French refused to listen to such strange scruples, and continued their movement. Ney had arrived upon the Ems, and nearly overtaken the Austrian rear-guard. He was directed to continue his pursuit; but he could not reach the enemy without crossing the plain, and he was not sufficiently strong to encounter the cavalry by which it was covered. Unable therefore to employ force, he had recourse to stratagem. He demanded an interview with Schwartzberg, represented to that general the hopelessness of the struggle and the danger of resistance; in short, he performed his part so well that he obtained, without firing a shot, that which he did not feel himself strong enough to carry by arms. The prince gave up the whole country to him, and peaceably withdrew behind the Ips. This was Ney's last feat in this war; the armistice of Steyer closed the arena, and he fell back upon Burkhausen.

The war had now ceased; but discontent and weariness always to be found among the French troops when not in the field, broke out among them as usual. The weather was cold, and the men, without shoes or clothing, were quartered in villages which contained no provisions of any sort, all having been either burnt or pillaged. Men are always exasperated by hunger; and this was the case with the French soldiers. They became very troublesome, and their exactions elicited dreadful reprisals. Several were murdered by the inhabitants; and Ney, anxious to prevent fresh crimes, directed that the cantonments should be disarmed. Now the cantonments belonged to Bavaria, and this electorate, though separated from the coalition ever since the armistice of Parsdof, had become neither more complying nor less hostile towards the French. It had, at Burkhausen, the president of a commission still more personally hostile, if possible, than his government: this was the Baron of Leyden. Expelled from Landshutt for his intrigues and hated of the French, he thought he might take his revenge at Burkhausen.

He accordingly opposed the disarming of the cantonments ; but his opposition not being attended to, he thought to involve in difficulty those who directed the execution of this measure. He accused them of having kept a few bad swords and old pistols. But the charge was untrue—for these arms had been deposited at head quarters ; and he gained by his attempt only the odium of having made an unfounded accusation. He was not however discouraged : unable to injure the subalterns, he attacked the General himself, whom he allowed to carry no measure into effect without the most active opposition. If there was a requisition for provisions, he forbade the population to obey it ; if shoes were demanded, he opposed their delivery. When the works which covered Burkhausen were to be destroyed, and the peasants called upon to work for this purpose, he came forward as an officious judge of matters that did not concern him, declared the one as useless as the other was oppressive, and applied all his means to throwing obstacles in the way. He forbade the inhabitants to purchase the materials, and enjoined the villages to refuse their labour. Neither did he consider this violent opposition sufficient, but attempted to bribe some officers on the French staff. Ney, indignant at his impudence, threw him into prison. The Bavarian became outrageous at this, and after obtaining his freedom withdrew from the place, declaring that Ney should hear of him ; and he kept his word ;—but, at all events, he was got rid of for the time.

The local administration remained however under his influence. The authorities issued requisitions on the one hand, and ordered, on the other, that such requisitions should not be obeyed. Thus no provisions were to be obtained. And as if misfortunes can never come single, Dessoles, being obliged to go to Paris, had left the direction of the staff to Lahorie. This latter General loved the pomp of head-quarters, and took a pride in showing his importance. He was clever, but of a sombre character ; and being little accustomed to fighting, he entertained a dislike to those who distinguished themselves in the field of carnage ;—it was that secret aversion which officers wielding the pen always entertain towards those who wield the sword. He would willingly have allowed the soldiers to starve in order to save the peasants from supplying a single ration of food to the army. Not that he cared for one more than for the other ; but the latter were protected by men of influence, whilst the former had no protectors, nor any other right to protection than the wounds received in defence of their country. Thus the claims to Lahorie's especial favour preponderated on the side of the peasants.

Some requisitions being mentioned to him as having been made for the troops, he suspended their execution. The exhaustion of the country having been represented to him, he ordered that the store-houses at Braunau should be opened, and the provisions which had been collected there for the soldiers distributed to the inhabitants.



But these warehouses belonged to Ney's cantonments, and he refused to give up their contents. The man of "a little brief authority" waxed wroth; but not daring to attack Ney openly, he vented his spleen upon the officers and the commissary-general of that officer's division. He brought charges against the former; then brutally arresting the commissary-general, sent him, under pretence of preventing a scandalous exposure to another division of the right wing. But he had ill calculated his means of vengeance. Ney rejected his pretended kindness in preventing exposure, and demanded a public investigation. Lahorie, as a justification of this proceeding, then reverted to certain complaints which he stated had been made to him by Prince Charles, and by the Elector of Bavaria. But Ney having persisted in obtaining an investigation, the result was Lahorie's utter discomfiture. Such a thing is not easily forgotten, and Lahorie waited only for an opportunity of revenge, which at length came.

We have already mentioned the estimation in which Ney held Lieutenant Daiker, and the homage he had rendered to the bravery displayed by that officer under the walls of Ulm. Ney having on a former occasion requested Daiker's promotion to the rank of captain, had renewed this request after the battle of Ingoldstadt, and again after the victory of Hohenlinden, in both of which actions Daiker had particularly distinguished himself. But no notice was taken of these repeated applications; and Lahorie, far from promoting Ney's protégé, imagined to apply to his case a former decision of the general-in-chief, and even to contest the rank which Daiker then held. Ney was indignant at such a proceeding, and referred the case to the commander-in-chief, to whom he wrote as follows:—

"You know Daiker; you are acquainted with his courage and zeal; you well know how little he deserves the treatment he has met with. You may easily perceive that he is not the real object of dislike: he is struck only by a rebound. I am myself the individual aimed at by this unjustifiable persecution. As there is a dread of attacking me face to face, my officers are made to stand the blunt of these manœuvres against me. But you are just, and will never allow your name to be made use of for the purpose of crushing a man whose talents and services entitle him to find in you nothing but a protector."

This appeal produced the desired effect, and Lahorie was obliged to adjourn his vengeance. The army repassed the Rhine, and here the matter dropped.

## CHAPTER IV.

NEY now returned to France. He had earned renown both as a soldier and as a commander, and his greeting at Paris from the head of the state was most flattering. Policy had doubtless something to do with the praises lavished upon him. The First Consul was well aware that the armies of the North felt some little jealousy of the splendid victories gained by those of the South ; and he was anxious to extinguish so dangerous a feeling of rivalry. He wished to convince every body that he had no respect of persons, and would acknowledge and reward the services performed on the Rhine as well as those done on the Adige. His reception of Ney was perhaps more warm on this account. Be that as it may, Ney was much gratified by it ; whilst the reforms which had taken place in every department of the state were calculated to win his warmest applause. Wise laws had consolidated the foundation of the social edifice ; the criminal laws were in progress of useful revision, and justice had resumed her power ; the public accounts were becoming every day more clear, and the machinery of government was much more rapid in its operations. The First Consul, always at work, animated the whole, and personally discussed every measure. From the decree which changed the denominations of the weights and measures, to the law establishing the courts of justice, not a public measure took place which bore not the stamp of his powerful genius. It was difficult not to admire his perseverance, still more difficult not to feel emotion at his solicitude. He overlooked no interest, he neglected no branch of administration. Education, commerce, arts, religion, industry—he gave life to all, and held the whole in the grasp of his gigantic mind.

The war had been unsuccessful during his absence, but the moment he assumed the personal command of the republican forces, the ascendancy of the French arms was restored. The French armies again sent beyond the frontiers, had carried all before them, overthrown the enemies of free institutions, and baffled the most odious plots against their country. The coalition against France was forcibly dissolved. Austria had treated on the 9th of February, Naples on the 28th of March, and Rome on the 1st of July : in a word, Bonaparte had renewed the wonders of Campo Formio, and forced Europe to subscribe to peace. He was therefore the benefactor of nations.

Ney, like every good patriot, gloried in the greatness and pros-

perity of his country. He joined the great body of his countrymen in cherishing the colossal genius which had raised it from the abyss into which it had fallen, and he gave his warm applause to the acts of the consular administration.

The First Consul was not insensible to Ney's good opinion, and whether from regard or from policy, determined to attach that general to his person. Madame Bonaparte approved of this resolution, and wished to concur in effecting it. She had recourse to those means which a woman knows so well how to employ, and called love to her aid. She brought about an attachment between Ney and a young female favourite of hers, and wound up the romance with the marriage of the lovers. Madame Louis Bonaparte had a friend of her childhood named Mademoiselle Auguié, a lovely and amiable girl, whose misfortunes rendered her still more interesting. She was the daughter of a former receiver-general, whose fortune had been greatly reduced by the revolution. She had seen her father thrown into a dungeon, and her mother, condemned to captivity by the same sentence, elude it at the cost of her life, in the hope of preserving from the ruffian grasp of her persecutors a last resource for her children.

Josephine was desirous of promoting the happiness of a soldier whose future renown she foresaw, at the same time that she procured for her young friend the brilliant and honourable rank in society to which this interesting girl was entitled, and which Ney's military rank, and the high respectability of his character, were calculated to secure for her. Josephine therefore gave Ney a letter of introduction, enclosed in the following note, as grateful to his own feelings as it was flattering to the family to whom it was addressed.

"I enclose you, General, the letter which you requested for Citizen Auguié. May I beg that you will read it. I have not mentioned in it all the good which I know and think of you ; for I would leave this amiable family the satisfaction of discovering your good qualities themselves. But I here repeat the assurance of the interest which both Bonaparte and I take in this marriage, and of the satisfaction which Bonaparte will feel in promoting the happiness of two persons towards whom he entertains very particular feelings of regard and esteem. I share with him in this double feeling.

"LAPAGERIE BONAPARTE."

"Malmaison, 10th Prairial, Year X. (May 30th, 1802.)"

Ney was delighted with these prospects of domestic happiness ; for the young lady was as elegant and accomplished in mind as she was beautiful in person, and preparations were soon made for the wedding. In spite of Ney's success in his profession, and the commands which he held during six years of warfare, his private fortune was but trifling ; for he possessed only a small estate, whose value did not exceed eighty thousand francs. This was singular in a general officer of the van-guard, but it was not less true. He therefore trusted



for future means to his talents in his profession ;—the world knows how the trust was redeemed.

With the wreck of his fortune, M. Auguié, his father-in-law, had purchased the chateau of Grignon ; there the marriage was celebrated.

In the village dwelt an old couple, who had been married half a century ; Ney clothed them, and made them receive their second\* nuptial benediction on the same day, and at the same altar with himself and his young bride ; thus marking his own marriage by an act of benevolence. “ These old people,” he observed, “ will recall to my mind the meanness of my own origin ; and this renewal of their long union will prove of happy augury for my own.”

The thought was the emanation of a noble mind, but the presage which it expressed was unfortunately not to be accomplished.

Ney continued his military duties. At the end of the preceding year he had been appointed inspector-general of cavalry, and he gave to these troops all the attention which their importance in the army required. He made many useful alterations in their equipments and exercise ; he moreover reformed abuses, repaired former negligences, and obtained for several corps a distribution of relief of every kind. But a more important mission awaited him. Discord, which had just been extinguished in France, had again burst into a flame in Helvetia : the smaller cantons had resumed arms, and were about to plunge the country once more into the horrors of civil war. The First Consul, who for two years past had been solicited to become the mediator between these mountaineers, had constantly declined interfering. But now the question assumed a new form : it was now no longer a verbal discussion, but an appeal to force ; and a spark might fall and again set Europe in a blaze. He therefore acted according to the expediency of the case, and sent General Ney to establish peace and concord in Helvetia. All the cantons had solicited the mediation of the French Consul, and each was therefore bound to abide by it. But as moderation is seldom the concomitant of political differences, and fortune changes the minds of men, Ney had orders to give notice of his intervention and at the same time to assemble troops to make it respected. His mission, one of pure benevolence if passions and personal feeling were made to yield to the general interests of the country, was to become one of rigour if the inhabitants would not make this sacrifice. He was instructed, in a word, “ to keep himself ready to act, according to circumstances, the part of a mediator, or that of a general—to employ force if it were indispensable, and immediately to enter the Pays de Vaud if the insurgents should attack him.”†

\* In France, when a couple has spent half a century in the joys of wedded life, the nuptial benediction is renewed.

† Letter from the War Minister, dated 10th Vendemiaire, Year XI. (November 2nd, 1802.)

Ney, as we have already shown, had formerly served in Helvetia; but he had only vague notions concerning the dissensions which agitated that country. He nevertheless set out, reached Geneva, and devoted the time whilst his troops were assembling, to acquiring a precise and thorough knowledge of the state and views of the different parties, and of the forces they could bring into the field.

General Seras, who commanded at Geneva, had made a collection of their libels, reports, and proclamations, and by means of these documents Ney soon discovered what projects he had to repress, and what kind of men he was sent to oppose.

The chiefs of the insurrection concealed neither the motives by which they were actuated, nor the object they had in view. They did not deny their wish to overthrow the institutions lately established and revive those which existed prior to the revolution of 1798: that is to say, they wanted to restore to each canton its particular form of sovereignty, and establish so many separate states, united only by the bond of the old confederation, and which were to have no other central point than a diet, whose members should be obliged strictly to adhere to the imperative instructions of their constituents.

Such was the object they wanted to attain; and they applied to its pursuit all the obstinacy by which the Swiss are characterized. They had given more or less publicity to their plots, according as circumstances commanded circumspection or inspired boldness. So long as the territory had been occupied by French troops, they had never attempted to use force; but they had reserved the means of doing so on any future occasion, either by misleading their own party with false hopes, or by applying to foreign courts, more especially to those London and Vienna, for support against the protection which France gave to the new system of their government—a system whose object was to conciliate the administrative federalism of the cantons with the unity of a central government, invested with sufficient power to put down internal dissensions, and with authority to treat, in the name of the whole confederation, with foreign states and potentates.

After the peace of Luneville, the First Consul offered to withdraw the army of occupation from Helvetia, and the government of Helvetia injudiciously accepted the offer. The leader of the counter-revolutionary faction thought this a favourable opportunity for his projects, and endeavoured to avail himself of it. The members of this faction persuaded themselves, or at least tried to do so, that the First Consul had been compelled to recall his troops; and that several of the great powers of Europe intended to oppose any interference by France in the affairs of Switzerland. They interpreted the treaty of Luneville, so far as Helvetia was concerned, in a manner quite contrary to its spirit. They rekindled old associations of glory, and compared the then state of Switzerland to its former situation. The sojourn and passage of the French troops had, they said, imposed heavy burthens upon the citizens of Helvetia. By

such an argument they found it not difficult to excite feelings of hostility in the bosoms of a people naturally fond of money, and to whom even the name of impost was almost unknown before the French revolution. In the Catholic cantons they strengthened the idea that the constitution, in allowing the free exercise of different religions, had injured the religion professed by the majority. In a word, they neglected no means of inflaming the minds of the people against the government and attaching them to the opposition.

They were sure of co-operation in the towns formerly aristocratic, whose citizens regretted the privileges which they had lost, and saw with displeasure an equality of rights granted to all the citizens. They had the same certainty with regard to the cantons formerly democratic, particularly those of Uri, Schweitz, and Underwalden, inasmuch as these cantons had always evinced a decided repugnance to every kind of innovation.

Matters being thus ripe for an uprising, the cantons of Uri, Schweitz, and Underwalden declared themselves in a state of insurrection. They proclaimed the revival of their ancient constitution, and their separation from the rest of Switzerland. The Grisons, under the influence of the partisans of the house of Austria, and through the intrigues of Austrian agents, placed themselves under the protection of Austria, and then followed the example of the three smaller cantons, which Glaris and a part of Appenzell soon joined. Meanwhile Zurich refused to obey the government and receive its troops. Some ex-members of the oligarchic government of Berne organized about the same time an insurrection in Argau, a country formerly belonging to that canton, and succeeding, by dint of money and intrigue, in assembling a body of peasants, who marched into Soleure, next into Berne, and enlisted in their body, either by force or by good-will, every man they met on their way.

The government troops, distributed on many points, were neither sufficiently numerous nor commanded with sufficient ability to make head against the storm. They had attempted to force Zurich; but the valour of the citizens, and the tumultuous march of the hostile columns which were assembling in their rear, had forced them to abandon the enterprise, and they were obliged to retreat, leaving a free scope to the insurrection. They who conducted the latter immediately formed themselves into a diet, and called upon every young man to take up arms. They ordered levies of men and horses, and decreed the formation of an army of twenty thousand men. This latter measure, however, rather cooled the zeal of the inhabitants: each became less eager and less bold when he found his personal services called for. But the diet well knew how to excite and subjugate the population; and gold soon smoothed every difficulty. This kind of argument had been successfully used before; for it was well known that in the democratic cantons considerable sums of money had been distributed, which could not have been raised in the cantons



themselves, since the latter are miserably poor, and all their inhabitants live either in mediocrity or in complete poverty. The aristocratic cantons, and more particularly Berne, had made very heavy sacrifices. Money had been lavished with a sort of profusion; and it was with the aid of this stimulus, rather than any other, that the insurrection had been excited, and kept up. Each soldier received eighteen sous\* per diem, besides rations of bread and meat. A premium was also given to desertion from the government troops; a reward of four louis-d'or† being promised to each foot soldier who deserted with his accoutrements, and one of fifteen louis-d'or to each horse soldier who with his horse and accoutrements joined the ranks of the insurgents. The use of such means proved fatal to the government.

The army of the insurgents contained between seven and eight thousand men. From a thousand to twelve hundred of them had served in the legions of Bachmann and Roverea, both of whom, during the last war, had been in the pay of Great Britain. This army was divided into regiments; it was tolerably well supplied with arms and ammunition, and was not deficient in artillery. It had moreover at its disposal, the arsenals of Berne, Basle, Zurich, and Soleure; but its guns were badly served, being manned by soldiers unaccustomed to such service. The cavalry was few in number, and consisted only of a handful of the Helvetic hussars who had joined the insurgents, and a few companies of recently levied dragoons, little accustomed to military manœuvres. The principal columns of this little army were concentrated between Moudon and Payerne. On its right was a small corps commanded by Colonel Wagner, and a strong detachment commanded by Auf-der-maur was under the walls of Friburg.

The documents collected by general Seras giving but little information concerning the officers who commanded the insurgents, Verninac supplied the deficiency. This diplomatist, who had long resided in the confederation, was well acquainted with the men who now raised the standard of rebellion in this unhappy country. He sent General Ney a series of Biographical notices of them, which, though somewhat tinged with acrimony, were not wholly devoid of truth. We insert some of these.

“General Bachmann, commander-in-chief of the insurgent army, was formerly a colonel in the service of France, whence he passed as major-general into that of the King of Sardinia. On the fall of this prince, Bachmann, being refused employment in the French armies, entered the service of England, and levied a legion bearing his name, which he commanded during the last war. He is about sixty-four years of age, and is said to possess military talents.

“The general officers under his command are:—

“Auf-der-maur of Schweitz, about thirty-two years of age, and

\* About ninepence, an immense rate of pay in Switzerland, particularly at that period.

† The louis-d'or, at that time, was worth a little more than a pound sterling.

once a captain in the service of the King of Sardinia. He is related to Reding, whose creature he is. He may possess courage, but he is deficient in talent. In temper he is impetuous and obstinate.

“Wattenwyl of Berne has served in Holland. His military knowledge is not, it is said, very extensive. He has talent nevertheless, and is one of the chiefs of the party who would incline the most towards an accommodation.

“Herrenschwand of Morat is an ex-officer of large property, and a man of great information. Prior to the revolution, he obtained the citizenship of Berne.

“Pillichaudi, formerly a seigneur in the Pays de Vaud, has likewise obtained the citizenship of Berne. He is a notable agitator, very resolute, and wholly devoted to the oligarchy.

“The other officers of the army are, for the most part, young men from Berne, Zurich, and Soleure. Some have served with Bachmann, and with Roverea who also commanded a legion in the pay of England.

“The man who, during the revolution, has displayed the strongest hostility to the government, is Reding of Schweitz. He commanded the troops of the smaller cantons when General Schawenburg reduced them to submission. He has since been Landamman to the Helvetian republic, and, whilst he held that office, contributed greatly to embroil the affairs of this country. He was dismissed from the government on the 17th of April last, since which period he has not ceased to agitate his canton, where he has in his interest a number of individuals, who, having nothing to lose, procure him the means of exercising a most dangerous influence. It is generally believed that it was he who ordered the massacre of a detachment of French troops, sent in the year VII. to Schweitz to restore public tranquility. He has ever shown himself an enemy to France, and has often used the name of the First Consul to deceive his fellow citizens. His talents are not above mediocrity; but he is ambitious, obstinate, and very firm in following up what he determines upon. The oligarchy have won him to their interest, and have known how to make use of his pride and influence. He is, at the present moment, president of the diet assembled at Schweitz.

“Reding is powerfully seconded by the monks, more especially the Capuchins, among whom one Paul Stiger has made himself conspicuous. This fanatic excites the peasantry, communicates to them the fury with which he is himself animated, and makes use of their ignorance and superstition to stimulate them to the most lamentable excesses. Although censured by the bishop, he nevertheless continues his scandalous course of proceeding.”\*

\* The other party chiefs designated by Verninac were :—

“*In the Canton of Berne.*  
 “Freudenriech of Thorberg, an enlightened man, who resided in England during the revolution. He is one of the coryphæi of the oligarchy, and much attached to the ancient order of things.

"D'Erlach, ex-bailly of Berthoud. He is advanced in years, and his mental faculties are a little impaired. It was he who raised the peasants of Argau, of whom he at first assumed the command, but it was taken from him.

"Thormann, secretary of state under Reding. He is haughty, intriguing, and one of the bitterest among the oligarchs. He is an enemy to France, as are all the instigators of the counter-revolution.

"*In the Canton of Basle.*

"Mérian, ex-grand tribune, a partizan of Austria, ignorant, intriguing, and a man of property.

"*In the Canton of Glaris.*

"Zwniff, a headstrong old man without talent.

"*In the Canton of Unterwalden.*

"Dr. De Flue, a man of learning, belonging to one of the most ancient and respectable families in Switzerland. He exercises great influence.

"Wursch, ex-prefect, and now Landamman; he is fanatical and headstrong, and a warm supporter of the party of the demagogues.

"*In the Canton of Friburg.*

"Montenach, and Gadi formerly Avoyer. Both are clever and well informed.

"*In the Canton of Schaffhausen.*

"Pfister, a man of very ordinary capacity, devoted to the insurgents.

"*In the Canton of Tésin.*

"Rossi, post-master at Lugano. He

undertook to make known the proposals of the insurgents to the second auxiliary demi-brigade.

"*In the Territory of Baden.*

"Baldinger, a man of no capacity, but guided by Charles Reding, a relative of Reding of Schweitz. Charles Reding is a man of talent.

"*In the Canton of Uri.*

"Muller, formerly Landamman; he is without talent, devoted to Reding, and a red-hot demagogue.

"Jauch, cunning and well informed.

"*In the Canton of Appenzell.*

"Zellweguer, one of the richest individuals in Switzerland, in a state of exasperation, and an ignorant man.

"*In the Canton of Grisons.*

"The Salis family, respected, influential, and devoted to Austria.

"*In the Canton of Zurich.*

"Hirzel, Wiss, and Reinhard, formerly members of the oligarchic government; clever and well informed men, and who have always served their party with great zeal.

"*In the Canton of Lucerne.*

"Balthazard, a former member of the government; a man of business and exasperated.

"*In the Canton of Soleure.*

"Gloutz, a weak man devoid of talent."



## CHAPTER V.

THE rights established by the revolution of 1798, were now trampled under foot, and the doctrines and institutions of a past age proclaimed. This was a war in defence of principles upon which the two parties could not agree; and Ney's object was to take such measures as should repress the animosities and overcome the prejudices of both.

The whole of his disposable force consisted of four hundred men of the 2nd light infantry. The insurgents had just beaten the Helvetic troops at Morat, and the Genevese, in exultation at this victory, calculated upon still more brilliant feats of arms by the confederates. Ney soon perceived that the object of the confederation was to gain time, disperse and annihilate the remaining forces of the government, drive him from the Swiss territory, and then declare, upon the frontier, that all further intervention was useless, as the Swiss people were now agreed and party dissensions at an end. This plan, had it succeeded, would have changed the aspect of affairs; and Ney took measures to defeat it. He sent officers to hasten the march of the different French corps, and direct them upon Locarno, Huningen, Geneva, and Besançon. At the same time he marched towards Versoix, at the head of the small force he had with him. Not that he depended much upon what these four hundred men could do, but he thought they would produce a great moral impression; he therefore led them onward towards the Pays de Vaud. Colonel Rapp had already stopped the movement which it was Ney's purpose to counteract. This officer, having been despatched by the First Consul to make known his determination to the Swiss people, arrived at Lausanne just as the troops defeated at Morat were taking refuge there. Having notified to them the intention of the French government, they received the intelligence with joy, hailed the measure as a benefaction, and hastened to make it known to the insurgents, among whom it spread dismay. Rapp, who was compassionate and of an easy temper, made every allowance for men under circumstances such as the latter were placed in. He at first listened to them without uttering a word; he felt for them—he sympathized in their grief, and was anxious to give them time for it to exhale. But far from calming, his silence only rendered them bolder. He at length lost all patience, and unfolding a paper which he held in his

hand, presented to them the following proclamation of the First Consul:—

BONAPARTE, FIRST CONSUL OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC, TO THE  
EIGHTEEN CANTONS OF THE HELVETIAN REPUBLIC.

“Saint-Cloud, 18th Vendemiaire, Year XI.  
(October 10th, 1802.)

“INHABITANTS OF HELVETIA,

“For two years past you have offered a most afflicting spectacle. Hostile factions have successively usurped the powers of the state, marking their passage by a system of partiality which equally betrays their weakness and their incapacity. During the year X. your government requested that the small number of French troops still in Helvetia should be withdrawn, and the French government readily embraced the opportunity of doing honour to your independence. But, soon after, your party feuds broke out with fresh fury, and Swiss blood had been spilt by Swiss hands.

“You have disputed these three years without being able to settle your differences; and if you are left any longer to yourselves, you will destroy one another for three years longer without coming to any better understanding. Your history proves, moreover, that your intestine wars have at no period been terminated, but through the efficacious intervention of France.

“It is true that I had resolved to meddle no more with your affairs; for I had constantly observed that your different governments asked my advice without following it, and oftentimes made an undue use of my name to serve their own party views or passions.

“But I can no longer, nor ought I to remain insensible to the misfortunes which now bear upon you. I therefore depart from my resolution, and will become the mediator of your quarrels. But my mediation shall prove efficacious; it shall be such as befits a great people, in whose name I speak.

“Five days after this proclamation has been notified to you, the senate shall assemble at Berne.

“The whole of the magistracy formed at Berne since the capitulation, shall be dissolved, and shall cease to assemble or to exercise any authority.

“The several prefects shall proceed to their respective posts.

“All the authorities which have been constituted, shall no longer assemble or act.

“All armed meetings shall be dispersed.

“The first and second Helvetian brigades shall form the garrison of Berne.

“The troops which have been raised upwards of six months, shall alone remain in corps.

“ Every discharged soldier of the belligerent armies, who is now armed, shall deposit his arms at the municipality of the commune to which he belongs.

“ The senate shall send three deputies to Paris ; each canton may likewise send deputies.

“ Every citizen, having held the office of landamman, or that of senator, or who may have successively held appointments in the central government, may proceed to Paris, for the purpose of pointing out the means of restoring union and peace, and of conciliating all parties.

“ With regard to myself, I have a right to expect that no town, no commune, and no corps will do any thing contrary to what I here make known to you.

“ Inhabitants of Helvetia, let hope revive among you.

“ Your country is on the brink of a precipice, from which it shall be immediately withdrawn.

“ Every man of good principles will co-operate in this noble work.

“ But if, contrary to my expectations, there are among you a great number of individuals so devoid of virtue as not to sacrifice their passions and prejudices to the good of their country, ye have woefully degenerated, O people of Helvetia, from the greatness of your forefathers !

“ There is no man of sense among you, who does not perceive that the mediation which I have undertaken is a blessing of that Providence which, amid so many shocks and revolutions, has always watched over the independence of your nation ; and that this mediation is the only means left for saving both parties from destruction.

“ For it is time you should consider that if the patriotism and union of your ancestors founded your republic, the bad spirit of your factions will, if it continue, infallibly overthrow your nation ; and it would be painful to think that, at a period when several republics have been raised, fate had marked the end of one of the most ancient.

“ BONAPARTE.”

“ By order of the First Consul,

“ H. B. MARET, Secretary of State.”

This communication was indeed harsh, but it was precise. The insurgents must now either give way or fight ; they must either lay down their arms, or add to the horrors of civil the devastation of foreign war. The officers of the insurgent forces soon made up their minds to the former alternative ; but the case was different with the representative of the diet who followed the army, and who, being conceited, bold, and presumptuous, attempted to open a discussion upon a question which was now settled. He insisted upon the ma-



gistracy appointed by the insurgents retaining their appointments; Colonel Rapp replied by pointing out the clause in the proclamation which related to them. He next demanded that the Landraths should be maintained; Rapp again referred to the decision of the First Consul. He next insisted that the government should preserve its new powers; Rapp now lost all patience, and handing him the proclamation, told him harshly that he came there to ratify, and not to negotiate. Still the obstinate representative endeavoured to prolong the discussion; but the officers, weary of this waste of words, observed to him that they were receiving an official document which the colonel had no mission to modify; and that it must be either wholly accepted or rejected.

The representative hesitated an instant at this formidable alternative; but immediately recovering himself, threatened France with the acts of despair to which such harshness would drive the heroes of Morgaten.

"I believe in the marvels you announce," the Colonel replied; "you will no doubt fight and die like brave men; but General Ney has put his troops in motion. One of his divisions is assembling at Pontarlier, another at Huningen, a third is advancing by Bellinzona, and a fourth is about to debouch from Valais. If these troops advance a single step, and push on towards Aarburg, Estevayer, Villerneuve, or Locarno, you will be annihilated at a single blow; and in the glen, without a second outlet, in which you have imprudently placed yourselves, you will not have even the satisfaction of a glorious death. I offer this to your consideration."

This statement was lamentably correct; but although the council felt their weakness, they were far from imagining all the disadvantages of their position. Nevertheless both the generals and the representative hastened to subscribe to every condition, in order to extricate themselves from it. Bachmann signed a suspension of arms, and the representative signed the act of dissolution of the body whose delegate he was.

The mediation being thus accepted in principle, nothing now remained but to carry the details into execution. Ney stopped his movement; but as there was yet no guarantee of the submission of the diet, and the snow season was approaching, he so disposed his troops as to be able, at a moment's notice, to put down resistance, if it were offered. He soon had reason to congratulate himself on this act of prudence.

Scarcely was the armistice concluded ere it was violated. The insurgent army advanced upon Friburg, and even went so far as to summon it to surrender.

The news of the First Consul's proclamation had reached this place. The troops which defended it knew confusedly that the proclamation commanded peace, and prescribed that both victors and vanquished should lay down their arms. They therefore urged this

in reply to the summons; but Colonel Effinguer, an insurgent officer, declared to them upon his honour that this was not the case, but that the government had been obliged to give way to the insurgent forces. The garrison believing this statement, yielded the place without resistance. It was impossible to obtain success by baser means, or to give a more glaring instance of the bad faith and dishonourable practices of the confederates.

The commission sitting at Berne was neither more honourable in its conduct, nor more sincere in its professions. Colonel Rapp having summoned it to dissolve, it pretended to be unable to do so unless authorised by the diet. The latter, in its turn, eluded giving such authority; and an attempt to gain time was made by all parties concerned in the revolution. On the other hand, the conduct of the Helvetian government was still more censurable than that of the confederates. Having been established with all the attributes of power, it proved as feeble and irresolute as before its late overthrow. Nothing could induce it come to any fixed resolution. In vain did Ney urge the senate to assume a firmer attitude; in vain did he call upon Rapp to acquaint him with the decision of the diet. The one was always timid and wavering in its replies, the other had nothing but hopes and vague surmises to send him. Under these circumstances he resolved to go himself and put an end to this uncertainty, which had already lasted too long.

He accordingly set out with two officers, and had not yet reached Moudon ere he met Adjutant-general Lemarrois, who was bringing him an answer from Schweitz to his last despatch. The diet refused to be dissolved, and signified its intention of using the right which the Swiss held from their forefathers, and from established treaties, of constituting their government according to their wants.\* It was not

\* THE DIET OF THE CONFEDERATED CANTONS TO CITIZEN GENERAL RAPP, AIDE-DE-CAMP TO THE FIRST CONSUL OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

CITIZEN GENERAL,

The Landamman Reding has this day laid before us your two letters of 27th Vendemiaire, year XI: the one forwarded to him by a messenger, the other by an express.

You refer more especially in one of them to an engagement stated to have been entered into by our representative attached to the army of the confederation, who is also a member of this diet.

The enclosed is a copy of the report which he made to us on this subject, and if you reflect upon its contents, you will be convinced that our intention still remains the same as it has ever been: namely, not to oppose the armed forces of the French Government. But we have been driven by past events to put ourselves upon our guard, and take precautions necessary to our safety against the Helvetian Government which has just been re-established. This we have done in the firm persuasion that the First Consul will be pleased to take into his gracious consideration the representations which we have had the honor of addressing to him, and also the reports which he has received from yourself.

It was not from our own wish that we undertook so difficult a charge as that we hold; it was imposed upon us by the confidence of our fellow citizens; and both our

without anger that Ney saw the undue advantage which had been taken of Rapp's openness and candour; but he had just received his appointment as minister plenipotentiary to the Helvetian republic, and his instructions breathed nothing but peace and good will. Flattering himself therefore, that he should soon bring the diet to a more becoming determination, he continued his journey. That which he required will be found in the following letter, containing the First Consul's instructions; and it will be seen that it was impossible for any country to show a deeper interest and a greater solicitude for another than France did for Switzerland on this occasion.

THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO GENERAL NEY.

Paris, 26th Vendemiaire, Year, XI.

(October 18th, 1802.)

"GENERAL,

"I am directed by the First Consul to inform you that he has been pleased to appoint you minister plenipotentiary from this republic to the Helvetian republic. You will therefore proceed to Berne, where you will receive the further instructions he has directed me to send you, and you will there fulfil the duties of your mission.

conscience and our duty towards them render it incumbent upon us to strive, in the most scrupulous manner, to execute its duties. As deputies we cannot take upon ourselves to dissolve our own body.

The Swiss have inherited from their forefathers the right of constituting their government according to the wants of their country; a right which has again been secured to them by the First Consul himself, in his capacity of high contracting party in the treaty of Luneville, and for which we owe him our deepest gratitude. This right is of a nature to impose upon us the obligation of transmitting it to our descendants. Therefore, neither we nor our constituents can forego it.

The First Consul, in his magnanimity, will doubtless not disapprove of this our mode of thinking, which ought to be that of every Swiss who truly loves his country; and surely he will never suffer a nation, which in no wise opposes his power, to be treated with hostility, more especially when that nation desires nothing more ardently than to owe once more the power of forming its political institutions to the kindness of the French Government.

We are in like manner persuaded that the Swiss nation will preserve an eternal remembrance of such an act of beneficence, and that its efforts will ever tend to prove, on all occasions, its attachment to the French Government.

Have the goodness, Citizen General, to use your influence with the First Consul of the French Republic, your powerful principal, to induce him favourably to receive our representations; the happiness of an honest and independent nation depends upon it. Surely to secure this happiness must be the object of your mission, and also your personal wish; and if you condescend to grant our request, you will certainly confer it upon us. We have the honour to be,

Citizen General,

The deputies composing the Diet of the Confederated Cantons, and in their name

ALOYS REDING, President.

(A true copy)

Schweitz, Oct. 21st. 1802.

NEY.



"A few days since, Helvetia was in agitation; the flame of civil war burst forth in every part of it; but the proclamation of the First Consul has given ideas of order and peace to all its inhabitants. The citizens of that country, struck with the wisdom of the advice given to them by the First Consul, have lost no time in following it. The principal object of your mission is to maintain and direct them in this just and prudent deference. It is probable that the senate, recently reinstated at Berne, will evince little of that strength of opinion so necessary to the authority it is called upon to exercise; it is likewise presumable that the municipal authorities of that city will feel but little disposed to submit to the authority of the senate. From your title of minister plenipotentiary, your former office, and your talents, you will derive means of influence which you will employ, more particularly in preventing any marked opposition to the government. All who have been, or are now in authority in Helvetia, must live together in peace and harmony. The present moment must appear favourable to no one for disputing about obedience and power. The universally accepted mediation of the First Consul must give sufficient influence to his minister to enable the latter successfully to recommend concord, tranquillity, and confidence in the kindly sentiments of the First Consul. The constant principle of your conduct lies in the execution of the clauses of the First Consul's proclamation, which recommend the return of the senate to Berne, the dispersion of the recently armed troops, and the sending to Paris of deputies from the different parties, in order to proceed to the social organization of Helvetia.

"I have reason to believe, from the letters of Citizen Verninac, that the two first clauses are fulfilled. If any thing still remains to be done on the second, you will use every exertion to secure its immediate and entire execution.

"It is of great importance that the last should be executed, in conformity with the just and impartial views of the First Consul, who has ever proved that he granted no favour to factions. He mistrusts, and justly so, every man who has rendered himself conspicuous in either of the parties which have nearly destroyed Helvetia. But as among such individuals there are some whose motives are above suspicion, it is but just that they should be consulted, and deference be thus shown to the opinions of the great number of citizens who placed confidence in them.

"The First Consul is desirous that you should advise the choice of the most prudent men of all parties. They who, during the late troubles, evinced the most regret at being seduced to join in them—they who were in the greatest alarm at the dangers of their country—and they who with the greatest degree of sincerity hastened to give the preference to measures of conciliation over an appeal to arms, seem to him the best qualified to work at the organization of their country.

“Do not cease to impress upon the minds of the citizens of Helvetia, that the First Consul has most particularly in view the repose, happiness, and greatness of Helvetia; that the Helvetian republic can be neither rich, nor happy, nor powerful, except by its union with France; and that it is principally in this view that he is desirous that the confidence should not be withdrawn, which Switzerland has always placed in the French government.

“The foreign powers are no longer enemies to France; but the present state of peace cannot destroy envy; and all have not, like France, a wish that Switzerland should enjoy tranquillity. It is the policy of some to consider the agitation of Helvetia a means of giving uneasiness to France and the neighbouring states; and this agitation offers, perhaps, to some men hostile to the peace of Europe, a prospect more or less remote of political dissensions, the result of which might be a renewal of war.

“Thus, the tranquillity of Helvetia is an advantage common to the whole of Europe; and its prudent and calm organization under the safeguard of France is connected with the most important interests of the general peace; consequently, the accomplishment of this organization appertains to the duty of the government of the republic, and forms one of its paramount interests.

“Such, Citizen, is the precise sense in which you are to express yourself. All that you may say to the persons with whom you may be in communication, must tend to prove that the First Consul will suffer nothing against the repose and power of Helvetia; that he considers it a duty to renew the friendly and eminently confidential relations which have at all times united Helvetia to France; and that any organization which would attain this object, so honourable, and at the same time so useful to Helvetia, would receive his approbation, provided it accorded with the feelings of the majority of the Helvetian people.

“I am expressly directed by the First Consul to recommend your carefully avoiding to write to any authority whatever in Helvetia. The frequent abuse of official documents in that country, renders it incumbent upon us to confine ourselves to verbal communications, which, moreover, are well suited to the occasion, and sufficient for the provisional state in which every constituted authority is placed, until the country is wholly organized.

“I am happy, Citizen, that the choice of the First Consul has fallen upon you to direct the legation of the republic in Helvetia, as it gives me an opportunity of corresponding with you, and of acquainting the First Consul with the proofs of prudence and zeal which you will give in the course of your mission.

“I think it right to observe to you that malevolent persons are endeavouring to spread a report that the First Consul would feel disposed to yield to a wish which a spirit of imitation might excite relative to the presidency of the Helvetian republic. You must formally

discourage any such idea, which is as far from the anticipations of the First Consul, as contrary to his firm determination.

“I must also, by the express orders of the First Consul, beg of you to avoid, at meetings of the authorities, any set speeches which might be taken down and published. You must take care, at the same time, to impart to your advice a character of dignity and kindness in keeping with the functions of a purely political minister. You must avoid any display that would seem too military, or resemble command. All that might make you appear to the Swiss as the general of an army stationed on their frontier, must be carefully avoided. Now that compliance has been yielded to the directions of the First Consul, you are the minister of a powerful ally, who would only give good advice, and act according to the inspirations of wisdom.

“I have now, General, only to request that you will punctually acquaint me with whatever passes around you. Under present circumstances no detail is indifferent; and the First Consul, to whom I shall communicate all your despatches, wishes to be regularly informed of every thing that occurs in Helvetia. I have the honour, &c.

“CH. TALLEYRAND.”

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## CHAPTER VI.

SUCH were the First Consul's instructions to Ney, and such the duties he had to perform. As the agitation of Switzerland was likely to embroil Europe, it became expedient to put an end to it, dissolve the armed bands which still existed in the country, and place the power of the state in the hands of men prudent, disinterested, and capable of doing justice to the institutions by which they were to be governed. This mission, though flattering, was not unattended with difficulty. Berne, it is true, had accepted the mediation; Soleure had followed this example; and Friburg, whom the insurgents had just evacuated, had hastened to acknowledge the act by which the country was to be saved from destruction. But the rest of Switzerland remained in arms. The diet protested, and refused to dissolve itself; and Berne, at the very time it yielded to the will of France, obeyed with evident repugnance the government which that power had reinstated. Matters were in a state of extreme delicacy, and Ney was obliged to bend his will to some circumstances contrary to his opinions, the better to stifle the passions in ferment around him. The government, however, continued weak and vacillating; it seemed fearful of committing an act of firmness. Dolder, its president,



was an Argovian manufacturer, of the strictest honesty and morality ; but passive, indifferent, governed alternately by the opposite factions, and paying little attention to the administration of the laws. Neither he nor his colleagues dared to show the least resolution. In vain did Ney represent to them the importance of the circumstances under which they were placed, and point out to them the duties prescribed by the act of mediation :—he obtained nothing but sterile protestations and empty assurances. They had been four days at Berne, and no public measure had yet been taken. Ney went to the senate, and endeavoured to make the senators assume an attitude consistent with their authority ; but all his remonstrances were unavailing. The very name of Reding threw these pusillanimous magistrates into an agony of dread ; and Ney was obliged to repeat the assurance he had already given them, that he would disperse the diet of Schweitz, and take care that the decrees of the senate should be executed. This declaration having given them a little confidence, they appointed three of their members to proceed to Paris, and took the necessary measures for the election of the other deputies, who were to proceed thither as the representatives of the different cantons.

The diet, on the other hand, was not less wavering and undecided ; and, although it did not break up, it appeared more disposed to act on the defensive than on the offensive, and to have no other object in view than uttering silly declamation about its pretended rights. Colonel Rapp, a little ashamed at having been made its dupe, had gone to summon it to fulfil its engagements ; but, from the peculiar bent of his mind, Rapp was the least qualified of any man to carry on such a negotiation. Kind-hearted, of easy temper, and naturally disposed to espouse the cause of the weaker party, he confined his attack to Reding's dissertations, and obtained no other result from his excursion than the announcement of the resolution, nay, the necessity under which the assembly of Schweitz felt itself, of waiting for the appearance of the French troops before it broke up. Ney was less complying. The diet seemed straining to keep up agitation throughout the country, and propagate vain hopes among the people. Sometimes it boasted of the support of Great Britain ; at others it spread reports of troubles at Paris ;—one day Austria was marching to the assistance of the Swiss Cantons ; the next brought news of the overthrow of the First Consul. There was no kind of absurdity which it did not propagate for the sole purpose of increasing the irritation of the people. Ney despatched a summons calling upon it to disperse forthwith ; and directed the officer entrusted with the message, to threaten it with the national vengeance, if it dared any longer to delay. But it was now in no situation to obey the summons ; for, being itself suspected of indifference to the cause of the confederation, it was governed by its guards, and could adopt no measure which was not agreeable to them. It was moreover imbued with Reding's notion, that it could not, without dishonouring itself

in the eyes of Europe, break up until the French columns should appear and dissolve it by force.

Ney was therefore obliged to recur to force to carry his point, and accordingly put his troops in motion ; but the diet was beforehand with him : the armed bands, collected by means of beacon fires, and other signals assembled round their standards. Formidable columns were speedily collected upon the right bank of the Reuss, and extended from Lucerne to the conflux of this river. From the nature of the mountains in which they were, they had the power of keeping up a resistance which could be overcome only at the expense of torrents of blood. To combat and defeat these troops, was nevertheless not very difficult ; but Ney considered that violence had always better be avoided, and that a friendly intervention ought to be conducted by pacific means alone. He had a lieutenant able to comprehend the importance of his mission ; and to this officer Ney stated his apprehensions, and submitted his plans for counteracting those of the confederates. Séras was this amiable assistant ; he entered fully into Ney's views, and was entrusted with the command of the movement. He was a prudent and able soldier, and knew full well how to make allowances for the feelings of men under political excitement. He perceived that the diet, fully sensible of its weakness, and of the folly of resistance, was desirous only to save appearances, and he humour-ed it in this desire. Having drawn out his forces, he paraded, affected rapid marches, and displayed to the affrighted deputies the prospect of an immediate attack. They who until now had only beheld war at a remote distance, drew back in affright from the conflagration that seemed about to be kindled. Backmann was the first to lay down his arms. This noble-minded man, though without fortune or prospects, and already advanced in years, voluntarily doomed himself to exile, rather than continue a struggle which would no doubt have encircled his brows with laurels, but would have reduced his country to wretchedness.

Séras, whose march was becoming more free, advanced to Lucerne, Zug, and Sarnen, all of which he occupied without obstacle. But the case was different at Zurich : there, resistance had long been prepared, and the struggle seemed likely to become serious. Séras marched upon that place at the head of seven battalions of infantry, the 3rd chasseurs, and a company of light artillery. Scarcely, however, did the troops of the confederation, then in position upon Aar, perceive the French advancing towards them, than they fell back in great haste. Séras followed them, pressed his march, and after a pursuit of fifteen leagues, came up with them on the Limath, which he crossed, and formed into line upon both banks. The night passed without accident. At day-break, the insurgents wanted to establish their posts ; but the French drove them back to Zurich, and entered the place with them. Colonel Mayer, who appeared before Séras under a flag of truce, made an attempt to protest against the inter-

vention; but the French general ordered him to be silent, and continued his movement. The bands of music at the head of the French troops played airs denoting victory, and the citizens of Zurich were at first seized with a panic; but, soon recovering, they mingled their acclamations with the music of the French, and saluted the French columns with cries of "Long live the First Consul! Vive la France!" They then ran to the prisons, and delivered those whom a short time before they had confined there as traitors to their country. Considerable bodies of insurgents, however, came to their assistance; but the French avoided hostilities, and opened negotiations. They represented to the Swiss people that the intervention, far from being prejudicial to their country, was the anchor of safety which the First Consul had thrown to them in their distress; and that the first magistrate of the French republic had no other view than that of restoring peace to their country, securing their liberties and independence, and doing justice to all parties. Both soldiers and peasants immediately laid down their arms, and returned peaceably to their homes.

Forty pieces of cannon, a great number of muskets, and immense stores of ammunition, fell into the hands of the French; but a much more important result was produced by the prudent conduct of Séras, who succeeded in throwing a strong discredit upon the diet at Schweitz. During these operations not a shot was fired, not a drop of blood spilt, nor a single cause of dissatisfaction given to the citizens:—nothing could have been more ably and more successfully managed.

Zurich having submitted, Séras marched to Schweitz, where no greater resistance was offered than at Zug and Lucerne. The leaders of the insurrection and the members of the diet fled with equal speed, and no one made the least attempt to stop them.

Arms, ammunition, and provisions in abundance fell into the hands of Séras, who now held at his disposal all the resources of the confederation. The storm, nevertheless, had not yet blown off. The men who had so easily surrendered the place, did not discontinue their invectives against the First Consul; and some of them even went to the length of boasting that they had adjourned their vengeance until the snow season;—they even talked of Sicilian vespers, and of the speedy extermination of the French in Switzerland.—Doubtless, such atrocities were not germane to Helvetian manners; nevertheless, the corpses of the murdered French soldiers were still lying in the vale of Disentis, and the troops of Séras were reminded of the circumstance by the Swiss themselves. This was a delicate reminiscence, and calculated to excite bitter feelings on both sides.

On the other hand, the small committees which existed in every part of Helvetia, together with the monks, and more especially those of Einsiedlen, did not cease from agitating the country. As such manœuvres might possibly lead to an explosion fatal to Switzerland, Ney hastened to put these agitators down, warning the monks that



the least attempt against his soldiers would be severely punished ; and in order to prevent the turbulent and headstrong from attempting any important movement, he resolved to disarm the people. This was a delicate measure : the mountaineers were never without their arms ; they carried them in their excursions, and displayed them in their cottages, where they formed at the same time a piece of ornamental furniture and a means of defence. These men were extremely jealous of their right to carry arms. But matters had assumed so serious an aspect, that Ney did not hesitate ; he ordered that the arms should be given up, and contrary to his expectations, he obtained them without any dangerous opposition. Not but that the measure called forth the strongest remonstrances, and various subterfuges were employed to elude it. One pretended that he had always respected the established order of things ; another attributed his assuming arms to particular circumstances ; a third declared that he had participated in no reaction whatever ; a fourth vowed he had never committed any act of violence. Each, according to his own view, was entitled to retain his carbine ; each, according to his own statement, was quite incapable of encouraging or permitting the least excess. The government was simple enough to add its testimony to the accounts which the inhabitants gave of themselves. They who composed it were apprehensive that the measure would alienate the public opinion from it in a still greater degree ; they therefore talked much of the peaceable disposition and moderation of those whom the French had surprised with arms in their hands. Ney paid no attention to this base truckling of the government, and excepted from the measure none but land-owners residing upon remote estates. There still remained stores of arms and ammunition which the diet had ordered to be concealed among the mountain rocks. As no search could lead to their discovery, Ney offered a reward to such individuals as would point out the places of their concealment, by which means he was soon able to seize them.

The Grisons were not so easily managed ; neither was this to be wondered at. Prior to the late changes, the sovereignty descended, among them, even to the lowest shepherd. They had no other code of laws than a few fragments of the Carolinæ ; each commune was sovereign and independent, and every citizen was subject, even in last resort, to no other jurisdiction than that of his own commune. The Grisons paid no taxes ; so far from it that some among them levied imposts on foreign states in the shape of secret pensions, granted to them by the governments who wished to secure votes at the diet of the Three Leagues.

Service in the armies of foreign potentates was also a source of wealth to them ; and appointments in the government and judicature at home were another means of fortune. The existence of a central government had dried up these sources of prosperity ; gratifications had been superseded by taxes ; pensions had ceased, and places of

public trust had become less lucrative. The inhabitants had been obliged to forego abuses so profitable to them ; and to complete the sum of their vexations, they were undergoing persecution for having so long enjoyed these abuses. The Valteline, for instance, not satisfied with putting an end to a ruinous administration, had seized and sold the property of its *powerful sovereigns*, the Grison shepherds. The lower orders were not less irritated at these things than the patricians. The clergy had lost their former influence, in public measures ; and the mechanics no longer enjoyed a monopoly of the fruits of industry. All classes were therefore in a state of intense excitement, and trembled with anger at the very name of a French intervention.

The lesser cantons were neither more tranquil nor more resigned than the Grisons. An explosion seemed likely soon to take place, which might lead to much bloodshed ; and Ney, anxious to avert such a calamity, sent officers into all parts of Helvetia. He professed compassion for some, to whom he represented that although the charges of occupation were no doubt heavy, they were nevertheless preferable to the immense sacrifices and alarms which civil war would inevitably have produced. He consoled others, announcing a speedy termination of their misery, and promising that it should cease with the return of their deputies. He declared, moreover, that, in the mean time, he would lighten the burthens of the occupation as much as lay in his power, and that no contributions should be levied on the citizens, except what was absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the troops under his command. He likewise sent to the religious corporations, and enjoined the heads of convents to use their influence in quieting the people, maintaining peace in country places, and turning the inhabitants either from acts of rebellion, or from any other proceedings that might tend to involve them in difficulties.

These measures produced a sort of tranquillity in the smaller cantons, and the population resumed their labours. An unobservant spectator might have supposed the dissensions of Switzerland for ever terminated ; but it soon became evident that such was by no means the case. The Swiss have all the duplicity remarked in mountaineers of every country ; but nature has provided them with a play of features which prevents them from concealing the feelings. The expression of their countenance is too marked, and their blood does not flow with sufficient rapidity to enable them to substitute the expression of an unfelt emotion for that by which they are really affected. Every feeling is depicted in their features, and in spite of themselves they expose that which they are most anxious to conceal.

Ney's troops, billeted upon and fed by the inhabitants, soon attracted their confidence, and became acquainted with their most cherished projects. The French soldiers pitied their situation ; and contenting themselves with the coarse fare supplied by their hosts, recommended concord, appeased their dislikes and prejudices, and by such conduct

drew forth the confidential overflowings of their lacerated bosoms. They had not ceased to look upon Reding as their providence; they placed all their hopes in him, relied on his courage, and considered themselves invincible whilst he was still among them. Auf-der-Maur, though more a man of execution, was less to be feared. But as both inflamed the imaginations, and fed the false hopes of these indocile herdsmen, Ney gave orders for their apprehension, as well as for that of some other individuals, who, without great personal fame, still exercised a sort of influence over the opinions of the peasants. Among the latter were Wursch, ex-landamman of the insurgents, to whom public report attributed the massacre of the French troops stationed at Schweitz; and Hirzel, a cunning and plausible man, and an incurable aristocrat.

Reding, when apprehended, was returning from a journey to the smaller cantons. He was at first surprised and struck with consternation; but soon recovering, he consoled himself under the idea that this measure proceeded from the French plenipotentiary, and that the Helvetian government would never have dared to adopt it. As for Auf-der-Maur, he was affected even to tears. Having committed divers excesses, and amongst others plundered the house of General Wonderweide, his situation was calculated to make him uneasy.

This event was not displeasing to the rich land-owners, whom the popularity and turbulence of Reding had displeased. But the people were very differently affected, and at first gave way without restraint to the grief caused by his arrest. They however remained peaceable, and soon forgot their dissensions and him who promoted them. The national party, on the other hand, took courage; and they who, being intimidated until now by the desperate efforts of a faction in its death-struggle, had not dared to manifest the slightest opposition to it, no longer feared to declare their feelings and principles, and to denounce several undiscovered depôts of arms in the mountains. In the neighbourhood of Schweitz four pieces of cannon were concealed, together with a large store of ammunition; at Glaris, St. Gall, and Mels there were twenty pieces of artillery, with immense stores. These last resources of the insurgents were now seized, collected at Brunen, and sent to Lausanne by the lake of Lucerne. And it is a singular fact, that the arrival of these things, which a week previously would have excited an insurrection among this haughty population, now gave a species of satisfaction. They congratulated themselves at being deprived of the means of undertaking any future insurrection. No one had it any longer in his power to feed the flame of revolt; and the people quietly resumed their habits of industry and moderation. Thus, by long-suffering and indulgence Ney easily obtained that which he would perhaps have been unable to effect by measures of violence.

Murat, anxious to pay the tribute of praise which Ney's conduct deserved, wrote to him as follows:



“This campaign of an instant has covered you with glory. It is a noble thing to have obtained, by mild proceedings, combined with a formidable appearance, that which another would have effected by force of arms. And recollect, my dear General, that you have a neighbour who will feel a real pleasure in seconding your operations with all his power.

“Milan, 27th Brumaire, Year XII. (Nov. 18th, 1802.)”

## BOOK THE SIXTH.

## CHAPTER I.

NEY was yet far from the accomplishment of his mission ; and if he had no positive and resolute resistance to put down, he had nevertheless to contend against the listlessness and indifference consequent upon defeat. The vanquished had, it is true, left the field, but they still refused to sanction the interference against which they had been contending, and they declined taking any share in the discussion of the question which it had raised. One very important circumstance preyed heavily upon their minds. The time was fixed for the election of the deputies to be sent to France for the purpose of framing a new constitution. They trembled therefore for the safety of their franchises ; and obedience to such an injunction as the one notified to them by the First Consul of the French Republic, seemed to them a mere preliminary to the total subversion of their liberties. On the other hand, they considered it an act of vassalage to go France, a foreign state, for the purpose of discussing the articles of their own free constitution. Ney made due allowance for their objections, which he knew to arise from a highly honourable feeling ; and he accordingly endeavoured to soothe their excited apprehensions. In this attempt he showed no disposition to enforce ; he only endeavoured to persuade : he represented to them that they were sacrificing the substance to the mere form ; that their objection was only prolonging the occupation of their country ; and that the convocation to which they evinced such repugnance was a simple matter of form, which any state, under certain circumstances, might feel compelled either to require in another or to comply with at the call of another. He further urged, that in the request of the First Consul to send deputies to France, there was really nothing either to humiliate or to alarm them ; and the First Consul himself had made it with no other view than to remove the persons composing the deputation beyond the influence of local prejudices ; that it would be impossible for these deputies to draw up a durable constitution ; and such a one as should

secure the permanent welfare of their country, unless they were wholly independent, and not within the reach of the intrigues and secret plots of factious men. The mediator, he said, in urging that they should go to him, had no other object than to listen to their opinions, make up their differences, comply with just and equitable claims, and carry into effect the combined views of men adequate to the task of co-operating in a free and prudent organization.

Though these observations were not without weight, the hesitation still continued, until by a lucky inspiration of thought Ney succeeded in changing the public feeling. He had constantly sought for opportunities of becoming personally acquainted with the most influential men in the country. He visited them, entertained them in his turn, and collected with care the opinions of each, relative to the troubles of Helvetia and to the individuals who had successively taken a leading part in public affairs. This plan, which had often been the means of his obtaining useful information, had brought him into contact with M. de Mulhinen, formerly a colonel in the service of France, a man of highly honourable character, free from exaggerated opinions, and above all zealously devoted to his country. Being strongly attached to the oligarchic party, whose confidence he enjoyed, no man was better able than M. de Mulhinen to set forth the views of that party, and advocate its rights, nor was any man better deserving of attention on such subjects. Ney, who had already mentioned M. de Mulhinen to the First Consul, was desirous that he should join the deputation; but the Helvetian officer sometimes urged his repugnance to go to France, at others objected that he had no mission. Unable to obtain his consent to take a voluntary share in the construction of the constitutional edifice, Ney imagined to have his assistance requested by the French government. The colonel, informed no doubt of Ney's project, wrote to the French minister for foreign affairs stating that he was resolved not to go to Paris. But Ney's letter had been so pressing, that Talleyrand replied to M. de Mulhinen's by an earnest request, almost amounting to a command, to join the deputation.

"The happiness of Helvetia," he wrote, "and the success of the First Consul's mediation, are to be found only in a great and speedy conciliation of all party opinions. The friends of freedom will not make it triumph in Helvetia except in honouring its cause by their moderation, and in displaying a strong spirit of concord, as well as the most complete indulgence for past errors."

This request, combined with Ney's solicitude and compliance with every reasonable wish, overcame all the obstacles which a high sense of honour, as well as the workings of malevolence, had opposed to his exertions. The smaller cantons proceeded to elect their deputies, which until now they had obstinately refused to do, and these deputies, when elected, immediately set out to join those of the confederation who were already at Paris.



The Helvetian deputation being thus complete, the first part of Ney's mission was fulfilled; but scarcely had he got over one difficulty ere another crossed his path. The First Consul received the deputation in the most gracious manner; he declared to its members that Switzerland, from its geographical situation, its manners, and its customs, was essentially a federative state, and that the question was, not to bewilder themselves in vain theories, but to establish and form, upon a just basis, such a government as nature had pointed out to them; that each deputy was therefore called upon to give his views and opinions, state the particular wants of his own canton, and point out the plan of organization best suited to it; and that when this organization was once fixed upon, the bond which was to unite the different states would soon be found.\*

\* BONAPARTE, FIRST CONSUL AND PRESIDENT, TO THE DEPUTIES OF THE EIGHTEEN CANTONS OF THE HELVETIAN REPUBLIC.

St. Cloud, 19th Frimaire, Year XI.  
(November 2nd, 1802.)

CITIZENS, DEPUTIES OF THE HELVETIAN REPUBLIC,

The situation of your country is critical; moderation, prudence, and the sacrifice of your passions are necessary to save it. Having resolved, in the face of Europe, to render my mediation effective, I shall fulfil all the obligations which the noble office I have undertaken imposes upon me; but that which is difficult without your concurrence, will become easy with your aid and influence.

Switzerland bears no resemblance to any other state, either in the succeeding events of several centuries, or in its geographical and topographical situation, or in its different languages, different religions, and the extreme difference of manners existing in the several parts of its territory.

Nature has rendered your state a federative one, and no wise man could form a wish to subjugate it.

Circumstances, combined with the spirit of past ages, has established in your country a sovereign people and a subject people; but recent events combined with a different spirit, sprung from a new era, and more consonant with reason, have restored an equality of rights among all the inhabitants of your territory.

Several of your cantons have, during many centuries, followed the most absolute democracy; in others, a few families have usurped the power, and have thus become at one and the same time subjects and sovereigns. The influence of the spirit prevalent in Italy, Savoy, France, and Alsace—states by which you are surrounded—essentially contributed to establish in the latter cantons the order of things adopted there; but the opinions of these different countries are now changed, and the renunciation of all privileges is your first necessity, as well as your first right.

That which is therefore consistent with the wish and interests both of your nation and of the different countries which border upon it, is comprised under the following heads:

1. Equality of rights throughout your eighteen cantons.
2. A sincere and voluntary renunciation, by the patrician families, of their privileges.
3. A federative organization, in which each canton shall be administered according to its language, its religion, its manners and customs, its interests, and its opinions.

The most important task is to decide upon the specific organization of each of your eighteen cantons.

This declaration again put all Switzerland in commotion. The oligarchs perceived in the proposed federative system, a means of regaining their ascendancy; the economy with which it was to be attended pleased others; and the major part of the population, who saw in it a proper degree of freedom, and an assured existence as a nation, were pleased that such advantages should be acknowledged and guaranteed by France. Some individuals were nevertheless discontented, and vented their feelings in murmurs and complaints. These were the supporters of the unitary system, at whose head appeared the President Dolder, the Statthalter Fueslin, Mohr the senator, Stapfer, and some friends of these individuals. They had expected the establishment of a strong and powerful republic; but this hope being now destroyed, they were unable to disguise their displeasure, and they spread abroad the most unfavourable insinuations against the intentions of the French government.

This being once settled, you will have to determine upon the connexion which shall exist between them; and then to establish your central organization, which is in reality much less important than your cantonal organization. Finance, army, administration,—nothing can be uniform among you. You have never been able to support a standing army; you can never possess great financial resources; and you have never even sent diplomatic agents to the different powers of Europe. Situated, as you are, on the summit of the chain of mountains which separates France, Germany, and Italy from each other, you partake of the peculiar spirit of these several nations. The neutrality of your country, the prosperity of your trade, and your being governed as one family, are the only things suitable to your population, and likely to preserve you as a nation.

I have always urged the same opinions to your deputies, whenever they have consulted me on their affairs; and these opinions seem to me so well founded that I had hoped you would have been induced, without the employment of any extraordinary means, and by the very nature of things, to concur in the truth of this system. But they who seemed the most convinced of its justness, were likewise the very persons who, from interested motives, clung with the greatest pertinacity to family privileges, and who, having granted their good wishes, and many the assistance of their sword to the French armies, felt a disposition to seek elsewhere than in France a support for their country.

Any organization made in Helvetia, which your people might have supposed contrary to the wishes and interests of France, could not have proved advantageous to you.

Having hitherto spoken to you a language which a Swiss citizen might have used, it now behoves me to address you as the chief magistrate of two powerful countries, and not to conceal from you that France will never allow a system of government to be established among you which might prove favourable to your enemies.

The repose and tranquillity of forty millions of men who are your neighbours, and without whom you could neither subsist as individuals nor exist as a state, must also be of great weight in the scale of general justice. Let there be among you nothing hostile to them;—let every thing be in unison with their feelings; and, as in ages past, let it be your first interest, your first policy, and your first duty, to do nothing nor suffer any thing to be done on your territory, which either directly or indirectly may injure the interests, the honour, or the cause generally of the French people.

If your own interests, and the necessity of terminating your dissensions, were not sufficient to call for my interference in your affairs, the interests of the allied republics would alone have imposed that duty on me. And indeed, your insurgents have

The cantonal system, they said, offered no doubt some advantages ; but it likewise opened the door to the oligarchy, for it admitted the patrician families to public functions, whereby the latter would soon be enabled to re-establish the cantonal sovereignties ; that, moreover, France was reorganizing the cantons, separating the powers of each, and giving to each a separate policy. Who would answer, they asked, for the good intentions of that power ? who would guarantee that its government had no afterthought : that it had not formed a plan to obtain possession of such parts of Helvetia as would contribute to the security of its frontiers ? If it had no views of aggrandisement, would it not establish a central government in Helvetia—a power which might give a simultaneous impulse, and impress a uniform direction, to the whole country ? By such an act the state of the country would become settled, and the people possess their immunities, without the enjoyment of a blessing which they had acquired at the price of their blood, being poisoned by fear or suspicion.

In vain did Ney state that these apprehensions were unfounded : that France would not only seize upon no part of the Swiss territory, but would oppose every encroachment or usurpation by any other state ; and that the First Consul had made an explicit declaration to this effect :—still the unitarians continued to insist upon the defects of the cantonal system. It was to no purpose Ney represented to them that the form of government with which they found fault was

been led on by men who have actually waged war against us, since their first acts have been an appeal to privileges, and the destruction of equality, which is a manifest insult to the French people.

No particular party among you must gain the ascendancy, and less than any other, the party which has been defeated. No counter-revolution can take place.

It is a pleasure to me to hold communication with you, and I shall often repeat the views I have just unfolded, because it is not until your fellow-citizens are convinced of their correctness, that your several opinions can be conciliated and your citizens live happy.

The policy of Switzerland has always been considered by Europe part of that of France, Savoy, and the Milanese ; because the very existence of Switzerland is strongly linked with the safety of those states.

The first and most essential duty of the French government will always be, to take care that no system hostile to it prevails among you, and that men devoted to its enemies shall not succeed in placing themselves at the head of your affairs. It is expedient not only that we should have no subject of uneasiness with regard to that portion of our frontier which is open, and which you cover, but that every thing should tend to convince us that, if your neutrality were forced, the good feeling of your government, as well as the interests of your nation, would induce you to side with, rather than against France.

I will bestow ample consideration upon every plan and every observation which you may be pleased to make to me, either collectively or individually, or by deputations of single cantons. The senators Barthélemy, Fouché, Rœderer, and Desmeunier, whom I have directed to collect your opinions, study your interests, and ascertain your views, will give me an account of all you wish they should either acquaint me with, or deliver to me on your behalf.

BONAPARTE.



the one adopted by their ancestors; that it would put an end to the difficulties attendant upon centralization, in a country whose different parts were so dissimilar in language, manners, interests and religion; that the organization which they rejected was that of an agricultural and commercial family, each member of which bore only a share of the common burthens proportionate to his means:—he could make no impression upon these headstrong men, who persisted in imputing undue motives to the First Consul, and complained bitterly that he seemed anxious to put down military spirit among them and convert a nation of warriors into a community of ploughmen. There was really nothing to justify such an imputation as the last; but had it even been well founded, it ought not to have excited such clamours. The time had gone by when an irruption of goatherds could make monarchs tremble; the progress made in the art of war had for ever destroyed the power of such hinds; and the Swiss, unable to make head against Austria, or to resist France,—having, moreover, no public revenue, or the means of assembling and providing food for an army, must, of necessity, content themselves with the secondary importance which nature and the political constitution of Europe had assigned to them. In the situation in which they were then placed, they could exist only by labour and industry, and through the benevolent assistance and protection of their neighbours; their demeanour ought therefore always to be peaceable, and marked by hospitality. This Ney stated to them in very broad terms, adding that it would be folly, in their country, to cultivate a martial spirit for which there could be no employment.

These observations were just; but the passion of the Swiss is that of arms. They really fancied that they were on the brink of annihilation as a people, and they were eager to reject beforehand measures which nobody ever thought of imposing on them. A military organization was, according to them, their only safeguard; to deprive them of it, was reducing them to a state of subjection, and exposing them to charges and imposts, the idea of which threw them into a state of real alarm. The contributions and supply of men and provisions, which war would force upon them, appeared dreadful. The sums which their whole population might economize during ten years, did not seem to them sufficient to meet the wants of one of the armies which a war would inevitably bring into their mountains. This led them into another speculation diametrically opposed to their feelings, when they urged their fears that France would subjugate their country. If, they said, Switzerland were united to France, its inhabitants would be subject only to the charges imposed upon the nation at large, and they should moreover enjoy the benefits of the departmental system, which they well knew how to appreciate. France, on the other hand, must be glad to incorporate them in its own territory; for their country completed the defence of the French frontier. Upon these grounds they calculated that their

union to that great nation would put an end to their state of fluctuation and misery, and they therefore thought it advisable to solicit such union.

As Ney well knew the intentions of the First Consul, he did not encourage these views. But the Swiss, affecting to be incredulous as to Bonaparte's motives, persisted in imputing ambitious views to France, and in affecting to believe that this power was desirous of annihilating the military propensities of the Helvetians. Ney therefore resolved to put an end to imputations, of which he easily saw the drift; and indeed this was dictated to him by humanity and sound policy. The letter addressed by the First Consul to the deputies of the cantons said not a word of Helvetian troops. The cantonal organization was decreed, and every thing led to the belief that an army being useless in the new institutions by which the country was in future to be governed, that which existed would speedily be disbanded, and the unfortunate soldiers who composed it left without means of livelihood. The French general therefore proposed to incorporate them in the Swiss demi-brigades serving in France. But so great was the hatred which the different parties bore to each other, that the one which in the new form of government seemed likely to be at the head of affairs, obstinately refused to sanction such an arrangement.

Though the situation of these brave men ought to have disarmed the hatred of their enemies, the factions opposed to them were inexorable. These poor soldiers, far from exciting commiseration, were by party spirit made objects of bitter hatred. Without the means of subsistence, or any prospect of future employment, and rejected by their own countrymen, these unhappy men were reduced to the most deplorable want. Some came to implore Ney's pity; others, indignant at receiving such contumelious treatment in reward of their services to their ungrateful country, endeavoured to pass into the service of foreign states. They offered themselves to Austria and Great Britain; so that whichever of these powers received them, would raise up so many more enemies whom the injustice of their fellow-citizens armed against France. If these soldiers renounced a military life, it would be still worse; for when the habits of men are once acquired, they can with difficulty conform to others to which they have been all their lives unaccustomed. If therefore they were forced to embrace the callings of civil life, they might feel greatly dissatisfied; and it was to prevent the breaking out of fresh disorders that Ney proposed to enlist them under the French banner.

The First Consul, "who would have no foreigners in the service of France," at first rejected the proposal. But he soon felt how prudent it would be, and how important for the tranquillity of Helvetia, to remove from that country men pursued by such vindictive hatred. Both humanity and policy pleaded in their favour, and he

consented to receive them into the ranks of the French army.\* Malevolence could now no longer injure these men; nevertheless, in spite of Ney's precautions throughout this business, he was everywhere received with coldness, indifference, or mistrust.

A host of banditti spread on a sudden over the whole country. Robbery, incendiary burnings, and even murders became matters of common occurrence; no one could any longer depend upon the protection of the law; and no one had any longer confidence in the power of the government to secure the lives and properties of the citizens. The pusillanimity of the government had already rendered it despicable; all parties now turned it into ridicule, and the people seemed to make a merit of eluding its decrees. This feeling, skilfully kept alive by secret emissaries, tended to excite the hopes and increase the irritation of the different parties. But such a state of things could not last; and the opponents of France flattered themselves that by dint of agitation and disorder, they should bring about the form of government for which they had previously taken up arms. A number of Swiss officers and men of every description, in the pay of Great Britain, had returned to their native country; and the colonel of the regiment of Watteville himself had just arrived at Berne. All had no doubt their instructions from the enemies of France, and each religiously fulfilled them.

The government was aware of these intrigues, but dared not repress them. It was itself verging towards its dissolution, and each of its members, more occupied with his own interests than with state affairs, dared not brave the factious spirit about to be arrayed against him. Each saw the danger, but no one had the courage to apply the remedy. The police was no longer to be depended on; its zeal and fidelity were extinct; British gold had corrupted every one of its agents, and they whose duty it was to serve the government were the first to betray it. On the other hand, the counter-police was perfectly well organized. The government took no measure, nor issued any decree, which was not prematurely made public, whilst seditious meetings were held with perfect impunity. All the inveterate prejudices of the aristocracy were now united to the burning excitement of the democracy, in one common sum of hatred to France; and both

\* THE MINISTER-AT-WAR TO GENERAL NEY, MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY.

Paris, 22nd Nivose, Year XI. (Jan. 12th, 1803.)

CITIZEN GENERAL,

I have submitted to the First Consul the observations which you addressed to me on the 3d Nivose, on the necessity of deciding upon the ultimate fate of the troops now in the pay of the Helvetian government, and also the proposal of incorporating them in the Helvetian demi-brigades at present in the service of the French republic.

The First Consul having given due weight to your observations on this subject, has directed me to inform you that if the Helvetian government has no further necessity for the services of those troops, the French government will take them with pleasure.

BERTHIER.



parties concerted, concocted, and spread abroad the most atrocious libels against the First Consul, and against the order of things which he was desirous of establishing.

These calumnious reports kept the minds of the mountaineers in a constant ferment. Being promised the benefits of the insurrection, they hoped to obtain a sensible improvement of their lot; and as all sorts of crimes are of easy perpetration when a whole population is agitated, the gunpowder was stolen from the government stores, arms were collected in the canton of Berne, and all seemed to indicate an approaching convulsion. Happily the mediation produced its fruit in due season, and these plots and dissensions were adjourned for a time, until the feelings excited by the new constitution should subside. Many particulars of this great political act being yet unknown, they offered matter for speculation sufficient for the present to occupy every mind.

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## CHAPTER II.

ALL that was yet known was, that the new constitution established the political rights of all the cantons, abolished subjection, made every Swiss citizen equal, and gave to each a right of voting even in the most unimportant affairs of the state. Twenty years of age, a wife, and landed property worth two hundred francs, were the qualifications for an elector, who could vote for the appointment, as well as for the dismissal of those called to wield the powers of state. But the nature of the general bond, by which these independent populations were to be connected, was not yet stated; and each was impatient to know what happy combination had been hit upon that would make so many contending interests merge into one general interest. M. de Talleyrand had alluded to it in his despatches as likely to satisfy all parties, and put an end to all their differences.

"The publication of the act of mediation," he wrote to Ney, "exposing to all Europe, in a noble, candid, and generous manner, the wise and beneficent views of the First Consul with regard to Helvetia, will have refuted, in a manner worthy of him, the infamous and absurd imputations which the enemies of the peace of Europe have had the boldness to cast upon him, and which can have found believers only among those servile beings as incapable of scanning the greatness of his ideas, as of feeling that his power needs no dissimulation, and that it is not the consciousness of strength, but of weakness, which inspires statesmen with thoughts of injustice and tyranny."

This brilliant announcement, far from making the general impatience subside, was like oil thrown upon fire. After much speculation

and anxiety, the particulars at length came, and the clauses of the federal pact which it had taken so much time to invent, were now made public.

The nineteen cantons were confederated according to the principles established in the constitution of each. They mutually guaranteed their respective institutions, territories, freedom, and independence, whether against the enterprises of foreign states, or against the usurpation of any one canton, or any particular faction. The respective contingents which each was to furnish in men and money, were determined; and there were to be no subject countries, nor any privileges of place, birth, persons, or families. Each Swiss citizen might settle in any canton he pleased, there to exercise his industry, and enjoy the political rights sanctioned by the local constitution of the canton.

The cantons abolished the old dues of *traite intérieure* and *traite foraine*. They decreed the free circulation of produce, cattle, and goods; the abolition of all *droits d'octroi*, whether entrance or in transitu; and they established a uniform standard for their coin.

The direction of the public force, and the framing of the laws, treaties, alliances, and declarations of war, were vested in an assembly of deputies from each canton, who were to meet alternately at Berne, Friburg, Soleure, Basle, Zurich, and Lucerne. Each of these deputies received instructions from his constituents, and could vote only to the extent expressed in such instructions. The diet, as this assembly was termed, was to act in the name of the entire confederation, and alone to possess the right of communication with foreign powers. The avoyer of the canton in which it assembled, was to add to his title that of landamman, and preside over the diet whilst it remained in that canton. He was also to supply its place in the intervals between the sessions. He was to keep the seal of state, pursue the diplomatic relations of the country, and give credentials to the agents which the Helvetian republic might send to foreign states.\* And, as nothing was to remain vague or uncertain, but all be precise and determinate, the period of the delivery of the powers was also fixed. The new magistrates were to assume the direction of affairs on the 10th of March; the constitution was to be in force on the 15th of April; and the elections were to be over by the 1st of June. The diet was to assemble in the beginning of July, and the duration of its session was not to exceed a month. To these provisions were added some regulations not less praiseworthy, but which afterwards led to very stormy debates in the new diet. The act of mediation had regulated the use to be made of national property, and had provided for the liquidation of the Helvetian debt; it had, in short, protected the interests, as it had secured the freedom, of every citizen.

\* See Appendix at the end of the volume, No. I.

Thus was the great problem solved which had so long agitated Helvetia. The act of mediation guaranteed and co-ordinated her rights; and it gave her that which she had vainly sought at the cost of much trouble and bloodshed: namely, a joint connexion, and a common focus of power, which, by repressing disorder and putting down resistance, should satisfy the wants and exigencies of the confederation. The measure was hailed with general satisfaction; it extinguished all party hatred, destroyed the conspiracies against which the country had so painfully struggled, and every one acknowledged the wisdom by which it was dictated.

But what contributed more especially to render it popular, was the enthusiasm of the commissioners appointed to organize the cantonal constitutions. They had been eye-witnesses of the conduct of the First Consul; they knew the sentiments by which he was actuated; they had seen his zeal and anxiety in settling the rights of each canton, and securing to the whole the benefit of wise institutions. Their praises of his benevolence, and their accounts of the interest he took in the Swiss people, were eloquent and inexhaustible.

This confidence in the First Consul, and the cessation of the charges of the occupation, restored the Swiss people to their ordinary feelings of justice. They admitted that France had reason to feel alarmed at the troubles which had taken place upon her frontier, and that she might, without being excited by ambitious or interested views, interfere in the dissensions of her neighbours.

The French legislative body had just opened the session, and the statement of the situation of the republic was presented by Chaptal, then minister of the interior. This account of the prosperity of the country, and the recollection of the disorder and anarchy from the horrors of which the powerful mind of Bonaparte had so promptly relieved it—together with the solicitude of a prudent and liberal administration, which provided for all the wants of trade, and gave the highest encouragement to industry—produced a powerful effect upon the Swiss, naturally an avaricious people, and who had scarcely yet emerged from the convulsions of intestine troubles. It taught them that a government anxious to repair national disasters, and promote national improvement, would be likely to apply its best energies to the maintenance of public tranquillity in a neighbouring state with which it was so closely connected as with Switzerland; and it convinced them that the First Consul could have none but peaceable intentions. His mediation, therefore, no longer appeared to them an attempt influenced by ambition, as calumny had taught them to believe,—but a work of conciliation and kindness, and an immense benefit conferred upon Helvetia, suffering, as she had been, under the turbulence of desperate factions. The winter being past, they resumed their ordinary occupations, and disavowed for ever the principles of those men who were still eager to lead them astray.

D'Affry, an old general officer formerly in the service of France,



and who had been appointed landamman by the act of mediation, had just arrived. He was as respectable by the moderation of his political principles, as by his talents, firmness, and patriotism. The French plenipotentiary received him in a manner worthy of the high functions to which he had been called. The firing of guns, guards of honour, and every thing which surrounds and points out to the people the high powers of a state, were lavished upon him with profusion and a courtesy which greatly flattered the self-love of the Swiss. D'Affry, who was a native of Friburg, determined to transfer the seat of his government to that city. Preparations were immediately made for his journey, which took place with a pomp of military pageantry never before witnessed in those mountainous regions.

The former government forthwith resigned its authority, and the new order of things was constituted. Nevertheless, this was not effected without some little difficulty, for all party feeling had not merged into concord and oblivion. The several factions had sunk, it is true, under the ascendancy of France, but they did not yet despair of raising opportunities for trouble, and of seizing some unexpected chances by which they might at least adjourn a question that seemed already decided, if not raise their fallen influence. Of this a lamentable instance soon occurred. The reader may recollect with what uneasiness the Helvetian troops contemplated their future prospects, and the eagerness they had displayed to be received into the French service. These soldiers, formerly so despised and repulsed by their fellow-citizens, were now on a sudden made objects of the most anxious commiseration, and most delicate attentions.

A French military expedition had been sent to St. Domingo; it had beaten and dispersed the blacks; but being assailed in its turn by the yellow fever, the havoc made by this frightful disease had in a short time reduced its number to comparatively very few men. Its losses were soon known all over Europe. The Swiss have naturally a strong repugnance to crossing the sea; and on intelligence of the disasters of the French army at St. Domingo, reaching Switzerland, it was eagerly caught at, and a report immediately spread that the Helvetian demi-brigades were destined to replace the troops whom the yellow fever had cut off in the West Indies, and that if they once embarked they would never more return. Then, as if it were not sufficient to arouse the terrors with which the idea of a tropical climate always inspired these mountaineers, much was added concerning the advantages which the British service held out, and the care and attention of which the soldiers were the object in that of Austria. These reports, this pretended commiseration, and an artful contrast drawn between a life of adventure across the ocean, and the sweets of the quiet service of a friendly power, produced the desired effect: the different corps assembled at Berne, became mutinous and disorderly, and immense numbers of them deserted. The landamman,

alarmed at this sudden disorganization of the army, issued a proclamation, which seemed to make some impression. Ney on the other hand wrote them a letter, which was read at the head of each company.\* He reduced to their just standard the insinuations which had troubled these poor men; pointed out to them the advantages they would derive from the French service, and the satisfaction and honour which would accrue to them from being assimilated to those brave soldiers who had filled Europe with the fame of their victories, and with admiration of their good discipline.

These two addresses seemed to have restored the confidence of the Swiss soldiers; and General Wonderveidt, who commanded them, made them execute a military promenade. At the first halt, the non-commissioned officers and the elders among the privates went in a body and assured him of their submission, and of their blind obedience to any orders he might think proper to give them. They begged him at the same time to overlook the faults of some young soldiers, of whose conduct he had reason to complain. The general granted their request with a good grace, and the promenade continued. Each seemed actuated with the best intentions; the men returned to their respective stations, and all appeared forgotten. The suspicions of the French plenipotentiary were not however lulled; the late agitation among these men appeared to him too singular to be unconnected with some political combination. He therefore directed all the officers to be present at the evening roll-call; and

\* To GENERAL WONDERVEIDT.

5th Germinal, Year XI. (March 26, 1803.)

Have the goodness, Citizen General, to make known, by means of an order of the day, to the troops under your command, that I herein express my satisfaction to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, at the good discipline which they have maintained, and the exactness with which they have performed their respective duties since my arrival in Switzerland. I trust they will properly appreciate the marks of kindness and esteem shown to them by the First Consul, in assimilating them, in compliance with my request, to the French troops who by their brilliant exploits have raised the glory of their nation to so high a pitch; and that they will show themselves deserving of the promotion and rewards which he confers upon those who distinguish themselves by their bravery and talents. These soldiers cannot doubt that their condition will be bettered by entering the service of the French republic. The old soldiers will receive the pension established by our laws, so soon as their age, their infirmities, or their wounds incapacitate them from continuing to follow their honourable profession.

I particularly recommend to the officers not to swerve, in the execution of their duty, from the firmness required by that severe discipline which constitutes the strength of the French armies, and has always enabled them to overcome their enemies. They who, from neglect, should fail to acquit themselves of this sacred duty, may expect exemplary punishment. I again repeat to all the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, that they must proceed to the places which the French government has directed me to point out to them, and they may rest assured that they will have no cause to regret it. They may also rest assured that those among them who are entitled to their absolute discharge, shall obtain the same after the review of general inspection for this purpose.

NEY.

by thus placing the men under the immediate observation of their superiors, he succeeded in keeping them in order. Meantime party malevolence was at work, and the ferment it produced became every instant more active. Ney therefore ordered that the French posts should be doubled; and by this display of force he succeeded in delaying the explosion.

Nor would it perhaps have taken place at all, had not a trumpeter of the Helvetian hussars, more eager than his fellows, sounded the *bout-selle*.

At this signal the men rushed forth in a state of mutiny, and committed the most unpardonable excesses. In vain did the officers attempt to stem the torrent; their authority was disregarded, and several among them were stabbed with bayonets. The French posts came up on hearing the tumult; but the instant the Swiss perceived them they sounded the charge and fired upon them. A corporal of the 42nd was killed; the patrols, whose anger was roused at the sight of their slain comrade, were eager to avenge his death. Nevertheless the officer who commanded them succeeded in preventing them from returning the fire, and calmly addressed the mutineers, whom he informed that the perpetrators of the murder just committed should be punished in due course of law. They however paid no attention to this, but spread through Berne in order to obtain artillery and ammunition, neither of which they possessed, and also to plunder the houses of some of the citizens, in which they expected to find a rich booty. But Ney had already taken his measures, and the French troops were under arms. Their patrols were increased, circulated through the streets, and drove from the arsenal some of the mutineers who had succeeded in effecting an entrance there. Order was soon restored; at daybreak a court-martial assembled, and one Swiss grenadier was condemned to be shot. After the execution of the sentence, his comrades walked round his body, wondering how this single execution could suffice for the expiation of their crime, and how the French could have the generosity to leave the punishment of their guilt to their own officers.

Such was the result of this infernal machination. It cost the lives of two men; but the corps of Swiss troops marched very peaceably to Auxonne, where it arrived without any event worth recording.



## CHAPTER III.

THE satisfaction was general among the inhabitants of Switzerland; but their new institutions required men capable of making them work, and those to whom this task had been confided were precisely the individuals who had already been declared incapable of performing such duties. The minister for foreign affairs in France consented to set at liberty Reding and his friends, who were detained in captivity at Aarbourg, but on condition that they should go to France, and not return to their own country until the elections were over. Under existing circumstances, this measure was useless, and not very generous: for, on the one hand, the passions of the multitude no longer seconded the intrigues of these men, whilst on the other, the constitution proclaimed an amnesty for all political errors and offences, and it was unfair to make conditions for granting them what was their right. Ney took this view of the case in his despatch to the minister.

"I have received," he wrote to the latter, "your instructions under date of the third instant, and will conform to them. I will, however, venture to observe, that what relates to the prisoners offers more difficulties than one. In the first place, it is nearly optional with them to proceed to France or not; in the next, as the act of mediation pardons all the offences necessarily attendant upon a political revolution, I am of opinion that their freedom ought to be full, entire, and free from restriction. And this opinion is the stronger, inasmuch as these prisoners have now scarcely any influence in their mountains. The inhabitants compare their present situation with the past—they contrast the tranquillity of the one with the sacrifices and alarms of the other, and are not at all inclined for a revival of their late troubles. I think then, that the deliverance of the prisoners should be unshackled with conditions; nevertheless I shall impose those which you specify.

"Berne, 8th Nivose, Year XI. (February 27th, 1803.)"

The minister avoided a reply, and Ney applied to the First Consul in person, who, more magnanimous than his minister, authorized the plenipotentiary not only to send the prisoners to their respective cantons, but likewise not to use any influence to prevent their being elected members of the diet. This was a happy measure, as it prevented a fresh collision; for whether the people were desirous of giving their fallen chiefs a mark of their esteem, or whether the aristocracy

had exerted their influence among them, certain it is, that a great majority elected Reding to the chief magistracy of Schweitz, Wursch to that of Underwalden, and Zellweiger to that of Appenzell.

Ney was thus able to yield to the wishes of the people, and his doing so rendered him very popular. It did not however facilitate the duties of his mission. The men whom he had thus allowed to rise once more into power, still retained the irritability consequent upon defeat. Far from moderating unjust pretensions, they lent their aid to support them. The former central administration, established perhaps upon correct views, had nevertheless been formed upon a scale out of proportion with the resources of the country. Surcharged with sinecures, and much of the useless machinery which encumbers the other governments of Europe, it was from the very beginning unable to provide funds to meet the expenses of its own support. Its troops were consequently unpaid, its subordinate functionaries were left without their salaries, and it was under the necessity of resorting to expedients to raise money. It increased the taxes to a most unreasonable amount, sold off annuities, and yet the arrears left at its dissolution still exceeded six millions of francs.\*

The act of mediation provided for the liquidation of this debt, by directing that what was termed national property should be applied to this purpose. This property consisted of the domains and bonded securities belonging formerly to the different cantons as sovereign states. Having been declared national property by law, they had been placed at the disposal of the minister of finance, and in part dissipated. Some of the cantons had managed to elude this measure, which was however common to all. Basle had hitherto escaped by means of the confusion it had contrived to raise between the property of the city and that of the canton. Zurich had with equal success followed the example of Basle, and Schaffhausen had likewise managed to preserve its annuities. This was now the subject of debate in the new diet. The cantons which had freely given up their bonded securities, demanded that the other cantons should do the same, and thereby concur in preserving the ancient character for integrity which the Swiss had acquired among nations. But the other cantons strenuously resisted this demand, and the new magistrates, far from endeavouring to overcome such unreasonable obstinacy, gave it their support. Nevertheless, if Berne had not been a party concerned, the matter would have been amicably settled; but Berne being forced to come to a settlement with the confederation, was bound also to settle with those cantons whose existence the haughty Bernese considered to have originated solely in the late revolt.† The

\* £240,000.

† Berne was to have remitted, in debentures upon the interior, to have them cancelled :

To the canton of Vaud	.	1,800,000 francs.
To the canton of Argau	.	2,357,000.

humbled oligarchy set forth in the most violent language the sacrifices which that city had made; and it must be admitted that they were enormous.

Prior to the invasion, Berne possessed immense wealth. It had a considerable sum in its treasury, well-filled storehouses, and contracts and annuities to the amount of more than twenty millions of francs.\* All had been either sent away or consumed by General Brune.† The stores had been applied to feed the French army; the treasure to pay the men; and the bonded securities forwarded to Paris. These debentures were, it is true, afterwards restored to the power which superseded the central administration, but at the cost of four millions of francs,‡ which the government of the canton was under the necessity of raising by an alienation of property valued at six millions.§ Being unable to meet some further expenses, this unfortunate canton was reduced to alienate to the amount of six millions more, and what remained of this last sum was handed over to the administrative chamber at Berne, which, after taking a portion of it to carry on the service of the state, made over the remainder to the city of Berne. The latter then entered into a contract to pay sixty thousand francs a year to the hospitals which it contained, and received as a consideration, South Sea annuities, bonds of Joseph II. a transfer of debentures upon Denmark, and other securities equally difficult to convert into cash. Meantime the disturbances of the month of October had burst forth. Berne encouraged them with all its might, but was under the necessity also of supplying those who conducted them with funds; and its treasury being empty, it had recourse to its foreign securities, and thus raised a further sum of two millions of francs.||

Berne still possessed debentures to a considerable amount; the commissioners, or members of the diet appointed to put in motion the machinery of the new government, required that they should be given up, and Berne refused. The question now became rather em-

\* £800,000.

† For the information of such as might be tempted to introduce foreign armies into their native countries, we insert the following statement of what the invasion of 1798 cost the canton of Berne.

The French general took as follows :

	Francs.
From the treasury . . . . .	7,000,000
From the mint, in bars . . . . .	3,700,000
In contributions . . . . .	4,000,000
For debentures (purchased back) . . . . .	4,000,000
850,000 cwt. of wheat, at 20 fr. per cwt. . . . .	17,000,000
6000 chars of wine, at 240 fr. each . . . . .	1,440,000
Articles taken from the arsenals, value . . . . .	7,000,000
Total	44,140,000 fr.
	or £1,765,600
† £160,000.	§ £240,000.
	£80,000.



barrassing: the delivering up of these securities was prescribed, it is true, by the federal pact; but the same pact likewise ordained the endowment of the sovereign cities, without, however, stating which of the two measures should take place first. Berne, anxious to secure some portion of the wreck of its possessions, contended that the latter should be first executed; the other cantons which had so long envied the prosperity of Berne, demanded the priority of the former. This difference led to angry debates; the other cantons would not even be satisfied with the delivering up of what Berne then possessed, but endeavoured to throw upon that canton the responsibility of the alienations it had been forced to made. This was certainly a monstrous pretension; but it was not more unreasonable than many others; for the commissioners, though always unanimous in their opinions when Berne was the object of attack, could not agree upon any other point. Local cupidity seemed the order of the day; each endeavoured to get rid of the charges which weighed upon his own canton, and to share the spoil wrung from the others. The following instance is too closely connected with our narrative to be omitted.

Glaris claimed certain domains possessed by St. Gall; this canton refused to give them up, and Zurich interposing, claimed them for itself; then, as if there were not already claimants enough, a fourth party came forward with similar pretensions.

A decree had at first been passed for the suppression of convents, and the application of their possessions to the establishment of useful and charitable institutions; but certain deputies whom this measure did not suit, had sufficient influence to get the decree revoked. They had represented to the First Consul of the French republic that such suppression might create disturbances, and lead to dissatisfaction among the people; for the mountaineers would not fancy their old political institutions restored to them if they no longer saw those monks among them whom they had been taught from their infancy to respect and cherish. Bonaparte gave credit to this statement, and decided that the property of the convents should be restored. It was this decision which brought a fourth claimant to the disputed domains, in the person of the Abbot of St. Gall. This reverend competitor, more sharp-sighted than his rivals, claimed not only these lands and the feudal rights attached to them, but likewise the sovereignty with which he was formerly invested. His pretensions, as may be imagined, were not very well received; but being a man of energetic temperament, and moreover a wily priest, he soon threw the whole country into commotion. His monks excited the people of St. Gall to open revolt, and his money produced wonderful effects upon the shepherds of Ury. Nothing was talked of but a league, a catholic union, the necessity of uniting in the defence of the church.

Ney knew what all this meant, and endeavoured to avert the evils which it threatened to produce. He invested the canton with the

sovereignty\* claimed by the abbot, recommending at the same time that the churchman should be treated with extreme liberality. But the obstinate priest would enter into no compromise, and it was at length agreed to submit the question to the arbitration of the landamman. But this measure had no better success: the landamman was addicted to procrastination, and many questions submitted to him were never settled at all. Being extremely reserved and timid in meddling with whatever interested the court of Vienna, he became still more so when he had to decide upon the claims of priests and religious communities. The tenants of the cloister had always found especial favour in his canton, and he had himself violent personal feelings in favour of Austria; so that the strongest remonstrances made by Ney could not induce him to come to a decision. Nevertheless, matters were pressing: the public business of the canton was at a stand, and the intrigues of the monks seemed soon likely to excite fresh troubles, unless measures were speedily taken to destroy their influence.

The canton of St. Gall, now in the peaceful enjoyment of its independence, would naturally be supposed favourable to the system which had secured its franchises. But such was not the case; for the monks still exercised unbounded influence over the people, in whom they excited strong prejudices against France, and favourable feelings towards Austria. This state of things, together with the nature and extent of the frontiers of St. Gall, gave a very peculiar importance to the question submitted to the landamman's arbitration; and Ney argued the point with unusual warmth. He maintained that the Abbot of St. Gall did not come within the provisions of the clause upon which he founded his claim; and that the community which this abbot represented having been dissolved under the unitarian government, could not be again established,—in fact, on account of its debts and its uselessness—and in law, from the spirit and tenour of the new federal pact. This treaty sanctioned the sovereignty and independence of the canton, and could not, as Ney justly observed, have a retroactive operation “in favour of squandering usufructuaries who would be in constant rivalry with the sovereignty of the

\* TO THE LOCAL COUNCIL OF ST. GALL.

The act of mediation has settled the sovereignty of your country upon the cantonal government. The ex-prince can no longer have any right to it, nor to any of the lands and revenues which he enjoyed in his former capacity of sovereign. Every attempt to violate this principle would be the more injudicious, because it could lead to no good result.

The first basis provides for the liquidation of the debts; it is doubtless an object of extreme importance, and deserving of the greatest attention. The French government, moreover, will feel much pleasure at the council acting with the greatest generosity towards the ex-abbot and the monks of the convent of St. Gall, and settling in an amicable manner the divers questions relating to them, so as to leave no further cause of trouble in one of the principal cantons of Switzerland.

27th Vendemiaire, Year XII. (October 20th, 1803.)

people." These arguments, though just, only irritated the monks, and Ney at length had recourse to the kind offices of the Pope's Nuncio, who had arrived at Lucerne during the discussion. He was a worthy and kind-hearted man, attached to France, and was thankful to the First Consul for the peace which the Catholic church then enjoyed. He was desirous of doing what would please the chief of the French republic, and he warmly interposed to adjust these differences. But the patrimony of the church is not easily alienated: the priesthood of all countries strenuously resist every attempt to touch their temporalities. The monks of St. Gall would not forego any of their pretensions, and the Nuncio had lost all hope of overcoming their obstinacy, when Ney by a new expedient succeeded in shaking it for an instant. He imagined to erect a bishopric, found a chapter and a college, and appoint the monks to offices whose emoluments would secure to them an easy and independent existence. The prospect of bettering their individual conditions overcame their late scruples, and they deserted the abbot, who without their assistance was unable to agitate the country. But the priesthood are inexhaustible in expedients when threatened with the loss of possessions wrung from superstition and fanaticism. A new and successful intrigue won back the support of the monks; the abbot resumed the quarrel, and succeeded in transferring to Rome the trial of his claims. The Bernese, on the other hand, found means, by consuming the time and creating delays, to defer the delivery of their debentures until it became their turn to be the directing canton; and then being both judges and parties, they were able to adjudicate in their own cause.

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#### CHAPTER IV.

SWITZERLAND had now entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with France; but as the new organisation of its government rendered this treaty very burthensome, the First Consul determined to make it lighter by altering it to a defensive alliance, and a treaty of assistance in case of need. The diet, whose session had begun, at first received this change with great delight; but suddenly changing its views, became cold and wavering, and soon after gave way to foolish intrigues and chimerical plots. In this manner time glided on. The more Ney urged it to come to a decision on any point, the more it would affect independence; at length he was obliged to recur to threats, and he could only get the better of its indecision and procrastination by declaring that he would write to Paris. The diet then seemed to arouse as from a trance, examined and discussed certain points submitted to its deliberations, but resolved "to enter into



no treaty with the French general, but to offer him only negative observations, and allow no counter-proposal to escape it, which might become binding.”\* Meantime the political horizon had once more become overcast; war had been again declared against France by Great Britain, the mortality of St. Domingo still continued, and the diet conceived hopes of ultimately eluding the stipulations of an act, the wisdom of which it had just before loudly proclaimed. An oath to the new constitution no longer appeared to it necessary, and many of its members therefore felt no scruple in declining such oath. In vain did the most reasonable of the deputies urge the propriety of taking the oath, and the positive duty of its observance; in vain did they represent the necessity of “dissipating the uneasiness and preventing the troubles, which must arise from a refusal to sanction, or even a delay in sanctioning by a voluntary acceptance of it, a work which might possibly be represented as the effect and consequence of circumstances.”† The only answer they obtained was, “that the oath was unnecessary; that the cantonal governments had taken it; that Switzerland was organised in the manner prescribed by the act of mediation, which sufficiently proved that she considered this act binding.” This was indeed going beside the question; beside, it was not true that the oath had been taken by all the cantonal governments, for several among them had confined themselves to a vague promise that they would work in furtherance of the general good of their country; and if the government of the country had been formed pretty nearly according to the tenour of the act of mediation, each deputy did not the less arrogate the right of interpreting the act according to his own peculiar views, until he could get rid of it altogether. But the diet had also its collective views, and the question was adjourned to the ensuing session.

In such conduct the members of the diet displayed a sad want of sincerity, and showed that they had no wish to bring the settlement of the political institutions of Switzerland to a conclusion. A conference however took place with the French plenipotentiary; but the commissioners of the diet, as if to put it out of their own power to make any counter-proposal which might become binding upon them, had omitted providing themselves with powers, and the conference was therefore reduced to a simple conversation. As what passed gives a pretty correct idea of the views and pretensions of these haughty mountaineers, we shall here transcribe some parts of this conversation.

“What need have we of powers, or negotiations?” asked Rheinhart, deputy of Zurich. “Would it not be much better to proclaim the independence of Switzerland, and secure an absolute neutrality?”

“Independence!” replied Ney; “why, is it not secured to you by the act of mediation? As for the neutrality which you claim, you

\* Sitting of the 18th of July.

† Sitting of the 8th of July.

will obtain it by and by. Each thing must come in its turn. That which is urgent at the present moment, is to settle your relations with each other, and with France; and if you delay doing this, you will get into the same state of confusion as that from which you have but so lately emerged."

"True! but at all events, if Switzerland is attacked, France ought not only to defend her, but to pay the expense of such defence."

"And would you look on as quiet spectators?" retorted Ney.

"No!" said the deputy; "but you should not carry to too great an amount the assistance we are to bring. You now fix it at sixteen thousand men, thus raising it to double the amount specified in the treaty of 1771. This is too heavy an aid for the Helvetic people to supply: they could not support so large a levy."

"Give me," Ney replied, "an account of the population of Helvetia at these two periods, together with a list of the troops you possessed at the former, and those you now possess. I will reduce the number fixed, if I find it too heavy. But I would urge you to bear in mind that the aid required by France is an eventual compensation for a positive engagement."

"I know that," said Jauch, deputy of Ury; "but the generosity and benevolence of France form the basis of our relations with her. Switzerland feels grateful for her friendship, and is desirous that the old alliance should be remembered in the new."

"So it shall."

"Then let the year 1516 be mentioned as the fortunate period at which the friendship commenced between the two nations."

"This recollection is too appropriate not to be admitted," the plenipotentiary replied; "but I must also offer one, which refers, it is true, to a less remote period, but is equally useful to the people you here represent. In the treaty of the Year VI. it is stipulated that a road should be cut along the left bank of the Rhine. For a long time it has been impossible to execute this plan, but now, when all assumes a new life, when a fresh impulse is given to . . ."

"'Tis the duty of Switzerland to oppose its execution," said the deputy interrupting Ney.

"What!" the latter replied; "prevent the opening of a road which would shorten distances and render communications more rapid?"

"The smaller cantons would be ruined," returned the deputy, "if trade were diverted into a new channel."

It was not this, however, that alarmed the deputy of Ury; but Ney feigned to think so, and limited his demands to the opening of a road between the lake of Geneva and that of Neufchatel.

"This at least," said he, addressing himself to Jauch, "can give no ground of discontent to the smaller cantons."

"Doubtless not," replied the imperturbable deputy; "but how many of the others would it not injure?" And he began to enume-

rate the confusion it would cause in the trade of some, the obstacles it would throw in the way of others.

"All this may be true," replied Ney; "but we are not now seeking to ascertain whether the execution of this latter plan offers any disadvantages; we admit that it may, and we are only anxious to discover whether these disadvantages outweigh its advantages:—this is the real question."

"Admitted," said d'Affry; "but you are not in want of roads. Should you be attacked by Austria, you can easily debouch upon Italy, and all along the course of the Rhine. You can have no occasion to borrow our territory for such a purpose."

"No doubt," Ney replied. "Nevertheless the First Consul does not see matters in the same light as you do, and I must inform you that I consider it very strange you should enter upon such discussions, before the absolute neutrality of Helvetia is proclaimed. However, I thank you for letting me know your opinions; you have at least the merit of sincerity."

Jauch having withdrawn, the conversation became more free and open. Rheinart sought an excuse for the conduct of the diet, and endeavoured to explain away its procrastination.

"Such delay must appear strange to you," said he to Ney, "and this is natural enough. Consider, however, our situation and that of France. The First Consul animates all, and keeps opposing factions in awe; and you will probably have no occasion to apprehend trouble or disorder whilst he remains at the head of affairs. But, as a man, he is subject to the common lot of men. Now, when all depends upon the life of a single individual exposed to so many casualties, is it surprising that we should hesitate to draw upon ourselves a portion of the storm which might otherwise burst at a distance from us?"

"Is it this that stops you?" exclaimed Ney. "Is this the sole ground of your apprehensions? Trust yourself with confidence to the fortunes of France, and instead of predicting that she will encounter future misfortune, try rather to conciliate her kindness, by founding the institutions which are to form your future government. Have you flattered yourselves, moreover, that in your relative situation, you can share in our good fortune without running any of our evil chances?"

"No, certainly," the landamman replied; "such a thing is impossible. But so many changes are in preparation!"

"What changes, pray?"

"Oh! nothing, or scarcely any thing," replied d'Affry smiling; "only the creation of a vast empire, and the crowning of the First Consul as Emperor."

"What! do you believe —?"

"Alas! yes," interrupted d'Affry; "I believe that the First Consul is on his way to Brussels to be crowned."

The landamman's smile now produced its counterpart on the



muscles of Ney's countenance. "Brussels!" said he; "what! in a city so recently annexed to France? Are you sure of this?"

"Sure of it? Oh! no, by no means sure. But it is perhaps from mere curiosity that Cardinal Caprara and the minister Cobentzel have preceded him to that ancient city, and that the ambassadors of divers other powers are also about to proceed thither!"

These reports greatly amused Ney; but the landamman persisted, nevertheless, in giving credit to them, and in contending that Switzerland could not fix its internal organization until that of France were first determined. In vain did Ney represent that the two countries were quite independent of each other, and that, even if the First Consul should assume the imperial purple, the mountains of Helvetia would not the less preserve their democratic institutions. The landamman made no direct reply, but launched forth in praises of the genius and labours of the extraordinary man who wielded the destinies of France; but through this noisy enthusiasm it was easy to perceive a desire to take the benefit of acts of long standing, and that he would rather have held his appointment from a descendant of Louis XIV. than from the First Consul. All the other members of the commission entertained the same hopes, uttered the same sentiments, and evinced the same prejudices as d'Affry.

France had forced the Swiss factions to live together in good intelligence; but the government of George III. having again declared war against France, each was anxious to act according to the chances which time and events might offer, and the diet was anxious to elude signing the treaty of alliance. Its members fancied that the days of Lautrec were returned, and began to coquet with their duties and set up unreasonable pretensions. Already had Zellveiger demanded the evacuation of Switzerland by the French troops, and Reding, still more audacious, had even ventured to threaten with the gallows those deputies who had defended interests to which he was hostile. Ney, however, having insisted upon a categorical answer from the diet, its turbulent members were obliged to adjourn the realization of their foolish hopes, and discuss the question of the settlement. In this debate the hostile party manfully maintained their opinion, and set up the most unreasonable pretensions. Not that the individual deputies were unworthy of the trust reposed in them by their constituents; taken separately each of them was conciliating, honourable, of easy intercourse, and of amiable manners. But when in a body, some strange feeling, as if each were emulous of a superiority in cunning and trickery, seemed suddenly to arise among them, and they admitted and seriously discussed the most extravagant schemes. Besides this, every thing submitted to them seemed to excite their mistrust; the plainest propositions were denied, and the most natural measures modified and spoilt.

On this occasion the landamman spoke first, and with extraordinary dexterity and address. He again endeavoured to palliate the

procrastinating spirit of the commissioners, and stated as the cause of their delay, that they had to compare the treaties entered into at different periods, and likewise the changes presented by each period. This was certainly prudent, and ought to have led to salutary reflections ; for how could they mistake relative situations so opposed to each other as that of the period at which they were debating and that of the former period alluded to ? But this was of little consequence to the deputies:—being actuated by recollections of past ages, they entertained no views but such as were connected with a single idea : namely, that of giving the same opinion of their own importance as they themselves entertained, and of impressing a belief that they possessed the power of making neighbouring states tremble. They at first took the perpetual peace of 1516 as their grand argument, and as the project under consideration was in no wise opposed to its principles, they considered it a sufficient groundwork to bear the edifice of their own false views and follies. But on a sudden they took up a new ground, having made the discovery that perpetual treaties were not consistent with the customs of the Helvetian nation, the most interesting part of whose history consisted, as they said, in the renewal of alliances ; and as their manners and the nature of their interests underwent a change from one century to another, they could enter into no engagement beyond half a century. The conditions, moreover, offered by France, were neither sufficiently positive nor extensive enough. France undertook, it is true, to defend Helvetia, but did not state in what manner ; and to ascertain this was a point of vital importance, for the confederation could not charge itself with the burden of the expense, which would far exceed the whole of its resources. Between allied states, it is not the actual but the relative amount of the means applied to the common stock, that establishes the reciprocity. Thus it was not unreasonable to expect that France would defend Switzerland at her own cost ; and if in return the latter granted an assistance of troops, it must be on very special conditions, and on the payment of large sums of money.

Meantime, the commissioners, in their several conferences with Ney, set up the most inconceivable pretensions. When the plenipotentiary talked to them of limits, and of rectifying boundaries, they expressed their surprise at Bienne being taken from them, and that some unimportant villages, long since annexed to France, were not restored to them ; but they took especial care to say not a word about the communes given to Basle, or those annexed to Soleure ; they avoided uttering a syllable about the Frickthal, of which they were in possession, and which produced an annual revenue of two hundred thousand francs, or eight thousand pounds sterling. On the question of trade and commerce, they made complaints and raised pretensions equally unreasonable. The fact is, they wanted to be freed from every obligation, so that they might proceed without restraint. They

claimed to purchase from France, duty free, all the raw silk they wanted for their manufactories. It was to no purpose Ney's observing, that from their proximity to Piedmont and to Germany they might procure the silk, manufacture it, and still undersell the French market; that the riband manufactories at Zurich had already done considerable injury to those of St. Etienne and Chaumont; and finally, that the exportation duty upon raw silk in France was not greater than the protection of the French silk manufactories required. Still they insisted upon a compliance with this demand, or at least, the entrance into France, duty free, of articles of Swiss manufacture: that is to say, they would have glutted the French markets with manufactured articles, the first material of which they had purchased at a lower rate than the French could possibly do, and which they had likewise been able to weave at a cheaper rate, their texture imitating the finest of the British manufactures:—in a word, they would have given facilities to a smuggling trade, which the similarity of the goods would have rendered difficult of repression.

Ney put an end to these pretensions and tergiversations by dismissing the commissioners, after informing them that he should leave his government to decide upon these questions, and immediately transmit their observations to the French minister for foreign affairs. But as night brings reflection, the next morning the landamman begged that Ney would make no such communication to his government. He admitted, that in the warmth of debate his colleagues had gone farther than they should have done; and he moreover stated that the commissioners were now ready to discuss and to determine with blind confidence upon such modifications as the plan was susceptible of. The conferences of the commissioners with Ney were then resumed without interruption, and each turned his attention seriously to settling upon an equitable basis the treaty of alliance which was to connect France and Switzerland. Ney had always a pen in his hand; he led the debate on each question, and wrote down each resolution the instant it was carried. Being conversant with the different dialects of the mountains, he was able to address each commissioner in his own native idiom, which rendered the proceedings much easier and much more rapid. Some of the deputies, however, persisted in their pretensions: Muller Friedberg still insisted that France should defend Switzerland at her own expense; and Rheinhart maintained his opinions about the limits. But Ney, perceiving the ascendancy he had acquired over the majority, refused to admit such pretensions. Jauch again renewed his demands with regard to the natural industry, and maintained with much warmth, that the adoption of his views was not less advantageous to France than to the Swiss cantons themselves.

"You are well aware," said he to Ney, "that Switzerland produces nothing in abundance; her necessaries of life, as well as her articles of luxury, are all drawn from foreign countries; and if she



succeeds in maintaining the balance of her trade by the production of her own industry, it will only be by dint of extraordinary activity and perseverance. It is only by working more than the common herd of men, and by imposing upon himself a degree of self-denial, seen perhaps in no other country, that the Swiss operative contrives to live. In like manner the Swiss merchant and the Swiss manufacturer succeed only by the most patient assiduity and by the strictest privations. And if a people, having no other capital than their own labour and the privations they are able to bear, possess a trade, they obtain it at a much greater cost than more favoured nations, and by a much stronger effort. Now the principal industry of Switzerland consists in spinning and weaving: the population of six of the cantons live almost entirely by this kind of labour. The muslins, linen, and cotton cloths which they manufacture, are sold in France, and the money which these goods produce, being swallowed up by rapid and considerable exchanges, soon returns to the place whence it originally came. Hemp, flax, iron, tobacco, broad-cloths, silks, wine, soap, hard-ware, and the productions of the Levant—such are the articles with which our goods are paid for. France and Switzerland are necessary to each other; they reciprocally consume each other's produce; and when the manufactories cease working in our mountains, the work of yours also slackens. We can suffer no misfortunes without their rebounding upon France; and this correlativeness acquires a still greater importance from the circumstances under which we are placed. Is it not your interest to reduce, by every possible means, the trade of Great Britain? And is not the increase of competition, and the glutting of every market with rival productions, one of the surest means of doing so? Encourage, therefore, the manufactories of your allies, and do not force them to a state of inactivity, of which England will reap all the advantages."

"I would willingly do as you wish, if it were practicable," Ney replied; "but the remedy appears to me worse than the evil, and I do not think it would be prudent to try it."

Jauch was about to reply. "What need is there of a reply?" said Ney. "Submit your views to the French government, which will perhaps view them in a more favourable light than I do." Jauch followed this advice, and no further difficulties were made.

The principal clauses of the treaty being now admitted, there remained only some points of minor importance to settle, and Ney referred them to the First Consul. Meantime, the amended project was proposed to the diet, and agreed to without a dissenting voice. A resolution thanking Ney for the kindly interest he had taken in this long discussion, was likewise passed, and the landamman was directed to thank him very warmly for the solicitude with which he had debated the interests and the wants of Switzerland.

Thus, after much trouble, this delicate negotiation was brought to a

close ; but it required no ordinary share of patience and of diplomatic tact to conciliate those mistrustful and vain-glorious men, whose presumption had been strengthened by the kindness of the First Consul. There was, however, another point which increased the difficulties of the negotiation. Neither the principles nor the individual interests of the several commissioners were the same ; they were divided in language, religion, and political doctrines. They individually bore as much hatred towards each other as they collectively bore towards France. But it became necessary to moderate these feelings, and make them merge into one common interest, in order to obtain one common treaty. This undertaking, difficult as it was, Ney succeeded in accomplishing.

The conditions of the alliance being stipulated, those of the capitulation, or terms of service of the Swiss soldiers lent to or to be supplied to France, were next to be considered. There was no little difficulty in settling these terms ; but the obstacles arose out of the thing itself, and not from objections raised by the individuals who were to settle the clauses. The military commissioners, much more reserved than the members of the diplomatic commission, did not give way to rash and unreasonable pretensions. No doubt they were anxious to obtain "the greatest possible number of commissions for officers, and supply the smallest possible number of Swiss recruits;" but beyond this, their demands were reasonable, and their observations well founded. Still the difficulty was great : the former capitulations were not general to the whole country, but only bound the particular cantons granting them. Matters were now upon a different footing : the First Consul no longer had to treat with such or such state of the confederation, but with the diet representing the whole of the confederated cantons as forming one political body ; and the diet alone could take measures to secure the execution of the treaty. It was this that caused the difficulty. The Swiss, alarmed at the idea of a conscription were fearful of establishing a precedent for it. They dreaded lest so alarming a mode of recruitment should be made general in their country ; they apprehended that if such were the case under the central form of their new government, one canton would be called upon to supply the men which another could not furnish.

This repugnance to a conscription was natural enough ; but the feelings of aversion entertained throughout the country towards the Helvetian troops already in the French service was by no means so. Although the cantons were constantly complaining of the smallness of their population, they would not allow the recruits which they were to supply, to fill up the vacancies in the demi-brigades already in the service of the French republic. They would not allow those unfortunate soldiers, of whom we have already spoken—those despised Helvetian troops who had fought and bled in the civil wars of

their country—to enter the regiments about to be raised.\* They were looked upon as so many pariahs, and every one despised and spurned them. To these feelings were added many doubts and fears with regard to the formation of the new corps. The interests of the country in general, and the advantages of its citizens in particular, were made the touchstone of popular feeling, and a cry was attempted to be raised by the opposition. But their tactics failed them on the present occasion, and nothing now remained but to settle the particulars of the plan laid down. The Swiss were anxious to adopt the French improvements in the military art, possess troops of all arms, and substitute the system of legions for that of regiments recommended in the plan. The strength of these regiments being fixed at four thousand men, the number was considered too great, inasmuch as the regimental accounts would be too complicated, and the drilling difficult. On the other hand, the staff was not deemed sufficiently numerous. The Swiss had formerly in the service of France one hundred and ninety-eight companies, exclusive of the regiment of guards; now the aid stipulated, amounted to almost double that number, whilst they themselves were allowed only a hundred and forty-four at home. “Hence,” said the commissioners, “there are fewer honourable and lucrative appointments, consequently less chance of rising in the service.” They therefore considered this condition unfavourable.

With regard to pay and retiring pensions, the project assimilated the Swiss to the French troops. This did not appear just to the Helvetican commissioners, because, as they urged, the French troops were discharging a duty, their own bearing a burthen. The former were fighting in defence of their hearths, the latter were shedding their blood for foreign interests and foreign institutions. And, besides,—not only did the Swiss run, in favour of foreigners, the chances and dangers of the field of battle, but they had long distances to travel, expensive uniforms to purchase and renew, and it was moreover acknowledged and admitted, that “they had always received greater pay, and larger retiring pensions,” than the troops of the foreign state which they served.

\* “The military commission authorized by the diet has come to no ultimate decision upon the fate of the three demi-brigades. I was desirous that the French government should retain the faculty of taking, on this subject, whatever determination it should deem advisable; but it is my duty to inform you, Citizen Minister, that the commission has requested, in the strongest terms, that these demi-brigades shall be joined together, and form only one corps. It is also desirous that the number of officers exceeding the wants of this new corps should be put upon half pay. And lastly, it is anxious that whatever measures the French government adopts in this matter, should give facilities to the cantonal governments for getting gradually rid of the officers appointed by the late Helvetican government, who might still remain after this charge, in order to replace them successively by officers appointed under the new order of things.”—Letter from the Plenipotentiary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Berne, 22d Fructidor, Year XI. (September 9th, 1803.)



This latter assertion was, however, incorrect with regard to France. According to the terms of the old capitulation, they were entitled, it is true, to a fixed rate of pay, and to a *monstre* above that of the national troops; but the amount of this *monstre* had never been fixed: it varied according to the will of the French minister for the time being, and the pay now offered exceeded the average of that granted at former periods. Ney considered it sufficient; for he did not think that raw recruits, who had still to win their first laurels, ought to be better paid than veteran soldiers who had already distinguished themselves in the field.

He was more indulgent with regard to the repugnance expressed by the Swiss soldiers to serve beyond seas. The plan under discussion had only excepted the East and West Indies. They would be delighted, they said, at having to serve only in Europe, and defend the French territory. This Ney observed to them, was impossible; for with such a clause they might, as their forefathers had done before them, refuse their co-operation on the eve of a battle. They were well aware, he said, that a war originally defensive, might by its results become offensive; and it would be hard that France, if she found it necessary to chastise the states of Barbary, should not have the power of sending thither any Swiss troops that might be at Marseilles. Ney thought, however, that the French government would use such power with great circumspection; because auxiliary troops at such a distance from the country they were serving, might be easily worked upon by tempting offers from the enemy, and in such expeditions it would be but prudent to admit as small a number of them as possible. But the principle must be laid down, and he would except only the East and West Indies.

As a last demand, the Swiss claimed the right, in the event of their country being in imminent danger of war, of recalling their troops from France. This seemed unreasonable to Ney. War could not be declared against them except by powers against which France was pledged to assist and defend them; and if this demand were acceded to, they would deprive her of their troops at the moment when she most needed them. Strange however as this pretension was, the First Consul had just complied with their wishes on a point almost as strange: in his munificence he had consented to defend Switzerland at the cost of France. The plenipotentiary therefore followed his example, and consented that, the case occurring, the cantons should have a right to recall their troops paid by France.

The conditions were now settled: Ney had fixed the bounty for enlisting, and the management and discipline of the different corps. He had admitted every claim that appeared to him just, and rejected those which were unfounded. Having been under the necessity of exceeding his instructions in many points, he would not sign the articles until he had previously obtained the consent of the First Consul.

Among his secretaries was one of whose zeal and abilities he entertained a high opinion; him he therefore despatched to Paris, and soon received, with authority to conclude the treaty, expressions of satisfaction from the chief of the French republic.

"The First Consul," wrote the minister, "before whom I have laid the articles of the treaty of alliance, and of the military capitulation agreed upon between you and the Helvetian commission, has directed me to express his satisfaction at the zeal which you have displayed in following up and closing this negotiation.

"You are hereby authorized to sign the two treaties, and even to yield, if you deem it necessary, to the subsequent demands made relative to the recruits, and to the colonies in the East and West Indies.

"These two changes affect the 7th and 18th articles of the capitulation. In article 7, it may be expressed, that the recruits shall be paid from the day of their joining their regiment, or of their arrival at the dépôt fixed for that regiment; and in article 18 it may be stipulated that the Swiss troops shall never be employed out of Europe.

"You will bring as near together as possible, the periods for exchanging the ratifications of these treaties. It is of advantage to Switzerland that its connexion with France should be speedily fixed, particularly as the terms agreed upon are so favourable.

"The changes operated through the mediation of the First Consul, in the organisation of Switzerland, would unavoidably render other changes necessary in the relations of that country with France; and it was to complete these advantages and secure the prosperity of Switzerland that the First Consul was anxious to restore to her the benefits she had derived from her ancient capitulations, and from the system of alliance and neutrality which she had always pursued.

"The concessions now made to Switzerland are more numerous than she had obtained by her ancient treaties; but the First Consul has thought that by extending these prerogatives and honorary distinctions, he should attach Switzerland still more strongly to France; and he has determined to give this strong proof of the estimation in which he holds the character and courage of the Swiss nation.

"It is the intention of the First Consul to facilitate, so far as his power extends, the execution of the military capitulation; and he apprehends no inconvenience from making the Helvetian demi-brigades already in the service of France enter into the composition of one of the four Swiss regiments, and giving their government the necessary latitude for this incorporation. It will be easy hereafter to concert upon the manner of carrying this into effect.

"Citizen Bouyer, who handed to me the two projects of treaty, has acquitted himself perfectly of the mission which you confided to him. Your good testimonials in his favour have given me the best

possible opinion of his talents and zeal; and he fully justifies this opinion. I shall with pleasure take the earliest opportunity of employing him agreeably to your desire, and shall make his services known to the First Consul.

“CH. MAUR. TALLEYRAND.

“Paris, September 21st, 1803.”

The First Consul now left every thing to the prudence and discretion of his plenipotentiary; the diet, on the other hand, announced that it was at length ready to conclude the two treaties, its members having received the necessary powers from their constituents. All was at length definitively agreed upon, and both parties thought they had brought this laborious negotiation to a close. But the spirit of faction was still at work: Reding again raised his voice against the alliance with France, and deluded them. He was himself deputy of Schweitz; he commanded the votes of his colleagues of Ury, Zug, and Unterwalden, and considered himself sure of support from the deputies of Glaris and Appenzell. An opposition thus constituted seemed to him sufficient for his purpose; and he immediately set up an opinion in the diet, that by the new constitution of Switzerland, treaties could not be concluded by individual suffrage, but to make them valid required the votes of three-fourths of the cantons, not of three-fourths of the deputies. Such an interpretation of the constitution was loudly protested against by the majority of his colleagues, but he persisted in it, and a stormy debate ensued. A great number of deputies deprecated an obstinacy which nothing could justify; but Reding was inflexible. Zellveiger, however, put an end to the obstacle by joining the majority, Hees followed his example, and Reding's plan was defeated.

Still he did not yield: the deputies of Ury, Zug, and Unterwalden clung to him and his fortunes, and these four resolved to carry their opposition to extremes. They uttered the bitterest invectives against France, and found fault with every article of the treaty. The other deputies in reply said, that France was as great and generous, as the treaty was full of wisdom and prudence; that Switzerland now enjoyed institutions which she had been seeking in vain during several centuries; that no enslaved people would now wear chains in the land of freedom; that there no longer existed in Switzerland either oppressors or oppressed; but that the mountains of Helvetia now possessed but one community of happy citizens, who all enjoyed the same rights, had the same obligations to fulfil, and were united by a common bond, of which their forefathers had seen the advantages, though they had never been able to establish a confederation upon the same principles.

These facts were evident, and neither Reding nor his friends attempted to deny them; but unable to offer even specious arguments against the treaties which they so violently rejected, they affected



scruples of another kind. They feigned now to doubt the power with which, a short time previously, they had maintained that they were invested, and insisted that the question of the ratification ought to be submitted to the cantons. Reinhart of Zurich, and Fründler of Berne, perceiving that these headstrong men were going too far, tried to make them listen to reason; and Zellweguer of Appenzell joined his remonstrances to those of the two former, but all was of no avail: Reding and his supporters persisted in maintaining that they could not ratify the articles agreed upon without consulting their constituents. Their opposition was however unheeded, and the two treaties were signed by the diet on the 4th of Vendémiaire, Year XII. (27th of September, 1803,) and sent to the different cantons for ratification.

Though the treaties were received with great enthusiasm in each canton, still all did not ratify them with equal promptitude. In some the delay was unavoidable, in others difficulties were purposely raised. Berne, Zurich, Basle, and Soleure gave them the final sanction, amidst the most joyful acclamations. The external Rhodes of Appenzell ratified them immediately; and of eight thousand men composing this latter assembly, there was not one who did not individually express satisfaction:—never had such unanimity been witnessed before.

The smaller cantons were almost the only ones which delayed the ratification of these treaties. Their inhabitants were as enthusiastic in favour of the measure as the rest of Switzerland; they were delighted that the theatre of war had been removed far from their mountains, and that their fortunes were again connected with those of the French nation, under whose standard their warriors might earn fame and fortune. Such, however, was not the case with Reding: he was hostile to the doctrines of the French republicans, and, being still angry at the intervention of Bonaparte in the affairs of Switzerland, continued to evince the same dislike to the treaties, as he had before professed hatred of the French republic. His friends were far from countenancing his obstinacy; Wurch even drew up a very excellent report of the negotiations of the diet, which report was greatly applauded; but, like his friends, Jauch and Muller, he respected, in his obstinate colleague, the uncompromising defender of Swiss independence. All three blamed his violence, and disavowed his acts, but neither had the heart to separate from him. They were anxious to allow him the honour of taking the lead in getting the treaties ratified, and they wished to wait until he had obtained the sanction of his constituents, before they convoked the assemblies of their own cantons. But Ney, who had the welfare of these cantons at heart, represented to the three deputies the injury which the whole of Helvetia was likely to sustain from such delay; Zug therefore set the example, which Ury followed immediately. Reding now found that he must yield to the torrent. The Lands-

guemende accordingly assembled, joined their vote to that of the rest of Switzerland, and the ratifications were exchanged on the 1st of December, 1803.

All was now terminated; arrogant pretensions or disappointed ambition could no longer throw obstacles in the way, or demand further concessions from the French minister. The whole of the Swiss people were much pleased with the conditions they had obtained. France had undertaken to defend their country, and to admit them to serve under its banner; thus they had the advantage of yielding to their fondness for arms, without their country being called upon to make any pecuniary sacrifices for the defence of its territory. Switzerland was now free; she had neither oppressors nor slaves among her citizens. The individual interests of the cantons were regulated by the local administrations, the general interests of the country by the diet. Helvetia had no longer to apprehend any attempts upon her franchises, nor any political agitation in her interior; she had all the advantages of centralization without its expenses. Thus her situation was most propitious, and she did ample justice to the friendly and disinterested views of France. Her citizens seemed to glory in proclaiming that they owed all these advantages to the First Consul of the French republic and to his plenipotentiary.

They now admitted that the mediation, which a powerful number of their citizens had so strenuously opposed, had been undertaken with views of benevolence and conciliation; they acknowledged the patient and mild manner in which it had been conducted, and they felt the necessity of disavowing the prejudices they had conceived against it at first. The inhabitants of Soleure thought it but justice to express their gratitude to Ney, not only for the broad and noble basis upon which he had established the relations between France and Switzerland,\* but likewise for the spirit of concord he had dis-

\* THE AVOYER AND COUNCIL OF THE CANTON OF SOLEURE TO HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL-IN-CHIEF NEY, MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY IN SWITZERLAND.

Soleure, October 5th, 1803.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR EXCELLENCY,

Mr. Avoyer Frim of Wartenfeld, our deputy at the general diet of Friburg, lost no time, on his return hither, in giving us an account of your Excellency's particular attention to our legation, and how much you had personally contributed to consolidate the union between the confederated cantons, as well as to hasten the important work of the alliance with the French republic, and that of the capitulation for the Swiss troops in the service of France. We acknowledge, as we ought to do, the good offices which your excellency has been so good as to render us on this occasion; we shall never forget that it is to your Excellency—to the worthy representative of the pacificator of your country, that we owe the happiness we are about to enjoy from the confederation guaranteed by the First Consul; and we dare flatter ourselves that the bonds of amity, existing for so many centuries, and now strengthened by gratitude, will prove indestructible, and that in future nothing will alter the harmony between the two nations.

Receive the assurance of our profound respect,

GERBER, Secretary of State.

P. GLUSZ RUCHT, Avoyer in charge.

played in his relations with the deputies of the several cantons, and the care with which he had reconciled their differences. Those of St. Gall avowed their obligation to him for the warmth and perseverance with which he had defended their interests; and those of Appenzell voted him an address, in which they stated what he had done for the happiness of Switzerland. The citizens of Berne went still farther: they determined to perpetuate the remembrance of Ney's mission by the erection of a public monument; they likewise had a medal struck, upon which were represented the disorders to which he had put an end, and the peace he had established.

These warm and grateful feelings were general throughout the country, and a new act of Ney's increased them to a pitch of enthusiasm. The country being happy and satisfied, he deemed the presence of the French troops no longer necessary, and accordingly withdrew them. This proof of confidence completely won the affection of the Swiss people; all celebrated the magnanimity of the French general by public rejoicings, and all were loud in acknowledgment of the services he had rendered them. But he was about to make his escape from these flattering testimonies of regard; his mission being now at an end, with the exception of some trifling details, and the French armies being in the act of assembling on the coast of the British channel, he applied for leave to join them. He was therefore appointed to the command of the corps-d'armée encamped at Montreuil. Prior to Ney's departure, the landamman was authorised to express the regret of the confederated cantons at losing him, and in their name to forward to him a snuff-box, with the monogram of Switzerland set in diamonds on the lid, and accompanied with the following letter:

“GENERAL,

“At the moment of your departure from us, and when I am myself about to deliver over my office to a successor, allow me to fulfil a most agreeable duty: that of speaking of the good you have done us, and of our gratitude towards you.

“It is not solely the expression of my own private sentiments that I now offer you. Having for the last ten months enjoyed the most delightful intercourse with you, it is quite natural that I should entertain towards you much esteem and personal attachment.

“But as chief magistrate of all Switzerland, it is in her name that I now address you.

“All the cantons, on being made acquainted with your intended departure, have expressed the most lively regret. They all set a proper value upon the share you have taken in the beneficial changes which the present year has brought us. Switzerland is restored to peace, order is everywhere established, the diversity of opinions among us merges each day into a spirit of moderation and harmony. Our line of conduct is traced with regard to internal administration,



at the same time that our foreign relations are become surer and more honourable,—those with France, in particular, having been stipulated in two treaties, which our forefathers would have signed as we have done. All this, General, we in part owe to your care. Switzerland having become happy and peaceable by this mediation, will not separate your name from that of the mediator himself.

“An act of kindness attaches him who performs it, as well as him upon whom it is conferred: we therefore do not fear that you will forget us; we would even on every occasion continue to rely upon your support, for you have conferred upon us at once the right and the habit of so doing.

“The cantons have expressed a wish that you would accept a feeble pledge of their attachment and gratitude; and seeing the preparations for your departure, I have requested M. Maillardoz to present it to you at Paris.

“It is a token of remembrance and nothing more; but we should esteem ourselves happy, if, by calling to your recollection a nation whom you have so essentially obliged, it should prove the means of your not forgetting the sentiments which every member of that nation will for ever feel towards you.

“LOUIS D'AFPRY,  
Landamman of Switzerland.

“MAUSSON,  
Chancellor of the Confederation.”

“Friburg, December 28th, 1803.”

## BOOK THE SEVENTH.

## CHAPTER I.

NEY had left France in the confident enjoyment of the blessings of peace; he found her on his return, again involved in the bustle of war. Great Britain had laid down her arms for a time, only because every other enemy of France had evacuated the field, and because single-handed she could not continue the war with any hope of success. But her government had calculated also upon the internal troubles with which the absence of foreign war was likely to be attended in France; it had been expected that envy, and hatred, and jealousy, and party-feeling, would inflict a death-wound upon the French republic which the foreign hosts coalesced against it had vainly attempted. But the powerful mind of the First Consul had crushed the strength of factions, and raised an extraordinary enthusiasm throughout the nation in favour of his government. His exertions towards the improvement of the national resources were prodigious. In the midst of war, when assailed by the joint efforts of the most powerful nations in Europe, he had successfully cultivated the arts of peace; and the short respite from hostilities which France had just enjoyed, had enabled him to consolidate his work, and found an edifice of eternal fame, much more noble and imperishable than that cemented by human blood. He had given an extraordinary impetus to the national industry; he encouraged both the useful and the liberal arts; and he was the patron of learning and science. He called to his councils men of all ranks and all professions; talent being the only passport to his favour. Under his rule, the country presented the picture of one vast family, each of whose members seemed to become daily more and more attached to the institutions which they had won from their former oppressors, and to rally with tenfold confidence around the chief who had foiled all the attempts of its enemies. The British government having soon discovered its mistake, determined to check, if possible, the career of greatness to which the duration of peace seemed likely to lead the French repub-

lic. Divers changes had taken place in the constitution of Europe, without the least opposition on the part of the British cabinet, or without its taking umbrage; but, on a sudden, it seemed roused from its tolerance and long-suffering; and seizing, as a pretence, those changes which it had not attempted to prevent, war was again declared.

France, taken by surprise, was far from being prepared to meet the exigencies of war. The state of her finances had imposed upon her measures of the strictest economy. The officers of her armies were dispersed on leave of absence; and the armies themselves were in a very inefficient state. The infantry was incomplete; and the cavalry had not half the number of horses necessary for the field. The artillery was still less able to act. Marmont, by whom it was commanded, had imagined improvements in this branch of the service, which had necessitated a fresh casting of the guns. He was likewise effecting a total change in the form of the tumbrils, and in the construction of the gun-carriages. The First Consul, however, soon got every thing in a state of preparation; he found in his own genius, and in the enthusiastic devotion of the nation to his wishes, all the resources necessary to carrying on the war. He called the young men to arms, provided horses, and soon got the artillery in order. In a few months all was ready, and an army more numerous and better equipped than at any preceding period of the wars of the republic, was sent to the sea-coast bordering upon the British channel.

The French people at length forgot their dissensions: the unprovoked aggression of Great Britain had united every patriot hand and heart against the common foe, and the republic was no longer torn by contending factions. The declaration of war by that power induced the First Consul, now free from the attempts of his continental neighbours, to renew the project he had in contemplation five years previously, but of which he had not then dared to attempt the execution: he resolved to cross the straits of Dover, and terminate at once, upon the banks of the Thames, a quarrel which could not be brought to an issue upon the Continent. But, as British squadrons covered the surface of the channel, and the disproportion of force between the navies of France and Great Britain destroyed all hope of success in a naval action, he sought the means of scattering those formidable fleets which he could not conquer, and thus rendering them powerless. The small vessels used in the defence of sea-ports, roadsteads, and the mouths of rivers, supplied him with the means of effecting this object. He feigned an intention of using such craft in distant expeditions; he altered their form, the shape of their sails, the manner of rigging them, and he gave orders that many should be built of various sizes, and upon different models. He divided them into three classes. The prames composed the vessels of the first class;—each carried six twenty-four pounders, which could be



shifted from side to side, thus forming so many floating batteries, which, it is true, might drift to leeward, being unable to sail upon a wind, and therefore to advance, unless the wind were right aft, or at all events abaft the beam. But as floating batteries they were excellent; they could act as batteries broadside-to, protect the local navigation, or cover the movements of a flotilla. They could moreover strand at low water without changing their position, or diminishing their power of doing mischief, and they could take shelter in places where neither ships of the line nor frigates could follow them.

The second class consisted of gun-boats, which were better adapted for navigation. Their form was more calculated for naval manœuvres, and they could sail near the wind. Each contained four twenty-four pounders and a howitzer. Some had thirty-six pounders, and were large enough to carry two hundred men.

The peniches, or gun-barges, which formed the third class, were small galleys with eighteen benches of rowers, carrying a four-pounder and a howitzer fore and aft.

These vessels were built with the most extraordinary despatch. The French nation had taken up the cause of its chief magistrate, against whom personally, the whole enmity of the British government was said to be directed. The people did not limit their aid to the demands which their government made upon them; they spontaneously granted much more than was asked. They seemed delighted to supply the First Consul with all the means he might require to come off victorious from a contest which attacked their institutions. The department of the Haut-Rhin presented him with a ship of the line; that of the Côte-d'or, with a hundred pieces of cannon. The departments of the Gironde and the Loire-inférieure were still more liberal; and there was not a town in France, even the smallest, nor even a hamlet, that did not make its offering and express its sentiments of patriotism.

This formidable armament did not, however, for a moment interrupt the arts of peace. The government, ever carefully attentive to the wants of the nation, pursued its undertakings of public utility, and its attempts at national improvement. It increased the number of public schools, and established secondary schools, in which the youth of France, under excellent regulations, and a strict and impartial discipline, received liberal instruction, and were qualified to enjoy the system of equality established by the revolution. It assembled likewise the veteran soldiers mutilated and disabled in war, formed them into military colonies, and bestowed upon them a portion of the territory which they had aided in conquering. Camps of refuge were established at Alexandria, and roads made upon Mount Cenis and across the Simplon. The bridges of Roanne, Corbeil, and Nemours—the canals of Arles, St. Quentin, and Aigues-Mortes—all in short that the First Consul undertook—were evidences of his zeal in pro-

moting the public welfare, and of the vastness of his genius. He had ordered the draining of the Colentin marshes, and likewise those forming the muddy banks of the Canche. At Cherbourg, Boulogne, Rochelle, Cette, Nice, Marseilles, Ostend, and Havre-de-Grace, all was bustle and activity, and the result of his gigantic plans may now be seen in those seaports. In every part of the kingdom improvements were made, and great and useful works begun.

The brilliant administration under which these national works were carried into effect, was not, however, free from the venom of envy. They whose assistance and co-operation it had not condescended to accept, as well as those to whose ambition it had not ministered, united to attack it: at first, indeed, by intrigue and silent plots; but soon after more openly. They pretended to see in the great undertakings of the First Consul nothing but subjects of anxiety and apprehension. Moreau, whose military renown should have saved him from the weakness of jealousy, supported the malcontents. He openly blamed the First Consul in all his measures, and attacked the integrity of his motives and intentions.

"What!" said he one day to Ney, when in a fit of envy he was inveighing against those who had rallied round the head of the state; "do you also go to the Tuileries?"

"Yes, indeed, I do," Ney replied. Moreau seemed surprised. "I go thither," Ney continued, "just as I should do if you held the office of First Consul."

"But how he has deceived us!" rejoined Moreau.

"May be so," answered Ney; "but I shall ever be grateful to him for his rapid and beautiful administration of public affairs. However, I have devoted my life to my country, and not to those whom events may place at the head of its affairs."

The conversation then turned from the person of the First Consul to the acts of his government. Moreau dwelt at great length upon the dangers of the invasion of England: he deemed it nothing short of madness to confront line-of-battle ships with gun-boats, and to hope that the passage across the channel could be won with such craft.

Ney was not of the same opinion. Barring the accidents of the sea, he thought that by taking advantage of light winds, of calms, and of long nights, it was not impossible to elude the vigilance of the channel fleet, and escape from the overwhelming superiority of the British naval force. He had procured a journal of the winds prevalent in the channel, and he was well acquainted with their course, their variation, the periods when they blow with violence, and those when their action is suspended. He had therefore no doubt that by seizing a favourable opportunity, the French army might escape the fleet which alarmed Moreau so much, and effect a landing upon the shores of England. The British nation, he said, were convinced of this; for the British admirals, who in 1756 were consulted on the possibility of such an event, had unanimously declared that they

could not answer for preventing a landing, even had they ten times the force they commanded; and in 1770 the same answer had been given. The Duke of Argyle, and some of the most distinguished British officers of the period, had often declared their conviction in parliament that situations and conjunctures might often arise at sea which would give a hostile army every possible opportunity of landing in England without the British fleets, even were they collected together, being able to secure the safety of the coast. The reason of this, he said, was very clear. The westerly winds, and those from the south and south-west, blow from France to England, and during their prevalence vessels sailing from the ports of France make good way, whilst those of England cannot leave their ports; thus the most formidable fleets are of no use during the continuance of those winds, and an attempt might be successfully made.

"A sudden cessation of wind," continued Ney, "might produce the same effect as a violent and continued gale; for if the British fleet were overtaken by a dead calm, either in the middle or at the end of a voyage from one port of the coast to another, it would baffle the talents of its officers and render the valour of its seamen of no avail. What could be done with ships of the line under such circumstances? Have recourse to oars?—that would be impracticable. Use their boats?—what chance would these have against our host of gun-boats, peniches, and light vessels, armed and equipped as they are? Besides, the tides and fogs will again increase our chances of success. How many of our squadrons are there which have escaped from the British cruisers in a fog, or during a dark night! Remember how the Prince of Orange crossed the channel, and that during six hours his fleet passed close to that of James II. without being perceived. The Earl of Dartmouth having ascertained at length that it had sailed, bore up in pursuit of it; but as he began to brace up his yards the wind became more a-head, having veered to south, and he was unable to interrupt the prince's landing.

"The same thing afterwards occurred to the French fleet cruising off Brest. It suffered the ships under the command of Admiral Anson to pass without perceiving them, and this distinguished officer did not know the danger he had run until his return to England. But these are not our only chances. The English are terror-stricken at our preparations, and the malcontents among them are excited with hope. Such vessels as ours have always terrified those islanders. In the reign of Elizabeth, one of her ministers frankly declared that England had never been more exposed to the dangers of an invasion than since the King of Spain had built small boats, similar to those used by the Flemish and the French. The same description of vessels has even more recently excited the alarms of Boscawen. This admiral knew the amount of our force in the Mediterranean; he knew that having been defeated in a great naval action on the 20th of November 1759, we were not in a state to attempt



any enterprise. Still such was the impression made upon him by one gun-boat on the coast, that on seeing a few sails appear on the horizon, he had no doubt of their forming part of an invading expedition, and he immediately stated his apprehensions to the king and the government. In an incredible short space of time all England was in rumour, whilst the dreaded expedition turned out to be nothing but a convoy of colliers!"

The means of attack, which appeared so serious to the British government, but which were treated so lightly by Moreau and others at Paris, were, nevertheless not those which the First Consul intended to employ. He had no idea of engaging line-of-battle ships with gun-boats; his views were much more consistent. What his exact intentions were, Ney did not precisely know; but he had faith both in the genius of his general, and in the destinies of France;—he was moreover penetrated with the idea of calling England to a severe account for three centuries of hostility.

The month of March had just begun; the Canche was restored to its bed, the harbour of Ambleteuse was open, and that of Vimereux had piers and plenty of water for the ingress and egress of vessels. All the great works, which had changed the appearance of the whole country, were nearly complete. Ney's duty was confined to the care and drilling of his men. The corps under his command consisted of three divisions: one stationed at Ostro-Hove, another at Etaples, and the third at Fromesseu. All three were commanded by officers, whose military fortune was inseparable from that of the First Consul. Dupont, who was at the head of the first, had not been without some influence in the destinies of Napoleon: he had contributed to bring him forward, and being soon after appointed to the direction of the cabinet topographique, had supported him with his interest. Partouaux, who commanded the third, was in a diametrically opposite situation with regard to the First Consul. Having been denounced for his opinions to the clubs at Marseilles, his protestations of hatred to kings were of no avail, and he would probably have been dismissed from the service, had not Bonaparte taken him under his protection. This general placed him in active service, afforded him opportunities of distinguishing himself, and enabled him to give the lie to his accusers. Partouaux ever bore this in remembrance, and was devoted body and soul to his protector. Loison was at the head of the second division. This officer had yet had no direct communication with the First Consul; but he was ardent, enterprising, and fond of military glory. He thrilled at the bare mention of Marengo; and the man who had won that day was his idol upon earth.

With such men under him, Ney's duties were not very severe; he could depend upon their vigilance, and feel confident that the details of the service would not be neglected. But Ney was accustomed to see every thing done himself, and assure himself that no part

of the duty was omitted. He inspected the most important posts, and examined every position ; he went through the camp and had reason to express satisfaction at the intelligence displayed in its formation. The barraques, or wooden huts, being all built upon the same model, and perfectly uniform, had the most agreeable appearance. They were whitewashed, and divided into groups ; these again were intersected by streets, or rather alleys, each bearing the name of some distinguished soldier, or of some great battle won. In front were avenues ; the parade was surrounded by plantations ; and in the rear were kitchens, dancing-rooms, and gardens.

The interior of the squares or groups was equally well distributed. At the bottom, the huts contained hurdles fixed horizontally about two feet from the ground, and covered with fresh straw for the men to sleep upon. Farther on were the eating-huts, with their fire-places and benches, and racks for the fire-locks, and pegs for the knapsacks. The general distribution of the camp was beautiful, but Ney did not think the situation well chosen. The means of defence did not appear to him good, nor the batteries properly supported. Moreover, the prames being obliged to proceed along the coast to reach Etaples and Vimereux, might be captured or destroyed by the British cruisers. The flotilla at anchor in the Canche was by no means secure from a coup-de-main. Ney therefore hastened to obviate all these defects. He distributed his forces in a different manner, and established walking sentinels, who passed each other every quarter of an hour from St. Frieux, which lay at his extreme right, to the mouth of the Canche, and continued on the other side from the right bank of the Somme as far as the Authie, which was at his extreme left. Pickets of cavalry and light artillery were placed along the whole line, in order to ensure the safety of the flotilla. And as espionage tries to find an entrance everywhere, and had its signals and means of communication in the camp, Ney took the severest measures against it. He gave orders to fire at whoever entered this long line of posts ; he placed guards at the windmills, and laid an embargo upon the fishing-boats. Nor did his vigilance stop here : considering that the fate of his country depended upon the projected expedition to England, the details which might conduce to its success were the constant objects of his solicitude. He had received his troops from General Soult, who had taken charge of them for him, and bestowed upon them the same care and attention as he did upon his own. Ney, grateful for this act of kindness, had called upon Soult, and they had together reconnoitred Vimereux, Ambleteuse, and all the line of coast under Ney's command. Boulogne, in particular, had attracted his attention. This seaport was free from the dangers by which it was formerly beset. The large vessels in its harbour could now leave it without risk : they were no longer in danger of grounding when they tried to place themselves under the protection of the batteries, nor of being taken when they

ran down the coast. The artillerymen had become perfect marksmen ; a fort arose from the midst of the reef of rocks, and the anchorage was securely guarded.

To these powerful means of defence were added mortars which threw shells to a distance of two thousand toises, guns which carried still farther, and a formidable work commanding the passes. Though all this was calculated to inspire confidence, still the security did not seem to Ney sufficient. He knew that this immense armament would strike terror into the British government, and that every attempt would be made to destroy the flotilla ; he felt confident, that dangerous as the undertaking was, it had its chances of success, and he dreaded what a bold and brave enemy might attempt to prevent it, as well as the effects of treachery. The very last attack had shown that the British shells could reach the shipping at the very extremity of the harbour. He feared that Nelson might take advantage of this circumstance, and succeed in setting fire to the French flotilla. He supposed that a British squadron might sail from England at twelve o'clock at night, reach Boulogne at five in the morning, lay broadside-to off the battery Des Grenadiers, and Fort l'Huert, send bomb-ketches forward, and before daylight create a dreadful confusion in the harbour. If the rasant batteries, or the side batteries interrupted the attack, the British might send a few old frigates to give another direction to, if not to silence, their fire, and meanwhile shot would be poured upon the harbour, treachery might also assist, and the First Consul's immense armament be totally destroyed.

To prevent such a disaster, the attack must be immediately counteracted and the enemy repulsed. If the bombardment were prolonged, it would inevitably cause immense damage. Ney's alterations therefore tended to foil such an attempt if made by the British navy. He wished that a division of prames should lie at anchor at the mouth of the *Lyonne*, so as to form a saliant angle, under cover of the rasant batteries, and be always ready for immediate action ; that these prames should be supported by two lines of gun-boats, which should go out every day with the tide, and lie at anchor outside until the British squadron was announced by signals on the heights. These gun-boats, manned by picked detachments, were to have set sail directly towards the British ships, and, after receiving the first broadside, attempt to carry them by boarding. If the wind and the chance of the day were both unfavourable, they were to have fallen back under cover of the batteries on the coast, and have gained Etaples, Vimereux, or Ambleteuse. The two last of these seaports being exposed to the same dangers as Boulogne, Ney thought the same plan ought to be adopted with regard to them. General Soult to whom he submitted his plans and fears, wrote him the following note :—

“ I sincerely thank you, my dear General, for your observations



upon the defence of Boulogne. I will profit by them, if circumstances allow me to do so.

"We have two prames ready to go out in case of attack; we are in expectation of several others now fitting out at Havre, Dunkerque, and Ostend, and which are likewise intended to protect and support the vessels of the flotilla at anchor in the roads.

"In the event of attack, some divisions of gun-boats and pirogues should proceed to the roads; and this would be the more necessary because, besides disencumbering the harbour, it would force the enemy, whatever were their force, to keep at a respectful distance.

"Numerous precautions have been taken against the effect of fire, and some fresh precaution is taken every day. For some time past the duty upon the quays is performed with tolerable exactness, and we observe with pleasure that, in this respect, there is an evident improvement.

"The flotilla has not yet been able to go outside the harbour, because, until to-day, the men have not ceased working day and night at their buildings; but now that this labour is far advanced I hope to resume this exercise, which is necessary, not only for the sailors and the troops, but likewise to accustom the enemy to have us in sight.

"As for the ports of Ambleteuse and Vimereux, of which you also speak in your letter, it appears to me very difficult for the enemy to succeed in any serious attempt, for the situation of these two ports, and the armament employed in their defence, are obstacles which they could not easily overcome.

"Believe in the assurance of my friendship,

"SOULT."

The precautions alluded to by Soult corresponded very nearly with those recommended by Ney; nevertheless, although they were quite sufficient to foil a coup-de-main, he still did not think them calculated to attain the object in view. The centre of operations appeared, in his judgment, badly chosen, and he would have removed the camp from Boulogne to Etaples, which offered immense advantages. Its bay is capable of holding from fifteen to eighteen hundred vessels, secure from bombs; and all might leave it during one tide. It would take them, it is true, two hours more to reach England from Etaples than from Boulogne; but on the other hand, if the weather was bad, they would be able to reach the Canche much more easily, and run less risk of grounding. A fort was in progress of building upon the Banc-aux-chiens; and the roadstead and the outer anchorage of the harbour, already defended by three batteries, would now be secure against any attack. But the flotilla and the *materiel* of the army were stationed at Boulogne; and this idea was not carried into execution. Meantime, an imaginary danger spread alarm along the coast; and it was of a kind that neither redoubts, nor armies, nor

flotillas could arrest. It was reported that the British cruisers had thrown three poisoned bales of cotton upon the coast, and that the British government had called the plague to its assistance.\* The first Consul refused to credit such a thing; nevertheless it was reported to him, and he applied to Ney to ascertain the fact.

"I am informed, Citizen General Ney," he wrote, "that the English have thrown bales of cotton upon our coast, which has led to the supposition that these bales are poisoned. Give me all the particulars you can collect on this matter. It would be lamentable to think that every principle of humanity could be thus forgotten.

BONAPARTE."

"Malmaison, 30th Ventose, Year XII.  
(March 21st, 1804.)"

\* TO THE POSTS ALONG THE COASTS.

Battery of St. Frieux, 25th Ventose, Year XII.  
(March 16th, 1804.)

Remain at your posts, Citizens, and increase your vigilance.

The English, unable to conquer us by force, are employing their last resource:  
THE PLAGUE.

Five bales of cotton have just been thrown upon our coast.

All are hereby forbidden to approach any boats or objects that may be cast on shore.

Let patrols be instantly on foot, and let them be accompanied by custom-house officers.

VILLATTE, General of Brigade.

P.S. These presents shall pass from post to post, from the battery of Petite-Garonne to the entrance of the harbour at Boulogne.

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VILLATTE, GENERAL OF BRIGADE, TO GENERAL-IN-CHIEF SOULT, COMMANDING THE  
CAMP AT ST. OMER.

Battery of St. Frieux, 25th Ventose, Year XII.

GENERAL,

The English, unable to conquer us by force, are recurring to their last resource:  
THE PLAGUE.

Five bales of cotton have just been cast upon our coast: I hasten to give you notice of it.

From St. Frieux to the mouth of the Canche, all the troops are at their posts; patrols are spread along the strand, and are accompanied by the custom-house officers.

In sight of this battery, and almost within shot, are a frigate and two sloops of war belonging to the enemy; also several small fishing-boats, which I presume contain other bales of cotton.

As no one is allowed to take out any boat or vessel, I have just received the order to fire at everything that may appear in the sea within the range of our batteries.

Be so good, General, as to give orders to the detachment of the 46th regiment, sent to guard the battery of St. Frieux, to build their huts behind and close to the battery.

If there be anything new, General, I shall lose no time in giving you intimation of it.

Health and respect.

VILLATTE.

Ney, although he had no high opinion of the principles on which Great Britain was then governed, thought with the First Consul, that this charge was too monstrous to be believed. He nevertheless set inquiries on foot, and after due investigation discovered that this alleged horrible attempt, which had terrified the whole country, turned out to be an old hammock which some fishermen had found on the sea-shore.

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## CHAPTER II.

THIS alarm, though false, had increased the hatred felt by every individual in the French army against England, and was not without influence in the manifestation of this feeling. For a long time past Great Britain affected a blind aversion towards the First Consul, and this aversion was made manifest, not only in parliamentary declamation, but in the diplomatic despatches sent abroad. At Petersburg, Admiral Warren had announced new contests which were to overthrow General Bonaparte. At Madrid, the British ambassador, Frere, had several times declared that Bonaparte could not long escape: that sooner or later he must fall either by steel or by poison.\*

George Cadoudal, and his band of assassins, having been landed upon the French coast by English vessels, had nearly realised these atrocious predictions; and as if to show the fulness of the measure of iniquity, the unworthy plots of two British agents had just been discovered. Drake, the British minister at the court of Bavaria, not satisfied with planning the overthrow of the French government, and the murder of the First Consul, aimed at a renewal of the horrors of the infernal machine, by blowing up the powder-mills, if an opportunity offered.† Spencer Smith, at Stuttgard, where he was

\* April 3rd, 1803.

† "Article II. The principal object of this journey being to overthrow the present government, one of the means of succeeding is to acquire a knowledge of the enemy's plans. For this purpose it is of the highest importance to begin by establishing sure correspondences in the different public offices, thus obtaining an exact knowledge of every measure to be adopted with regard either to the interior of the country or to the exterior. A knowledge of their plans would furnish the best weapons for defeating them, and the failure of such plans is one of the means to be used in bringing absolute discredit upon the government: this is a first, and indeed the most important step towards the object in view.

"The persons employed in the powder-mills might be gained, with the aid of associates, and the mills blown up, when an opportunity offered.

"It is above all things necessary to bring into the plot, and secure the fidelity



moting the public welfare, and of the vastness of his genius. He had ordered the draining of the Colentin marshes, and likewise those forming the muddy banks of the Canche. At Cherbourg, Boulogne, Rochelle, Cette, Nice, Marseilles, Ostend, and Havre-de-Grace, all was bustle and activity, and the result of his gigantic plans may now be seen in those seaports. In every part of the kingdom improvements were made, and great and useful works begun.

The brilliant administration under which these national works were carried into effect, was not, however, free from the venom of envy. They whose assistance and co-operation it had not condescended to accept, as well as those to whose ambition it had not ministered, united to attack it: at first, indeed, by intrigue and silent plots; but soon after more openly. They pretended to see in the great undertakings of the First Consul nothing but subjects of anxiety and apprehension. Moreau, whose military renown should have saved him from the weakness of jealousy, supported the malcontents. He openly blamed the First Consul in all his measures, and attacked the integrity of his motives and intentions.

"What!" said he one day to Ney, when in a fit of envy he was inveighing against those who had rallied round the head of the state; "do you also go to the Tuileries?"

"Yes, indeed, I do," Ney replied. Moreau seemed surprised. "I go thither," Ney continued, "just as I should do if you held the office of First Consul."

"But how he has deceived us!" rejoined Moreau.

"May be so," answered Ney; "but I shall ever be grateful to him for his rapid and beautiful administration of public affairs. However, I have devoted my life to my country, and not to those whom events may place at the head of its affairs."

The conversation then turned from the person of the First Consul to the acts of his government. Moreau dwelt at great length upon the dangers of the invasion of England: he deemed it nothing short of madness to confront line-of-battle ships with gun-boats, and to hope that the passage across the channel could be won with such craft.

Ney was not of the same opinion. Barring the accidents of the sea, he thought that by taking advantage of light winds, of calms, and of long nights, it was not impossible to elude the vigilance of the channel fleet, and escape from the overwhelming superiority of the British naval force. He had procured a journal of the winds prevalent in the channel, and he was well acquainted with their course, their variation, the periods when they blow with violence, and those when their action is suspended. He had therefore no doubt that by seizing a favourable opportunity, the French army might escape the fleet which alarmed Moreau so much, and effect a landing upon the shores of England. The British nation, he said, were convinced of this; for the British admirals, who in 1756 were consulted on the possibility of such an event, had unanimously declared that they

could not answer for preventing a landing, even had they ten times the force they commanded ; and in 1770 the same answer had been given. The Duke of Argyle, and some of the most distinguished British officers of the period, had often declared their conviction in parliament that situations and conjunctures might often arise at sea which would give a hostile army every possible opportunity of landing in England without the British fleets, even were they collected together, being able to secure the safety of the coast. The reason of this, he said, was very clear. The westerly winds, and those from the south and south-west, blow from France to England, and during their prevalence vessels sailing from the ports of France make good way, whilst those of England cannot leave their ports ; thus the most formidable fleets are of no use during the continuance of those winds, and an attempt might be successfully made.

“A sudden cessation of wind,” continued Ney, “might produce the same effect as a violent and continued gale ; for if the British fleet were overtaken by a dead calm, either in the middle or at the end of a voyage from one port of the coast to another, it would baffle the talents of its officers and render the valour of its seamen of no avail. What could be done with ships of the line under such circumstances ? Have recourse to oars ?—that would be impracticable. Use their boats ?—what chance would these have against our host of gun-boats, peniches, and light vessels, armed and equipped as they are ? Besides, the tides and fogs will again increase our chances of success. How many of our squadrons are there which have escaped from the British cruisers in a fog, or during a dark night ! Remember how the Prince of Orange crossed the channel, and that during six hours his fleet passed close to that of James II. without being perceived. The Earl of Dartmouth having ascertained at length that it had sailed, bore up in pursuit of it ; but as he began to brace up his yards the wind became more a-head, having veered to south, and he was unable to interrupt the prince’s landing.

“The same thing afterwards occurred to the French fleet cruising off Brest. It suffered the ships under the command of Admiral Anson to pass without perceiving them, and this distinguished officer did not know the danger he had run until his return to England. But these are not our only chances. The English are terror-stricken at our preparations, and the malcontents among them are excited with hope. Such vessels as ours have always terrified those islanders. In the reign of Elizabeth, one of her ministers frankly declared that England had never been more exposed to the dangers of an invasion than since the King of Spain had built small boats, similar to those used by the Flemish and the French. The same description of vessels has even more recently excited the alarms of Boscawen. This admiral knew the amount of our force in the Mediterranean ; he knew that having been defeated in a great naval action on the 20th of November 1759, we were not in a state to attempt

any enterprise. Still such was the impression made upon him by one gun-boat on the coast, that on seeing a few sails appear on the horizon, he had no doubt of their forming part of an invading expedition, and he immediately stated his apprehensions to the king and the government. In an incredible short space of time all England was in rumour, whilst the dreaded expedition turned out to be nothing but a convoy of colliers!"

The means of attack, which appeared so serious to the British government, but which were treated so lightly by Moreau and others at Paris, were, nevertheless not those which the First Consul intended to employ. He had no idea of engaging line-of-battle ships with gun-boats; his views were much more consistent. What his exact intentions were, Ney did not precisely know; but he had faith both in the genius of his general, and in the destinies of France;—he was moreover penetrated with the idea of calling England to a severe account for three centuries of hostility.

The month of March had just begun; the Canche was restored to its bed, the harbour of Ambleteuse was open, and that of Vimereux had piers and plenty of water for the ingress and egress of vessels. All the great works, which had changed the appearance of the whole country, were nearly complete. Ney's duty was confined to the care and drilling of his men. The corps under his command consisted of three divisions: one stationed at Ostro-Hove, another at Etaples, and the third at Fromesseu. All three were commanded by officers, whose military fortune was inseparable from that of the First Consul. Dupont, who was at the head of the first, had not been without some influence in the destinies of Napoleon: he had contributed to bring him forward, and being soon after appointed to the direction of the cabinet topographique, had supported him with his interest. Partounaux, who commanded the third, was in a diametrically opposite situation with regard to the First Consul. Having been denounced for his opinions to the clubs at Marseilles, his protestations of hatred to kings were of no avail, and he would probably have been dismissed from the service, had not Bonaparte taken him under his protection. This general placed him in active service, afforded him opportunities of distinguishing himself, and enabled him to give the lie to his accusers. Partounaux ever bore this in remembrance, and was devoted body and soul to his protector. Loison was at the head of the second division. This officer had yet had no direct communication with the First Consul; but he was ardent, enterprising, and fond of military glory. He thrilled at the bare mention of Marengo; and the man who had won that day was his idol upon earth.

With such men under him, Ney's duties were not very severe; he could depend upon their vigilance, and feel confident that the details of the service would not be neglected. But Ney was accustomed to see every thing done himself, and assure himself that no part



of the duty was omitted. He inspected the most important posts, and examined every position ; he went through the camp and had reason to express satisfaction at the intelligence displayed in its formation. The barraques, or wooden huts, being all built upon the same model, and perfectly uniform, had the most agreeable appearance. They were whitewashed, and divided into groups ; these again were intersected by streets, or rather alleys, each bearing the name of some distinguished soldier, or of some great battle won. In front were avenues ; the parade was surrounded by plantations ; and in the rear were kitchens, dancing-rooms, and gardens.

The interior of the squares or groups was equally well distributed. At the bottom, the huts contained hurdles fixed horizontally about two feet from the ground, and covered with fresh straw for the men to sleep upon. Farther on were the eating-huts, with their fire-places and benches, and racks for the fire-locks, and pegs for the knapsacks. The general distribution of the camp was beautiful, but Ney did not think the situation well chosen. The means of defence did not appear to him good, nor the batteries properly supported. Moreover, the prames being obliged to proceed along the coast to reach Etaples and Vimereux, might be captured or destroyed by the British cruisers. The flotilla at anchor in the Canche was by no means secure from a coup-de-main. Ney therefore hastened to obviate all these defects. He distributed his forces in a different manner, and established walking sentinels, who passed each other every quarter of an hour from St. Frieux, which lay at his extreme right, to the mouth of the Canche, and continued on the other side from the right bank of the Somme as far as the Authie, which was at his extreme left. Pickets of cavalry and light artillery were placed along the whole line, in order to ensure the safety of the flotilla. And as espionage tries to find an entrance everywhere, and had its signals and means of communication in the camp, Ney took the severest measures against it. He gave orders to fire at whoever entered this long line of posts ; he placed guards at the windmills, and laid an embargo upon the fishing-boats. Nor did his vigilance stop here : considering that the fate of his country depended upon the projected expedition to England, the details which might conduce to its success were the constant objects of his solicitude. He had received his troops from General Soult, who had taken charge of them for him, and bestowed upon them the same care and attention as he did upon his own. Ney, grateful for this act of kindness, had called upon Soult, and they had together reconnoitred Vimereux, Ambleteuse, and all the line of coast under Ney's command. Boulogne, in particular, had attracted his attention. This seaport was free from the dangers by which it was formerly beset. The large vessels in its harbour could now leave it without risk : they were no longer in danger of grounding when they tried to place themselves under the protection of the batteries, nor of being taken when they

ran down the coast. The artillerymen had become perfect marksmen ; a fort arose from the midst of the reef of rocks, and the anchorage was securely guarded.

To these powerful means of defence were added mortars which threw shells to a distance of two thousand toises, guns which carried still farther, and a formidable work commanding the passes. Though all this was calculated to inspire confidence, still the security did not seem to Ney sufficient. He knew that this immense armament would strike terror into the British government, and that every attempt would be made to destroy the flotilla ; he felt confident, that dangerous as the undertaking was, it had its chances of success, and he dreaded what a bold and brave enemy might attempt to prevent it, as well as the effects of treachery. The very last attack had shown that the British shells could reach the shipping at the very extremity of the harbour. He feared that Nelson might take advantage of this circumstance, and succeed in setting fire to the French flotilla. He supposed that a British squadron might sail from England at twelve o'clock at night, reach Boulogne at five in the morning, lay broadside to off the battery Des Grenadiers, and Fort l'Huert, send bomb-ketches forward, and before daylight create a dreadful confusion in the harbour. If the rasant batteries, or the side batteries interrupted the attack, the British might send a few old frigates to give another direction to, if not to silence, their fire, and meanwhile shot would be poured upon the harbour, treachery might also assist, and the First Consul's immense armament be totally destroyed.

To prevent such a disaster, the attack must be immediately counteracted and the enemy repulsed. If the bombardment were prolonged, it would inevitably cause immense damage. Ney's alterations therefore tended to foil such an attempt if made by the British navy. He wished that a division of prames should lie at anchor at the mouth of the Lyonne, so as to form a saliant angle, under cover of the rasant batteries, and be always ready for immediate action ; that these prames should be supported by two lines of gun-boats, which should go out every day with the tide, and lie at anchor outside until the British squadron was announced by signals on the heights. These gun-boats, manned by picked detachments, were to have set sail directly towards the British ships, and, after receiving the first broadside, attempt to carry them by boarding. If the wind and the chance of the day were both unfavourable, they were to have fallen back under cover of the batteries on the coast, and have gained Etaples, Vimereux, or Ambleteuse. The two last of these seaports being exposed to the same dangers as Boulogne, Ney thought the same plan ought to be adopted with regard to them. General Soult to whom he submitted his plans and fears, wrote him the following note :—

“ I sincerely thank you, my dear General, for your observations

upon the defence of Boulogne. I will profit by them, if circumstances allow me to do so.

"We have two prames ready to go out in case of attack; we are in expectation of several others now fitting out at Havre, Dunkerque, and Ostend, and which are likewise intended to protect and support the vessels of the flotilla at anchor in the roads.

"In the event of attack, some divisions of gun-boats and pirogues should proceed to the roads; and this would be the more necessary because, besides disencumbering the harbour, it would force the enemy, whatever were their force, to keep at a respectful distance.

"Numerous precautions have been taken against the effect of fire, and some fresh precaution is taken every day. For some time past the duty upon the quays is performed with tolerable exactness, and we observe with pleasure that, in this respect, there is an evident improvement.

"The flotilla has not yet been able to go outside the harbour, because, until to-day, the men have not ceased working day and night at their buildings; but now that this labour is far advanced I hope to resume this exercise, which is necessary, not only for the sailors and the troops, but likewise to accustom the enemy to have us in sight.

"As for the ports of Ambleteuse and Vimereux, of which you also speak in your letter, it appears to me very difficult for the enemy to succeed in any serious attempt, for the situation of these two ports, and the armament employed in their defence, are obstacles which they could not easily overcome.

"Believe in the assurance of my friendship,

"SOULT."

The precautions alluded to by Soult corresponded very nearly with those recommended by Ney; nevertheless, although they were quite sufficient to foil a coup-de-main, he still did not think them calculated to attain the object in view. The centre of operations appeared, in his judgment, badly chosen, and he would have removed the camp from Boulogne to Etaples, which offered immense advantages. Its bay is capable of holding from fifteen to eighteen hundred vessels, secure from bombs; and all might leave it during one tide. It would take them, it is true, two hours more to reach England from Etaples than from Boulogne; but on the other hand, if the weather was bad, they would be able to reach the Canche much more easily, and run less risk of grounding. A fort was in progress of building upon the Banc-aux-chiens; and the roadstead and the outer anchorage of the harbour, already defended by three batteries, would now be secure against any attack. But the flotilla and the *materiel* of the army were stationed at Boulogne; and this idea was not carried into execution. Meantime, an imaginary danger spread alarm along the coast; and it was of a kind that neither redoubts, nor armies, nor



flotillas could arrest. It was reported that the British cruisers had thrown three poisoned bales of cotton upon the coast, and that the British government had called the plague to its assistance.\* The first Consul refused to credit such a thing; nevertheless it was reported to him, and he applied to Ney to ascertain the fact.

"I am informed, Citizen General Ney," he wrote, "that the English have thrown bales of cotton upon our coast, which has led to the supposition that these bales are poisoned. Give me all the particulars you can collect on this matter. It would be lamentable to think that every principle of humanity could be thus forgotten.

BONAPARTE."

"Malmaison, 30th Ventose, Year XII.  
(March 21st, 1804.)"

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the accredited British agent, was engaged in similar machinations. Like his colleague, he plotted murder, offered wages to infamy, and encouraged the most disgraceful and atrocious actions; whilst the British minister at home, far from disavowing such acts, took them upon his own responsibility.

He declared in the face of all Europe, that he should be culpable if he did not second the exertions of those of the inhabitants of France who made a profession of hostile sentiments towards its present government.\* Thus the plan of attempting the First Consul's life, or at least the project of destroying what he had done, was avowed and proclaimed by the British government. England wished not only to strike down the great man who had united the scattered elements of national strength in France, but likewise to overthrow the institutions, dissolve the armies, and annihilate, in a word, all that had been obtained in that country by ten years of unprecedented victories.

The last attempt of the British diplomatists had failed, and the First Consul had escaped the poniards of their hired assassins; but the army did not deceive itself with regard to the existing state of things: it felt that the popular energy was exhausted, that each citizen was tired of war and strife, and that the advantages of the revolution would be destroyed, should the republic lose its powerful chief. Its own glorious labours would in such case be deemed a lengthened revolt, its victories a series of crimes, and that France, which it had so nobly defended—which it had surrounded with glory so bright and dazzling, would become a prey to the emigrants. It was outrageous at this persevering personal enmity to its leader, around whom it assembled, and intreated that his existence, together with the fruits of its own labours, might be rendered secure. The dragoons, assembled in independent divisions, took the lead: they intreated the First Consul to assume the imperial purple, and their desire, repeated by even the smallest hamlets, became that of entire France. Addresses from the different corps poured in;—each day Loison transmitted some, and Dupont renewed the expression of his own wishes, in forwarding those of the officers under his command.\* Ney joined in the expression of this general feeling.

of some printers and engravers, in order to print and do what the association may require.

"It would be desirable to ascertain precisely the state of parties in France, more especially at Paris.

"It is understood that all possible means shall be employed to disorganize the armies, either out of, or in the country."

(Instructions from the British minister, Drake, to one of his agents, M. D. L.)

\* Note of Lord Hawkesbury, addressed to the foreign ministers at the Court of St. James's.

\* TO GENERAL-IN-CHIEF NEY.

I enclose, my dear General, the personal addresses from the generals and colonels of the 1st division to the First Consul. They all contain the same wish which we



Such a change in the form of government was rather a sudden return to monarchy, and the danger was perhaps less imminent than the army supposed; but nature has its casualties as well as fortune, and if Bonaparte were fortunate enough to escape steel and poison, he might perchance be seized with a sudden disease, and leave his great work incomplete in the hands of a less able successor. The new institutions of France were by no means consolidated; they might be attacked and the country exposed to the strife of ambitious men, each eager to seize upon the supreme power. The thought of an hereditary sovereign excited, no doubt, a strong repugnance in many; but the civil rights of the French citizens had just been proclaimed, liberty and equality formed the basis of the laws of France, and the object of the revolution was attained. It was now absurd to sacrifice the substance to the form, place in danger the object which had been obtained by such enormous sacrifices and exertions, and all this to conciliate a mere sensitiveness of principle which in state affairs must needs give way to expediency. The army felt no such foolish delicacy; both officers and men were impatient to place the guardianship of the principles which they had so nobly defended, in the hands of a man capable of still making them triumph. Ney therefore assembled his corps-d'armée, and the following address was agreed upon:—

THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF, GENERALS, OFFICERS, AND SOLDIERS OF  
THE CAMP OF MONTREUIL TO THE FIRST CONSUL.

9th Floréal, Year XII. (April 29th, 1804.)

“The French monarchy has crumbled to pieces under the weight of fourteen centuries; the noise of its fall has alarmed the world and shaken all the thrones in Europe. France, abandoned to a total subversion, has during ten years of revolution undergone all the evils which could desolate a nation. You have appeared, Citizen General, radiant with glory and surpassing genius, and suddenly the storms have blown off.

“Victory has placed you at the helm of government; justice and peace are seated by your side.

“The recollection of our misfortunes was already beginning to be effaced, and all the feelings of the French people were about to merge into that of gratitude alone, when a dreadful event has shown them the new dangers which they are about to encounter.

“Your life, vainly defended by thirty-millions of men, has been threatened; and a single blow of a poniard would have thrown back

have already expressed at the head of the troops, that the hero of France should be invested with the Imperial dignity. May I beg that you will lay these addresses before him as the most sacred pledge of the devoted attachment felt towards him by the division he has placed under my command.

DUPONT.

Head-quarters, Fayette, 14th Floréal, Year XII.

the destinies of a great people, and revived among them the dreadful excesses of ambition and of anarchy.

“So appalling a prospect has dispelled every illusion, and the minds of all are divided betwixt horror of the past and dread of the future. France, with all its greatness and power, seeing that it might lose all in a single day, has been struck with consternation and dread. It is now like the Colossus with feet of clay. The time has come to put an end to such a state of anxiety, by making our powerful institutions secure for us a lasting prosperity. The same cry is heard from every part of France; be not therefore deaf to this expression of the national will.

“Accept, General Consul, the Imperial crown offered to you by thirty millions of people. Charlemagne, the greatest of our ancient kings, obtained his from the hands of victory: do you, with still more glorious claims than his, receive yours from those of gratitude. Let it be transmitted to your descendants, and may your virtues be perpetuated upon earth with your name!

“As for us, General Consul, full of love of our country and of attachment to your person, we devote our existence to the defence of both.”

The camps of Ostend and St. Omer followed the example of that of Montreuil, and expressed the same wish in still more enthusiastic language. It was at first deemed advisable to prevent those tumultuous meetings, where each lights his enthusiasm at the torch of his neighbour, whom he excites in his turn. Deputations were therefore thought of, and it was proposed to allow only an officer, a non-commissioned officer, and a soldier to vote in each company, as the representatives of that company. But all vehemently claimed their rights, and each was desirous of giving his individual vote. Never was such eagerness seen, nor so complete a feeling of unanimity; but likewise, as Soult observed, “the nation had never done so much for its happiness as by acquitting its debt of gratitude.”\* The legislature, the senate, and the whole of the magistracy, from the body of judges down to the petty magistrates in the villages, declared the same intentions and expressed the same desires. The First Consul, therefore accepted this new dignity, and was proclaimed Emperor on the 14th of May, 1804.

The question of hereditary descent was referred to the primary assemblies, but the feelings of the nation in its favour were expressed throughout the country. The power with which Napoleon was invested, was accordingly settled on his family, and the order of succession regulated: there was no interval between him who died and him who succeeded, so that no opening was left for the plottings of ambitious men. This new order of things led to new titles and new

\* Letter to Ney, dated 17th Floréal, Year XII.

powers. As consul, Bonaparte had generals in chief; as emperor, he was obliged to assume the forms of monarchy and create great dignitaries, and marshals of the empire. Ney was included in this new aristocracy; he received the staff of supreme command, as did also Berthier, Murat, Moncey, Jourdan, Masséna, Augereau, Bernadotte, Soult, Brune, Lannes, Mortier, Davoust, Bessières, Kellermann, Lefebvre, Perignon, and Serrurier.

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### CHAPTER III.

“WHEN Pepin was crowned,” says Montesquieu, “it was one ceremony more, and one phantom less: he only acquired ornaments by it, but nothing in the nation was changed.” This was the case with the new dignity conferred upon Napoleon Bonaparte: it gave him no power which he did not already possess; it only consolidated those rights which the people had conquered, placed them beyond the reach of the assassin’s dagger, and established a centre round which the nation could rally when they were attacked; and if the revolution were assailed in the person of its chief, its benefits were nevertheless now secured to the nation. The army, constantly exposed to see its dearly bought fame dishonoured, and the principles for which it had fought and bled disavowed, hailed with enthusiasm this new pledge of security. It remembered that the old aristocrats of France, eternally plotting against the life of General Bonaparte, had always found him in their way whenever they made any attempt hostile to the nation. It was he who beat them on the 13th of Vendemiaire; it was he who foiled them on the 18th of Brumaire, and utterly frustrated their plans. In him the army beheld the champion of the new principles, the hero of civilization and improvement; and it applauded with transport the elevation of a man whom his own labours, and the odious conspiracies against him by foreign states, had equally tended to establish as the representative of the French revolution. Thus each day brought its particular homage to the popular chieftain, and the unanimous feeling in Bonaparte’s favour, which pervaded all classes of the nation, was evinced each day by some fresh act. The new Emperor had always loved to honour courage, and excite it by rewards and distinction. In Italy he had decreed swords of honour to those who won distinction in the field; in Egypt he gave pecuniary rewards; and in France he addressed words of praise. Being now invested with supreme authority, he instituted the Legion of Honour, distributed in person crosses to the troops then at Paris, and directed the marshals of the empire to distribute among the corps on the coast a number of crosses destined for each.



Ney received seventy-seven great and a hundred and thirty small crosses for the corps under his command. But the enthusiasm in favour of the Emperor was so great that all regretted the distance which had prevented them from being in Paris to be invested with the badge of honour by Napoleon himself; and this feeling was so strongly expressed by the general officers that Ney felt it incumbent upon him to state the circumstance to him who was the object of these feelings. He wrote as follows:

"It is my duty to acquaint your Majesty with the feelings of regret expressed by the general officers at not receiving this glorious decoration from your Majesty's own hands. They had flattered themselves that they should have been equally fortunate with those members of the Legion of Honour who were present at Paris at the ceremony of the 14th of July.

"This desire, in which I share with them, has its origin in our attachment to your Majesty; and you give an additional value to your favours when you confer them in person."\*

The anniversary of St. Napoleon's day was not far off, and the Emperor anxious to meet the wishes of Ney's officers, fixed that anniversary for the ceremony of investiture. But an idea struck him that the same opportunity might serve to appease the jealousies existing among the different French armies, and induce the troops of each corps to entertain the same kindly feelings towards each other as they seemed to do towards him. His idea was, in short, to make the troops forget the distinctions of the Rhine and the Adige, and that all their hatreds as well as all their affections should be in common. He therefore ordered the several corps stationed at Bruges, at Ostend, and at Montreuil to join those encamped at Boulogne. The commanders of the corps received directions to concert with each other in bringing the troops into amicable communication, and making them fraternize. The camp of St. Omer's was to receive the others; and Marshal Soult, by whom it was commanded, was anxious to ascertain Ney's opinion as to the best mode of providing accommodation for his guests.

"His Majesty," wrote Soult, "seems desirous that the troops of the camp of Montreuil should occupy our camps, together with those of St. Omer, who now inhabit them. The latter will entertain the men composing your army, as well as the troops who shall arrive from the different reserves. By these means his Majesty's wish that the troops should fraternize together, will be accomplished. It would be difficult to fulfil this his Majesty's intention, unless your troops were settled in our camps; although, perhaps you would prefer that they should be encamped with tents, in some spot agreed upon near the place fixed upon for the ceremony, or else cantoned in the neighbouring villages; and that, under all circumstances, they should be

\* Letter of the 6th Thermidor, Year XII. (July 25th, 1804.)

in our camps on the 28th, to dine and fraternize with the other troops, who will be present at the ceremony. If you think, my dear Marshal, that either of these plans be preferable to the other, pray let me know immediately, and I shall lose no time in concerting with you on the best means of insuring its execution."

Ney adopted the plan which appeared most convenient to his colleague. Soult narrowed his cantonments, the calvary was quartered in the villages, the infantry provided with tents; each soldier had a companion, each officer a guest; and the whole army found quarters within the limits assigned to the camps of St. Omer.

On the day before the ceremony, all the several corps reached the quarters prepared for them. The evening was spent in friendly greetings and joyous anticipations. Some indulged dreams of military fame; others, and these composed the majority, called to mind the hazards and dangers which the revolution had run. And in truth, it had been assailed by conspiracies and by armies in succession: at one time it was near being crushed by the plots of the emigrants; at another it was in imminent danger from a coalition of kings. But Napoleon Bonaparte had always appeared as its tutelary genius; he had repaired the disasters consequent upon the defeats of its brave defenders, and frustrated the wily plots of its enemies. He was now in the act of consummating his work, and taking under his own guard and governance the principles which he had defended. Personal ambition, as these brave soldiers could not but admit, had some share in his undertakings; but who was free, they asked, from faults? Besides, it was the least of two evils: it was the alternative between the confirmation by law of a popular dictatorship, which already existed, and a total sacrifice of the benefits of the revolution. With the exception of himself, there was no man to whom the preservation of these benefits could be safely confided. Of three leading generals in whose keeping the fortunes of the revolution had been placed, one had quitted his country, the second had betrayed the principles he defended, and the third had just entered into a compact with the emigrants. When each of the Emperor's competitors had proved himself so ignominiously faithless to his country, it was hardly fair to expect that he should himself be free from all the weaknesses of human nature. At all events Napoleon was faithful to his principles, and his own ambitious feelings were closely interwoven with the greatness of the French nation.

At daybreak the cannon announced the beginning of the festivities, and every one was soon ready to participate in them. The troops were drawn up upon the ground set apart for the ceremony. It was a gentle slope, which terminated at the cliff on the sea-shore. In the middle of it was a throne, from which all the columns, formed by the several corps, diverged.

The infantry was spread out in the shape of a fan; in its rear the cavalry described a semicircle, and farther back were the inhabitants

of the country, whom curiosity had brought to the spot. The esplanade formed an amphitheatre, and each spectator could distinctly perceive, at one and the same time, the English coast whence the elements of war were propelled, and that throne which had just been raised amid agitation and alarm. Each individual present was impatient to reach the one, and each internally resolved to defend the other to the last drop of his blood.

The thunder of the artillery, announcing the arrival of the Emperor, turned the thoughts of each spectator into another channel. Each became silent and motionless; and when the monarch appeared at the head of his suite, a spontaneous shout rent the air, every hat was waved, and a profound silence succeeded this burst of enthusiasm. The new members of the Legion of Honour were assembled at the head of each demi-brigade, and Napoleon having ascended the throne, arose and addressed them as follows:

"You severally swear, upon your honour, to devote yourselves to the service of the republic, to co-operate with all your might in maintaining the integrity of its territory, and defending its government, its laws, and the property acknowledged by those laws. You swear to resist, by every means which justice, law, and reason allow, all attempts to re-establish feudality and its titles, or the privileges which they conferred. You swear, in short, to co-operate with all your might in the maintenance of liberty and equality. You swear all this!"

These were the very principles which the new members of the Legion of Honour had themselves proclaimed; these were the principles whose triumph they had secured in the field of battle; the Emperor's appeal to them was therefore received with the loudest acclamations. Napoleon continued:

"You, soldiers, severally swear to defend, at the peril of your lives, the honour of the French name, your country, and the institutions and laws by which it is governed!"

"We swear it!" cried the soldiers simultaneously.

The sound of this oath had scarcely subsided, when a small squadron appeared in full sail entering the port of Boulogne. It was commanded by Captain Daurier, who after having been obliged to put twice into Havre-de-Grace, to escape from the British cruisers, had at length eluded their vigilance and reached Boulogne in safety. The applause was renewed on receiving these particulars, and the troops then filed off. The remainder of the day was spent in dancing, running races, and other manly sports; the whole was wound up by a display of fireworks, and when the bouquet was let off, fifteen thousand men, formed in line of battle at the top of the cliff, kept up a running fire with starred cartridges.

All this produced fresh acclamations, and the night set in for some time ere the army returned to their quarters. But the festival, and the preparations for it, had been perceived by the British cruisers, who gave intelligence to their government of the evacuation of the



camps of Bruges, Ostend, and Montreuil, and the concentration of the whole French army before Boulogne. All England was in rumour at this news, but the British government persisted in its opinion that the prizes assembled on the French coast were intended to engage decked men-of-war, and that the army about to embark in these boats intended to attempt forcing the passage, and hoped to cross the straits by the military strength of the flotilla alone. It therefore resolved to anticipate the French army and trouble its preparations: its cruisers accordingly got under weigh, and proceeded to attack the flotilla at Boulogne.

The military combinations, which were to enable the French to reach the coast of Great Britain, being far from complete, the armament was content merely to take up the gauntlet thrown to it. The fire was opened at about half range, and in a short time the engagement became very animated. The Emperor in person directed the French. He was in a boat with Admiral Bruix. The British squadron was soon thrown into confusion; one of its cutters was taken, and its sloops of war were in tow. The French gun-boats closed their ranks in order to attempt boarding the British vessels; but these, not daring to prolong the struggle, hauled off and were soon out of sight. The Emperor then withdrew, after expressing his satisfaction at the conduct of the flotilla, and stating that the enemy, which it had just dispersed, would not fail to return and attack it again; but that if it continued to display the same energy and courage, all the British navy together would be unable to prevent the French army from landing on the English coast, where they would be able to crush, in its very strongholds, that demon of strife and bloodshed which had so long desolated the Continent.

He had inspected and was well acquainted with this part of the coast; he therefore proceeded towards Montreuil. Detachments were placed on the road at short distances from each other, and the Emperor was every where received with the most deafening acclamations. About two thirds of the camp of Montreuil had been unable to assist at the ceremony, and were desirous of expressing, like their brethren, their zeal and attachment towards their sovereign, whilst they who had already done so during the ceremony, were eager to repeat their professions.

Ney's men were all under arms; and they executed every manœuvre and evolution in line with such precision and rapidity, that the Emperor was delighted at their skill. He expressed his satisfaction to Ney, to whom he stated how much he was gratified at the noble bearing of the men and their elegant and soldier-like appearance, which contrasted so strongly with the rags which, until lately, had formed their only clothing.

"No doubt, Sire," Ney replied, "the military administration, like every other branch of the public service, has experienced the happy effects of your government. It is greatly improved, and has become

provident and economical. But if I might venture to make an observation, I should say that it would be advantageous to the service, if zeal were stimulated by rewarding the exertions of those by whom the duties of the commissariat are conducted."

"Do you mean in the person of your commissary-general?" asked the Emperor.

"Yes, Sire: I mean by making Marchand a commander of the Legion of Honour. No man is more deserving of such distinction; no man has sounder principles, or more extensive talents, and none is more devoted to your person."

The Emperor approved of this idea, and thought that the members of the military administrations ought likewise to reap the reward of their exertions, by sharing in the honours bestowed on the officers and soldiers of the army. He therefore followed Ney's suggestion with regard to Marchand, and other functionaries in the same branch of the service. Having continued to observe the conduct of the troops, he had the oldest soldier of each demi-brigade presented to him. He interrogated these veterans, inquired in what battles they had fought, and where they had been wounded; and he conferred a pension upon each of them. Such acts of liberality produced a powerful effect among the soldiery, who became still more attached, if possible, to their Emperor. They saw that the helm of state was now held by a man who could appreciate the services of a soldier, and that opprobrium and beggary would no longer be the reward of bravery in the field of battle.

Meantime the British had resolved to make another attack upon the flotilla. Having invented new engines of terrific effect, they announced the speedy destruction of the armament. On the 1st of October they set sail, and next day fifty-four vessels of all sizes, under the command of Lord Keith, appeared off Boulogne. The British commander, having ranged his fleet in line-of-battle, sent off twenty fire-ships towards the harbour. These were filled with fireworks and projectiles, having a pendulum affixed, which after a certain number of oscillations fired the train and the whole blew up.

These horrible machines passed through the French lines and exploded between their vessels and the shore. The shock was dreadful; it was felt at a distance of three leagues in the country, but it did very little damage to the flotilla. A peniche was destroyed. Its crew, seeing one of these vessels approach, took it for an armed brig, and determined to attack it at close quarters. Having approached, they were about to attempt boarding it, when with a sudden explosion it blew them and their boat into the air. Notwithstanding the danger, the French endeavoured to board several of these vessels and prevent their exploding; they succeeded in getting possession of one, and were thus able to ascertain of what these formidable engines of destruction were composed.

The action continued till the night was far advanced. The British

had lost several vessels, either captured or sunk; and the French line being still compact and in good order, they dared not continue the conflict. Thus the expensive attempt, which had been so long in preparing, and had been announced with so much pomp, proved a total failure. This ill success was therefore likely to weaken the confidence of the other states of Europe in British power.

Ney expressed his satisfaction to Soult at the result of this attack, and invited him to a military fête at Montreuil. Ney's men were becoming daily more skilful in their evolutions, and their general daily acquired a stronger taste for these manœuvres, which he alone directed.

"On Sunday next, my dear Marshal," he wrote to his colleague, "I shall manœuvre sixteen battalions; if your occupations enable you to absent yourself during part of the day, I shall be delighted to receive you in the midst of my troops. The manœuvring will begin at seven in the morning, in the plain near the Chateau de Recques, on the road from Boulogne to Montreuil, and at a distance of about three quarters of a league from the latter town. Should you find it necessary to return to Boulogne the same evening, you can easily do so. You promised to come and see me after the Emperor's departure, and I call upon you to keep your word."\*

The sight was deserving of the attention of such a man as Soult. The troops were active and expert in each evolution and manœuvre, and Ney, with his own powerful and manly voice, gave the word of command to this immense column.

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#### CHAPTER IV.

THE summer was over, the rains began to be more frequent, and the winds, which are always high upon the coast, to blow with greater violence and impetuosity. The huts already bore marks of their fury: the walls of some were blown in, others had their roofs blown off, and the men were constantly employed in repairing the ravages of the gale, which were as constantly renewed. The health of the men now began to suffer, and Ney resolved to pull down the huts and erect stronger, larger, and more commodious buildings, better calculated to resist the wind and keep out the cold and rain than the slight wooden cabins occupied by the men during the fine weather. There was however so great a scarcity of stone, that recourse was had to the fragments found in the beds of the neighbouring rivers.

\* Letter of the 11th Vendemiaire (October 3d, 1804.)



Pits were also opened in the soil to find those materials for building which its surface did not yield. At length, by dint of labour and perseverance, a sufficient quantity was collected, and each soldier became either a mason or a carpenter. They pulled down and built up again with the same zeal and alacrity, and in a short time spacious habitations covered the ground previously occupied by slight and narrow huts.

Nor was this Ney's only care. As winter was fast approaching, he was anxious that the men should have a place of meeting, where they might pass their hours of leisure when off duty. He therefore had three spacious halls built behind the front of each regiment. The first, in the centre of the first battalion, was used as a fencing-room; the second, in the rear of the second battalion, was a dancing-room; the third, placed in the same parallel, but in the space which separated the two battalions, formed a room for the officers. Here exercises in military tactics took place. Ney ordered that each officer should give an account of the manœuvres in which he had taken a part, and of the grand military operations he had personally witnessed. The attack of fortified places, the administration of armies, a knowledge of military law—all, in short, requisite to constitute an able commander, he wished them to study and make themselves masters of; and as solitary research in such matters often leads to error, he built this room for the purpose of their studying together, assisting each other with their observations, debating upon what they had seen, and stating to each other the opinions they might form upon different practical points of the military art. This was perhaps a difficult and irksome undertaking for men previously accustomed to a life of activity; but Ney thought it indispensably necessary to add precept to example, and fortify the courage which led them to victory with the theory in which the French officers of that period had often shown themselves woefully deficient.

But Marshal Ney himself submitted to the same task he imposed upon the officers under his command. He felt the want of correcting many erroneous notions, and of discussing many still undecided questions in military tactics. The standing regulations of the army were ambiguous in many points and defective in others; they did not determine either the positive strength or the composition of the several corps; and the manœuvres which they indicated were in many respects bad. Ney endeavoured to give fixed notions on these matters. He sought to discover what ought to be done, and he pointed out the defects of what had been done. He disclaimed any intention of writing a treatise on these matters, which he modestly said was "beyond his abilities;" but he was anxious, he stated, to acquire information, and to search into the causes of that which he was interested in knowing. In his opinion, the tactics of military manœuvres consisted principally in forming rapidly into close col-

umns, and in making the troops march in line of battle. He applied himself to the study of the different manœuvres by which these objects might be attained, by simple movements in column, or by battalions on one or two lines, and he pointed out all the changes of front which might be executed by this mode, as well as by the evolutions most commonly in use. He successively examined all that related to armies in active service: the commissariat, marches, encampments, arms, and manœuvres; and it is but doing him an act of justice to say, that he pointed out at that period most of the improvements which have since been made. This work, so full of novel views at the time it was written, is of less interest now; but we shall give some fragments of it at the end of this volume, pointing out those parts which have since been carried into execution.

Time sped on amid these studies, and the British government had begun to acquire more confidence. Still it laboured under the same mistake with regard to the Emperor's plan for the invasion of England. There were four thousand flat-bottomed boats on the French coast; and the building of new prames and peniches proceeded with vigour. Every thing tended to confirm the opinion that the flotilla was to cross the channel by main force. If the attempt upon England offered any chance of success, the British cabinet fancied themselves well acquainted with the nature and extent of such chance. But the English ministers were completely deceived, and while they were watching with intense anxiety the flotilla at Boulogne, the real plan of invasion was in progress of development. Napoleon never entertained the idea of attempting to cross the channel in gun-boats under cover of a fog, or during a gale of wind, or by main force. His plans were better conceived, and this immense armament of gun-boats was a mere feint to conceal them. His object was to scatter the forces he could not encounter—to disperse the fleets he could not hope to overcome. The French fleets were to sail from Toulon, Rochefort, Cadiz, Brest, and Ferrol, entice away the British blockading squadrons in pursuit, lead them into the midst of the Indian Ocean, return suddenly and get into the channel before the British ships had crossed the line on their return. The French would then command in the channel, and be masters of the coast on either side of it; and their forces might embark in the gun-boats and get possession of London, nay, of the whole of England, ere the immense navy of Great Britain, which Napoleon had been unable to encounter hand-to-hand, could interfere. The French fleets, which had been long detained in the harbours above-mentioned, at length set sail, and the troops on the coast received orders to hold themselves in readiness to embark at a moment's notice. The instructions given to the several commanders were precise, and provided against every contingency; they even indicated the boats in which each corps was to embark. Arms, horses, ammunition,

soldiers, civilians,—each object had its place, and each individual was stationed according to his rank and employment.\*

\* TO MARSHAL NEY, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE CAMP AT MONTREUIL.

Paris, 29th Ventose, Year XIII.

MONSIEUR LE MARECHAL,

I have the honour to inform you that, in conformity to the intentions of his majesty the Emperor, the troops of the camp at Montreuil are to form three divisions, which are to embark in the following manner, on board of the first and second squadrons of the imperial fleet:

One division shall embark on board of the vessels of first and second class belonging to the first squadron; the second division, on board the vessels of the second class of the second squadron; the third division, or the division of the van-guard, on board of the vessels of the third class belonging to the first and second squadrons.

Consequently the first division, commanded by General Dupont, shall embark on board of the fifth and eighth divisions of gun-boats, and the ninth and tenth divisions of gun-barges forming part of the first squadron.

The second division, under the command of General Loison, shall embark on board of the eleventh, twelfth, seventeenth, and eighteenth divisions of gun-barges, forming part of the second squadron.

The third division, or division of vanguard, under the command of General Malher, shall embark as follows:—General Marcognet's brigade on board of the tenth and eleventh divisions of peniches of the first squadron, and General Labassée's brigade on board of the twelfth and thirteenth divisions of peniches of the second squadron.

The horses of the third regiment of hussars shall be shipped on board of the first division of stable transports attached to the first squadron, and those of the tenth regiment of hussars on board of the fourth division of stable transports attached to the second squadron.

The horses belonging to the artillery trains shall be shipped on board of the second division of stable transports attached to the first squadron, and of the third division of stable transports attached to the second squadron.

The artillery shall be shipped on board of the first and second sections of the twentieth division of transports.

Lastly, the baggage of the staff officers and of the troops composing the first division, commanded by General Dupont, and of the first brigade of the van-guard under General Marcognet, shall be shipped on board of the thirtieth division of transports; and that of the second division, commanded by General Loison, and of the second brigade of the van-guard under General Labassée, on board of the thirty-first division of transports.

Each transport vessel shall be definitively attached to its section of gun-boats, gun-barges, or peniches. There shall be no further change. Each company shall know its boat; and each general of division shall know the officer by whom it is commanded.

Three men from the third regiment of hussars, and from the tenth regiment of chasseurs, shall be placed in garrison on board of each stable boat belonging to the first squadron. The battalion of the train shall supply three men for garrison on board of each stable boat of the second squadron.

The vessels destined to convey the baggage of the army shall be distributed as follows:—a boat for each regiment; one for each general of division; one for two brigadier generals. They shall be assigned to each in the squadron to which they respectively belong.

In furtherance of the above instructions, I have to request, Monsieur le Marechal, that you will prepare a statement by which I may ascertain, by separate tables:



Ney had only to see to the exact execution of the orders transmitted by the minister. He distributed his ammunition, and the tools he was to take with him, among the several transports. He then arranged the distribution of the flotilla: he directed that each battalion and each company should make themselves acquainted with the vessels assigned to them, and that every man should be ready to rush on board at the very first signal. But as dispatch necessitates great precision of movement, he resolved to drill his troops into such precision, by making them execute sham embarkations. The divisions composing his corps were successively assembled on the shore, and by turns escalated the gun-boats in which they were to embark. This they executed in the most beautiful style, and Ney was satisfied with it; but the divisions had only performed it separately,—when together they might display less coolness and promptitude, and he resolved to put them to the test.

The infantry, cavalry and artillery assumed their arms; each column placed itself opposite to its own vessels. All were formed into platoons for embarking, at a little distance from each other, and divided by sections. The whole, from left to right, were in a parallel line to the anchorage. A first gun was fired: the general officers and staff officers alighted from their horses, and placed themselves at the head of the troops which they were respectively to lead. The drums had ceased rolling, and the men had unfixed their bayonets. Every thing was ready, and each man prepared. A second gun was heard nearer to them, and the generals of division gave the word of command: “Prepare to embark!” The brigadier-

1st, with regard to the war flotilla:

The distribution of the infantry, by battalions or by companies, on board of each section of the flotilla;

The distribution of the artillery companies;

The distribution of the train companies;

The distribution of the companies of sappers;

The distribution of the cavalry;

The distribution of the staff officers, inspectors, commissaries-general, unattached officers of health, together with the number of horses and grooms each will be allowed to ship on board of the war flotilla, according to their respective ranks;

And, lastly, the distribution of the guns, carriages, ammunition-wagons, and generally, all the *personel* and the *materiel* which each war boat of the first and second squadrons of the imperial flotilla is to contain.

2ndly, with regard to the transport flotilla:

The distribution of the garrison men on board of each section of the flotilla;

The distribution of the troop horses;

The distribution of the artillery;

The distribution of the baggage of the army and of the staff horses;

And, lastly, the distribution of the commissariat, secretaries, sutlers, grooms, servants, and generally all the *personel* and *materiel* to be contained in each of the transport vessels attached to the first and second squadrons.

I enclose a list of the vessels of war and transports belonging to each of these squadrons.

BERTHIER, Marshal and War Minister.

generals received it, transmitted it to the colonels, and the latter to the officers under them. A dead silence now succeeded; each man was attentive and motionless, and each controlled the intense excitement under which he laboured. A third gun gave forth its thunder, and the word, "Forward columns!" immediately followed. Each soldier now yielded to an almost uncontrollable emotion, when a last report was heard. The word "March!" was pronounced; it was almost drowned by acclamations; the columns immediately put themselves in motion, and got into the boats. In ten minutes and a half twenty-five thousand men were already on board. The troops felt assured that they were immediately to set sail: they took their places, and were engaged in making their quarters comfortable, when a shot was unexpectedly fired. The drums rolled, and called the men to arms; they formed upon the decks of their respective boats. A fresh discharge soon followed the first; they fancied it was the signal for weighing anchor, and they received it with cries of "Long live the Emperor!" but it was only an order to land. They were unable to control the expression of their disappointment, which broke forth in murmurs. They resigned themselves, however, and scarcely had thirteen minutes elapsed ere they were again upon the beach, formed in line of battle.

The Marshal now saw that he could depend upon his preparations, and calculate to a minute the time his troops would occupy in embarking.

His provisions and hospital stores were shipped, and he had only to put on board of his prames cartridges for his infantry, some flints, and a chest of tools which he expected from St. Omer. All being thus prepared, he was now waiting for the curtain to rise upon the last act of the drama.

The British navy had completely fallen into the snare laid for it: the moment the fleet cruising off Rochefort perceived Missiessy to leeward, it bore down in pursuit of him. The British fleet off Toulon was still more completely misled. Villeneuve, who had sailed on the 15th of January, was struggling with a violent gale of wind, while the British admiral stood out to sea; for so great was the anxiety of Lord Nelson, who commanded the British fleet, to anticipate the French in reaching the place to which he fancied they were bound, that he paid no attention to the contingent chance of their not weathering the gale. And in truth the scattered French ships were obliged to return and refit. They had affected to threaten Egypt, and Nelson hastened thither; but not finding them, he proceeded to the West Indies, where he was equally unsuccessful. He then went from coast to coast in pursuit of a fleet which was snugly anchored at Toulon. His colleague was also enticed to persevere in a vain pursuit. The channel was now almost free, there was but a small British force in the Mediterranean, and the moment seemed to have

arrived when a decisive blow was to be struck, and England attacked upon her own shores.

But the unexpected return of Missiessy destroyed many of the chances of success. That admiral who had proceeded very rapidly to Martinique, had returned with still greater rapidity, and the fear evinced by the British government of an attack upon Jamaica having consequently subsided, it kept in the channel the naval forces which it was about to send to the assistance of that island. Thus many of the chances in favour of Napoleon's enterprize were lost. Still the French forces were calculated to inspire confidence in the ultimate result. They had fifteen ships of the line at Ferrol, six at Cadiz, five at Rochefort, and twenty-one at Brest. Villeneuve had directions to unite them with the twenty which he commanded, and with this prodigious fleet to take possession of the straits of Dover. He accordingly sailed from Toulon on the 30th of March, anchored on the 14th of May at the Fort-de-France; took the Diamond on the 25th, stood out to sea on the 28th, and it was known that on the 23d of June he was in the latitude of the Azores. He was therefore expected every hour to make his appearance in the channel. But when every one was in anxious expectation of his arrival to consummate the Emperor's gigantic plan, intelligence arrived that, having sustained considerable damage in an action of some hours with the British, he had sought refuge at Ferrol. Thus was the opportunity lost of reaching the British coast without opposition.

All hope, however, was not yet destroyed, and the Emperor had still confidence. It is well known that he continued his preparations and encouraged his navy. He still flattered himself, and the nation felt as he did, that Villeneuve, penetrated with the full importance of his mission, would again put to sea, effect a junction with Gantheaume, and, after dispersing Cornwallis's squadron, at length reach the channel. But Villeneuve seemed beset by a strange fatality; he left Ferrol only to run into Cadiz; and there was no further dependence to be placed upon the co-operation of his fleet. What was now to be done? The Emperor sought advice and information from every man of talent and experience in the kingdom. If Villeneuve remained at Cadiz, what measure was to be taken? Such was the question he proposed, and upon the solution of which depended whether the undertaking should be pursued or not. No one could strike out any satisfactory plan, and yet every one seemed convinced that the invasion was practicable; but the scheme seemed so excellent to Napoleon, and so likely to succeed, that although the non-appearance of the squadron had caused the opportunity to be lost, still he would not give it up, as he entertained a hope that another propitious opportunity might occur for carrying it into execution.

Meantime, some British vessels having appeared in observation off the Boulogne roads, Napoleon ordered that troops should be embark-



ed, and these vessels attacked. Ney immediately made the necessary preparations; put three thousand picked men on board the peniches, and gave the command of them to officers in whose bravery and talents he could confide. General Marcognet, remarkable for his coolness and intrepidity, and chef-d'escadron Crabbé for his prudent valour, had the direction of this column, with orders to board the vessels off the harbour. The weather however was so bad, that the peniches could not put to sea;\* meantime other circumstances intervened, and led to new plans.

Austria, which had hitherto appeared timorous and wily, now became every day less reserved. Her government seemed occupied in laying in provisions, and forming dépôts of military stores. At length she assumed an attitude of defiance, and war became inevitable. The Emperor had long watched her motions; he had previously declared that he was desirous of peace, but of "a frank, evident, and entire peace—a peace which the movements of troops, and the formation of hostile camps should not render more deplorable and a thousand times worse than war could be." Austria was led into these measures by Great Britain, which had at length perceived, to its full extent, the dangerous situation in which the Emperor's combinations had placed it. The French fleets might repeat their manœuvres, plan them better, and evince greater daring. If the British government despatched its squadrons in pursuit of them, England would be exposed to the hazards it had already run; if the French fleets were allowed to proceed peaceably in their operations, the British colonies would be in danger. The navies of England being insufficient to guard the two hemispheres, the cabinet of St. James's caused a diversion by exciting Austria to declare war against France.

The French armies on the frontier soon advanced and crossed the Inn; and nothing now remained but to attack the forces of the coalition. All was speedily prepared to take the field. The troops at Zeist, Ostend, Calais, Boulogne, and Ambleteuse, were already in motion. They set out on their march with their arms and baggage, and without changing the order of their organization. Their march was conducted in the order of war: each was at his post; the gene-

\* TO THE WAR MINISTER.

I have the honour to inform your excellency that the fifth and eighth divisions of gun-boats, and the four divisions of peniches, were early yesterday provided with sufficient garrisons, and ready to put to sea; but towards midnight a westerly wind sprang up, freshened considerably, and rendered it impossible for the intended expedition to quit the harbour.

It is now half past five; and I have just ordered the troops to land. Those on board the peniches have passed a somewhat rough night. They evince, nevertheless, no other regret than that of not having been able to reach the enemy.

NEY.

Etaples, 25th Thermidor, Year XIII. (August 13th, 1805.)

als of division at the head of their divisions, the brigadier-generals at the head of their brigades, and the colonels at the head of their regiments. It was, as it was then stated, the execution of a grand military movement. But a countermarch was soon to bring back the troops to the stations they had just quitted; and the strictest orders were given to prevent all disorders during the march. The artillery was assembling wagons and cattle upon the Rhine, and the commissariat collecting provisions from Landau to Spires. The troops were to take nothing with them that would delay the march, and no article that could be provided at Strasburg, was to be removed from their late quarters on the coast.\* To these general arrangements, Ney added many of his own. He was anxious that the

\* To MARSHAL NEY.

Boulogne, 9th Fructidor, Year XIII.

You will receive enclosed, Monsieur le Maréchal, the orders which I sent off this morning for the movement of countermarch which your army is to execute.

The 22nd regiment of the line, forming part of the centre, shall proceed to Etaples on the evening previous to the departure of your last division, in order to occupy the camp near that place.

I have given orders to send to Etaples the third battalion of that regiment now at Belhunc, and likewise its dépôt.

Brigadier-General Martillière shall proceed to Etaples to take the command there, under the orders of general of division Carra Saint-Cyr, who shall reside at Boulogne.

There shall be two companies at Etaples, selected by the senior inspector; also an artillery officer to command the artillery, who shall be under the orders of General Faviel, commanding the artillery upon the coast, and resident at Boulogne. Measures will be taken with regard to the fleet and the sailors.

Commissary-General Desmandoir will remain provisionally in charge of the commissariat at Boulogne, and direct the service at Etaples.

General Songis is charged with the necessary arrangements, in order that on your arrival at Strasburg you may have cattle for all your artillery. He is authorised to send with the divisions all he shall consider necessary for this purpose, and which he may think he cannot be supplied with at Strasburg. The general in command of your artillery shall do nothing without the orders of General Songis. All that belongs to the commissariat of your army must follow it, for it will be provided with food upon the banks of the Rhine by the same officers as when it formed part of the army on the coast.

We are only making a grand military movement, it being the Emperor's intention to order, a few months hence, your return hither by a counter-march.

Each military authority, and each commissariat must remain at its respective post during the march.

I have given orders that all the muskets marked as unfit for service, shall be changed. Take care that each division remains until this order is executed. You may correspond on this subject with General Songis, who has sufficient authority for making the necessary exchanges, on drawing up the usual *procès-verbaux*.

Such, Monsieur le Maréchal, are the principal arrangements which regard the forces under your command; but, as you cannot leave till after the departure of the last detachments of your army, you will retain the command of the district until that time. You will likewise give to General Martillière such information as you may deem necessary.

It is possible I may have forgotten some particulars, but we will supply this omission in executing the movement.

BERTHIER, Minister-of War.

men should be taken care of, their cantonments made comfortable, and every unnecessary fatigue spared them. He entered on this head, into the most minute details. He directed that none but the corps fixed upon to occupy the head-quarters of the different stations, should be taken to them, and that those who were to take up their quarters beyond them, should proceed by the shortest road, and without halting. He paid likewise great attention to the men's arms, and to their shoes. In a word, his vigilance and anxiety were so great, that, according to a flattering expression of the government, "he left nothing for the minister to do."

His colleagues displayed the same zeal, and the army rolled on like a torrent towards the Rhine. The simplicity of its organization gave it great rapidity of motion. It was divided into seven corps, each of which had its separate commissariat, and acted independently of the others, though directed to the same object. The Emperor had reserved to himself the command of the whole; the war minister fulfilled the duties of major-general of the army, and transmitted his sovereign's orders to the different commanders. In the absence of the Emperor, his Lieutenant, Prince Murat, directed the operations of the whole.

The several corps remained under the command of the marshals. The first which occupied Hanover, was led by Bernadotte, the second by Marmont, the third by Davoust, the fourth by Soult, the fifth by Lannes, the sixth by Ney, and the seventh, which still remained on the coast, by Augereau. A certain force of cavalry was attached to each, and the surplus of this arm was formed into a reserve consisting of six divisions; two of heavy cavalry, and four of dragoons.

The first division of heavy cavalry was commanded by General Nansouty, the second by General D'Hautpoul; the first reserve of dragoons by General Blein, the second by General Walter, the third by General Beaumont, and the fourth by General Bourcier.

All these corps did not amount to more than a hundred and eighty thousand men. This was not a force commensurate with the greatness of the contest in preparation; for the coalition did not confine its efforts against France to the troops it had in line: it appealed to the population of its territories, calling upon every individual to assume arms in defence of their liberties. It thus brought in array against the French the very principles it was anxious to destroy. In Germany it raked up national antipathies; it flattered Italy with a spirit of independence, and it sought everywhere to sow the seeds of insurrection against Napoleon. Not that the mass of the population thus sought to be seduced were to be caught by such a bait, for they generally valued the institutions of the French nation, and did not behold, without distrust, this sudden interest taken by kings in the popular cause; but they were easily excited by the picture which was drawn of the sacrifices imposed upon them, and by pointing out to them that the French did not allow them to share in the political



benefits which themselves enjoyed. The coalition was thus preparing to attack France upon the whole of the vast line which they occupied. Russians, British, Swedes, and Hanoverians had joined in the contest ; the approach of such a host of enemies might therefore lead to results unfavourable to the French, and a reverse place them in collision with populations impatient of their yoke. But the Austrians had imprudently spread themselves through Bavaria, before the Russians had well quitted Poland. Napoleon therefore hoped to anticipate the former, overpower the latter, and by placing himself between both, dissipate this league of kings ere it was in a state to injure him seriously in the field. According to his calculations a junction of the allies with each other could only be effected in Suabia. Now, from this country to Boulogne, where the French troops were stationed, the distance was about the same, as to Podolia, where the Russian troops were assembled. He therefore made it his object to start first, and to conceal for a few days the secret of his grand manœuvre from Boulogne to the Rhine. Marmont, whose forces were on board the flotilla when he received orders to march them into Germany, was directed to give out that his troops were landing to go into cantonments ; and Bernadotte, stationed in Hanover, was to confirm the opinion that he intended to spend the winter there. Each however pressed his march, and proceeded with equal celerity to the point indicated, so that the French columns were pouring upon the banks of the Rhine, when the members of the coalition fancied them in snug quarters upon the shores of the British channel. The first and second corps had reached Mayence ; the third was spread round Mannheim ; the fourth had halted in the neighbourhood of Spiers ; the fifth was quartered at Strasburg ; and the sixth, which had left Montreuil on the 28th of August, reached Lauterburg on the 24th of September. In this short interval Ney's division had executed a march of more than three hundred leagues, which was upwards of ten leagues a day. History has no example of such rapidity ; but the celerity of this march had prevented the artillery and engineers from taking their measures, and nothing was ready for crossing the Rhine. Thus the troops had a short time to take breath and obtain a momentary respite from their fatiguing duties.

## CHAPTER V.

THE several corps rested on the 25th and 26th of September. They were refreshed, in excellent condition, and eager to meet the enemy. The movement was resumed on the morning of the 27th : Murat, at the head, crossed the Rhine at Kehl ; Lannes followed him, and both, advancing upon the outlets of the mountains, brought all the Austrian forces upon the Iller, to a stand. From the number of the French reconnoitring parties, and the frequency of their patrols, Mack fancied that the whole of Napoleon's army was advancing upon him. He supposed that the French, having resolved to penetrate through the defiles of the Black Forest, would attempt to reach the upper waters of the Danube ; and he accordingly took measures to prevent them. But whilst he was waiting until they appeared in front of him, they were in motion to fall upon his rear. Marmont had crossed the Rhine at Mayence, Davoust at Manheim, Soult at Spire, and all following corresponding roads, were proceeding by forced marches upon Ingolstadt and Donawert.

Ney, like his colleagues, had received orders to cross the river ; but his departure from Boulogne had been so unexpected, and his motions so rapid, that nothing was ready. The artillery had been unable to collect its cattle, or the commissary-general to provide rations ; and the engineers by whom the bridges were to be built had not even begun this necessary work. But Ney was so eager to push on and lead his men to victory, that his very impatience gave him the means of overcoming the difficulties which stopped him.

Ammunition was what he most wanted ; he therefore issued a requisition for the horses belonging to the several villages of the country occupied by his corps, and thus succeeded, if not in setting his guns in motion, at least of being followed by a number of cartridges adequate to a first consumption. And, as it was of no use to possess the means of fighting, unless the enemy could be reached, he ordered the banks of the river near to where he was to be examined. But the timber found on them being insufficient for his purpose, he rode to Hagenbach, where he found both boats and timber in abundance. Thus the means of building a bridge being obtained, the engineers immediately set to work, and erected one a little below Lauterburg. Ney pressed the work, and in fifteen hours it was finished. The troops immediately fell in and were formed to the right of Lauterburg. The drums were beating, the bands playing, and never were French soldiers actuated by stronger feelings of enthusiasm. All had waking dreams of glory, and each congratu-

lated himself that he had at length reached those banks upon which they were to meet and to conquer the Austrians. On a sudden the drums rolled, a dead silence succeeded, and the words of command alone interrupted the calm which followed this manifestation of joy.

The movements being finished, and the troops formed into close columns, the different generals conveyed to them the Marshal's thanks and congratulations. They had passed through France without committing the least excess; they had shown themselves patient, attentive to discipline, affable towards the hosts upon whom they had been billeted, and he could not sufficiently testify his approbation of their conduct. This unexpected praise filled them with emotion, and in the satisfaction of their hearts they swore they would continue to deserve the praises of such a commander. The whole army was full dressed, and both officers and men had placed small branches of oak in their caps, as a presage of the victories which they soon after gained. They marched in columns of regiments,\* and defiled in beautiful order, to the cries a thousand times repeated of "Long live the Emperor!" On a sudden the news reached them that Napoleon had just arrived at Strasburg; it spread like wildfire through the ranks, and the enthusiasm of both officers and men

\* ORDER OF MARCH OF THE SIXTH CORPS OF THE GRAND ARMY IN CROSSING THE RHINE BY MEANS OF THE BRIDGE THROWN ACROSS THAT RIVER OPPOSITE DURLACH, ON THE 4TH VENDEMAIRE, YEAR XIV.

The troops shall march with the right at the head, and by intervals of sections, if possible. If not, they shall march by the flank, and the sections shall re-form as soon as the passage is effected.

First division : General Dupont.

First Brigade : General Bouges.	{	9th	{	The 1st squadron of the first regiment of hussars.
		light		The 1st company of voltiguers of the 1st battalion.
		infan-		The 1st company of carabiniers.
		try,		2 pieces of artillery : a four-pounder and a howitzer.
		and		8 companies of the 1st battalion.
		1st.		The 2nd battalion of the 9th, with its light company at the tail
		huss.		of the battalion.

A detachment of ten gendarmes.

Second	{	32nd regiment of the line : 2 battalions.
Brigade :		6 pieces of artillery : a four-pounder, 4 eight-pounders, and a twelve-
General		pounder.
Marchand.		96th regiment of line : 2 battalions.

Second division : General Loison.

First	{	1 battalion of the 6th light infantry.
Brigade :		2 pieces of artillery : a four pounder and a howitzer.
General		2 battalions of the 6th light infantry.
Villatte.		19th regiment of the line : 2 battalions.
Second	{	69th regiment of the line : 2 battalions.
Brigade :		6 pieces of artillery : a four-pounder, four eight-pounders, and a twelve
General		pounder.
Roguet.		76th regiment of line : 3 battalions.

A detachment of twelve hussars.

A detachment of ten gendarmes.



amounted almost to delirium. Each swore to conquer or perish, and each aspired to fighting under the Emperor's eye.

The Rhine was now crossed, but the artillery remained behind, and the enemy was close at hand. Nor was this the only drawback; the provisions were nearly all expended, and troops were arriving from all directions. Marshal Lannes having unexpectedly withdrawn from the mountains, where he had spread alarm, was advancing upon Louisburg. Murat was debouching upon the Gleims, the imperial guard was proceeding to Constadt, and there were no means of meeting the consumption. Ney, though in the second line, was ordered to provide them.

Though this commission was conveyed in the most flattering terms, no attempt was made to conceal the difficulties of finding such supplies, but at the same time the necessity of doing so was strongly urged.

"The troops were threatened with famine, and the country was exhausted. It was as urgent to supply the wants of the one, as to avoid crushing the other." Provisions must be collected from a country afflicted with a sudden irruption, and more than that, they must be supplied immediately. But the generals were ably seconded

	Third division: General Malher.
First	1 battalion of the 3rd light infantry.
Brigade:	2 pieces of artillery: a four-pounder and a howitzer.
General	2nd and 3rd battalions of the 25th light infantry.
Marcognet.	27th regiment of the line; 2 battalions.
Second	50 regiment of the line: 2 battalions.
Brigade:	6 pieces of artillery; a four-pounder, 4 eight-pounders, and a twelve-pounder.
General	59th regiment of the line: 2 battalions,
Labassée.	A detachment of twelve hussars.
	A detachment of ten gendarmes.
	Cavalry: General Tilly.
	3rd regiment of hussars.
General	12 pieces of artillery; namely, 3 howitzers, 6 eight-pounders, and 3
Dupré's	twelve pounders.
Brigade.	10 regiment of chasseurs.

The reserve, park, the provisions and substance, the *personel* of the commissariat; the baggage of the army beginning with that of the general staff,—the remainder to follow after the order laid down above. The four last companies of the 59th regiment to close the march and serve as an escort. Each regiment shall leave only a serjeant and twelve men with the wagons. During each day's march the battalions shall alternately supply four companies, according to the order laid down.

The squadron of gendarmerie shall close the march.

The chef-d'escadron, Jammeron, charged with the police of head-quarters, shall provisionally do the duty of baggage-master general. He shall maintain the most exact order during the march, and point out the places where the wagons are to be parked, always being kept near the reserve park of artillery.

A detachment of twenty men from the select company of the 3rd hussars shall follow everywhere the Marshal commander-in-chief. This detachment shall be relieved every fifth day by one from the 10th hussars, alternately with the 1st hussars and the 22nd chasseurs, as soon as this last regiment joins the corps d'armée.

by the different commissariats, and that which, at any other time might have been considered impossible was done in a few hours. The inhabitants felt that the French had not deserted the cause which they had so long defended, and under the excitement of such feelings they made the most extraordinary exertions.

But this was by no means the case with their rulers ; they feared and detested the principles of the French, and in seeking the support of Napoleon's eagles, they followed them only with a species of hesitation. Several among them had agreed to unite their forces with those of France. Ney summoned to his standard those who were selected to join him ; but no act of hostility having taken place, and the fortune of the French arms being still undecided, each urged a pretext for not obeying the summons. One stated that he had disbanded his troops ; another that he had not yet assembled his. The Elector of Baden required a fortnight's delay before he could get ready to begin the campaign ; and the landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt could not assemble his forces in less than a month. Both might have sent at a moment's notice the number of troops they had agreed to supply ; but they wished previously to see the tide of events, and then determine to which side they should carry assistance.

But the Duke of Wirtemberg went far beyond his fellow sovereigns, and gave a specimen of Germanic arrogance with which he thought to intimidate Marshal Ney. The left wing had pressed its march ; Soult had reached beyond Heilbron, and Davoust was advancing upon Oettingen. The movement which was carrying the French troops into the heart of Bavaria had begun, and Ney advanced to support it. But no sooner had the duke notice of his march, than he did all in his power to stop him. He had, without making the least objection, suffered the Austrians to cover his dominions with their patrols ; but his friends and allies, the French, whose chances of fortune he had pledged himself to share, were not to be allowed to approach either Stuttgart or Louisburg ; and what is more singular still, the French minister at the duke's court supported these unreasonable pretensions. He invoked the rights of the alliance between France and Wirtemberg, and expressed in strong terms his disapprobation of the direction pursued by the sixth corps. This solicitude in favour of the Duke of Wirtemberg was certainly most exemplary ; but Ney had his instructions, and quietly pursued his march. The diplomatist, still more impetuous than the prince at whose court he resided, now broke through all bounds. He summoned, not Marshal Ney, but the "Commander" of the French troops, to halt, and not proceed to Louisburg ; and as if this were not sufficient, he sent the summons by one of the duke's officers.\*

\* The undersigned, Commander of the Legion of Honour, Minister Plenipotentiary from His Majesty the Emperor of the French to his Highness the Elector of Wirtemberg and to the Circle of Suabia, requests and commands, if necessary, the commander of the French troops proceeding to Steinheim, not to take the road to

Nevertheless, the French troops pressed their march and soon debouched. The elector in a fury put himself at the head of his guards, declared himself an independent sovereign, and dared any one to enter his residence, threatening to fire at any individual who should be bold enough to brave his prohibition.

Such menaces were likely to have but little weight with a man of Ney's character; nevertheless the Marshal, on being informed that the whole of the royal family were assembled at Louisburg to celebrate the marriage of one of its members, generously resolved not to trouble the nuptial festivities, and withdrew to the banks of the Necker. This considerate act of kindness emboldened the elector, who was naturally violent, tyrannical, and conceited; and being accustomed to see every thing bend to his harsh will, he took it into his head that Ney had withdrawn in consequence of his threats, and he determined to try whether he could not take further advantage of the awe with which he fancied he had inspired the French marshal.

He began by setting forth in the most pompous terms the friendship which subsisted between himself and the Emperor Napoleon, boasted of the supposed deference which this monarch would pay to his wishes, and concluded by demanding that Stuttgart should enjoy the same exemption from receiving the French troops as Louisburg had done. In addition to this, he himself undertook to point out the road which the sixth corps was to pursue, and the positions it was to occupy. But Ney taking no notice of these vain pretensions, continued his movement. Again did the French minister interfere, give the elector all the weight of his official support, and insist upon the French troops keeping from Stuttgart. Ney replied to this singular injunction by pressing his march. The diplomatist in a rage protested again this breach of alliance; he bitterly complained of this want of deference to a prince who was the friend of the Emperor Napoleon, and he appealed to Murat for an ultimate decision on the point at issue. Ney however paid no attention to this protest; he had instructions to occupy Stuttgart, and he summoned the garrison to open the gates of the town. The governor of Stuttgart was an old and prudent man, who felt all the danger of his situation, but who had received orders to employ force against force. His garrison manned the ramparts, but he hesitated as to the manner in which he should act under these delicate circumstances. On the one hand, he was bound to obey his instructions; on the other, the unfortunate inhabitants would be unnecessarily exposed to the inconvenience of a siege, which must soon end in the fall of the place. Ney also filled

Louisburg, the electoral residence, and inhabited at the present moment by the Elector, but to proceed along the causeway leading to Zuffenhausen and Constadt, where an Austrian detachment arrived about twelve o'clock this day. The commander, moreover, may place full reliance upon any information given to him by the electoral officer, bearer of these presents.

CH. DIDELOT.



him with dread : the French marshal was threatening and imperious ; he displayed that sternness and inflexibility of purpose which he so well knew how to assume in the execution of his duty. Fear, and the instinct of preservation, soon put at end to the governor's hesitation, and he chose to run the risk of being disgraced by his self-willed prince, rather than by an injudicious resistance expose the town under his command to the horrors of a capture by storm. He therefore opened the gates to Ney, but was immediately after brought to to a court-martial by the elector's orders, and condemned to perpetual imprisonment.

Ney, who had been the cause of the old general's crime, was denounced to his Emperor ; the elector complained officially, and in terms of great bitterness, of the violence offered to him in thus occupying Stuttgart against his will, and demanded reparation for the insult. It was intimated to him that this was going too far, and he therefore dropped the matter, but it still rankled in his heart.

The Austrians covered Wirtemberg ; their armies and those of the French were already, as it were, in presence, and still the princes of the right bank persisted in eluding their engagements. The more Ney pressed them, the greater were their protestations of zeal ; but they did nothing. Sometimes the different corps which they intended to supply could not be immediately assembled ; sometimes the cattle for the artillery had not yet arrived. In vain was message after message sent to these sovereigns and to their generals ; the same pretences were always put forward, the same difficulties always stood in the way of compliance. Meantime the movement continued, and as it would have been dangerous to have left doubtful allies in the rear of the French army, Ney stated his situation to the Emperor, who, aware that success always puts an end to such wavering, replied by the following pithy note.

“ MY COUSIN,

“ I calculate upon your having reached Stuttgart. Marshal Lannes is on his way to Louisburg, ready to fly to your assistance should you require it. Prince Murat, aware of what is passing, is proceeding to Radstadt. He will not wait for orders, should it be necessary for him to march to you. Watch the movements of the enemy ; endeavour to cut off their cavalry patrols. Nevertheless it is not my intention that you should go beyond Stuttgart, nor even there have any serious engagement.

“ Whereupon I pray God, &c.

“ NAPOLEON.”

“ Strasburg, 8th Vendemiaire, Year IV.  
(September 30th, 1805.)

It was no difficult matter to do what the Emperor required. The French troops having turned the mountains, were able both to descend and ascend the Danube ; they could therefore reach the enemy in

all directions. Mack was in a very critical situation ; he knew not where to make a stand or whither to proceed. Instead of grouping his forces in a central position, which would have enabled him to try the chance of a battle, he was anxious to occupy all the passes. One day he would send his forces in one direction, the next he would march in an opposite one. If he reached Vorarlberg he would retrograde upon Stockach, march to Ulm, or Memmingen, always abandoning the point already occupied by his forces in order to defend one which they did not occupy.

Ney thought that "if advantage were taken of this information to push with celerity upon Donawert, and debouch upon Ulm and Riedlingen, the Austrians would be unable to make head and must inevitably be defeated." Orders for this movement were accordingly given ; the French forces advanced, and took up a position. But Murat sent Ney an order to divide his corps, place part at Hessingen, part at Suessen, and his van-guard at Heydenheim. The two former of these places being at a distance of six leagues from each other, this movement appeared too dangerous to Ney, and he refused to execute the order.

"When the enemy is in presence," he replied to Murat, "the vanguards are the posts by which the divisions in line are covered. In this case, they cannot be farther assunder than twice the distance of cannon-shot. When the enemy is far off, to place these divisions six leagues asunder is giving them up to the light cavalry and exposing them to be cut off."

These observations were unanswerable ; but Murat supplied the place of the Emperor, and as he peremptorily repeated the order, Ney was forced to obey. This was the first act of the kind that Murat had ventured to take upon himself; Ney yielded to it with bitterness of spirit, which he took care that the prince should know. He wrote to him as follows :—

"Coppingen, Oct. 4th, 1805.

"You cannot doubt that I experienced great pain in reading the letter which your Serene Highness wrote to me this morning.

"It is only after having commanded during two years the corps which the Emperor has placed under my command, and at the very instant I am about to justify the confidence which his majesty reposes in me, that I find myself suddenly deprived of the portion of glory which my zeal, the confidence my troops have in me, and some experience in war, may have led me to expect. You are a soldier, Prince, and the bitterness of my regret cannot be matter of surprise to you.

"I will not remind you that I have gone through my various campaigns with honour, and am wholly a soldier. I have never aspired to any other glory than that of arms ; but I may be allowed at least to say that, the Emperor having shown me such distinction and

kindness, it is lamentable that I should lose the opportunity of proving to him the extent of my gratitude by some important service.

“At all events, we are on the eve of a battle ; my post is sacred to me, and I will never think of quitting it so long as I have a chance of shedding my blood in his majesty’s service.

“I have opened my heart to your Serene Highness with the candour of a soldier, and with the same candour I beg you will believe in the sentiments, &c. NEY.”

Murat did not then enjoy the celebrity to which his subsequent deeds raised him. Only a short time before, he had been aid-de-camp to the general-in-chief of the army of Italy, now Emperor, and his marriage with that general’s sister, together with a high office at court, constituted all his claim to the command of the army. Ney’s letter was calculated to remind him of his sudden elevation ; but he felt that he had courage and talent to do that which he had not yet done to deserve it. He was judicious enough to make due allowance for Ney’s letter ; too high-minded not to admit the justice of the Marshal’s complaints, he was too generous to avail himself of the advantages which the Emperor had given him, and he endeavoured to render as light as possible to Ney the subordination which so deeply wounded his feelings.

“I approve,” he replied to the offended marshal, “and participate in the feelings you express ; and were I in your place, I should think as you do. But I did not solicit the command which his majesty the Emperor has entrusted to me : and when, this morning, I made you acquainted with my arrangements, it was with a view to put an end to the confusion existing in the march of the two corps, and not to make you feel that I had the power of giving you orders.”

This explanation was far from satisfactory to Ney ; but Lannes being almost immediately after subjected to the same thing, both these marshal’s resigned themselves to receiving from Murat those orders which they wished to receive only from the Emperor.



## CHAPTER VI.

THE movement continued; the French occupied Nordlingen, held the outlets leading to the Danube, and were on the eve of consummating a great military combination. Marmout had orders to march upon Neuberg, Davoust to follow him, and Bernadotte to push towards Munich with the Bavarian army, of which he had just assumed the command. Murat, on the other hand, was to press the advance of his columns, do bouch before Donawert, force that place, and get possession of the bridge. As he was to be supported by Lannes and Soult, there seemed no doubt of his success.

These manœuvres were now unmasked to the Austrians, who had not before noticed them. They perceived with alarm the French unexpectedly debouching upon their rear, and they found it necessary to run all the risks of their disadvantageous situation, in order to preserve their communications. The Emperor would not, however, expose his army to any of the hazards sometimes caused by a desperate enemy in a critical situation, but resolved to bring all his available forces into the field before he attacked them. He accordingly directed Ney to join him at Donawert. This marshal had just taken up a position on the Brentz. Instead of establishing his force at Heydenheim where he could get neither provisions nor wagons, he had taken upon himself to modify his instructions, and had marched his columns into fertile valleys where every thing was abundant. His corps accordingly occupied Herbrechtingen, Giengen, and Hohenmemmingen, positions which not only supplied the necessaries not to be found at Heydenheim, but commanded the course of the Danube, and all the roads leading to that river from Ulm to Donawert; but as a drawback, these valleys were rather too far to the right of the line of operations. Ney, being called at a fixed hour to the point where he was to engage the enemy, found that he could not possibly reach it if he were first to march to Neresheim. But to proceed thither along the bank of the Danube, and effect a long march by his flank, might possibly appear to his staff a dangerous measure. He did not, however, share in the apprehensions of his staff with regard to the enemy's plans, neither did he in general participate in its views; he therefore decided upon attempting this movement. He felt convinced that Mack had only "a few squadrons of light cavalry before Donawert, and would take good care not to give battle with the Wernitz in his rear." As for any attempts upon the sixth corps by the Austrians, Ney was sure that they had no certain intelligence con-

cerning his march, and did not even know that the French were formed into a corps-d'armée.\*

The marshal was right: the fourth corps carried Donawert, without resistance, and the sixth had completed its movement along the banks of the river without accident, when it received orders to take up a position. Soult, who had advanced upon Donawert on the 6th, found in the neighbourhood, as he stated in a letter to Ney, only a few bodies of cavalry, which he did not even attempt to engage. After an uninterrupted march of fifteen hours, he had arrived in front of the bridge which he was to carry; his light infantry sprang upon the joists which the Austrians were attempting to burn, and the river was crossed.

The Austrians now fell back upon the Lech; the French pursued them and advanced upon Neuburg. But the Emperor being informed that the enemy were concentrating their forces upon this place, and supposing they had abandoned Michelsberg, resolved to get possession of Ulm. He accordingly directed Ney to attack them on the left bank, whilst Soult pressed them on the right. He was convinced that the Austrians had retired from the banks of the river, and that by marching he could circumscribe their operations. But Ney was of a different opinion; for the Austrians had just quitted the left bank of the Lech, and were advancing in confusion towards Ulm. The bridge at Guntzburg being destroyed, their flanks were secure and their rear out of reach. He therefore, had no doubt that they would again attempt to debouch upon the left bank, and thus place the dragoons at Heydenheim in danger, if not immediately ordered to fall back upon his corps.

Ney reached the heights of Bamberg on the 8th, and on the 9th continued his movement. Loison had taken Elchingen, Dupont occupied Albeck, and Malher had halted at Riedhausen. Thus Ney's division threatened Guntzburg and Ulm at the same time, and was able to defeat or keep the Austrian army in check whenever it appeared. But fortune seemed to have deprived Mack's army of the power of undertaking any thing. Davoust† had nearly reached

\* Ney's letter to the war minister, dated 14th Vendemiaire, (October 6th.)

† Head-quarters, Donawert, 16th Vendemiaire  
(October 8th) 12 o'clock at noon.

MONSIEUR LE MARECHAL,

The Lech being crossed, Marshal Soult's army is on its march to Augsburg, where it will arrive this evening.

Prince Murat with ten thousand cavalry will be this evening at Zumershausen, and will establish posts at Burgau.

Marshal Lannes will be this evening half way from Zumershausen to Vertingen. Marshal Davoust with his corps-d'armée will be at Aicha. It is impossible that the enemy, to whom our having crossed the Danube and the Lech is known, and who likewise cannot be ignorant of the alarm which their troops beyond the Lech must necessarily feel, should not think seriously of retreating. It is probable that they will

Aicha, Bernadotte was entering Munich, whilst Soult and Marmont were pushing towards Landsberg. The Austrian forces were now completely invested, and their field of operations confined to the space between the upper Lech and the Danube. Thus circumscribed and surrounded, they had no alternative but either to throw themselves into the Tyrol, or to risk a battle; as to the idea of their venturing upon the left bank, Marshal Berthier considered it would be madness in them to attempt it, and still greater madness in the French to suppose that they would do so. A battle was therefore inevitable, and Napoleon was anxious that Ney should take a part in it. "Do not lose sight of this fact," wrote the war minister:—"that the Emperor is obliged to spread his forces a little, and that he requires all his confidence in his generals, and all their activity, so that they do not remain idle whilst he is acting."

Ney's men were overpowered with fatigue: during three days they had obtained neither provisions nor rest. The rain fell in tor-

at first attempt doing so upon Augsburg; but they will soon find that they are too late, and will then try to effect their retreat by Landsberg. If our forces arrive in time, they will either determine to give us battle, or withdraw into the Tyrol; but it is likely they will choose the alternative of fighting. Under this supposition, the Emperor wishes that your corps-d'armée should take a part in the battle. His Majesty does not think that the enemy would be rash enough to cross to the left bank of the Danube, because all their stores are at Memmingen, and they have the greatest interest in not losing their power of communicating with the Tyrol, which by such a manœuvre they would leave entirely exposed. It is the Emperor's intention, therefore, that you proceed this day to Guntzburg, and occupy it with your vanguard. You will use all the means in your power to unite to your force General Gazan's division, and General Bourcier's division of dragoons.

You will give notice to General Baraguey-d'Hilliers that, should the enemy be so injudicious as to attempt penetrating by Heydenheim, Aalen, and Nordlingen, he will receive instructions from you to retreat before them, pursuing the road to Heydenheim, Aalen, and Elwangen, so as to dispute this ground, which is the great and only communication for every thing coming from France, and is so well covered with detachments, that after a short march General Baraguey-d'Hilliers will have collected twenty thousand men. As for you, Monsieur le Maréchal, with Gazan's division, and General Bourcier's dragoons, your force will consist of more than thirty thousand men. Repair the bridges in your rear, and obtain as many passages as you can, so that the moment you are sure that the enemy have evacuated Ulm, and are marching either upon Augsburg or upon Landsberg, you may by a flank march keep in a parallel position with them, and bear upon their flanks the moment Marshal Soult, Marshal Davoust, or Marshal Lannes, shall come up with and attack them. You will however take care, Monsieur le Maréchal, to keep a division at Gundelfingen, in order that it may serve as your vanguard, in the event of the Emperor wishing to make you march upon Ulm, by Lawingen, and Albeck. The Emperor supposes that you have had the bridge of Dillingen repaired.

By it, Marshal Lannes can communicate with you. Send out cavalry patrols to meet him.

Marshal Murat has also received orders to communicate with you. Send cavalry patrols to meet him also. The present time, Monsieur le Maréchal, is of great importance; the Emperor depends upon your zeal, your talents, and your activity: all are requisite at this moment.

MARSHAL BERTHIER, War Minister.



rents, the ground was soaked with water, and all the evils of a military life seemed to have befallen these brave soldiers at the same time. But Berthier's despatch was pressing, and Ney directed General Malher to make preparation for the march. On the 10th, at three o'clock in the morning, this general reached Riedhausen, and resuming his march at dawn of day, advanced towards Guntzburg. The road was broken up, the country intersected with marshes, and it was with the greatest difficulty that he effected his movement. He at length reached the banks of the river. Ney had indicated to General Malher a ford which he had formerly known, and which no doubt still existed, directing him to try its depth, and stating what parts of it seemed best calculated to afford him a passage. But Malher cared not for obstacles; indifferent as to the depth of the water, he formed his columns and led them to the attack. Marcognet being ordered to force Guntzburg, opened his fire, fell with his whole force upon the Tyrolians who defended the approaches to the Danube, and carrying all before him, cut the men to pieces and took their guns. He then dashed into the river, crossed the first branch, seized the island, and reached the bridge across the second branch. The timbers supporting the bridge were cut away; he however attempted to set them up again, but grape-shot being poured without intermission upon his troops, he was forced to abandon the undertaking and retire to the skirt of the wood.

Ney, soon informed of the resistance which Malher encountered, sent the second division to his assistance; but they arrived too late, General Labassée having been more successful than his colleague. This latter general had reached the point indicated in his instructions. Neither the difficulties of the ground, nor the fire of the infantry, nor the thunder of the artillery could stop him. He reached the bridge of Reseinsberg, sprang upon the platform, crossed it in an instant, and rushing upon the Austrian troops through a very destructive fire, cut many of them to pieces and put the remainder to flight. These he pursued, drove into the place, and took possession of the heights.

The Austrian army, almost entirely assembled under the walls of Guntzburg, immediately came up and renewed the action, which every instant became hotter and more deadly. General Malher advanced with the rest of his troops to the assistance of his colleague. The Austrians were thrown into confusion, and their infantry entered the place, which they dared not again leave. But their cavalry still held out; its confidence was not yet shaken, and it persisted in its attempts to force the heights occupied by the brave 59th. It advanced with great gallantry towards this regiment, but being constantly repulsed by a well-sustained fire, as often returned to the charge with fresh fury. Five times it was driven back, and still it was not discouraged: it rallied, re-formed, and attacked again. The

gallant 59th lost its best officers; Colonel Lacuée was killed, and two chiefs-de-battailon were hors de combat. The regiment, eager to avenge its losses and obtain satisfaction for these repeated desperate assaults, made a mighty effort, and by its fire completely disorganised this obstinate cavalry which it at length forced to withdraw from the field. Malher thus invested the place and entered it before day-break.

The second division was just in sight, and Ney himself, with two-thirds of his force, appeared upon the right bank. He had forced the passage of the river, captured the cannons, the colours, and about a thousand men. The Emperor expressed his satisfaction at this successful operation, but still persisted in believing that the enemy were manœuvring upon the Iller, and pressed Ney to advance and take possession of Ulm. "He left it to him to march as he thought proper in order to effect this object, but the place must be surrounded by the 11th; this was important in every point of view."\*

Ney prepared to make the attempt: Loison pushed on the right bank, Dupont was directed to approach the left, and Baraguey-d'Hilliers, who was at Stolzingen with the dragoons, received orders to proceed towards Languenau, and take up a position behind Albeck, which he was to support. Dupont was to provide ladders, timbers, and every other implement necessary for scaling, without, however, making any attempt till further orders. But in a course of such rapid events, each hour brings its particular incident—each instant leads to fresh combinations. On a sudden, intelligence arrived that the Russians had begun to appear upon the Inn. The French Emperor hastened to meet them, and Murat took the command of the right wing. This prince, being master of the enclosed area which contained the Austrian army, fancied likewise that he must give them the coup-de-grace upon the Iller, and consequently proceed thither in search of them. It was to no purpose that Ney argued against this opinion, urging that the archduke having left Guntzburg at the head of ten regiments of infantry and several corps of cavalry, had no doubt proceeded to Ulm where fifteen thousand men had arrived from Schaffhausen the day before; that all tended to show that the Austrian prince aimed at cutting off the French communications, and intended to carry on his operations by the left bank. Murat refused to believe that the archduke would dare to undertake such a thing. Marches, sickness, and the want of provisions, he said, had made sad ravages in the French army; and his principal instructions were to prevent the Austrians from communicating by their right with the forces on the confines of the Tyrol. He was therefore anxious to assemble all the troops he could dispose of and give the enemy battle upon the Iller.

Ney deemed this a very imprudent step, and endeavoured to dis-

\* General order of the 10th of October, Zumershausen, six o'clock in the evening.

suade Murat from pursuing it. This led to a warm discussion between the two commanders. They were equal in rank, and both hasty and impetuous in temper. The one was impatient at being commanded by an equal of less standing in the service; the other was determined that his orders should be obeyed. They were on the point of settling their dispute by single combat; already had Ney written to appoint a place of meeting, when, recollecting that he was in presence of the enemy, he altered his mind, and resolved to bear that which he could not prevent. He sent a corps of observation in front of Albeck, and summoned Dupont and Baraguey-d'Hilliers to the right bank.\* Nevertheless the movement appeared to

\* "TO GENERALS DUPONT AND BARAGUEY-D'HILLIERS.

"Guntzburg, 19th Vendemiaire, Year XIV.

(October 11th, 1805.)

"In compliance with the Emperor's new arrangements, the right wing, upon which the 6th corps depends, is to be under the orders of His Serene Highness Prince Murat. As it is the formal intention of His Serene Highness to concentrate upon the right bank of the Danube, and parallel to the Iller, all his united force, in order to give the enemy battle, who seem determined to defend themselves, only a corps of observation shall remain at Ulm, on the left bank of the Danube. This corps shall be composed of the 1st battalion of the 9th light infantry, and the two last squadrons of the 1st hussars, lately attached to General Baraguey-d'Hillier's division of cavalerie-à-pied. This detachment shall be commanded by M. Crabbé, my aide-de-camp, to whom I forward particular instructions.

"General Dupont shall therefore immediately quit his position at Albeck, advance with the two first squadrons of the 1st hussars, and his infantry, which shall be followed by the two regiments of dragoons commanded by General Sahuc, and cross to the right bank of the Danube either by the bridge at Elchingen, or by that at Guntzburg. Should the morasses be impracticable, this force shall return by Gundelfingen, and thence proceed to Guntzburg. In either case, the artillery and baggage shall pass by Gundelfingen, and take the lead in the march, by setting out a few hours before the troops.

"The division of General Baraguey-d'Hilliers shall precede the movement of the troops under the command of General Dupont, and shall preserve the same order in the advance of its guns and baggage.

NEY.

This order was no doubt unknown to a writer who constantly boasts of having been Marshal Ney's providence. The following is an extract from a work, entitled "Napoleon au tribunal de César," vol. ii. p. 112. "Fortunately Ney took upon himself to execute but a part (of Murat's orders); he sent Loison's division from Elchingen to the Roth, but left Dupont and Baraguey-d'Hilliers upon the left bank of the Danube, in spite of the orders of the Grand Duke of Berg. I was only made acquainted with these particulars at a later period, and it gave me a high opinion of Ney's talents. I afterwards found that I was indebted for it to one of his officers."

It is true that Ney left Dupont and Baraguey upon the left bank, but not in spite of the Grand Duke's orders. The circumstance took place in a manner much more flattering to Ney's self-love. The Emperor, surprised at seeing his communications given up to the Austrians, revoked some of his arrangements, and Ney had the satisfaction of receiving orders from the Grand Duke to re-occupy the positions whose importance he had so vainly endeavoured to point out.

"I am grieved to the heart," he wrote to Dupont, "at the dreadful fatigue I am forced to make you brave men undergo; but it has just been determined by Prince Murat, who assures me it is a formal order from his Majesty, that your division shall



him so serious that he considered it his duty again to point out its consequences to the minister. He represented to him the chances of the approaching battle, and the danger of abandoning to the Austrians the outlets from Ulm. They might suddenly attack the rear of the French the moment the latter had crossed the river, seize their communications, and place them in the situation in which they had themselves been placed. They might march upon Elwangen, Heydenheim, and Neresheim, and even push on to Nordlingen, if they thought proper.

Nor was this the only evil: the French wanted to give them battle, but how, if such a movement took place, was this to be effected? how were the Austrians to be got at? The Iller was no where fordable; the Austrians had only to destroy the bridges, and the French forces had no means whatever of crossing. Even should the Austrians determine to give battle, the result might be disastrous for the French, who were without stores, and among whom the want of provisions was already very severely felt. However brave and efficient their calvary might be, still the want of forage, and the long marches it had performed, had cruelly thinned its ranks. The division of hussars and chasseurs attached to the sixth corps did not exceed nine hundred strong. That of General Bourcier, consisting of six regiments of dragoons, contained at most sixteen hundred men under arms. The whole corps could not muster more than seventeen thousand men, which number did not exceed the amount of a strong division.

The rest of the right wing had equally suffered, General Gazan's division was reduced to five thousand men, that of General Oudinot mustered about six thousand, and that of General Suchet eight thousand; the dragons-à-pied four thousand; the calvary at most five thousand. General total, fifty thousand men. Could such a force, and in such a state, inspire much confidence? and were the advantages expected worth the risks to be run?

The marshal's anticipations proved but too correct. The Austrians, having reached Ulm on the 10th in the night, crossed the Danube on the morning of the 11th, and immediately spread like a torrent over the communications of the French army. Meantime Dupont executed his movement; he and the Austrians came unexpectedly upon each other, and a fierce engagement ensued. The immense superiority of the Austrian forces rendered their fire very destructive, and the French rushed upon them with fixed bayonets. This threw their ranks into disorder; but scarcely was a column broken ere

remain in observation upon the left bank of the Danube, in order to keep in check the enemy's forces now at Ulm. Select the position that shall appear to you best calculated to effect this object."

Guntzburg, 20th Vendemiaire, Year XIV.

(October 12th, 1805.)

Believe, after this, the vain boasting of a man who pretends to have directed Ney, and who proves himself ignorant of the marshal's most simple combinations.

another took its place. Baraguey, who alone supported Dupont's division, did not appear, and Dupont, obliged to sustain the attack of a whole army, was unable to keep back the columns which covered the plain, and the Austrians continued their movement.\* Werneck marched upon Heydenheim, and Reisch proceeded with a strong column towards Elchingen. This position was almost abandoned; he seized and occupied it, and made such immediate preparations as circumstances required. He damaged the bridge, cut up the timbers, undermined the piles, and left only a narrow passage for the purpose of observing the right bank. In the avenue leading to it he planted six pieces of canon, supported by a numerous body of troops, and his position then seemed secure. But not content with what he had already done, he occupied the gardens round Elchingen, and entrenched his forces within the castle, the convent, and the chapel. Every wall was converted into a fortification, every corner made use of, and every natural obstacle turned to some account.

Ney had just led his second division to the banks of the Roth, when he received orders to proceed to the Leiben, and to send Dupont back to Albeck. The Emperor Napoleon had, like Ney, seen the importance of maintaining the position on the left bank, and had severely censured the plan of disgarnishing and abandoning the

\* GENERAL DUPONT TO MARSHAL NEY.

Chabanois, August 6th, 1806.

MONSIEUR LE MARECHAL,

I have just received your letter in which you ask for further particulars, in reference to the action of the 19th Vendemiaire, concerning the dragons à pied, commanded by General Baraguey-d'Hilliers. The following is what occurred: On receiving your orders to march upon Ulm, my division began the march and reached Hasslach at noon. Having been informed by your instructions that the division of dragoons was to form in second line behind mine, and support it in case of need, I caused Albeck to be entirely evacuated, and withdrew all the baggage of my division, in order to leave this point free, and avoid all confusion, so that nothing might impede the movement of the division of dragoons. You are aware, Monsieur le Maréchal, that I had scarcely reached Hasslach ere I found all the Austrian army prepared for battle, and my division immediately engaged it. Under circumstances so critical, and of which there are but few examples, I dispatched orderly upon orderly to General Baraguey, to acquaint him with my situation, and urge him to press his march; but I know not whether these orderlies ever reached him: the fact is, no assistance came.

I cannot give you any positive information with regard to the hour at which your orders were received by that general; but I believe that the officer of your staff who brought me mine was likewise the bearer of his, and he can therefore give you an exact account of his mission.

I have always thought, Monsieur le Maréchal, that if your instructions had been executed, and your corps-d'armée been able to engage, the Austrian army would have been annihilated on that day. The success obtained by my division, and which it owes entirely to the truly extraordinary courage it displayed, only leaves me one regret, that of not having fought under your eye, and in the presence of the emperor.

Receive, Monsieur le Maréchal, the assurance of my respectful sentiments.

DUPONT, General of Division.

heights which commanded the river. The marshal had just despatched orders to the first division to occupy them, when he received intelligence of the severe action which that division had maintained, and of the preparations for defence made by General Reisch. He immediately dispatched the third division after the second, and hastened in person to join the columns under Loison, which he overtook on the 13th, at seven o'clock in the evening; at eight he resumed his march, and on the 14th, at daybreak, he appeared before Elchingen. This little town is built principally upon a platform, whence its houses and gardens extend to the banks of the river. On the right is a forest, which reaches to the Danube, and on the left, villages and clusters of trees. In front, the ground is intersected with enclosures, and terminates in a peak sixty toises above the level of the river. From the right bank, Elchingen had the appearance of a strong fortress covering formidable works, defended by a numerous army, and to be approached only after crossing a river which alone seemed to form an insurmountable barrier. Ney, however, brought up his forces to the bridge, where they collected some timbers, and tried to adjust them. The artillery thundered from the place, and the French soldiers, soon out of patience at the slow progress of their preparations, rushed upon the works in spite of the enemy's fire, sprang from timber to timber, overturned all who opposed them, carried the passage in a very short time, and the whole French force debouched upon the left bank. There was here only a narrow meadow in which the French troops could form into line; however, they marched up to the enemy, drove them from garden to garden, and from house to house, and succeeded in forcing them to evacuate the principal buildings. Nothing daunted, the Austrians continued to make a vigorous defence; and when at length they were expelled from the last houses, they rallied, formed upon the platform, and seemed resolved again to try the chances of fortune. But the French light cavalry had debouched: Colonel Colbert was already in line of battle, and General Roguet, having driven before him large bodies of Austrians which had offered a most determined resistance in the abbey of Elchingen, had just crowned the heights. Reisch, drawn up in two lines, with his right against the woods which skirt the road to Oettingen, developed his force in a line parallel to the Danube. At a short distance a little higher up, was General Miezery, placed there to maintain the communication between this column and that under Werneck which was proceeding to Heydenheim; and in the rear of the enemy, but it was not known where, was General Dupont's division, which, as we have before stated, had been first sent to the right bank, and immediately after received orders to re-occupy Albeck.

The situation of the French army was critical, and its arrangements somewhat confused; but Ney did not despair of bringing the action to a successful issue. Having feigned to operate with his



right, he drew the enemy's reserves upon that point; and no sooner did he perceive their centre weakened, than, putting himself at the head of part of his forces, he manœuvred to cut it off with his left, and seize its communications. Colbert developed his column below Elchingen; whilst Roguet, with the 69th, fell back by platoons to the left, intrepidly brushing along the enemy's line, and receiving their fire close to the muzzles of their firelocks. The 76th, which followed in columns, bore to the right, and the 18th dragoons began also to move. The collision was dreadful, and in a moment two of the Austrian squares were broken. But Reisch now discovered the object of Ney's manœuvre: he perceived that the marshal wanted to turn him, and was trying to seize upon the cross road leading from Elchingen to the high road from Albeck and Ulm. He therefore closed and grouped his columns, from one extremity of his line to the other, forming them all into squares, and making them press to the right. But this manœuvre was of no avail: the French infantry dispersed the Austrians in the woods, the cavalry broke them in the plain, and they were over-powered on all sides. They succeeded, however, in preserving their communications; some single corps were driven upon Languenau, the remainder threw themselves into the forest of Kesselbrun, where they rallied. But Villatte having followed the movement, his columns were already on the skirts of the wood. General Malher likewise reached the field of battle, cleared the left, and placed his division on the second line. The action was now resumed with fresh fury; the French were about to carry the Hasslach woods, and to establish themselves on the road to Albeck; and victory seemed to have crowned their exertions, when an incident occurred which had well nigh turned the fortune of the day. Werneck, informed of the battle, had returned in all haste; Dupont, on the other hand, who had taken refuge at Brentz after the action at Hasslach, had executed his movement by Languenau, and had just reached Albeck, when the Austrian column appeared. The one held the road, the other resolved to force it, and the struggle was violent; but the Austrians could not with the most prodigious efforts succeed in overcoming the resistance opposed to them. They made several charges, but were always driven back with loss. The French columns from Elchingen now appeared and rendered their already unfavourable situation still worse. Having again formed, they advanced with fury upon the French; but General Bourcier having come up with his cavalry, they were broken, and part of them driven upon Languenau, part upon Jungingen. Ney did not attempt to pursue them; he had made five thousand prisoners, with numerous pieces of cannon and colours; but on his right, the artillery thundered with increasing energy. He therefore altered his march, and proceeded in the direction of the firing.

It had however gradually ceased, and the night was quite dark when he arrived. He took up a position, with his right at Albeck

and his left towards Oettingen, intending to resume the attack at daybreak. But the Emperor, who at first had not properly appreciated the importance of the action at Hasslach, soon discovered his mistake. His columns were converging upon Ulm when he received intelligence of this engagement. He therefore pressed the march of all his corps, and assumed in person the direction of the movement. Bessières proceeded to Wassen-Horn, Soult advanced upon Memmingen, and Marmont, in position at Oberkirch, completely invested the right bank. Murat passed to the left, Lannes followed and pushed towards the Michelsberg. Ney received orders to support Lannes and to resume the positions he had left the day previous. At daybreak therefore he marched towards Jungingen, a village already occupied by General Suchet. The troops were formed into line, and an attempt was made to take a circuit round the heights and thus turn the redoubts which covered them.

Ney led the right and Lannes the left; and all being ready, the movement commenced. The Austrians, in position near Michelsberg, at first made a desperate resistance, but being attacked in front at the same time that they were threatened on the rear, they were forced to give way and seek refuge in the town. Ney drove with impetuosity the columns opposed to him into the suburbs; Lannes was still contending with the redoubts in front of his corps, but perceiving that his colleague was master of the heights, he formed his troops under the glacis. He was stung to the quick at seeing his colleague in advance of him, and he excited his generals and officers to emulate the deeds of the corps commanded by Ney. Vedel, at the head of the 17th light infantry, rushed upon the redoubts which covered Frauenberg and carried them. Lannes warmly applauded this feat, and resolved to pursue the road which this brave colonel had thus opened for him. He accordingly advanced to force and carry the place, or at least to share with his colleague the glory of overthrowing the battalions of the enemy who defended it. The 17th again pushed forward into the hottest of the affray. Ney on his part urged forward the 6th light infantry and the 50th regiment of the line. The attack was near succeeding: these brave battalions had crossed the bridges, and the Austrians in consternation threw away their arms and fled. The French had now only to follow up their success and push into the place; but although the fortune of the day was decided, the Austrians might still make such a resistance as would cause a dreadful butchery among their assailants, and the Emperor was loath to make an unnecessary sacrifice of life. He therefore stopped his columns, and gave the Austrians time to recover from their consternation, leaving Colonel Vedel, who had advanced too far, and some hundreds of his men, prisoners in the hands of the enemy.

The French were now masters of all the forts and of every avenue leading to Ulm. Werneck, again defeated in front of Albeck,

was pushing in great disorder towards Franconia. The hopes of the Austrians were annihilated, and their generals, unable to obtain a passage through the French army by force of arms, attempted to negotiate for one. Prince Lichtenstein was accordingly deputed to Ney, with an offer to surrender Ulm, on condition that the troops it contained should be allowed to join Kienmayer, and take a share in his operations. They declared that if this offer, which they considered reasonable, were refused, they had resolved neither to make nor to receive further overtures, but to bury themselves under the ruins of the town. Ney made no attempt to interrupt the prince; he respected his misfortune, and honoured him as a man; but, situated as the Austrians were, these proposals were inadmissible, and Ney candidly told him that the army from which he came deputed must undergo the fate of war. Lichtenstein returned to Ulm with this unfavourable answer. The Austrian generals again assembled, and came to a determination to try what effect their ultimatum would make upon Ney; they accordingly forwarded to him their resolution couched in the following terms:—

“The garrison of Ulm, understanding with regret that the equitable terms which it considered it had a right to demand of his excellency Marshal Neu\* have not been accepted, is firmly resolved to run the chance of war.

“The COUNT GIULAY, Lieut.-Gen.

LOUDON, Lieut.-Gen.

The COUNT RIESCH, Lieut.-Gen.”

“Ulm, October 16th, 1805.”

This determination was worthy of the brave men who formed it; but courage is unfortunately of no avail when it is not seconded by fortune. Ulm was without stores, and the French were in possession of the heights which commanded the place. The Austrian army was forced to submit to the law of necessity; and thirty-three thousand men, most of whom had distinguished themselves in honourable battles, defiled in sorrow before the French battalions, to whom they delivered up their arms and colours. The sixth corps had defeated them in six consecutive engagements; namely, at Guntzberg, at Hasslach, at Elchingen, at Albeck, and at Michelsberg; it had taken from them fourteen thousand prisoners, a numerous artillery, and ten standards. The battle of Wertengen, and the capitulation of Memmingen were the only feats of which the sixth corps could not claim the glory, every other defeat of this Austrian army being achieved by the troops under Ney's command. The Emperor, anxious to confer upon this corps a mark of his approbation, ordered it to assume the place of honour in this victory by taking possession of the conquered city.


\* This mistake in spelling Marshal Ney's name is not surprising in Germans, for they pronounce Neu something like Ny, and this they might have imagined to be Ney's name.



MARSHAL NEY'S  
MILITARY STUDIES.

VOL. II.

20



# INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE TROOPS COMPOSING

## THE LEFT CORPS.\*

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THE generals of division, in attending to the drilling of the several regiments under their command, will be pleased to apply to the principal evolutions in line hereinafter described the observations which I have made upon each, whether with a view to obtain all possible celerity and precision in the movements required in the execution of such evolutions, or to simplify some of them, or to compare the manœuvres prescribed in the drill regulations of 1791 with those more commonly in use in the field, and which experience teaches us to prefer.

There is no general officer of the present day who does not admit the advantage of acting in the field with troops skilled in the execution of great manœuvres; for knowledge renders military enterprises less doubtful, and obviates many difficulties which seem insurmountable. With such soldiers, the results of well combined operations is no longer left to the chance of events. Moreover, the confidence of the troops in the superiority of their tactics will render their conduct in the field always more or less satisfactory, and will maintain, with their reputation, the honour of the several regiments, and the glory of the arms of the empire.†

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### MARCHES AND EVOLUTIONS IN COLUMN.

Marches and evolutions executed in column form the essential parts of military tactics. In such cases, commanders of battalions

\* General Schneider, member of the commission, has been so good as to read Marshal Ney's manuscript, and to indicate the points of similarity between these studies and the changes adopted in the new infantry regulations. The notes on the following pages are by this general.

† These are excellent views with regard to the advantages of drilling, and skill in manœuvring. The prodigies performed at Ulm and Austerlitz have shown sufficient grounds for appreciating the results of such a system.



and of platoons cannot pay too much attention to all that relates to the direction of the march, to the perpendicular on the flank where the guides are, to the distances between the platoons or the divisions\* of which the columns are composed, and to the intervals between the different battalions or regiments, in order to give the commander-in-chief the facility of deploying in every direction: resuming the line of battle either to the front, or on one of the divisions or subdivisions of the centre, or on one of the two flanks; and of executing, in fine, all such movements, facing to the rear of the original direction, or by a counter-march.

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EXAMPLES OF THE MARCH IN COLUMN TO OUT-FLANK ONE OF THE WINGS OF THE ENEMY'S LINE INTENDED TO BE ATTACKED.

I.

The attack with four regiments being directed against the right wing of the enemy, the general in command shall form his lines by the left; the battalions shall be formed into columns by platoons, the left in front, at whole or half distance.† The columns thus prepared shall, in marching forward, take a diagonal to the left, and by heads of the column formed by each battalion. So soon as the three first platoons shall have taken the given direction, the remainder shall insensibly resume the perpendicular by moving obliquely to the right. The heads of columns marching on the diagonal to the left, having now sufficiently approached the point fixed on for outflanking the enemy's line, and by a rapid movement resumed the perpendicular, shall re-form, the line of battle by a general conversion to the right.

It will be advisable, if circumstances admit of it, to keep the columns at the distance from each other of only a half battalion or division, in order to shorten the movement; and also to close the platoons to half distances whenever the columns change their direction. By such means a too great undulation would be avoided.

II.

If however the diagonal to the left, taken by each column, should not prove sufficient to outflank the enemy's right wing, the commander-in-chief must form his new line by successive battalions, beginning with the right of his two lines and giving the following word of command:—"By the right of the two lines, and by successive battalions form line of battle to the right." The first battalion having executed its movements by platoons to the right in line of battle, shall advance twenty-five paces, in column by platoon, in order to

\* The distances and the correction of the guides, are in fact the ground-work of a march in column.

† An excellent method of outflanking an enemy on either wing.

establish itself upon the oblique line indicated for this movement. The other battalions shall successively continue to march until the right of each is parallel with the left of the last formed battalion. They shall then execute a conversion by platoons to the right, and successively take up their proper position in line.

If the attack be directed against the left wing of the enemy, the lines shall march by the right, the columns having the right in front. This measure is applicable to manœuvres I. and II. It is necessary during the march of the columns on the diagonal, to designate the last battalions of the two lines as the directing battalions, when the left is in front, and the first battalions, when the right is in front. Care must also be taken to make the columns of the second line march so that their heads be directed between the interval of those of the first line, without, however, losing the distance in line prescribed to them. But the moment the columns march directly forward, those of the second line shall resume the perpendicular.

### III.

The enemy being drawn up parallel to the front of your four regiments, and it being the intention of the commander-in-chief to deceive them with regard to the true point of attack,—if it is meant to be on the enemy's right, the battalions of both lines shall form by platoons to the left, and march on, appearing thus to retreat. So soon as the heads of the two lines shall have extended the space of one or two battalions beyond the enemy's front, a new oblique line shall be formed in the following manner: On the command, "Form the oblique line, left wing in front,"—the fourth platoon of the third battalion of the first line, and the eighth platoon of the third battalion of the second line, or such other platoons as may be directed, shall march by the right flank, and by file to the right; as shall likewise all the platoons preceding those which serve as the axis of the movement, upon the new line taken. The platoons in the rear shall move by the left flank, and form a perpendicular to the head. A general wheel to the right shall replace the line in the order of battle prescribed.

### IV.

If, on the contrary, the commander-in-chief determine to attack the left of the enemy, the battalions of the two lines shall march to the right, and, as soon as the heads of the columns of the two lines shall have extended the space of a battalion or two beyond the enemy's front, he shall form an oblique line, right wing in front, upon the eighth platoon of the second battalion of the first line, and upon the eighth platoon of the first battalion of the second line. All the divisions preceding those designated for the formation of the oblique line shall operate successively by the left flank, and successively establish themselves upon the new line; those in the rear shall

operate by the right flank, in order to resume the distance and perpendicular of the head. A general conversion to the left will replace the line in the order of battle prescribed.

## V.

But if the two heads of columns of the lines, the right being in front, should come to the diagonal on the left towards the centre of the enemy's front, and you intend to attack the left of the enemy's line ;—in that case the platoons preceding those which are to serve as the axis, shall operate by the right flank, and those in the rear by the left flank ; and, the perpendicular being taken, the line shall be resumed by a general wheel to the left. Nevertheless, if during the movement the enemy should make a demonstration of attack, it would be prudent to form the platoons in the prescribed line of battle, as they successively came up, for the purpose either of making head against the enemy, or of protecting the manœuvre.\*

If, on the contrary, your heads of columns arrive, the left in front, upon the diagonal on the right, and proceed towards the enemy's centre, and you intend to attack the right wing of the enemy's line, —all the platoons preceding those which serve as the axis in the two lines shall operate by the left flank, those in the rear by the right flank ; and the oblique line of battle shall be re-formed by means of a general conversion of platoons to the right.

## VI.

The four regiments marching in column of platoons, the right in front, on a line parallel to the enemy's front, as if they intended to attack the enemy's left wing, when, on the contrary, their right wing was the object of attack : in such a case, the oblique line might be formed, the left wing advanced on the first platoon of the third battalion of the first line, and the eighth platoon of the third battalion of the second line, or such other platoons as might be selected ; the platoons preceding these to operate by the right flank, and to proceed along the new perpendicular ; the platoons in the rear to operate by the left flank and by file to the right. A general wheel by platoons to the left would place the line in the order of battle required.

It is to be observed that this movement must either be rapidly executed, or take place at some distance from the enemy, because the column for a time stands with its rear to the latter.

## VII.

The same manœuvre may also be performed if the lines march in columns of platoons towards the right of the enemy's line, though the commander-in-chief intends to form his oblique line upon the enemy's left. In this case, the platoons in the rear of those fixed

\* The same project of outflanking the enemy by simple and sure means—in column, and by one to the left, or one to the right in line of battle.



upon as the axis of the movement shall operate by the right flank and by files to the left ; those in front of the axis shall operate by the left flank. The perpendicular being assumed, the line of battle shall be re-formed by a general conversion to the right by the two lines. Whenever the commander wishes to change the perpendicular of the columns, he will take care to establish, as in a change of front, the platoon designated for the rest of the troops to form upon.

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#### SOME MANŒUVRES BY MEANS OF THE COLUMN.

Four regiments in columns with intervals, marching, right in front, by platoons or divisions, at whole or half distance :—If the commander requires to make them march by front of regiments in columns, on the reverse flank of the guides in natural order, he shall give the following command after halting :—“By platoons (or divisions) on the uneven or alternate battalions of each regiment, to the right form line of battle.”

This movement being executed, he may resume his line of battle by a change of front on the centre of each regiment, the right wing forward : that is to say, on the first division of the even battalions of each regiment. But if he wanted to form into line of battle by an inversion of regiments to the other flank, the change of front must be effected with the left wing forward : that is to say, on the fourth division of the uneven battalions of each regiment. If he wished to march in column of regiments by the proper pivot flank, he must execute a conversion of the divisions or platoons by inversion to the left.

#### II.

By this distribution of columns of regiments, the commander might easily form his four regiments into a hollow square. If such were his intention, the first regiment would stand fast ; the uneven battalions of the second and third, must execute a conversion to the right by battalions or by platoons, half wheel to the right, and the even battalions must effect a conversion to the left. The fourth regiment, after having closed its ranks, would form the rear face.

#### III.

The commander having reduced the square in order to form into line in the same order of columns, the first regiment shall operate by platoons to the right after having cleared the second regiment ; the latter shall then advance the space of one division, in order to form the basis for the general line. The first regiment shall halt and form in battle ; the third and fourth shall operate to the left by platoons, and place themselves successively in the alignment.

If this is to be effected in front on the second regiment, the column shall close to division distance, after which, forward and wheel.

But if the commander intended to form two lines, the uneven regiments would stand fast, whilst the even numbers should execute the movement above indicated for the third and fourth regiments.

#### IV.

Should the commander, however, find that the movements prescribed for the manœuvre, No. IV., are too slow of execution, he may form a single column of regiments. He will command to form close column, the right in front, upon the colour division of each battalion; and, having closed in mass, he may form into line by battalions in mass, or deploy on any named battalion.\*

#### V.

The four regiments having deployed, and the commander being desirous instantly to form two lines, and to place the uneven battalions in the first, and the even battalions in the second, he shall form a close column of regiments, the right in front, on the fourth division of the uneven battalions, then close the masses, at the distance of a battalion from each other, upon the second regiment, and afterwards form into line upon the colour division of each battalion.

#### VI.

If the commander wants to march in columns, with the left in front, by entire regiments in their proper order: (let us suppose that the odd battalions are in the first, and the even battalions in the second line;) he will command a change of front to be effected on the colour platoon of each battalion, right wing in front. If, on the contrary, he wished to march with the right in front, the change of front must be effected upon the colour platoon of each battalion, the left wing in front. The battalions would thus be in line of battle by inversion.

If the even battalions were in the first, and the uneven battalions in the second line, the column might be formed by fronts of regiments in columns of march, the right in front, by effecting a central change of front in each battalion, left wing forward; and, on the contrary, a change of front, right wing forward, if the troops were to march with the left in front. In this case the battalions would likewise be in line of battle in inverted order.†

\* This is the manœuvre adopted by the regulation of the 4th of March, 1831, the movements in mass being preferred in this regulation.

† At present the column is always first formed, even for a change of front.

## VII.

The line of four regiments or eight battalions being fully deployed, as in manœuvre No. V., if the intention of the commander be to make the eight battalions march in two columns close to each other, in order to conceal his force and give greater precision to his movement,—the regiments shall form, in the rear, into columns by divisions, viz.: the first regiment with the left, and the second with the right in front. The same movement shall be adopted for the second and third regiments. This movement may be executed by the following command:—"To the left of the uneven regiments, left in front, to the rear in column; and to the right of the even regiments, right in front, to the rear in column."

## MARCH IN LINE AND INCREASE OF FRONT.

## I.

The principles of the march in line are clearly enough indicated in the regulation of 1791. The men and the battalions are placed square to the front on the ground they occupy, and in perfect alignment; the colours are generally carried six paces in front, when the line is to march, for the purpose of giving the cadence of the step, serving as a point of intermediate direction, and preventing the battalions from undulating and from outflanking the one appointed to direct the movement.

This arrangement, though good in itself, is seldom observed in actual warfare.\* The regiments shall continue, nevertheless, to follow this mode, and also the following, which appears to me better adapted to rendering the direction visible to the whole of the line, and facilitating the correctness of the line when the word is given to halt.

On the cautionary command:—"Battalions (or lines) forward," the colours will remain in the ranks; the regulating battalion shall advance three paces, so that its rear rank is exactly on a line with the battalions to the right and left. The general guides, or camp colourmen, of the other battalions, shall advance to the same alignment. At the word HALT! the whole shall line themselves on the directing battalion. Whenever the first line is to charge bayonets, the directing battalion shall not move from its place in line of battle.

As, on many occasions in war, great advantage may be derived from increasing the front of the line, the commander may affect it in the following manner:—

\* The Marshal endeavours to avoid the evils admitted to exist in the old system of marching in line of battle, and he gives the means of doing so. But at present the formation into column by battalions is preferred, even for marching in line of battle.



Let us still suppose four regiments or eight battalions upon one or two lines whose front is to be increased by some battalions on the wings.

If it is to be of the four battalions placed at the two wings on the first line, the third rank of those battalions shall make a half turn to the right, retire thirty paces to the rear, face about to the front, then, quickly forming into two ranks, proceed in double-quick time to support the first platoon of the first battalion. There shall be a lieutenant and two non-commissioned officers to the third rank of each platoon. The non-commissioned officers shall be placed to the right of the sections, and the lieutenant shall act as captain. An adjutant-major shall command the two battalions of each regiment thus formed, and to which four drummers shall be added. The formation shall be the same for the third rank of the two battalions on the left, but the platoons shall execute the inverse movement. These battalions may be employed according to circumstances.\*

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#### PASSAGE OF LINES.

The passages of lines may be effected by column in different ways, besides those specified in the regulations :—

##### I.

Two lines of four or eight battalions having to execute the passage of lines to the front, by column; the first line stands fast; the battalions of the second, having broken into platoons to the right, shall march forward, change the direction to the left by heads of columns of battalions, pass outside the right of the battalion on the first line, and replace themselves in order of battle, either upon the first platoon or division, or upon one of the divisions or subdivisions of the centre. But if the commander wishes positively to place the first line on a parallel with the second, the heads of columns, after they have passed the right of the battalions of the first line, shall oblique to the left in a sufficient degree to regain the platoon front which they have lost by the direct march. This manœuvre is applicable either to the first or the second line.†

The battalions of the second line may likewise gain ground to the front by proceeding round the left of the battalions on the first line. In this latter case they will break by platoons to the left, and will

\* Method of passing from a formation of three ranks to a formation of two, in order to extend the line.

† The method of passage of lines, in the regulations of 1791, is quite defective; the Marshal substitutes a mode of doing it in proper columns, which is much more rational. The manœuvre in the regulations of the 4th of March, 1831, is very like that of the Marshal.

change their direction to the right on reaching the level of the left of the battalions which have preceded them.

The movement to the rear is executed in the same manner ; the battalions of the first line, after a half turn to the right, and by platoons to the right, march forward, change their direction to the left and pass round the left of the battalions of the second line, and so on from both sides.

## II.

The passage of lines to the front may likewise be effected by columns of whole regiments for both lines. In this case the second line must form a close column of regiments, the right in front, either upon the first division of the even battalions, or upon the fourth division of the uneven ones. Each column shall march forward and pass through the interval between the two battalions of each regiment of the first line which precedes them. After having gained sufficient ground, each column shall form into line upon one of the divisions prescribed for its formation. The passage of line of regiments of the second line may likewise be effected by the latter executing the movement of the passing the defile forward by the centre. This mode is perhaps preferable, because the manœuvre takes up less time, and the heads of columns may immediately execute the platoon firing.

The passage of line retrograde, by columns of regiments, would be evidently too dangerous very near the enemy. Those prescribed by the regulation, and those indicated in No. I. for columns of battalions, must, therefore, alone be put in practice.

In the supposition of a general attack in front, the heads of columns of each regiment of the second line shall march up to the intervals between the battalions of the regiments which precede them on the first line, and thus uniting the *ordre profond* to the *ordre mince*, necessarily give more vigour to the ensemble of the charge. The movement being concluded, the regiments shall extend to the front.

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## CHANGES OF FRONT.

The changes of front upon one or more extensive lines are seldom executed in actual war. Nevertheless, as most of these movements are effected by the column, I shall give some examples of the manœuvre.

### I.

Four or eight battalions, on one or two lines, having to execute a change of front perpendicularly or obliquely, the right wing forward, either upon the centre, or nearer one of the two flanks of the line :—

If the lines are composed of four battalions, the first line shall form the close column of divisions, the right in front, upon the first division of the third battalion, and the second line upon the first division of the second battalion.

If there are eight battalions, the first line shall, in like manner, be formed by column upon the first division of the fifth battalion, and the second line upon the first division of the fourth battalion.

The columns being formed upon either supposition, all the divisions in front of that of formation of the first line (first division of the third battalion, or first division of the fifth battalion,) shall resume the distance by the head or right of the column; and all those in the rear of the division of formation, after the half turn to the right, shall resume the distance by the rear or left of the column; and then, in succession as the divisions resume their distances, they shall replace themselves right in front.

Immediately after the movement of the first line is begun, the second shall march forward, taking its distance by the head, and shall establish itself parallel to the first line.\*

A general conversion by divisions to the left will place the two lines in the exact order of the change of front commanded.

This movement might be effected by platoons, and its execution rendered much more rapid.

The principle of a change of front, as it may be perceived, remains the same as that laid down in the regulations; that is to say, that if the first line operates upon the fourth battalion, the right wing forward, the second line executes it upon the third battalion; in like manner, if the first line executes it upon the third battalion, the left wing forward, the second line effects it on the fourth battalion, and so on.

## II.

Four or eight battalions upon two lines intending to execute a change of front with firing, breaking successively to the rear by platoons or divisions from one of the two wings, in order to form a new oblique line upon one of the flanks:—

When the order for this movement is given, the first division of the battalion on the right of the first line shall operate by the left flank, and by file to the rear by the left; it shall fall back in its whole depth, then operate by the right flank, and march forward, taking a direction behind the front, in order to place itself in line of battle on the extreme left of the line. So soon as the first division has passed to the parallel of the centre of the second division, this latter shall likewise make its movement by the left flank, and so on

\* The method here proposed is much superior to that in the regulations of 1791, and very much resembles that adopted in the new regulation of 1831.



with regard to the other divisions. The moment a battalion of the first line has unmasked the front of a battalion of the second line, the latter shall immediately be replaced, and so on. The battalions of the second line shall execute the fire commanded for those of the first, but none of these battalions shall fall back until the battalions of the first line have executed their movement; after which, if the commander wished to prolong the line, by adding the second to it, he must command the latter to execute the same manœuvre; or, lastly, by the same movement he may replace it in its position of battle in second line.

If the movement is to be effected by the left of the line, in that case the fourth division of the last battalion must move by the right flank and by files to the rear by the right, so as to proceed behind the front, in order to replace itself on the left in battle towards the extreme right of the line, and so on with the other divisions.

### III.

Changes of individual fronts by battalions give infinite facility in executing the principal manœuvres of war. They require two or three minutes only, and, consequently, enable the commander to change the front of his line in a very short time, either by executing an oblique change of front upon each battalion, the left wing forward, re-forming afterwards upon the battalion on the right of the first line, by battalions forward in line of battle; or the right wing forward, re-forming upon the last battalion forward in battle. Lastly, this oblique arrangement allows of attacking by order of echelons.

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### PASSAGE OF DEFILES AND BRIDGES.

The passage of a defile to the rear, by the flank and by files, according to the regulation, is in general very long, and borders too much on confusion to be executed in the presence of the enemy. This movement may be effected in column by sections, platoons, or divisions, either by a movement to front or rear.\*

#### I.

To pass a defile, in front by the centre, according to regulation, the first battalion proceeds by sections to the left, the second, by sections to the right; they afterwards march forward and form up into line as the defile widens.

Here a battalion is supposed to be posted behind a defile whose width would not allow the passage in front of more than one platoon

\* This reason is the same as the one stated in the new regulations, in which the method presented by Marshal Ney is adopted.

at a time. In this case all the sections of the half battalion on the right would place themselves in the rear in column, the left in front, behind the second section of the fourth platoon, and the sections of the half battalion on the left, in the rear in column, right in front, behind the first section of the fifth platoon. The battalion marching in this order of column of attack, at section distance, through the defile, should gradually form upon the centre and forward in line of battle, as the defile became wider.

## II.

If the defile is wide enough to allow the free passage of a division, in that case all the platoons of the right shall form into column, the left in front, at platoon distance, behind the fourth platoon; and those of the left, with the right in front, behind the fifth platoon. The advance in line of battle shall be executed in the same manner as that specified for the column, by fronts of platoons formed by the sections of the half battalions on right to left.

This mode may be applied to a line of several battalions, by forming the uneven battalions into columns by sections or platoons, the left in front, and the even battalions the right in front. In this case the columns must be closed, so that there remain only an interval of three paces.

## III.

The passage of the defile in retreat is effected in the natural order of the sections, platoons, or divisions, in the following manner:—

As the battalion is to fall back by sections of the two wings at the same time, let us suppose that the defile is behind the second section of the fourth, and first section of the fifth platoon. All the sections of the right shall break successively by the left flank and to the rear by left, then front and march; those of the left, by the right flank and to the rear by the right, then front and march. On reaching the entrance of the defile, the sections of the right shall make a conversion to the left, and the sections of the left a conversion to the right, proceeding together on the new line indicated. To cover the retrograde movement, it will be necessary for the platoon or division at the entrance of the defile to march up twenty-five paces to the front, and throw out some tirailleurs. Lastly, so soon as the two wings have effected their movement, the platoon in advance shall recall its tirailleurs by the rallying beat of the drum, and after a half turn to the right, place itself three paces in front of the centre of the battalion, and there serve as a base on which to form the general line.

## IV.

If the retrograde movement is to be effected by platoons from both wings of a regiment at the same time, the eighth platoon of the first

battalion, and the first platoon of the second battalion, shall likewise advance obliquely to the left and right, in order to cover the point indicated for the passage of the defile to the rear. The platoons of the right, and those of the left of both battalions, shall break to the rear in the same manner as the sections, and the line of battle shall be re-formed in the manner already specified.

If instead of breaking by platoons, the commander thought proper to break by divisions, in such case the fourth division of the first battalion, and the first division of the second battalion, should execute the same movements.

To aid the judgment of commanders of battalions and platoons as to the distances they are to observe during the march, and to enable them to ascertain when they are to halt, so that the line shall not offer too extensive a development at the moment of conversion to the left to enable the platoons coming from the right, and of wheel to the right for those marching from the left, to resume their order of battle, they shall count as many paces as there are files in their platoons, and then multiply by the number which are to follow them, deducting those which are keeping the enemy in check. By such means the commanders of battalions will find no difficulty in halting and forming into line of battle, exactly parallel to the original front of the line, by a general conversion to the left.

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#### MARCH OR ATTACK BY ECHELONS.

This manœuvre is extremely advantageous in war; but it requires a great perfection in the marching of the troops, in order that the attack upon the enemy may be supported with rapidity and intelligence, and that the battalions which refuse to attack may be in fit state to execute attentively every movement which circumstances may require.

##### I.

Eight battalions upon two lines having to attack the right wing of the enemy placed parallel to their front :—

The movement shall begin by the left at full distances, either by regiments or by battalions, whichever may be preferable. So soon as the last battalion of the first line has marched forward, it shall be followed by that of the second line, and so on by the remaining battalions. In the supposition that the enemy refuses its right, and makes a demonstration of attack with its left upon the right flank of the echelons in march : in this case, all the battalions shall effect together a change of direction to the right by battalions; or for the sake of more compactness and greater celerity, a change of front upon the



colour platoon of each battalion in the two lines, left wing forward. This manœuvre being performed, the battalions may continue the attack by echelons, or march forward and place themselves in line of battle upon the first battalions of the right of the two lines, which serve as pivots or point-d'appui. By this operation the two wings act alternately on the offensive.\*

If the attack were to be made on the left wing of the enemy's line, the movement must begin by the right of the two attacking lines. The change of direction by battalions must be executed to the left; or the change of front made right wing forward.

## II.

If the commander wishes to attack with only the first line in echelons of battalions, either by the right or by the left, the battalions shall march at full distances, after the echelons are established; and if they were threatened with an attack by cavalry, each battalion should form into column of division at platoon distance, the right in front, upon the colour division of each battalion, if the movement were effected by the right of the line; or the left in front, if the movement were effected by the left of the line. This being done, the first division of each head of column would stand fast. The uneven platoons of the second and third divisions should then wheel to the right, and the even platoons wheel to the left. The fourth division should close up, and then face about so as to form squares by battalions placed in echelons.

## III.

The attack in echelons by the centre is in general too dangerous a manœuvre to be frequently used in war, unless the commander is certain that the enemy has imprudently weakened his centre to strengthen his wings; and that when he has reached the central position he can maintain it, cut off the enemy's wings, and force him to give battle separately. This attack upon the centre requires great resolution and extreme celerity in the march of the assailants.

Let us suppose a first assailant line of eight battalions: in this case the battalions Nos. 4 and 5 shall begin to march at half distance; the other battalions shall in like manner follow at half distance, so that the movement may be better concentrated. It would be prudent not to make the second line march otherwise than in line of battle, in order that it may serve as a support to the two wings of the echelons of the first line, and be able to receive the first line thus formed, and protect it in case of necessity.

\* This is a beautiful manœuvre, and has been adopted,

## RETREAT EN ECHIQUIER, OR ALTERNATE RETREAT.

The retreat en echiquier upon two lines may be effected according to the principles laid down in the regulations, by falling back by battalions a hundred or a hundred and fifty paces. But in order to change alternately the defensive into the offensive, the even battalions of the second line, instead of falling back at the same time as the even battalions of the first line, may form columns by divisions, at either close, half, or whole distance behind the first division, the right in front, and then advance outside the right of the even battalions of the first line then in retreat, and form into line a few toises in the rear of the left of the uneven battalions of the first line. This movement may be alternate in the two lines, and by even and uneven battalions, during the whole time that the retrograde movement lasts.

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 SQUARES.

Squares are formed three deep, in conformity to the Emperor's instructions; and sometimes also by doubling the interior sections, according to the principle laid down in the regulations of 1791. Regiments may also be practised to fire from the four sides by the simple column; and as this is often seen in war, the troops generally marching in that order, it would be advantageous to accustom the men to it.

## I.

Four regiments crossing a plain in columns with intervals, by platoons or by divisions. If they were attacked by cavalry, and had not time to form into the prescribed squares, the regiments should close up in mass, the three files on the proper pivot flank (we suppose that the columns have their right in front) should form to the left flank; and those on the reverse flank should form to the right flank; the last division would face about.\*

## II.

But if the four regiments marched upon two lines in columns: the first and second regiments of the first line, the right in front, in column upon the eighth platoon of the even battalions, if it be by platoons, or upon the fourth division of the same battalions, if it be by divisions; and the first and second regiments of the second line, with also the right in front, but to the rear in columns upon the first platoons of the uneven battalions, or the first divisions of the same battalions, if it be by divisions. This arrangement would enable the

\* This formation is adopted in preparing against charges of cavalry.

commander to form squares, either by making the uneven platoons wheel to the right, and the even platoons to the left, the column being by divisions at half distances; or, after having closed up in mass, by making the three files on the right and left flanks of the columns face as above to the left and to the right. Should circumstances permit, the quincunx may be formed, in order that the fire may cross without inconvenience to the troops.

### III.

The four regiments may also be formed into columns in the following manner :—The first regiment of the first line in front forward into column, the right in front, upon the fourth division of the even battalion; the second regiment in the rear into column, the right in front, upon the first division of the uneven battalion. The first regiment of the second line forward into column, the left in front, upon the first division of the uneven battalion, and the second regiment in rear into column, the left in front, upon the fourth division of the even battalion.\*

### IV.

Four regiments upon two lines may easily form the hollow square, and place within it the baggage and implements of war, which they might have to cover or protect on a march. In this case, the two lines should leave no interval between the battalions and the regiments. The first battalion of the first line should break to the rear into column, by platoons, the left in front, at whole distance, upon the eighth platoon; the fourth battalion of the same line into column by platoons, the right in front, behind the first platoon; the first battalion of the second line forward into column, the right in front, upon its eighth platoon, and the fourth battalion forward into column, the left in front, upon its first platoon; a wheel by platoons to the right, by the right flank, would close this part of the square, and a wheel to the left, by the left flank, would close the other part. The second and third battalions of the second line must make a half turn to the right. The grenadiers might be so disposed as to cover the exterior and interior salient angles of the square.

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### CONCLUSIONS.

The battalions and regiments shall be progressively accustomed to execute, both stationary and in marching, all the above manœuvres.

The generals of division shall see that this be done, and shall give to each brigadier-general and colonel under their respective command a copy of these instructions.

\* The new regulations do not, and very properly so, allow of squares formed of more than three battalions.



As the whole of military tactics lies in the science of forming the troops into column with rapidity, and making them march in line of battle, I shall apply myself more particularly to show the utility of making whole lines operate by simple movements in columns of battalions upon one or two lines, and by such means execute all possible changes of front, either from the halt or on the march, comprising generally the principal movements used in war.\*

It is not my intention to develop the knowledge required to carry on warfare on a large scale, but I shall confine myself to the simple mechanism of the evolutions which form the essential ground-work of its particular enterprises. It belongs wholly to the individual genius of the commander to direct his lines of operation in such a manner as to embrace a vast whole, and to be able, at the proper time, to take advantage of all the events and circumstances which succeed each other so rapidly in the field of battle.

The success of every operation in war depends upon confidence of the troops in their leader, which can only be acquired by the example which the general must give when the danger is common to all. He must, without intermission, and with unceasing solicitude, attend to the wants of the men, and insure, by the most persevering activity, the execution of his orders;—nothing being more important in war than to impress upon his army at once, and decidedly, the utmost punctuality in marching at the very moment specified, in order that combined movements may produce the success intended. False interpretations and misunderstandings put forth by inexperienced men, must be corrected by laconic, clear, and precise orders for movements. It belongs principally to the intelligence of the staff officers to extirpate this military defect, which may lead to so many evils when the remedy is not applied on the instant.

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#### OBSERVATIONS AND GENERAL SUMMARY.

Columns by battalions at platoon distance, of one or two lines at once, allow the commander to execute every possible manœuvre, change frequently his direction, and march on the diagonal to the left, the columns having the left in front, and on the diagonal to the right, if the right is in front; likewise to change the direction to the right.

Changes of front by individual battalions are the easiest, because they require only a simple platoon wheel, either in the proper or in an inverted order. Their execution takes up much less time than those indicated in the regulations, and no part of the troops present their rear to the enemy.

\* Good reflections and excellent principles.

Passage of lines by individual battalions forward by the centre.— The battalions of the second line march as in the passage of a defile, forward by the centre, and the forming into line is effected almost without the necessity of any general words of command. The passage of lines by falling back, does not offer the same advantage ; that prescribed by the regulations may be used in preference.

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#### ADJUTANTS-COMMANDANTS.

During war these officers shall be employed in active service and in the army offices, but more especially in the former, in order to select the places of encampment, form the camps, and stake out positions when circumstances admit of it. They are to keep up communications with the head-quarters of divisions and with general head-quarters ; fix upon the places for distributing the provisions, forage, &c. ; direct the van-guards, and general and particular reconnoitering parties ; proceed with parties to observe the force, the position, and the movements of the enemy. The adjutants-commandants employed in the army offices shall be specially charged with collecting the states as to the situation of the forces ; they shall also provide for the wants and subsistence of the men ; write reports upon the observations made respecting the country, the topography of the war, marches, encampments, &c. &c., and superintend the *personnel* and *materiel* of the staff.\*

The assistant adjutants-commandants shall assist the latter in their important duties. The assistants, to qualify themselves for war, and to benefit as well by their own observations as by those of the other officers in the army, shall write down, in the form of notes, any thing that may strike their attention with regard to good or bad dispositions, and neglect nothing to render such remarks profitable to themselves in their profession. The most important thing for a staff-officer is to inure himself to fatigue from the very opening of the campaign, by remaining constantly dressed and booted, in order that on the very first shot fired, he may be able to proceed in all haste to the place of action, and return and give information to his superiors. The assistants and other officers of the staff shall be present at every distribution of rations, or any thing else to the men ; they shall reconnoitre during the night in the camps and at the advanced posts. An adjutant-commandant shall direct them in turn of duty, beginning from the head, in every thing relative to the service, and at the bottom in every thing concerning distributions, and other drudgery, errands, &c.

\* The rank of adjutant-commandant does not now exist ; but the duties attributed to that officer, and the Marshal's instructions, are perfectly applicable to the staff-colonel of the present day.

## AIDES-DE-CAMP.

Besides the confidence of the general officers, of which aides-de-camp must render themselves worthy by indefatigable zeal, it is necessary that they should be extremely active, well acquainted with the different corps of the brigade or division to which they belong, the names of the several officers in command, and those of the commissaries, that they may be able to transmit orders with precision, and superintend their execution.

## THE COMMANDANT AT HEAD-QUARTERS.

He shall personally take the orders of the chief of the staff, shall preside at parade, and superintend the interior and exterior duty at head-quarters. The watch-word shall be given only in fortresses, such a custom being found useless in camps, where the development is too extensive, especially when several divisions composing a corps-d'armée act individually in pursuit of the enemy.

## PERSONNEL OF HEAD-QUARTERS.

The commander of the artillery.\*

A company of guides on horseback, taken from all the corps composing the army.

A company of guides on foot.

Half a company of light artillery.

A company of pontoonmen.

A section of miners.

A company of sappers.

A company of armed bakers, and two sections of butchers.

A company of swimmers of a hundred men.

Engineer officers.

Officers topographers.

Commissaries general.

Inspector and sub-inspector of musters.

Officers of health and of pharmacy. The officers of health shall have *voursches*,† and shall follow everywhere.

A division of horse gendarmerie.

A military commission, or standing court-martial.

\* All that follows, as far as No. 7, is order given to chaos. It was worthy of a mind like that of the Marshal to feel the want of this, and to dare undertake it. The principles of this organization have been adopted in the new regulations for the field.

† A sort of light car.



Messengers.

Administration of posts, and the veterinary artist of head-quarters.

Paymaster-general, guarded by the guides of the general-in-chief.

Four washerwomen and two sutlers, with carts, each of which shall bear a plate.

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#### INDISPENSABLE OBJECTS ATTACHED TO A GENERAL STAFF.

A bridge equipage consisting of pontoons, another of trestles for crossing a river of from a hundred to two hundred feet wide, provided with cramp-hooks, cordage, anchors, two skiffs, beams, timbers, carpenters' tools, torches, combustibles, pitch, &c. &c.; ladders with cramp-hooks to scale, when necessary, the walls of a town, or other places not strongly fortified by art and nature. The whole placed in drays, or other strongly built carriages.

The light artillery attached to head-quarters shall always have a good stock of rockets for signals, either to direct night movements, or to guide columns of attack before day-break, whether in an open country, or when forcing redoubts and entrenchments or storming a fortified place.

An equipage of tumbrils for the provisions and forage.

Baggage of head-quarters.—Fix its amount with precision, and preserve the greatest order on a march; and maintain a discipline always difficult, particularly among the soldiers who have the direction and superintendence of the train.

The commander of the equipages, wagons, tumbrils of rockets, bridge equipages, pontoons, and other implements of war, must be a man of firm character, well informed, and extremely strict. It is necessary that the soldiers of the train should have learned to manœuvre, in order that, in case of need, the commander of the equipages or of the park, might be able to form a square against the enemy, and to re-form with equal facility into one or more columns. The execution of such manœuvres requires great rapidity and precision.

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#### THE CHIEF OF THE STAFF.

Besides the staff officers under the command of the chief of the staff, the number of which is fixed by laws and decrees, there shall be an under chief of the staff, who shall superintend the work in the offices, the execution of reports, the destination of troops, and draw up papers upon the reconnoitings, &c. &c.

The under chief of the staff shall distribute to the individuals alone

who are attached immediately to the staff the billets which the commander of head-quarters shall issue to him. The orders respecting the police at head-quarters, and all measures concerning the details relative thereto, shall be placarded inside the office of head quarters. The commander of the gendarmerie, specially charged with this branch of the service, shall keep a register, in which shall be entered the orders and arrangements concerning the distribution of rations, billets, the interior and exterior service, the police, sutlers, washerwomen, prisoners of war, spies, delinquents belonging to the army, convicts, execution of sentences, conscripts, deserters, &c.

The following order in billeting, once established, shall be invariably maintained during the war.

The under chief of the staff shall receive from the commandant of head-quarters, or from the commander of the gendarmerie, billets for the general officers, artillery officers, officers of engineers, assistants, aides-de-camp, adjutants, commandants, and other persons immediately attached to the general head-quarters.

Billets distributed by the commander of head-quarters or under chief of the staff,—To the officers or subdivision of gendarmerie, for the non-commissioned officers and gendarmes.

Commander of the guides,—To the horse and foot guides, and the half company of light artillery.

Commander of the gendarmerie,—To the sutlers and washerwomen.

Commander of engineers,—To the sappers and pontoonmen.

Commissaries,—To the bakers and butchers.

Commandant of the artillery,—To the swimmers and the reserve park of artillery.

Paymaster,—To the clerks, employés, and other individuals attached to the treasury.

Director-general of posts,—To the messengers and administration of posts.

Inspectors of that administration,—To the administration of bread and liquors and forage.

The guard of general head-quarters, and of the chief of the staff shall be furnished by the horse and foot guides.

The guard of the general in command of the artillery, by the horse or foot gunners.

The guard of the commandant of engineers, and all field officers of that arm, by the sappers, pontoonmen, miners, and swimmers.

The guard of the inspector and sub-inspector of musters, by the bakers and butchers.

The guard of the commissary-general, and the other commissaries, by the bakers and butchers.

The guard of the general administration of posts, by the guides of head-quarters.

The guard of the administration of bread, meat, liquids, and forage, shall consist of a detachment of infantry taken from the division nearest to head-quarters.

The guard of the treasury to be taken from the guides of general head-quarters, or to consist of grenadiers attached to the general staff.

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#### STAFF OF A DIVISION.

The general of division.—The chief of his staff, taken from among the adjutants-commandants; two generals of brigade, two adjutants-commandants, and four assistants.

The commandant of head-quarters selected from among the field-officers of the division, or from among the unattached field-officers at home.

A division or sub-division of gendarmerie to carry on the police; the commander of this corps is to communicate with the commander of the gendarmerie at general head-quarters.

Pontoonmen, sappers and miners, to be taken by detachments from those employed in the army.

Two officers of engineers employed in military reconnoitring, constructing military works, tracing and staking out camps and positions, drawing plans of the ground and of marches, engagements, &c. &c.

Paymaster of the division.

Officer in charge of the topographic department.

A bridge equipage of trestles for crossing a river from one to two hundred feet wide, together with a skiff, anchors, cordage, beams, timbers, carpenters' tools, combustibles, torches, scaling ladders to storm a place; rockets to direct the columns during the night, or to serve as signal on a day of battle, engagement, crossing a river, &c. &c. :—

A company of bakers.

One of butchers.

One of swimmers.

Commissaries.

Inspector and sub-inspector of musters.

Commandant of artillery.

Commandant of engineers.

Wagon equipages for the carriage of provisions.

Administrations of posts, bread, liquors, and forage.

Officers of health, physicians, compounders of drugs.—The surgeons shall follow everywhere either in voursches or on horseback.

A company of grenadiers to guard head-quarters, and a detachment of a hundred foot soldiers to be alternately on duty with the baggage, wagons, administration of posts, &c., and to supply sentries for the post, the inspectors and sub-inspectors of musters, the commissaries, the paymasters, &c.



## COMPOSITION OF A DIVISION IN INFANTRY, CAVALRY, AND ARTILLERY.

Four regiments of the line, forming two brigades.

One regiment of light infantry, employed in the vanguard.

Four regiments of cavalry, chasseurs, dragoons, or cuirassiers.

One regiment of chasseurs or hussars, employed in the vanguard.

Two companies of light artillery, detached among the infantry brigades; and a half battery for the vanguard.

Eight pieces of heavy artillery, twelve and eight pounders, and six or eight inch howitzers.

A park of reserve, with the necessary ammunition, containing cartridges for infantry and cavalry, besides those required for the light and heavy artillery.\*

The grenadiers of the whole division may be united so as to form the reserve of the division, to which may be attached the heavy cavalry and artillery.

It is necessary that the park of artillery should be provided with grenades, and the grenadiers exercised in using them, for the storming of a work, a fort, a garrisoned place, &c.

In order to form the staff officers, an adjutant-commandant shall have the command of the vanguard. He shall be relieved once a month by another, and successively by the field-officers of the line.

The other divisions shall be, as much as possible, of the same composition as the above.

It shall be commanded by the chief of the staff of the army, a general officer, one or more colonels of regiments of the line, chefs-de-bataillon, and chefs-d'escadron, who shall alternately be officer of the day to superintend the execution of orders with regard to the service of the advanced posts, the camp, the police, the night rounds, &c.

## ON ENCAMPMENTS.

The regiments of infantry distributed in the different brigades which are to compose the division, or those composing several divisions of the army assembled in a single position, shall be placed in the order of their numbers one, two, three, and four, from right to left, unless particular reasons should prevent this arrangement, which, however, is strictly to be followed if the ground admits of doing so, in order to efface any impression of preference, and prevent jealousy. The French armies are too tenacious of the point of honour to render it prudent in any general officer to grant distinctions to such or such regiments.

The light infantry shall be invariably placed in front of the line, on the flanks, and sometimes in the rear of the camp.

\* This organization must depend upon the country in which the war is carried on, the troops opposed to you, the resources at your disposal, and the object in view. In other respects the proportions are excellent.

The cavalry, in the rear and upon the flanks of the line of encampment.

The light cavalry with the vanguards.

The light artillery in front and upon the wings of the line of encampment.

The heavy artillery, in the intervals between the brigades, and in reserve behind the line.

The reserve behind the line, where shall be assembled the park of artillery, the provision wagons, the baggage, &c.

The baraqucs or huts, whether built of boards or of straw, shall be placed in lines of two or three ranks. The distance prescribed between each and between the different battalions and regiments, for the purpose of preventing fire, shall be strictly observed. The same shall hold good with regard to the cavalry and the artillery. The area of the camp shall be marked by stakes driven into the ground, as shall likewise the communications with the vanguard, the detached posts, body of reserve, place for distributing rations, headquarters, &c. &c.

The fasces of arms shall be formed fifteen feet in front of the flag of the line of huts. The muskets shall occupy the development of the platoons to which they belong; the cartouches and sabres shall be sheltered as much as possible from the damp and the rain, by means of sheds made of boards, or covered with thatch.

The colours and drums, shall be placed in the centre of the firelocks of their respective battalions.

Each infantry regiment shall have, on the right and left of its front, a pole, at the end of which shall be nailed a board with the number of the regiment inscribed.

The colonel shall have, near his hut, a similar pole showing his name.

The cavalry shall be cantoned, if the locality allows it, but always near the camp. In the contrary case, the horses shall be picketed in two ranks, and the men have their huts in the rear of them. The front and rear shall be kept clear in order to facilitate the falling in. For this purpose openings shall be left between the squadrons.

The colonels of cavalry shall, as well for their regiments as for themselves, adopt the method of poles showing the numbers of the regiments and the names of the colonels, as prescribed for the infantry.

The artillery shall follow in every respect the same arrangements that are prescribed for the infantry and cavalry; so also shall the vanguard and the reserve.

The guards shall be so stationed as to maintain tranquillity, watchfulness, order, and cleanliness in the camp.

The fires for cooking shall be placed according to the sinuosity of the ground, either in front or in the rear of the line of encampment.

The privies upon the flanks.

## SERVICE OF THE CAMP.

The drums shall beat the reveillé from two till three in the morning; at four the troop or assembly, when the men shall take their arms, form in front of the colour, and be ready to execute any movement which circumstances may require. In the event of a manœuvre, the guards of the camp and the police guards shall receive notice to remain at their respective posts. They shall prevent any stranger from entering the camp. But if the troops do not manœuvre, they shall be dismissed at broad day-light, after having been inspected.

The trumpeters shall sound the *boute-selle*, or "to horse," immediately after the beating of the reveillé. The horses shall be saddled and prepared, at four the bridles shall be put on, and the cavalry regiments shall, in the greatest silence, fall in on the spot indicated for that purpose. The colonels shall order the captains to have the rolls called, and if at broad day-light there is no manœuvre to be performed, the squadrons shall return to the camp in the same order, after the inspection of clothing, accoutrements, harness, and arms.

The heavy artillery shall put the horses to the pieces at the same time as the cavalry mount, and the gunners shall be ready to march.

The light artillery shall mount, and the horses be harnessed to the pieces.

All these arrangements shall be equally applicable to the rear-guard, the wagons, the baggage, and all, in short, belonging to a *corps-d'armée*.

The van-guard shall have its duty diminished during the day, in order to be more active and alert during the night. As soon as the day closes, the *videttes* shall be doubled. A service of patrols shall be established in such a manner, that there shall always be some on duty. If there are different outlets to guard, leading to the principal post, they shall be barricaded with ladders, felled trees, or wagons without wheels, and be further guarded by squads of infantry. The cavalry shall guard the advanced posts during the day, and occupy the most advanced positions in the neighbourhood. At nightfall they shall withdraw to a good distance in the rear of the infantry, and only four or five cavalry orderlies shall remain at the principal post of infantry, to carry to the commandant of the camp intelligence of any attack that may be made upon the van-guard. At daybreak, the cavalry shall scour the country according to the orders it may receive, and the infantry remain under arms till its return. It is very necessary that a detachment of cavalry of the new guard should, in reconnoitring, accompany the one relieved, in order to become acquainted with the localities and with the inequalities of the ground.

The order of the day shall be given out after parade, or in the morning immediately after the inspection.



The generals and staff-officers shall proceed to the camp at four in the morning, when the troops fall in. They shall remain until the return of the reconnoitring parties.

The service of the camp and of the advanced posts shall begin at the reveillé. The posts shall remain doubled, until the return of the reconnoitring parties sent in the direction of the enemy, and if there is nothing new, the relieved guards shall return to the camp.

If the troops in the camp are to march against the enemy, the colonels of regiments, and even the officers and non-commissioned officers, shall write in their pocket-books the principal dispositions for the attack which they will have to operate; for it is not indifferent to an officer anxious to do his duty properly, to know the right, the centre, and the left of the brigades or divisions of the camp with which he will have to act, and more especially the hospitals for the wounded, the places where the rations are to be distributed, and lastly, the point on which the reserve park of artillery will be stationed during the skirmish, engagement, or battle.

The report of the officers of the day, shall be addressed to the chief of the staff of their division, who shall forward it to the general staff.

The firelocks shall be drawn as soon as the advanced guards have returned to the camp. The adjutant-major of each battalion shall assemble, for this purpose, the men just come off guard, and shall receive back the ball-cartridges. Each soldier shall be furnished with a pricker to clear the touch-hole of his piece, two flints garnished with sheet-lead, and placed in reserve in the pocket of the cartouche, a cloth to wipe the pan, and a small phial of oil to keep the lock in order.

The cavalry soldiers, besides being provided with these articles, as necessary to the carbine as to the musket, shall each have a small hatchet in the left holster, instead of a second pistol. This hatchet consists of a hammer and a blade in the shape of a half moon, formed of a single piece of metal. At the bottom of the handle, there shall be a screw-ring to enable the rider to fasten his horse to a tree, &c. This screw shall be fixed inside the handle by means of a matrice formed therein.

Colonels of infantry and cavalry may, on days of rest, have the different classes of recruits drilled, and the infantry exercised in the drill of platoons and battalions, the cavalry in that of squadrons. The officers and non-commissioned officers shall be instructed at least twice a week, in the theory relating both to the manner of giving the word of command, and the execution of evolutions and grand manœuvres, and also in the military rules and the administration of military bodies. It is then that colonels well versed in the art of war shall examine them on points of knowledge necessary for the attack and defence of a fortified place, the attack and defence of a post, reconnoitring to be effected in an open or wooded country, and lastly, on

the different occurrences in war in which the duties of officers are so important.

The cavalry officers and non-commissioned officers shall be instructed in the theory of their own arm. The cavalry shall take care during the war to have two horses in each squadron with pack-saddles, to which shall be fastened two baskets lined with strong leather, containing a stock of cartridges for the carbines, muskets, or other firelocks; also spare flints, and worms for drawing charges.

The guard-rooms shall be established at the advanced posts, and the men guilty of breach of discipline shall be sent thither. These shall have no huts, and shall receive nothing but dry bread, with the exception of soup twice a week.

The code of penalties and military crimes shall be read every Sunday at the head of each company.

The retreat shall be beat at specified hours; the band shall play an hour beforehand in front of the fasces of arms, the colours and the drums, and in the centre of the battalions.

The roll shall be called immediately after the tattoo, and the fires shall be extinguished at tattoo at eight or nine o'clock at night; or at ten o'clock, when soup is to be served out, &c. In the cavalry, the rolls shall be called four times a day: in the morning when the men mount their horses, at noon at two o'clock, and in the evening before the horses are dressed. The same regulations apply to the infantry, to whom, also, every regulation relating to the service and to the police is likewise applicable. The cavalry shall have, if possible, pickets with iron points, to picket the horses in camp or at bivouac. But the laxity of discipline during actual service is the cause that this article, so necessary to cavalry soldiers, is seldom observed longer than a few months, because it is inconvenient to the men when in the ranks.

The soldiers shall be exercised in making fascines, saucissons, gabions, and in constructing works necessary in a campaign, such as intrenchments, redoubts, &c. The officers shall endeavour to acquire skill in directing these works, in order to be able to intrench themselves with detachments, in case of need, for the defence of a post, or a wood, or a village, or a defile, a bridge, a river, a ford, &c. The sentries and videttes shall be accustomed to place themselves at night in holes which they shall dig. This plan, besides sheltering them from surprise, enables them to hear at an immense distance the approach of any one, by listening from time to time with the head reclining in the excavation.

Both infantry and cavalry shall supply night pickets, who, every evening before the tattoo, shall assemble behind the hut of each colonel, to be employed as circumstances may require.

The cavalry shall send patrols during the night along the great communications in the rear of the camp, and along those of the different head-quarters.

## DISTRIBUTION OF RATIONS.

The chief of the staff shall issue an order of the day, stating the arrangements relative to the distribution of rations, whether for two, three, or four days. When rations are to be distributed, each regiment shall send an armed detachment with the fatigue-men whose turn of duty it is, and also the adjutants and under officers. The corps shall be mentioned which in their turn take precedence in the distribution, consisting of bread, meat, rice, salt, dry vegetables, brandy, wine, vinegar, forage, straw, oats, &c. Water shall also be sent for in a regular manner; the fountains, springs, wells, and brooks in the neighbourhood of the camp shall be guarded by posts of infantry.

The cavalry shall proceed to the distributions in the same order as the infantry, and shall have, to water their horses, a place different from that resorted to for water by the infantry, and which shall be guarded by a mounted vidette.

The staff officers shall be directed to be present, by turns, at the issues, for the purpose of preserving good order there, and examining the quality of the bread, meat, forage, liquids, &c. Articles of bad quality, spoilt or unwholesome, shall not be paid for to the contractor, provided there be a procès-verbal requiring that they shall be burnt. The receipts of the adjutants and quarter-master sergeants shall be given to the storekeeper in the presence of the quarter-master general and the commissary-general, both of whom are to be present at the distributions.

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ON THE MARCH OF A CORPS-D'ARMÉE, A DIVISION, A BRIGADE, A RECONNOITRING PARTY, A PATROLE, &c.

A body of troops shall never leave the camp except on a formal order of the general in command, and in the presence of the staff or other officer appointed to carry the order into execution, after having examined the instructions for the direction of the march and the nature of the enterprise. If the expedition is not a secret one, it is necessary that the commander of the detachment should read the instructions, and make, in case of need, such reflections and observations upon them as he may think proper, and which the staff-officer shall report to his general, if he be not attached to the expedition, in which case he shall forward them by a cavalry orderly.

When a corps-d'armée is preparing for a movement, either for offensive operations, or to effect a retreat, the men shall fall in without the least noise, an hour before the march. The generals of brigade shall march at the head of their respective columns, and the staff-officers, before the troops engage, on the flanks and in the rear, in order that the officers of regiments may remain in their places of



battle, and that the distances may be well observed without allowing the depth of each column to lengthen out. Each regiment of infantry and of cavalry shall form a rear-guard, commanded by officers of firmness, and notoriously devoted to military discipline. This guard is to prevent the number of stragglers from being too great, and oblige the men to keep to their ranks. The soldiers under arrest, in confinement, or in the guard-house, shall march at the head of the battalions to which they belong, with their coats turned, their muskets slung reversed on their backs, without bayonet, or sabre, or cartridges. They may be made to engage with the tirailleurs; so soon as the action begins, ammunition and bayonets may be given out to them. After the action they shall return to the guard-house, unless their colonel forgives their fault on account of their good conduct during the action. The men thus in confinement shall be forced to perform all the drudgery of the camp, field works, &c.

The van-guard shall proceed with all the precautions necessary to insure a march, and discover by its flankers the situation of the enemy. It shall open its march with a squadron of light cavalry, a company of carabineers, an eight-pounder or a four-pounder; a battalion of light infantry, three squadrons of light cavalry upon the flanks of this battalion of light infantry, behind which shall be two pieces of artillery: a howitzer and an eight-pounder, or a four-pounder, and a subdivision of sappers. The remainder of the infantry shall follow with the remaining artillery, and the march shall be closed up by the cavalry. The piece of cannon at the head of the column shall be fired as rapidly as possible the moment the enemy is perceived in force, in order to give notice to the corps-d'armée. A staff-officer shall be immediately despatched to the general in command, to report on what has been perceived of the enemy's force, position, or motions.

The corps-d'armée shall march, so far as the nature of the ground will admit of it, by platoons or divisions, at half distances, and even in columns of half-battalions or battalions, if the country should become more open, and when the position which the army is to occupy by a rapid attack requires that it should form into line of battle with great celerity. The cavalry stationed in the several divisions shall march on the roads upon the flanks and in sections, or by fours. The battalions shall maintain a distance of twenty toises from each other, the regiments a distance of sixty toises, and the brigades a distance of a hundred and twenty toises. But, to insure precision in this arrangement, staff-officers, or adjutants-major from the infantry regiments, and intelligent orderlies on horseback, shall be stationed so as to prevent the columns from becoming encumbered, or from stopping during the march. If the enemy is far off, there shall be a general halt of half an hour after every two hours of march. If it be a forced march, it shall continue four hours, and then a halt of an hour for refreshment.

It is necessary to accustom a number of non-commissioned officers, placed along the whole depth of the column, on the pivot flank, to repeat the word of command "halt," from the head to the rear, if the column is to stop, and the march is by files, sections, platoons, or divisions; also the word "march" after the halt, when the command to resume the march is given, &c. This very simple measure is of the greatest importance.

The drummers and fifers shall, during the march, be distributed at the head of their respective battalions. A number of them, fixed by the drum-major or by the corporal-drummer, shall execute different beats accompanied by the fifes. By day only, and when the enemy is far off, the bands shall remain at the head of their respective regiments, and shall play, from time to time, different warlike airs. The cavalry trumpets shall play flourishes; the march shall be commanded by sound of trumpet, and the sounding of a call shall suffice to stop the column. The march shall be resumed, whenever it can be so managed, only after the men have had their soup.

The greatest order shall exist in the march of the baggage and the provision wagons, which shall be guarded by a detachment of infantry and cavalry, taken either from the reserves of the different divisions, or from the army in general. The guard of head-quarters, the commissariat, the gendarmerie, the sutlers, &c. shall follow in the order laid down by the commander-in-chief.

The park of artillery, the bridge equipages, and the other implements of war, shall always remain with the reserve, to which also shall be attached the surgeons and the moveable hospitals.

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GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE TO THE MARCH OF ONE OR  
MORE DIVISIONS OF A CORPS-D'ARMEE.

Order of march for the . . . . .

The division of the general commanding the van-guard, or the brigade forming the van-guard, or in fine the flankers, shall quit the position of . . . . . at two o'clock in the morning precisely, with arms and baggage. It shall march with the right (or the left) in front, secure its march and its flanks, maintain the greatest order in its movement, and proceed to the camp, place, position, &c. of . . . . . fixed upon and staked off by the engineer and staff-officers, in pursuance of instructions to this effect. It shall place its right . . . . . (after having established its advanced posts in a line with . . . . .) on the village behind the . . . . . brook, its centre upon the heights of . . . . ., and its left shall extend to the forest of . . . . ., whose outlets and skirts it shall guard. Its reserve, park of artillery, and baggage, shall be stationed in the rear of the village, at the river or wood of . . . . ., and the head-quarters of the division shall be established at . . . . .

The first, second, third, or fourth division shall quit its camp and

## COMPOSITION OF A DIVISION IN INFANTRY, CAVALRY, AND ARTILLERY.

Four regiments of the line, forming two brigades.

One regiment of light infantry, employed in the vanguard.

Four regiments of cavalry, chasseurs, dragoons, or cuirassiers.

One regiment of chasseurs or hussars, employed in the vanguard.

Two companies of light artillery, detached among the infantry brigades; and a half battery for the vanguard.

Eight pieces of heavy artillery, twelve and eight pounders, and six or eight inch howitzers.

A park of reserve, with the necessary ammunition, containing cartridges for infantry and cavalry, besides those required for the light and heavy artillery.\*

The grenadiers of the whole division may be united so as to form the reserve of the division, to which may be attached the heavy cavalry and artillery.

It is necessary that the park of artillery should be provided with grenades, and the grenadiers exercised in using them, for the storming of a work, a fort, a garrisoned place, &c.

In order to form the staff officers, an adjutant-commandant shall have the command of the vanguard. He shall be relieved once a month by another, and successively by the field-officers of the line.

The other divisions shall be, as much as possible, of the same composition as the above.

It shall be commanded by the chief of the staff of the army, a general officer, one or more colonels of regiments of the line, chefs-de-bataillon, and chefs-d'escadron, who shall alternately be officer of the day to superintend the execution of orders with regard to the service of the advanced posts, the camp, the police, the night rounds, &c.

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 ON ENCAMPMENTS.

The regiments of infantry distributed in the different brigades which are to compose the division, or those composing several divisions of the army assembled in a single position, shall be placed in the order of their numbers one, two, three, and four, from right to left, unless particular reasons should prevent this arrangement, which, however, is strictly to be followed if the ground admits of doing so, in order to efface any impression of preference, and prevent jealousy. The French armies are too tenacious of the point of honour to render it prudent in any general officer to grant distinctions to such or such regiments.

The light infantry shall be invariably placed in front of the line, on the flanks, and sometimes in the rear of the camp.

\* This organization must depend upon the country in which the war is carried on, the troops opposed to you, the resources at your disposal, and the object in view. In other respects the proportions are excellent.



The cavalry, in the rear and upon the flanks of the line of encampment.

The light cavalry with the vanguards.

The light artillery in front and upon the wings of the line of encampment.

The heavy artillery, in the intervals between the brigades, and in reserve behind the line.

The reserve behind the line, where shall be assembled the park of artillery, the provision wagons, the baggage, &c.

The baraques or huts, whether built of boards or of straw, shall be placed in lines of two or three ranks. The distance prescribed between each and between the different battalions and regiments, for the purpose of preventing fire, shall be strictly observed. The same shall hold good with regard to the cavalry and the artillery. The area of the camp shall be marked by stakes driven into the ground, as shall likewise the communications with the vanguard, the detached posts, body of reserve, place for distributing rations, headquarters, &c. &c.

The fascos of arms shall be formed fifteen feet in front of the flag of the line of huts. The muskets shall occupy the development of the platoons to which they belong; the cartouches and sabres shall be sheltered as much as possible from the damp and the rain, by means of sheds made of boards, or covered with thatch.

The colours and drums, shall be placed in the centre of the fire-locks of their respective battalions.

Each infantry regiment shall have, on the right and left of its front, a pole, at the end of which shall be nailed a board with the number of the regiment inscribed.

The colonel shall have, near his hut, a similar pole showing his name.

The cavalry shall be cantoned, if the locality allows it, but always near the camp. In the contrary case, the horses shall be picketed in two ranks, and the men have their huts in the rear of them. The front and rear shall be kept clear in order to facilitate the falling in. For this purpose openings shall be left between the squadrons.

The colonels of cavalry shall, as well for their regiments as for themselves, adopt the method of poles showing the numbers of the regiments and the names of the colonels, as prescribed for the infantry.

The artillery shall follow in every respect the same arrangements that are prescribed for the infantry and cavalry; so also shall the vanguard and the reserve.

The guards shall be so stationed as to maintain tranquillity, watchfulness, order, and cleanliness in the camp.

The fires for cooking shall be placed according to the sinuosity of the ground, either in front or in the rear of the line of encampment.

The privies upon the flanks.

## SERVICE OF THE CAMP.

The drums shall beat the reveillé from two till three in the morning; at four the troop or assembly, when the men shall take their arms, form in front of the colour, and be ready to execute any movement which circumstances may require. In the event of a manœuvre, the guards of the camp and the police guards shall receive notice to remain at their respective posts. They shall prevent any stranger from entering the camp. But if the troops do not manœuvre, they shall be dismissed at broad day-light, after having been inspected.

The trumpeters shall sound the *boute-selle*, or "to horse," immediately after the beating of the reveillé. The horses shall be saddled and prepared, at four the bridles shall be put on, and the cavalry regiments shall, in the greatest silence, fall in on the spot indicated for that purpose. The colonels shall order the captains to have the rolls called, and if at broad day-light there is no manœuvre to be performed, the squadrons shall return to the camp in the same order, after the inspection of clothing, accoutrements, harness, and arms.

The heavy artillery shall put the horses to the pieces at the same time as the cavalry mount, and the gunners shall be ready to march.

The light artillery shall mount, and the horses be harnessed to the pieces.

All these arrangements shall be equally applicable to the rear-guard, the wagons, the baggage, and all, in short, belonging to a *corps-d'armée*.

The van-guard shall have its duty diminished during the day, in order to be more active and alert during the night. As soon as the day closes, the *videttes* shall be doubled. A service of patrols shall be established in such a manner, that there shall always be some on duty. If there are different outlets to guard, leading to the principal post, they shall be barricaded with ladders, felled trees, or wagons without wheels, and be further guarded by squads of infantry. The cavalry shall guard the advanced posts during the day, and occupy the most advanced positions in the neighbourhood. At nightfall they shall withdraw to a good distance in the rear of the infantry, and only four or five cavalry orderlies shall remain at the principal post of infantry, to carry to the commandant of the camp intelligence of any attack that may be made upon the van-guard. At daybreak, the cavalry shall scour the country according to the orders it may receive, and the infantry remain under arms till its return. It is very necessary that a detachment of cavalry of the new guard should, in reconnoitring, accompany the one relieved, in order to become acquainted with the localities and with the inequalities of the ground.

The order of the day shall be given out after parade, or in the morning immediately after the inspection.

The generals and staff-officers shall proceed to the camp at four in the morning, when the troops fall in. They shall remain until the return of the reconnoitring parties.

The service of the camp and of the advanced posts shall begin at the reveillé. The posts shall remain doubled, until the return of the reconnoitring parties sent in the direction of the enemy, and if there is nothing new, the relieved guards shall return to the camp.

If the troops in the camp are to march against the enemy, the colonels of regiments, and even the officers and non-commissioned officers, shall write in their pocket-books the principal dispositions for the attack which they will have to operate; for it is not indifferent to an officer anxious to do his duty properly, to know the right, the centre, and the left of the brigades or divisions of the camp with which he will have to act, and more especially the hospitals for the wounded, the places where the rations are to be distributed, and lastly, the point on which the reserve park of artillery will be stationed during the skirmish, engagement, or battle.

The report of the officers of the day, shall be addressed to the chief of the staff of their division, who shall forward it to the general staff.

The firelocks shall be drawn as soon as the advanced guards have returned to the camp. The adjutant-major of each battalion shall assemble, for this purpose, the men just come off guard, and shall receive back the ball-cartridges. Each soldier shall be furnished with a pricker to clear the touch-hole of his piece, two flints garnished with sheet-lead, and placed in reserve in the pocket of the cartouche, a cloth to wipe the pan, and a small phial of oil to keep the lock in order.

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battle, and that the distances may be well observed without allowing the depth of each column to lengthen out. Each regiment of infantry and of cavalry shall form a rear-guard, commanded by officers of firmness, and notoriously devoted to military discipline. This guard is to prevent the number of stragglers from being too great, and oblige the men to keep to their ranks. The soldiers under arrest, in confinement, or in the guard-house, shall march at the head of the battalions to which they belong, with their coats turned, their muskets slung reversed on their backs, without bayonet, or sabre, or cartridges. They may be made to engage with the tirailleurs; so soon as the action begins, ammunition and bayonets may be given out to them. After the action they shall return to the guard-house, unless their colonel forgives their fault on account of their good conduct during the action. The men thus in confinement shall be forced to perform all the drudgery of the camp, field works, &c.

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#### GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE TO THE MARCH OF ONE OR MORE DIVISIONS OF A CORPS-D'ARMEE.

##### Order of march for the . . . . .

The division of the general commanding the van-guard, or the brigade forming the van-guard, or in fine the flankers, shall quit the position of . . . . . at two o'clock in the morning precisely, with arms and baggage. It shall march with the right (or the left) in front, secure its march and its flanks, maintain the greatest order in its movement, and proceed to the camp, place, position, &c. of . . . . . fixed upon and staked off by the engineer and staff-officers, in pursuance of instructions to this effect. It shall place its right . . . . . (after having established its advanced posts in a line with . . . . .) on the village behind the . . . . . brook, its centre upon the heights of . . . . ., and its left shall extend to the forest of . . . . ., whose outlets and skirts it shall guard. Its reserve, park of artillery, and baggage, shall be stationed in the rear of the village, at the river or wood of . . . . ., and the head-quarters of the division shall be established at . . . . .

The first, second, third, or fourth division shall quit its camp and

that it prevents the line from charging rapidly with the bayonet. There are but few instances to be cited during the last war, in which direct firing, according to this system, has been executed with any great success. This circumstance alone would militate against its practice. What matters the period at which the soldiers were first accustomed to execute a dangerous movement? If its execution is disadvantageous in war, there ought to be no hesitation in rejecting the practice.

It has been remarked that when, in dangerous situations, the soldiers have been obliged to kneel, there has been some difficulty in making them rise during the enemy's fire, because they were in some measure sheltered from it; for the most even ground has always some slight inequalities which shelter a man in such a position.

The firing of two ranks, or file firing, is, with the exception of a very few movements, absolutely the only kind of firing which offers much greater advantages to the infantry than those above-mentioned. The third rank, during this firing, exchange their loaded pieces with the discharged pieces of the second rank; but this exchange is made with repugnance, and the men of the second rank fire with much less confidence the pieces which have not been loaded by themselves.

Most infantry officers must have remarked the almost insurmountable difficulty they find in stopping file-firing during battle, after it has once begun, especially when the enemy is well within shot; and this firing, in spite of the command given by the field-officers, resembles general discharges. It would be better, therefore, after the two first ranks have fired, to charge boldly with the bayonet, and by an act of vigour force the enemy to retreat.

The German soldier, formed by the severest discipline, is cooler than any other. Under such circumstances he would, in the end, obtain the advantage in this kind of firing, if it lasted long.

This imperfection disappears when the firing is confined to the two first ranks, the third porting arms and remaining as a reserve to be used according to circumstances. It has, moreover, been proved that the best drilled infantry in firing is not, on that account, the best in battle. Ammunition always fails in the end, and this diminishes the men's confidence; each then finds some excuse, either in the condition of his firelock, or even in his own impatience and vivacity, for hastening his retreat, unless the movement becomes offensive.

These observations are of a nature to urge colonels of infantry regiments to prepare and drill their men to attacks by main strength, so peculiarly adapted to the vivacity and temperament which distinguish the French soldier from that of other nations.

After the two first ranks have fired, the third, having reserved its fire, will increase the disorder in the enemy's ranks if they be broken. This rank may be employed with the same success in

protecting the retreat of the line, should unforeseen events render a retrograde movement necessary. This reserve, so essential, offers an infinity of resources of which the commander may avail himself whenever circumstances require it.

The firing of infantry, of whatever nature it may be, offers real advantages only when troops are acting on the defensive.

A country covered with wood, intersected with hedges, ditches, defiles difficult of access, rivers, marshes, fords, and bridges, is favourable to this kind of warfare; for such natural obstacles may be strengthened by redoubts, intrenchments, felled trees, and other field works.

The defensive system is ill calculated for the French soldier, unless his excitement be kept up by diversions and successive excursions. In a word, if the lesser kind of warfare be not constantly carried on, idleness destroys the strength of a body of troops acting merely on the defensive. It is constantly in danger of being surprised day and night; whereas expeditions prudently combined, raise the courage of the men, and prevent them from penetrating the real cause of their dangerous situation.

In offensive warfare, the French soldier has inexhaustible resources; his active genius, and his bravery in storming, double his energy, and a French commander ought never to hesitate in marching against the enemy with the bayonet, if the ground is at all adapted to a charge in line with one or more battalions at a time.

It is by attacking that the French soldier is formed to all kinds of warfare, whether when he braves the fire of the enemy, which is seldom very destructive, or when the field is left open to his intelligence and boldness.

One of the greatest difficulties in war is to have the men inured to marching. The other nations of Europe will with difficulty reach the same perfection in this respect as the French, whose abstemiousness and physical temperament are powerful causes which, in this kind of fatigue, have given them such immense superiority over the Austrians.

The rapidity of a march, or rather skilful marches, almost always determine the success of a war. Thus, colonels of infantry ought to neglect nothing to obtain progressive perfection in ordinary and forced marches. To accomplish this object so essential in war, it is necessary to oblige the men to carry their knapsacks from the very opening of the campaign, and also to accustom them to the works attendant upon military operations. The health of the soldiers depends upon this; it will also effect a considerable saving of men who are lost in partial actions, and also prove a great saving in hospital expenses.

It is this power of marching which constitutes the strength of infantry; and enterprises which seem to present the greatest difficulties become comparatively easy by the advantages accruing from rapid marches.



SOME REFLECTIONS UPON MOVEMENTS OF INFANTRY AND OTHER  
POINTS OF WARFARE.

Most of the infantry manœuvres executed in time of peace are not used in war; those easiest to be understood ought to form the basis of manœuvring, and their execution should be rigorously enforced. The superfluous must be rejected without hesitation, and the leisure of winter quarters, now spent in teaching useless evolutions, which the troops will scarcely ever have occasion to perform even in the course of numerous campaigns, be devoted to instructing the infantry officers and non-commissioned officers. They should be taught the system of attacking and defending fortified places; they should be exercised in the erection of military field works, in attacking and defending a post, in military reconnoitering, &c.; and lastly the coup-d'œil must be exercised in the choice of positions and encampments, whether for offensive or defensive operations.

It is admitted by all military men that infantry is the great lever of war, and that the artillery and cavalry are only indispensable accessories. Care ought therefore to be taken that the officers and non-commissioned officers of infantry should be as well informed as possible. The national genius discloses a vast field of resources for this object, and particularly at the present period when promotion is open to all.

The greatest powers of Europe have always shown the most particular and unremitting attention to the drilling and forming of their infantry, without considering the too great number of evolutions invented in time of peace, for the soldiers' torment, by officers often more systematic than experienced in war. Two essential conditions constitute the strength of infantry:—

That the men be good walkers and inured to fatigue.

That the firing be well executed.

The physical constitution, and the national composition of the French armies, fulfil the former most advantageously; the vivacity and intelligence of the soldiers ensure the success of the latter.

The following evolutions, to which the infantry ought to be restricted, both in time of peace and of war, would, I imagine, meet the views of government and the real end of the institution of infantry.

## EVOLUTIONS IN LINE.

## First part.

Formation of a regiment in line of battle. (The places of the officers and non-commissioned officers in the ranks, and in close order.)

Open and close the ranks.

The manual exercise.

The command and execution of the different firings.

Break and form by files, sections, platoons, and divisions.

Form a line into close column.

Deploy into line.

### Second part.

March in order of battle, in close column, and in column of route.

Oblique and diagonal march.

Change of front and of direction.

Passage of defile by wings or centre, either in front, or in rear of the line.

Order in échelons.

Retreat in échiquier, or by alternate divisions.

Passage of lines.

Formations against cavalry. (Squares.)

The soldier's instruction in platoon and battalion ought to be founded upon these evolutions.

In order to facilitate their execution, it would be important, besides exercising the men in the marching step, the ordinary step, and the quick step, to exercise them also in running. This method would produce amazing celerity in the formation of the different columns, and also in the deployments. French soldiers are more calculated than those of any other nation to attain this perfection, which so well agrees with their intelligence.

I think, in summing up my reflections, that it would not be useless to advise colonels of infantry regiments to avoid, with the greatest care, a reverse at the opening of the campaign. The least check has more influence than is generally supposed upon the remaining operations of the campaign : it diminishes the confidence of the men, by raising mistrust of the commander's talents. The least success, on the contrary, impresses upon the troops, from the very beginning, that just military pride which doubles their strength, and serves as a presage of a series of brilliant feats.

Victory smiles in general only upon those who know how to command it by good preparations. It is seldom the effect of chance or of unexpected good luck, but the fruit and recompense culled by the experienced soldier whose discernment is supported by the resolution and boldness of his undertakings.

Irresolution in war is the most dangerous defect in a commander, more especially when the enemy is approaching. He must make up his mind without long deliberation, and above all things prevent French soldiers from giving way to their propensity to criticism. The most distinguished men in the career of arms have never ceased repeating this axiom : "Make your preparations for attack or defence *instantly* on the enemy's approach ; should you even be obliged to execute them with disadvantage, do not hesitate." The enemy, who is a good observer, would take advantage of your indecision. It is often better to come to a bad decision immediately, than to hesitate between several good ones ; for the bad one has always some favourable side by which success may be obtained. Moreover a vigilant

mind is never embarrassed by the presence of the enemy, which on the contrary will tend to facilitate the boldness of its conceptions.

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#### ON THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF INTRENCHMENTS.

There are three kinds of intrenchment used in war :

Redoubts, or closed works.

Continuous lines.

Detached works, open at their gorges.

Experience has convinced well-informed soldiers that redoubts, particularly those in the form of a quincunx, are to be preferred to all kinds of intrenchments ; they are indeed the only ones which suit the French, because they allow of offensive retaliations on the part of those who defend them, which is peculiarly adapted to the national character.

This species of intrenchment has been used with the greatest success, and has decided the fate of several celebrated battles ; for instance, those of Pultawa and Fontenoy. Frederick the Great held them in great estimation ; and they were very useful, during the last war, in the intrenched camp of the creek of Ham at Dusseldorf.

Intrenchments, or continuous lines, of which great use was made in the old wars, are adapted to absolutely defensive operations. They are open to the great inconvenience of spreading the means of defence along a considerable extent, and, consequently of being weak upon all points which the enemy may attack.

They offer moreover the great disadvantage of forcing an army to abandon them the instant any part of them is carried.

The British often use them, and were thus intrenched at the last battle which decided the fate of Egypt.

Detached works ought to be considered simple batteries only, for the employment of the artillery and of some troops. I think they ought not to be used except in the rear of redoubts, and for the establishment of fixed batteries and a part of the reserve. This species of intrenchment is seldom capable of being long defended.

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#### ON THE ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF AN INTRENCHED CAMP FORMED BY TWO LINES OF REDOUBTS, IN THE FORM OF A QUINCUNX.

##### 1st, the Defence.

To defend an intrenched camp, the troops must be divided into four bodies : one to be placed in the redoubts, two at a hundred and fifty toises behind them, and the fourth to form a reserve.

The redoubts shall be mounted with the necessary cannon. The light and heavy artillery shall be placed in the most advantageous position.

These arrangements being made, and the enemy having given the signal of attack, the redoubts, which are so many little fortresses



reciprocally protecting, though independent of, each other, will necessarily oblige the assailants to break their lines, as well to surround them as to prevent the double fire of their artillery and musketry. If some of the redoubts are carried, and the others sorely beset, then the light and heavy artillery must batter those in possession of the enemy, directing the whole of their fire against them. Now is the time for the second line to act : it must fall with impetuosity upon the broken enemy, weakened by the exertions they have already made, discouraged by their losses, and surprised that in attacking they become the attacked. This offensive return generally produces a great effect, and forces the enemy to make a retrograde movement. Should the attack of the second line not produce the effect anticipated, the reserve covers its retreat.

### 2nd, the Attack.

For the attack of an intrenched camp with two divisions of eight battalions each : the troops shall arrive in columns, and form into line out of the reach of the enemy's shot.

The first line, which is that of attack, shall detach about a company from each battalion as tirailleurs ; to these volunteers shall be added the sappers of the battalions and of the division, with hatchets, a few hoes, fascines, and light ladders.

The point of attack shall be either on the right or the left, and must embrace two salient redoubts, together with those defending them in the second line.

As soon as the troops are within half cannon range of the enemy, the tirailleurs shall advance at a run, and leap into the ditches of the works attacked, in order to cut the palisades and make openings through which they may penetrate into the interior. Meanwhile the line of attack shall advance in good order with the light artillery, which shall fire as it proceeds, and be protected by the heavy artillery which shall remain with the second division.

The tirailleurs must carry the redoubts attacked ; if they are not strong enough they shall be reinforced by a few companies of grenadiers. In no case must the line of attack be broken, in order that it may always be ready to face the enemy's second line and reserve.

The redoubts being taken, the line shall advance rapidly, porting arms ; it shall not fire until it is within twenty-five paces of the enemy, who shall then be instantly charged with fixed bayonets.

The cavalry must follow the division of attack, in order to be in a situation to take advantage of the victory when once the redoubts are taken and the enemy routed.

The second division shall deploy at the distance of cannon shot, feign an attack upon the left of the enemy's camp, and then advance, or protect the retreat, according as events may turn out.

ON THE ATTACK OF INTRENCHMENTS, OR CONTINUOUS LINES, BY ONE  
OR MORE DIVISIONS.

A division of four regiments, or eight battalions, charged to make the principal attack, shall form into line beyond the range of the cannon of the enemy's intrenchments which they are to storm. Every order for the details of the undertaking must be clear, precise, and laconic. The instant before the attack, the staff-officers having the direction of the columns shall ascertain whether all the officers clearly comprehend the instructions given, in order to avoid misconceptions, which are always dangerous and sometimes fatal to the success of combined operations. The general officer in command shall harangue the men in a manner suited to the occasion, and with that energy which characterizes a warrior.

All being ready, the signal of attack shall be made by three guns being fired, and the troops shall march to the enemy at the charge, and in the following order :—

The companions of tirailleurs of the eighth battalion, the command of which shall be intrusted to a field or a staff officer, shall cover the front of attack. The men shall be provided each with a hatchet besides his firelock, and when within musket shot they shall run as fast as possible into the ditches of the intrenchment, cut the palisades, tear away the fascines and gabions, and make openings.

An officer of engineers and the sappers of the army attached to this division shall march with the tirailleurs for the same purpose. So soon as the officer shall have reconnoitred the situation of the enemy's intrenchments, he shall dispatch a non-commissioned officer, or proceed himself in all haste to make his report, in order that, if circumstances require it, the plan of attack may be changed.

The sappers of the four regiments of infantry shall be divided into four equal bodies :

The first shall open the march of the two companies of grenadiers formed in column of platoons in front of the first battalion of the first regiment, at a hundred and fifty toises in the rear of the tirailleurs, and a hundred and fifty toises in advance of the column.

The second shall be at the head of the two companies of grenadiers, also in column of platoons, first battalion, second regiment, right brigade.

The third shall be at the head of the two companies of grenadiers, first battalion, third regiment, left brigade.

The uneven battalions shall be formed in column of platoons, the right in front. They shall follow the movement of the grenadiers, observing the prescribed distance of a hundred and fifty toises, until the moment the grenadiers arrive within fifty toises of the intrenchment. Then the double quick step to close up and give impetus to the storming.

The men of the battalions in column, and also the grenadiers,

shall each carry if necessary a fascine under his left arm, to fill up the ditches and be enabled to pass with greater ease the impediments which the enemy may oppose to their attack.

The even battalions shall march in line, carrying arms, at three hundred toises from the four columns of attack. The interval occasioned by this distance shall be filled by a squadron of light cavalry.

The light artillery shall be placed upon the two exterior flanks of the columns of attack of the first and fourth regiments, on a level with the companies of grenadiers, whose movements it shall follow within one hundred and fifty toises of the enemy's entrenchments.

The remainder of the cavalry and of the artillery of the line shall form a reserve, and march in the second line three hundred toises in the rear of the even battalions, in order to be employed as circumstances may require.

An officer of engineers, or of the staff, shall be attached to each column of attack.

After the entrenchments are carried, the tirailleurs shall pursue the routed enemy, and clear the interior flanks of their works.

The sappers of the division and those of the regiments shall fill up the ditches, and make openings for the passage of cavalry, at the places pointed out by the officers of engineers or staff officers attached to the columns of attack. The grenadiers shall remain within the entrenchments.

So soon as the columns of attack have passed the entrenchments, they shall form as a first line, one hundred and fifty toises in advance of the grenadiers.

The even battalions shall pass by platoons, right in front, through the intervals of the first line, then form into line, and charge bayonets on the enemy's reserve, should it still resist. They shall be preceded by tirailleurs.

The eight companies of grenadiers shall form the reserve, and march one hundred and fifty toises in their rear.

The light artillery and the cavalry shall march on the flanks of the even battalions, now become the first line, constantly developing the enemy's wings; and the light cavalry shall charge as tirailleurs whenever a favourable opportunity offers.

If, upon one of the flanks of the principal attack, the ground presents advantages sufficient, several pieces of artillery of the line shall be united to silence the enemy's fire and protect the attack made by the columns.

Should the enemy's entrenchments present a greater development than the front of attack of one division, the second division shall dispose its forces in the same manner, and the third shall march in line of battle in the rear of the centre of the two first, in order to support and protect the attempt.

In the event of failure, the retreat shall be effected in the same order as the attack, until the troops reach the level of the first posi-



tion ; and if by a vastly superior force the enemy compelled a retrograde movement, the retreat should in such case, be effected en échiquier. In this predicament, the cavalry and light artillery should be employed on the flanks, and stationed according as circumstances might require.

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ON THE ATTACK OF DETACHED WORKS COVERED AT THEIR GORGES.

An army protected by a line of redans or detached works covered at their gorges, is to be attacked at daybreak.

The division of attack shall be formed into close columns of divisions, preceded by some companies of éclaireurs.

The columns of attack shall penetrate within the intervals of the redans, and break the enemy, who, being in line of battle, will be unable to resist the shock of the numerous columns by which they are surrounded. The second division shall follow the movement of the first in line of battle.



## APPENDIX.

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### HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS.

#### No. I.

#### FEDERAL ACT.

#### TITLE I.

#### GENERAL PROVISIONS.

#### ARTICLE I.

THE nineteen cantons of Switzerland, to wit :—Appenzell, Argau, Basle, Berne, Friburg, Glaris, Grisons, Lucerne, St. Gall, Schaffhausen, Schweitz, Soleure, Ticino, Thurgau, Underwalden, Uri, Vaud, Zug, and Zurich, are confederated together, conformably to the principles established in their respective constitutions. They reciprocally guarantee their constitutions, territory, liberty, and independence, both against the attacks of foreign powers, and against the usurpations of any particular canton or faction.

#### II.

The contingent in troops or money, which may become necessary for the execution of this guarantee, shall be supplied by each canton in the following proportions :

Of fifteen thousand two hundred and three men to be supplied, the contingents are thus regulated :

Berne .	.	.	.	2292
Zurich .	.	.	.	1929
Vaud .	.	.	.	1482
St. Gall	.	.	.	1315
Argau	.	.	.	1205
Grisons	.	.	.	1200
Ticino	.	.	.	902
Lucerne	.	.	.	867
Thurgau	.	.	.	835
Friburg	.	.	.	620
Appenzell	..	.	.	486



Soleure	.	.	.	452
Basle	.	.	.	409
Schweitz	.	.	.	301
Glaris	.	.	.	241
Schaffhausen	.	.	.	233
Underwalden	.	.	.	191
Zug	.	.	.	125
Uri	.	.	.	118

The sum of 490,507 Swiss livres shall be paid by the several cantons as follows :

Grisons	.	.	.	12,000 livres
Schweitz	.	.	.	3,012
Underwalden	.	.	.	1,907
Uri	.	.	.	1,184
Ticino	.	.	.	18,039
Appenzell	.	.	.	9,728
Glaris	.	.	.	4,825
Zug	.	.	.	2,492
St. Gall	.	.	.	39,451
Lucerne	.	.	.	26,016
Thurgau	.	.	.	25,052
Friburg	.	.	.	18,591
Berne	.	.	.	91,695
Zurich	.	.	.	77,153
Vaud	.	.	.	59,273
Argau	.	.	.	52,212
Soleure	.	.	.	18,097
Schaffhausen	.	.	.	9,327
Basle	.	.	.	20,450

### III.

There exist no longer in Switzerland, either subject countries, or privileges of place, birth, persons, or families.

### IV.

Each Swiss citizen has the faculty of removing his domicile from one canton to any other, there freely to exercise his industry. He acquires political rights conformably to the laws of the canton in which he resides ; but he cannot enjoy political rights in two cantons at the same time.

### V.

The ancient dues of *traite interieure* and *traite foraine* are abolished. The free circulation of produce, cattle, and goods, is guaranteed. No octroi dues, entrance dues, or transit or custom-house dues, can be established in the interior of Switzerland. The revenue arising from the custom-houses on the external limits shall belong to the cantons bordering upon foreign countries ; but the tariffs must be submitted to the approval of the diet.

## VI.

Each canton maintains the tolls applied to keeping in repair the highways, causeways, and banks of the rivers; but the tariffs also require the approval of the diet.

## VII.

The money coined in Switzerland shall have a uniform standard, fixed by the diet.

## VIII.

No canton shall give an asylum to a legally convicted criminal, or to an accused under legal prosecution.

## IX.

The number of paid troops which a canton may maintain, is limited to two hundred men.

## X.

All alliance between any two cantons, or between any single canton and a foreign power, is prohibited.

## XI.

The members of the government, or the legislative body of any canton, violating a decree of the diet, may be arraigned as rebels before a tribunal composed of the presidents of the criminal tribunals of all the other cantons.

## XII.

The cantons shall enjoy all the powers not specially delegated to the federal authority.

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TITLE II.

## DIRECTING CANTON.

## XIII.

The diet shall assemble by turns, and from one year to another, at Friburg, Berne, Soleure, Basle, Zurich, and Lucerne.

## XIV.

The cantons, of which these cities are the capitals, shall, in succession, become directing cantons. The year of the directorship begins on the 1st of January.

## XV.

The directing canton supplies the deputies of the diet with residences and a guard of honour; it also provides for the expense of the session.

## XVI.

The avoyer or burgomaster for the time being of the directing canton, joins to his title that of landamman of Switzerland. He

keeps the seal of the Helvetic republic, and cannot absent himself from the city. The great council of his canton grants him a fixed salary, and pays all the extraordinary expenses attached to his office.

## XVII.

Foreign ministers shall deliver their credentials, or their letters of recall, to the landamman of Switzerland, and shall apply to him in all negotiations. He is likewise the channel of every other diplomatic relation.

## XVIII.

At the opening of the diet he gives all the information he has received relative to such internal and external affairs as interest the confederation.

## XIX.

No canton shall, within its own territory, levy and put in motion more than five hundred militia-men, without having first given notice to the landamman of Switzerland.

## XX.

In the event of a revolt in the interior of a canton, or in any other case of extreme emergency, the landamman may make troops march from one canton to another; but only on the demand of either the greater or the lesser council of the canton requiring assistance, and after having taken the opinion of the lesser council of the directing canton, with the proviso of convoking the diet after the repression of hostilities, or if the danger should continue.

## XXI.

If, during the recess of the diet, differences should arise between two or more cantons, application is to be made to the landamman of Switzerland, who, according as circumstances are more or less pressing, shall either appoint arbitrators to conciliate such differences, or adjourn the matter to the nearest session of the diet.

## XXII.

The landamman of Switzerland admonishes the cantons, if their internal conduct should tend to interrupt the tranquillity of Switzerland, or if any thing occurs within their territory in violation either of the federal act, or of their individual constitutions. He may also direct a convocation of the great council, or of the lands-gemeinde in those places where the supreme authority is exercised by the people.

## XXIII.

The landamman of Switzerland sends, when requisite, inspectors to examine the highways, roads, and rivers, and orders the necessary repairs to be made to them; and, in case of necessity, he commands the immediate execution, and at the cost of those bound to pay it, of such works as are not begun or finished at the time prescribed.



## XXIV.

His signature gives authenticity and a national character to the acts to which it is affixed.

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TITLE III.

## THE DIET.

## XXV.

Each canton sends a deputy to the diet, to whom one or two counsel may be attached, to supply his place in the event of absence or illness.

## XXVI.

The deputies sent to the diet shall have limited powers, and shall not vote against their instructions.

## XXVII.

The landamman of Switzerland is, in virtue of his office, the deputy of the directing canton.

## XXVIII.

The nineteen deputies composing the diet shall have twenty-five votes in the deliberations.

The deputies of the cantons, whose population exceeds a hundred thousand inhabitants, to wit : those of Berne, Zurich, Vaud, St. Gall, Argau, and Grisons, shall have two votes.

The deputies of the cantons, whose population is less than a hundred thousand souls, to wit : those of Ticino, Lucerne, Thurgau, Friburg, Appenzell, Soleure, Basle, Schweitz, Glaris, Schaffhausen, Underwalden, Zug, and Uri, shall have only one vote each.

## XXIX.

The diet under the presidency of the landamman of Switzerland, shall meet on the first Monday in June, and its session shall not exceed the term of one month.

## XXX.

There may be extraordinary diets.

1st, on the demand of a neighbouring state, or of one or more of the cantons ;—should the demand be admitted by the great council of the directing canton, which, if it be in recess, shall be convoked to this effect.

2dly, On the advice of the great council, or of the lands-gemeinde of five cantons, who may think a demand well founded, which the directing canton may have rejected.

3dly, When they are convoked by the landamman of Switzerland.

## XXXI.

All declarations of war, and treaties of peace and alliance emanate

from the diet, but the consent of three-fourths of the cantons is necessary.

## XXXII.

The diet alone concludes treaties of commerce and military capitulations for foreign service. It authorizes the cantons, if necessary, to treat individually with any foreign power for other objects.

## XXXIII.

No recruiting for a foreign power, shall take place in any canton without the consent of the diet.

## XXXIV.

The diet orders the contingent of troops to be supplied by each canton as provided in Art. II. ; it appoints the general who is to command them, and takes, moreover, all the necessary measures for the security of Switzerland and for the execution of the other provision of Art. I. It possesses the same right, should troubles break out in any canton so as to threaten the tranquillity of the other cantons.

## XXXV.

It appoints and sends ambassadors extraordinary.

## XXXVI.

It decides in all disputes between the cantons, provided such disputes have not been settled by arbitration ; and for this purpose it creates a syndicism at the conclusion of its ordinary labours. But in such cases, each deputy has but one vote, and is not subservient to instructions.

## XXXVII.

The proces-verbaux of the diet shall be entered in two registers, one of which remains in the directing canton, and the other, together with the seal of state, is to be transported, at the end of December, to the capital town of the new directing canton.

## XXXVIII.

A chancellor and a register appointed by the diet for two years, and paid by the directing canton, conformably to the regulations made by the diet, shall always follow the seal and register.

## XXXIX.

The constitution of each canton, written upon parchment, and sealed with the seal of the canton, shall be deposited in the archives of the diet.

## XL.

The present federal act, also the particular constitutions of the nineteen cantons, annul all former provisions contrary to any thing contained in all or either of them, and no right whatsoever concerning the internal government of the cantons and their relations with each other shall be founded upon any former political state of Switzerland.

WHEREAS the repose of Switzerland and the success of the new institutions to be formed require that the measures necessary for making these institutions succeed the order of things which is now at an end, and investing new magistrates with the care of the public happiness, be kept free from the influence of passion and from all that might excite contention, and that such measures be executed with moderation, impartiality, and prudence ; it would be difficult to carry such institutions into effect, except through commissioners appointed by the act of mediation itself, and who are animated by its spirit.

From these considerations,

We in our said capacity, and with the reservation hereinbefore expressed, DO HEREBY ENACT as follows :

#### ARTICLE I.

Friburg shall be the directing canton for the year 1803.

#### II.

Citizen Louis d'Affry is landamman of Switzerland for that year ; and is, to this effect, invested with extraordinary powers, until the meeting of the diet.

#### III.

The original act of mediation shall be delivered to the landamman, to be by him deposited in the archives of the directing canton.

#### IV.

In each canton there shall be a committee of seven members one of whom shall be appointed by us, and six by the ten deputies appointed to confer with us ; and this committee is authorized to carry the constitution into effect and administer provisionally.

#### V.

(Contains the names of the members composing these committees.)

#### VI.

On the 10th of March next, the central government shall be dissolved, after handing over its papers and archives to the landamman of Switzerland.

#### VII.

Each committee shall meet on the 10th of March, in the capital of the canton for which it is appointed, and shall give notice of its meeting to the prefect.

#### VIII.

Twenty-four hours after notice is given of the meeting, the prefect shall transmit to the committee the papers of the administration.

#### IX.

In cases which may require special instructions or authority, the committee shall apply to the landamman of Switzerland.



## X.

On the 15th of April the constitution shall be in activity ; by the 1st of June each canton shall have elected its deputy to the diet and drawn up his instructions ; and on the first Monday of July in the present year the diet shall assemble.

## XI.

Causes pendent at the supreme tribunal shall be heard by the tribunal of appeal of the canton. The supreme tribunal shall, on the 10th of March, cease to exercise any functions.

## XII.

The Helvetian troops at present in the pay of Switzerland, who, on the 1st of May, are not employed by the cantons, shall be taken into the service of France.

## XIII.

No prosecutions shall take place for offences relative to the revolution, committed or pretended to have been committed by persons either in their individual capacity, or in the exercise of some public office.

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WHEREAS the dissolution of the central government, and the restoration of the sovereignty to the cantons, require that the liquidation of the Helvetian debt should be provided for, and also that the disposal of the property termed national, be determined upon :

WE, in our said capacity, and with the reservation hereinbefore expressed, DO HEREBY ENACT as follows :

## ARTICLE I.

The property and possessions formerly belonging to the convents shall be restored to the latter, whether such property and possessions be situated in the same canton or in any other.

## II.

The administration of national property, other than that belonging to the cantons of Vaud and Argau, is provisionally restored to the cantons to which such property formerly belonged. The bonded securities belonging to Berne shall be provisionally placed in the hands of three commissioners appointed by the cantons of Berne, Vaud, and Argau.

## III.

In each canton burthened with debts contracted prior to the revolution, a fund shall be assigned for the purpose either of hypothecating or of liquidating them ; the said fund to be raised from the property formerly belonging to the canton.

## IV.

A revenue shall be reconstituted for each town, proportionate to its municipal expenses.

## V.

The national debt shall be liquidated, and the securities obtained upon foreign countries in favour of certain cantons, shall serve at first for its extinction. Should the debt exceed the amount of the said securities, the payment of the surplus shall be borne by the other cantons, each paying in proportion to what remains of its former immoveable\* property, after acquitting its own cantonal debts contracted prior to the revolution.

## VI.

All moveable and immoveable property remaining after the formation of the communal fund, and the liquidation of the cantonal and national debts, shall become once more the property of the cantons to which they formerly belonged. That remaining in the cantons of Vaud and Argau shall belong to those cantons. Whatever remains of the bonded securities of Berne shall be distributed in equal portions among the cantons of Berne, Vaud, and Argau.

## VII.

A committee composed of five members, to wit : Citizen Stapfer, minister of the Helvetian republic ; Citizen Kuster, ex-minister of finance ; Citizen Raemy, formerly chancellor of Friburg, and now member of the administrative chamber ; and Citizen Laurent Mary, of Lucerne, president of the administrative chamber, shall verify the wants of the municipalities, determine the extent of such wants and the amount of the funds necessary to constitute their revenue.

## II.

THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO GENERAL NEY, MINISTER  
PLENIPOTENTIARY IN HELVETIA.

Paris 29th Prairial, Year XI.  
(June 17th, 1803.)

CITIZEN,

Towards the close of the year VI. the French and Helvetian republics concluded a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive ; but the new organization of Switzerland having rendered the conditions of this treaty too burthensome to that country, the First Consul, willing to bestow upon it a mark of his kindness, is disposed to confine the treaty to a mere defensive alliance, and to renew the capitulations in virtue of which a certain number of Swiss troops were, during a long period of time, attached to the service of France.

The principal stipulations of the project of treaty, of which I here-

\* The word must stand thus, as it does not convey the meaning of a frechold. The law of Switzerland, like that of France, is founded upon the civil or Roman law. The nation acknowledges only two kinds of property : moveable and immoveable ; the former consisting of what we term personal property, and the latter of houses and lands.

with transmit you a copy, are the same as those of the treaty of 1777, and some have also been taken from the treaty of the year VI. The stipulations of the project of capitulation, also sent with this despatch, resemble those of most of the old capitulations concluded between France and the Swiss cantons or their allies ; but, the organization and relative position of the two countries being in some degree changed, modifications have become necessary both in the treaty and in the capitulation.

By the treaty of alliance of 1777, France might, in case of war, make a voluntary levy in Switzerland of six thousand men. The intention of the First Consul is that this assistance so lent shall be greater and more secure, and that Switzerland shall supply twelve thousand men, raised, armed, and equipped at its own expense, and who shall be paid and fed by France from the moment they leave the Swiss territory.

The number of French troops with which the First Consul shall supply Switzerland for its defence, is not fixed in the project of treaty ; it will vary according to circumstances and the wants of the moment. Were it fixed beforehand, it would give Switzerland a less sure guarantee than one resulting from an engagement to defend her made by the French government.

I have included in the project of treaty of alliance, every other relation which ought to subsist between France and Switzerland ; but, before I enter upon these matters, I shall, in order not to interrupt the military details of this letter, speak to you about the renewal of the capitulations.

These were formerly nothing but private contracts between France and one or more states of the Helvetic confederation. At present they must be concluded with the diet, and they include all the cantons in one and the same engagement.

One sole capitulation must therefore serve for all the Helvetic troops which France may have in her service. This act must include the demi-brigades already organized, the troops which, according to the act of mediation, the cantons cannot keep, and which have just come to France ; and lastly, those which may be necessary to complete a corps of sixteen thousand men.

This corps must be divided into four regiments, and each regiment into four battalions of nine companies. The particulars of the organization are given in the accompanying project of capitulation.

The pay, the soldiers' *masse*, the barracks, and the pensions, shall be upon the same footing as among the French troops ; but the Swiss captains shall be charged with the recruiting of their companies.

It was formerly the custom in Swiss regiments to require only two-thirds of natives ; but it seems expedient that this proportion should extend to three-fourths, both for the better insuring that the regiments are well composed, and because Switzerland will have



fewer troops in the service of other powers, and may therefore supply France with a greater number.

Each regiment, consisting of four thousand men in time of peace, shall be increased to five thousand in time of war. This surplus shall serve to repair the losses of each of the four battalions, and to keep each of them always a thousand strong. These *depôt-corps* shall have no separate organization: their officers and non-commissioned officers shall be taken from the regiment which each is intended to complete.

The Italian republic shall take one regiment into its service, which shall have the same organization; and the Batavian republic shall likewise have one.

Thus Switzerland shall keep in the service of other powers six regiments consisting of twenty-four thousand men in time of peace, and of thirty thousand in time of war.

There is no objection to Switzerland concluding a capitulation with Spain, and another with the Pope; but the diet must engage to conclude none with any other power; and this condition must be insisted upon. France could not depend upon soldiers who would have to fight against troops of their own nation. The Swiss, by confining themselves to the service of the allies and natural friends of France, are fighting as it were under one and the same banner, and serving the same cause. They are themselves interested in not embracing any other party, as it would expose them to serve with less zeal, and to encounter, even out of their own country, all the evils of civil war.

The Swiss troops engaged under the capitulation, and those which, in execution of the treaty of defensive alliance, shall be supplied to France, must serve every where except in the East Indies, in America, and in the colonies.

The treaty of 1777 simply stipulated that they should be employed only in defending the possessions of France in Europe; but this clause was neither extensive enough nor sufficiently clear. Switzerland might infer from it that the defence of a territory does not include the obligation of going beyond its frontiers. Nevertheless, as a war defensive in its origin may become offensive in its results, it is necessary that there should be no doubt as to the obligation of serving in every place not formally excepted in the treaty.

With regard to the details of the internal organization of the Swiss troops, you are at liberty to modify the project of capitulation in any manner that may appear to you most favourable to the good administration and discipline of the corps. But their division into four regiments, the appointment of a colonel, four *chefs-de-battalion*, a major, four *adjutants-major*, and a *quarter-master* to each, must be maintained. The appointment of colonel-general of the Swiss troops may even be revived.

This appointment was formerly in the gift of the King, who generally conferred it upon a prince of the blood. In future it will be fill-

ed by the First Consul. With regard to the other appointments, they shall be regulated by the past.

The King appointed the field-officers of each regiment and also the captains of grenadiers. The First Consul shall appoint to the corresponding grades in the new organization, such as those of colonel, chef-de-battalion, major and captain of grenadiers. The captains of fusileers shall also receive their commissions from him, and shall be chosen by seniority of standing from among the lieutenants of the same regiment. The commissions for the subaltern ranks on the staff and in companies shall be given by the colonel-general. You will, in concert with the Helvetian deputies, consider of what modifications the several articles of the project of capitulation may be susceptible with regard to promotions.

The old capitulations granted to the Swiss troops, the free exercise of their religion and of their own laws: the new project allows them the same privileges.

Soldiers who have obtained pensions, or have retired upon half-pay, may receive it either in Switzerland or in France; they may thus choose their own place of residence.

I have great reason to believe that the diet will find the clauses of the treaty and capitulation proposed as advantageous as they are honourable to Switzerland. France, by taking Swiss troops into her service, shows the high estimation in which she holds their fidelity and valour, and she will preserve that military spirit among them which, together with her assistance, must continue to secure the independence of their country. Lastly, she strengthens those bonds of affection and good neighbourhood which have constantly existed between the two countries, and which Switzerland, now restored to tranquillity by the First Consul's act of mediation, must be particularly desirous to maintain.

I now come to the clauses of the treaty of alliance, which have nothing to do with that of military aid.

The two Governments agreed, by their treaty of the Second Fructidor, year VI., that the limits of the two countries should be determined by a convention. This demarcation has not yet been rectified, and the consequences are greater facilities for smuggling in certain parts of the territory, and more difficulty in the communications. These are evils which must be put an end to; certain communes, like that of Cressonnières, are half Swiss and half French: it would, therefore, be desirable that they should belong to us entirely.

The territory beyond the Dole was ceded to us for the purpose of opening a new road between Gex and Morey; but there was no special convention for this cession, and it is right that it should be mentioned, as I have done it, in the project of treaty.

It is with the cantons which border upon us, and not with the diet, that the work of demarcation must be concerted; this labour will thereby become much easier, because we shall not then have to dis-

cuss it with the whole of Switzerland, and it will be sufficient to state the basis of this work in the treaty which you are empowered to conclude with the diet.

Switzerland engaged by the treaty of the year VI. to receive annually from France two hundred and fifty thousand quintals of salt ; but since the separation of the Valais, its consumption has diminished. It is just that a quantity of salt equal to the consumption of the Valais should be deducted. The quantity can then be taken to that country by means of a separate and special convention, and the receipts of the salt-pans continue the same.

Article X. of the project, according to which a communication by water is to be established between the lake of Neufchatel, that of Geneva, and the navigable part of the Rhone, may possibly not be very speedily executed. The greater part of Switzerland will bear no share in this expense ; but as such a communication would be very useful to trade, it is necessary to secure the right of carrying the plan into execution at any future time, and to maintain this article, which is almost wholly borrowed from the treaty of the year VI.

This latter treaty has served as the basis of the new project in all that concerns the commercial relations of the two countries, and in the manner of terminating litigations ; but some explanations or corrections have been added, necessary to prevent a return of chicanery, to which the conciseness or false interpretation of certain articles had led.

It is advisable to establish clearly that with regard to rights of importation, exportation, or transit, the Swiss shall be treated in France and the French in Switzerland as the most favoured nations ; and that each shall enjoy the rights of natives in all things relating to their persons, as well as to actions which they might have to bring before the tribunals of the country they are in.

The dues of *traite foraine* being for the time abolished both in France and Switzerland, it has not appeared necessary to insert in the project of treaty, that the French, who would alienate their property in Switzerland, should be exempt from those dues. But should the diet appear disposed to revive them for foreigners, you will stipulate, in the treaty, an exception in favour of the French.

The article of the treaty of the year VI. relative to extradition,\* must already have been modified, and made to correspond with the laws of amnesty relative to persons accused of emigration. This

\* This word might be adopted in our language with advantage, as we have none which conveys the same meaning. Extradition signifies the delivering up of criminals who may have sought refuge in any country, to the government whose subjects they are, on a claim being made to this effect. Its use is more especially applied to political offences. Great Britain is the only power in Europe whose Government dares not commit such a breach of the national hospitality ; and the British territory is, therefore, the only sanctuary in which political offenders can find refuge.



article does not stipulate that the latter shall not be allowed to remain in the country ; it is confined to the cases of extradition generally mentioned in other treaties, and it contains a further guarantee for the punishment of offences of less magnitude, and to which extradition does not apply.

The administration of the two frontiers had often complained of the damage committed in the forests on both sides of the border. It is to prevent the recurrence of this, and to render smuggling more difficult, that Article XVIII. has been added to the project. By this article, the cantons bordering upon France are bound to establish custom-houses and forest agencies, whose members shall concert with those of France, but only under the authority of their respective governments.

The development into which I have entered, is sufficiently indicative of the spirit of benevolence and friendship in which the French Government proposes to the Helvetian diet to conclude a treaty of defensive alliance and a capitulation.

These two acts together include every point in which France and Switzerland have a mutual interest in coming to an understanding.

Equally distinguished as you are, General, both as a soldier and a politician, you will possess a double advantage in the important negotiation entrusted to you, and for the success of which the Government relies upon the talents and zeal of which you have given such constant proofs. I have the honour, &c.

CH. M. TALLEYRAND.

### No. III.

TO MARSHAL NEY, AT HAGUENAU.

Paris, third complementary day, Year XIII.

MONSIEUR LE MARECHAL,

In pursuance of the Emperor's orders, you will cross the Rhine on the 4th Vendemiaire, upon a bridge thrown over that river opposite Dourlach, and on the evening of the 5th, you will proceed to this town.

You will have Marshal Lannes in advance of you, and you will follow the same road so as to march upon Stuttgart when you receive the order to do so.

You will have rations of bread distributed to your men for four days, and make the necessary arrangements to have a quantity of biscuit made sufficient also for four days. This biscuit is intended for your use on a day of battle, should your assembled forces find any difficulty in procuring provisions.

You will issue fifty cartridges to each man, and take care that your artillery is well provided with ammunition, and your park in a good position.

You will also have the great-coats and shoes distributed, which are in store. Marshal Soult will be on your left; he passes by the road to Spires. He has directions to provision his forces from the country on the left, so that the territory included between his right, Spires, Vislack, and Heilbron, will furnish the necessary requisitions for your army. All the provisions for which you may be under the necessity of issuing requisitions in the dominions of the princes friendly to France, shall be acknowledged by regular receipts. Marshal Lannes, who marches in advance of you, has orders to issue his requisition to the right.

If any extraordinary occurrence should impose upon you the necessity of changing any of the above arrangements, you will apply for orders to Prince Murat; all those given from this place being subservient to any unexpected movements made by the enemy.

I have the honour, &c.

MARSHAL BERTHIER, War Minister.

P. S. The Elector of Baden is to supply a body of troops and six pieces of artillery with cattle and provisions.

These are to proceed to Dourlach, where they will be at your disposal.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

#### No. IV.

#### ORDER TO MARSHAL NEY, COMMANDING THE SIXTH CORPS-D'ARMÉE.

Head-quarters, Strasburg, 4th Vendemiaire,  
Year XIV.

In consequence of the plans determined upon by the Emperor, Marshal Ney is directed to concentrate his army at Stuttgard on the 8th and the 9th. He will place his vanguard in position two leagues in advance of that town, upon the road to Eslingen.

Marshal Ney will make arrangements for distributing, on the 10th, to his whole corps-d'armée, rations of bread for four days, independently of the four days' stock of biscuit which he has with him, so that the bread may be distributed for the 11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th: which will make, from the 11th, rations for eight days,—four in bread, and four in biscuit.

It is to be presumed that his movement in advance of Stuttgard will begin on the 11th, in pursuance of an order he will receive to this effect; and this movement must not be embarrassed for want of provisions.

Marshal Ney is informed that Prince Murat will be at Stuttgard on the 10th, with three divisions of dragoons, and General Baraguey-d'Hillier's division of foot dragoons, which will make about fifteen thousand men. He will, therefore, make the necessary arrange-

ments, so that these corps, as well as his own corps-d'armée, may, on their arrival at Stuttgart on the 10th, find rations of bread for four days.

The Emperor is aware of the difficulties which Marshal Ney will have to encounter; His Majesty knows that, on this occasion, the Marshal will require all his activity to succeed in procuring the requisite supplies; and these difficulties will be the greater, because the corps under the command of Marshal Lannes, which is likewise to debouch by Louisburg, and pursue the road to Gemund, will procure, at Louisburg, four days' rations of bread, as will also the Imperial Guard. The Marshal will, therefore, have to provide at Louisburg, Stuttgart, and in the environs of these places, two hundred and forty thousand rations of bread: namely, one hundred and forty thousand from Louisburg, and a hundred thousand from Stuttgart.

General head-quarters will, on the 10th, be at Louisburg.

Marshal Ney will, on the 9th, have the proclamation, which shall be sent to him by the Aid-Major-General, chief of the General Staff, read publicly to the assembled forces under his command.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

## No. V.

### TO MARSHAL NEY.

Strasburg, 5th Vendemiaire, Year XIV.

MONSIEUR LE MARECHAL,

I am directed by the Emperor to give you the order to begin your march to Stuttgart the moment you receive this. It is His Majesty's wish that you should so manage matters, as to carry the enemy's post of cavalry at Pforzheim. The Emperor trusts, therefore, Monsieur le Marechal, that you will send him to-morrow, fifty or sixty prisoners. These gentlemen are pleased to be facetious, and to salute our patrols: you must, therefore, turn them, in order to carry them. I have sent a similar order to Prince Murat, to force on his side the enemy's posts of light cavalry, stationed near the outlets of the Black Forest. The Emperor, therefore, hopes to have in his power to-morrow, two hundred of the enemy's cavalry as prisoners of war.

The Emperor, Monsieur le Marechal, could have wished that you had reported to him your position to-day. His Majesty desires that you will write to me twice a day.

You will proceed to Stuttgart only by short marches, for if you are there by the 8th it will be time enough. I have to inform you that Marshal Soult, with his corps-d'armée, will be at Heilbron on the 7th.



When you reach Stuttgart, your divisions must be near to each other, in order that your corps-d'armée may assemble in line of battle in less than two hours. The Emperor will have no partial engagements by divisions; therefore, it is His Majesty's order that you take up a good position at Stuttgart, as he will have no action engaged on that side.

I have the honour, &c.

MARSHAL BERTHIER,  
Major-General of the Army.

P. S. I have directed my aide-de-camp, M. Lagrange, to hand you over with this 25,000 francs for secret service.

## No. VI.

TO MARSHAL NEY.

Strasburg, 7th Vendemiaire, Year XIV.  
(September 29th, 1805.)

MONSIEUR LE MARECHAL,

I have laid your correspondence before the Emperor, who finds it very interesting. His Majesty has also read your letter from Carlsruhe, dated the 6th Vendemiaire, and says that you have acted perfectly right. Having no orders to give you to-day, I send back your aide-de-camp, and 25,000 francs in gold for secret service.

I have the honour, &c.

MARECHAL BERTHIER,  
War Minister and Major-General of the Army.

## No. VII.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRINCE OF WIRTEMBERG.

Ettlingen, 10th Vendemiaire, Year XIV.  
(Oct. 2nd, 1805.)

The Emperor has forwarded to me the complaint which your Highness has made against Marshal Ney. Having to make a report to His Majesty on the subject, it has been incumbent upon me to inquire into the circumstances upon which this complaint is founded.

Marshal Ney had orders to proceed with his corps-d'armée to Stuttgart. No treaty had been communicated to the staff, fixing in a positive manner the relations of your Highness with France. Moreover, all the different points of your Highness's dominions were occupied by the enemy's patrols, consisting entirely of cavalry, and not amounting in the whole to the complement of half a regiment.

On the other hand, it was positively affirmed that the Austrians were marching upon Stuttgart by Rottemburg. The non-existence of a treaty between the Emperor and your Highness, the cloud which your Highness had thrown over your intentions, in allowing your territory to be occupied by so small a force,—all this led to the measure of marching into your Highness's dominions, as into a state occupied by the enemy. Your Highness is too good a soldier not to know, that in war, no considerations are allowed to have weight, which might endanger the success of military operations. Marshal Ney having then received no other instructions than to occupy Stuttgart, it would be difficult to make a crime of his having obeyed the orders given him.

The general staff would deserve to be blamed for having Stuttgart occupied, if there existed stipulations not to occupy that city; but your Highness knows that no treaty had been concluded to this effect, and that even to this day no such treaty is in existence.

Doubtless the general staff would have acted improperly in sending an army into the dominions of a Sovereign Prince, without an understanding with him, or without some previous steps; but no such imputation could be made in the present instance, because your Highness's dominions had previously been violated by the enemy, whose patrols occupied its several outlets.

It is my duty not to conceal from your Highness, that Marshal Lannes had orders to occupy Louisburg with his army, and in this measure military considerations yielded to all others; but his Majesty has now given orders that no troops shall, in future, pass through the residence of your Highness; consequently Marshal Lannes is about to proceed to Kanstadt. I trust this explanation will prove satisfactory to your Highness.

Moreover the whole matter has arisen from circumstances which will not occur again.

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## No. VIII.

TO MARSHAL NEY.

Louisburg, 12th Vendemiaire, Year XIV.  
(Oct. 4th, 1805.)

MONSIEUR LE MARECHAL,

I read your letter of the 11th to the Emperor, and also your report to me upon the situation of the enemy's troops.

With such officers as you, and a commander like the Emperor, we shall do wonders.

I send back to you two officers of your staff who were here.

You know my attachment to you.

MARSHAL BERTHIER,  
War Minister and Major-General of the Army.

## No. IX.

## ORDER TO MARSHAL NEY.

Nordlingen, 15th Vendemiaire,  
Year XIV. (Oct. 7th.)

MONSIEUR LE MARECHAL.

The Emperor thinks that you are in a very good position at Gien-gen.

Marshal Soult has just crossed the Danube at Donnawert. The enemy seem to be in force at Neuburg, for the purpose of defending the Lech. It is His Majesty's desire that Ulm should be immediately attacked. You might attack it by the left bank of the Danube, and Marshal Soult by the right. But as Marshal Soult will be unable to march until to-morrow morning, let me know by the return of my messenger whether the enemy have still any forces at Ulm, and what they are doing.

The Emperor would, at the same time, order a march upon Augsburg and Landsberg, in order to cut off all the forces which the enemy may still have upon the Iller.

Take possession of Gundelfingen and Lauingen, and likewise of one or two bridges across the Danube, so that, if the intelligence the Emperor may receive should induce His Majesty to direct a march upon the Upper Lech, you may be able to effect it by a flank march. Send likewise patrols of cavalry upon Donnawert, which will make us masters of the whole of the left bank. By these means our communications will be easy.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

## No. X.

## TO MARSHAL NEY.

Donnawert, 16th Vendemiaire, Year XIV.  
Twelve o'clock at night (Oct. 8th).

MONSIEUR LE MARECHAL,

You must have heard the cannonading which took place during the day; it was caused by eleven battalions of Austrian grenadiers, coming from Botzen in the Tyrol, who being hemmed in by Prince Murat with his cavalry, were attacked by Marshal Lannes with the grenadiers forming his first division, and made prisoners with their artillery and colours.

Marshal Soult having proceeded to Augsburg, it is essential that you should speedily reach Guntzburg, in order to intercept all the movements of the enemy from Ulm upon Augsburg, also from Ulm



upon Donnawert. Should the enemy manœuvre on the right bank, be very careful to advance rapidly and parallel to them. Throw Gazan's division upon the right bank; and, lastly, do not lose sight of this fact: that by the Emperor's plans, which are to surround the enemy, and cut off their retreat, he is obliged to spread his forces a little, and that he requires all his confidence in his generals, and all their activity, so that they do not remain idle when they should act. In a word, Monsieur le Marechal, you are to observe the force at Ulm: if it marches upon Donnawert, you will follow it, and so you will should it march upon Augsburg, keeping always to its left, that is to say, between it and Donnawert; and you will always keep one of your divisions a half march in the rear, to form your vanguard, and enable you to maintain yourself between the enemy and Donnawert, should they march upon that town, or even send strong detachments thither.

MARSHAL BERTHIER,  
Major-General of the Army.

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No. XI.

ORDER TO MARSHAL NEY.

MONSIEUR LE MARECHAL,

The Emperor has just learned from General Savary the particulars of your glorious action; it now remains to take possession of Ulm, which is important in every point of view. His Majesty leaves it to your own discretion to march as you think proper on this occasion; but surround Ulm in the course of to-morrow.

The foot dragoons will continue to remain under your command. You will station them at Grumberg, upon either bank, whence they will be able to proceed when they may be wanted. Immediately after the capture of Ulm you will not wait for fresh orders; and you will leave an engineer officer there to complete the works which the Austrians have begun.

You will march upon Memmingen, or upon any other point whither the enemy may have gone, whom you will press as much as possible.

The forts of Midelhein and Landsberg shall be occupied in force: Midelhein by Marshal Lannes, and Landsberg by Marshal Soult, whence they may, if necessary, direct their forces to Kempfen and Fuessen. Do not fail, on your arrival at Ulm, to send me every possible information regarding the enemy's force, the number of their corps, and the direction they are in.

The Emperor recommends that you should march and make your divisions engage in mass. You may have General Baraguey-d'Hilliers' division of foot dragoons at Ulm. But if circumstances require it, you are authorised to leave in that place only a number of the foot dragoons sufficient to keep it, and to take the remainder with you to form your reserve.

As the Emperor is going to Munich, where our troops will arrive this evening, his majesty intends waiting there for the Russians, who have just debouched. In the mean time the Emperor leaves to his highness Prince Murat the command of all his right wing, consisting of Marshal Lannes' corps, your own, and the reserve of cavalry.

Gazan's division returns under the command of Marshal Lannes, in pursuance of the orders which it has received.

You will address your reports on service to his highness Prince Murat, but this does not prevent your corresponding with the Emperor and me.

This evening, at Augsburg, the Emperor will write to you when he has read your report.

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

Major-General of the Army.

Head Quarters, Zusmerhausen, 18th Vendemiaire,  
Year XIV. (October 10th), six o'clock in the  
evening.

## No. XII.

CAPITULATION OF THE CITY OF ULM, OCCUPIED BY THE TROOPS OF HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA, AND KING OF HUNGARY, TO THE ARMS OF HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH, AND KING OF ITALY.

Between us, Alexander Berthier, Marshal of the Empire, commander of the first cohort of the Legion of Honour, Grand-Cordon, Grand Master of the Hounds, Great Officer of the Red Eagle, Major-General of the Grand Army, and War Minister, stipulating for and in behalf of his Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy,

And Field-Marshal Baron Mack, Quarter-Master-General of the Armies of his Majesty the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary,

It is agreed as follows :—

### ARTICLE I.

The place of Ulm shall be delivered up to the French army with all its stores and artillery.

*Answer.*—Half of the field artillery shall be left to the Austrians. (*Refused.*)

### II.

The garrison of the place shall evacuate it with all the honours of war, and having defiled, shall deliver up its arms. The officers shall be sent back to Austria on their parole ; the non-commissioned officers and privates shall be conducted to France, where they shall remain until regularly exchanged.

*Answer.*—The whole shall be sent back to Germany, on condition of not serving against France until they are exchanged. (*Refused.*)

## III.

All the baggage belonging to the officers and men shall be left to them.

*Answer.*—And the regimental cash chests likewise. (*Refused.*)

## IV.

The Austrian sick and wounded shall be taken care of, like the French sick and wounded.

*Answer.*—We well know the honour and humanity of the French.

## V.

Nevertheless, if before the 3d Brumaire, Year XIV. (October 25, 1805), at noon, a corps-d'armée shall appear strong enough to raise the blockade of Ulm, in such case the garrison of that place shall be discharged from the capitulation, and be free to act in any way it may deem advisable.

*Answer.*—If before the 25th of October, at midnight, inclusive, a force of Austrian or Russian troops should un-blockade the city, the garrison shall march out free, from any of the gates it pleases, with its arms, baggage, and artillery, to join the troops which shall have caused the blockade to be raised. (*Granted.*)

## VI.

One of the gates of Ulm (that of Stuttgart), shall be given up to the French at seven o'clock in the morning, and also quarters sufficient to contain a brigade.

*Answer.*—Yes.

## VII.

The French army may use the great bridge across the Danube, and communicate freely from one bank to the other.

*Answer.*—The bridge has been burnt, but every exertion shall be made to rebuild it.

## VIII.

The service of the armies on either side shall be so regulated as to prevent any disorder from taking place, and the greatest harmony shall exist between the two armies.

*Answer.*—French and Austrian discipline will answer for this.

## IX.

All cavalry, artillery, and wagon horses belonging to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, shall be delivered up to the French army.

## X.

Articles I. II. III. IV. and IX. shall be carried into execution only at the pleasure of the commander of the Austrian forces, provided



the delay go not beyond the 3d of Brumaire, year XIV. (October 25th, 1805) before noon.

And if, at this period, an army of sufficient strength should appear and force the raising of the blockade, the garrison shall be at liberty, conformably to article V. to do as it pleases.

Made in two parts at Ulm, this 25th of Vendemiaire, year XIV. (October 17th, 1805.)

MARSHAL BERTHIER,  
MACK.

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### No. XIII.

#### LIST OF REGIMENTS IN THE CITY OF ULM.

Part of the cavalry regiment of Schwartzenberg, hussars.

The regiments of:

Hohenlohe—dragoons.

Mack—carrassiers.

Archduke Francis.

A detachment of the Blanckenstein hussars; several orderlies attached to the general officers, from the regiments of Latour, Rosenberg, Klenau, and that of the Archduke Albert.

#### INFANTRY.

Tyrolian chasseurs.

Collowrath.

Manfredini.

Frolich.

Archduke Charles.

A detachment of the Emperor's regiment.

#### GRENADIERS.

Hildburghausen, formerly Bender, 1 battalion.

Archduke Charles . . . 1 do.

Manfredini . . . 1 do.

Colloredo . . . 1 do.

Stuart . . . 1 do.

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### No. XIV.

#### ADDITIONAL CAPITULATION TO THE CAPITULATION OF ULM.

Marshal Berthier, Major-General of the French army, authorized by special order of the Emperor of the French, gives his word of honour :-

1st, That the Austrian army is beyond the Inn, and that Marshal Bernadotte, with his army, is in position between Munich and the Inn.

2ndly, That Marshal Lannes, with his corps-d'armée, is in pursuit of Prince Ferdinand, and was yesterday at Aalen.

3rdly, That Prince Murat, with his corps-d'armée was yesterday at Nördlingen; and that Lieutenant-Generals Werneck, Hohenzollern, and seven other generals have capitulated, with their corps-d'armée, at the village of Troitzelfingen.

4thly, That Marshal Soult is between Ulm and Bregenz, watching the road to the Tyrol, so that there is no possibility of Ulm being succoured.

Lieutenant-General, Quartermaster-General Mack, giving due faith to the above declarations, is ready to evacuate, in the course of to-morrow, the city of Ulm, on the following condition :

That the whole of Marshal Ney's corps, consisting of twelve regiments of infantry and four regiments of horse, shall not quit Ulm, and a radius of ten leagues from it, until the 25th of October at midnight, at which period the term of the capitulation expires.

Marshal Berthier and Baron Mack, Lieutenant-General and Quartermaster-General, severally agree to the above articles.

Consequently, to-morrow at three o'clock in the afternoon, the Austrian army shall defile before his Majesty the Emperor of the French, with all the honours of war. It shall lay down its arms, and road tickets shall be given to the officers, who shall preserve their arms, to proceed to Austria by the road to Kempten, and by that of Bregenz for the Tyrol.

Made in two parts at Elchingen, October 19th, 1805, (27th Vendémiaire, Year XIV.)

MARSHAL BERTHIER.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL MACK.

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
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
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